Syrie/Irak: Attention, un triomphe peut en cacher un autre ! (Obama legacy: After the nuclear deal and the Islamic state, guess on whose doorstep Iranian troops are now being delivered ?)

3 juillet, 2017
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Les forces irakiennes affirment avoir délogé les combattants de l’Etat islamique de la mosquée Al-Nouri de Mossoul, haut lieu symbolique de la ville mais également du pouvoir des djihadistes en Irak. Les forces irakiennes ont annoncé ce 29 juin avoir pris le contrôle de la mosquée Al-Nouri de Mossoul, où Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, le chef de l’Etat islamique, avait donné en juillet 2014 son premier prêche en tant que chef de l’Etat islamique – sa dernière apparition publique connue à ce jour. (…) Le général-brigadier Yahya Rasool se félicite de son côté d’une victoire qui, selon lui, marque un triomphe sur l’Etat islamique. «Leur Etat illusoire s’est effondré», s’est-il réjoui. «Nous assistons à la fin du faux Etat de Daesh», a déclaré le Premier ministre irakien Haider al-Abadi en anglais sur son compte Twitter. RT
Je n’ai pas énoncé que la destitution de Bachar al-Assad était un préalable à tout. Car personne ne m’a présenté son successeur légitime ! Mes lignes sont claires. Un : la lutte absolue contre tous les groupes terroristes. Ce sont eux, nos ennemis. […] Nous avons besoin de la coopération de tous pour les éradiquer, en particulier de la Russie. Deux : la stabilité de la Syrie, car je ne veux pas d’un État failli. L’utilisation d’armes chimiques donnera lieu à des répliques, y compris de la France seule. Emmanuel Macron
La mairie de Londres a autorisé la tenue dimanche d’un rassemblement anti-israélien organisé par des sympathisants du groupe terroriste chiite libanais Hezbollah. Selon les organisateurs de la Journée d’Al-Quds, les participants ont été autorisés par la mairie à manifester avec le drapeau du groupe terroriste car l’aile politique du Hezbollah n’est pas une organisation proscrite par les autorités britanniques. Les États-Unis, le Canada, l’Australie et la Ligue arabe ont placé le Hezbollah sur leur liste officielle des organisations terroristes. L’Union européenne ne considère pas l’ensemble du groupe comme terroriste mais a inscrit la branche militaire de l’organisation chiite sur sa liste noire, car « liée à des actes terroristes perpétrés sur le territoire européen ». Instaurée en 1979 par l’Ayatollah Khomeini, fondateur de la République Islamique d’Iran, la Journée mondiale d’Al-Quds est un événement anti-israélien annuel destiné à protester contre le contrôle israélien sur Jérusalem (Al-Quds en arabe) et à exprimer la solidarité avec le peuple palestinien. Au cours de cet événement, célébré dans le monde entier dans les communautés chiites, les manifestants scandent des slogans appelant à la destruction d’Israël et brûlent des drapeaux israéliens. Le Monde juif info
Un adage largement admis par la sagesse populaire est malmené depuis près de soixante dix ans au Moyen Orient. «On ne peut faire la paix qu’avec ses ennemis». Car, encore faut-il être capable de définir l’ennemi. La nébuleuse terroriste étant multicéphale, le monde musulman ayant, dans son ensemble, rejeté Israël depuis sa fondation et l’Autorité Palestinienne ne symbolisant qu’un point d’achoppement d’un conflit bien plus large, le simple fait d’avoir rebaptisé le conflit israélo-arabe (qui s’étend à l’Iran depuis la révolution de 1979 ) en conflit israélo-palestinien, cache une réalité bien plus vaste à laquelle Israël ne cesse d’être confronté. S’il est tout à fait légitime de critiquer le gouvernement israélien, comme celui de n’importe quel pays, et même de s’insurger contre nombre de ses politiques, il serait dommageable de passer à coté de certaines vérités, qui font que les Israéliens s’inquiètent de la crédibilité du partenaire pour la paix que l’on tente de leur imposer. (…) la situation au Proche Orient s’affirmant de plus en plus volatile, un nouveau projet de processus plus global, impliquant les pays limitrophes semble se profiler à l’horizon. Trump et ses conseillers, sans se ranger complètement du coté de la position israélienne, ont fini par comprendre qu’Israël n’a aucun intérêt à accepter une paix telle que définie par l’Autorité Palestinienne, et qui n’impliquerait pas la participation intégrale du monde arabe. La confrontation décadaire pourrait bien de la sorte reprendre son identité de conflit israélo-arabe, duquel il ressortirait enfin un authentique projet de paix. Car on ne peut faire la paix qu’avec ses ennemis… dans leur ensemble et pas seulement avec la partie immergée de l’Iceberg. Pierre Rehov
En sus de la chute imminente de ces deux places fortes, l’EI a perdu la plus grande partie de son territoire et de ses revenus, selon une évaluation divulguée jeudi par le cabinet de référence des questions militaires et de conflits, IHS Markit. A son apogée à l’été 2014, il assurait une souveraineté quasi étatique (armée, taxes, justice expéditive, versement d’allocations, administration) sur environ 8 millions de personnes et un territoire grand comme 4 régions françaises, quoique largement désertique. Depuis lors, il a perdu 60 % de ce territoire, estime IHS Markit (ex-Jane’s), dont 40 % depuis janvier. Son effondrement financier est encore plus spectaculaire. Les revenus de l’EI sont tombés à 16 millions au deuxième trimestre 2017, exactement 5 fois moins qu’il y a deux ans. Les salaires des combattants avaient été divisés par 2, à 400 dollars par mois pour les djihadistes étrangers, début 2016 et auraient encore été baissés cette année. IHS ne donne pas d’indication sur les réserves de l’EI, censées avoir atteint 1 milliard de dollars en 2014 à la suite du pillage (non confirmé) de la succursale de la Banque centrale d’Irak à Mossoul. Les revenus pétroliers de l’EI ont été divisés par 10 à cause de la chute mondiale des cours, de la destruction de ses puits par l’aviation russe et occidentale et des pertes de territoires. Les autres revenus de l’EI, trafic d’antiquités, racket et rançons, ont, pour leur part, été divisés par 5 en raison, là aussi, de la perte de territoires, souligne Ludovico Carlino, analyste à IHS Markit. « Le projet de gouvernance du califat a échoué », conclut Columb Strack, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient à IHS. Mais IHS estime que l’EI va tenter d’intensifier sa campagne terroriste en Occident pour compenser ses pertes territoriales. Les pressions des gouvernements égyptien et saoudien sur les religieux pour qu’ils interprètent le Coran dans un sens « plus moderne » risquent de pousser certains conservateurs à basculer dans la violence, avertit IHS, qui affirme que le « risque terroriste va augmenter ». Paris estime que 700 Français ont rejoint l’EI. Quelque 200 d’entre eux sont revenus et un nombre équivalent a été abattu. C’est de loin le plus fort contingent parmi les 3.000 djihadistes européens. Les Echos
Les principales puissances impliquées dans la guerre en Syrie sont engagés dans une course visant à engranger le maximum de bénéfices tirés de l’effondrement de l’Etat Islamique, dans l’Est et le Sud de la Syrie. Les avancées continues des forces du régime syrien et de milices appuyées par l’Iran vers la base d’Al-Tanf tenue par les forces spéciales américaines et occidentales – ainsi que les avancées potentielles des deux côtés de la frontière irakienne – élève le risque d’affrontements supplémentaires susceptibles d’entraîner lers Etats-Unis et la Russie, bien que cette dernière n’aient pas voulu défier les Etats-Unis, après leurs frappes délibérées contre un convoi et des avions de chasse syriens. Jforum
La bataille de Raqqa, du point de vue stratégique, est une affaire classée. L’unique inconnue consiste à savoir combien de temps les 3 000 miliciens islamistes de DAESH acculés et encerclés dans la ville résisteront aux 20 000 combattants kurdes, à leurs 4 000 alliés tribaux arabes dans les FDS, et à l’extraordinaire puissance de feu des avions, des canons et des commandos américains. On ne voit pas les Alaouites, les Syriens, les chiites libanais ou les Russes se risquer à déranger la ripaille ; pour Raqqa, ils arrivent trop tard. Le véritable enjeu des incidents de dimanche se nomme Deïr ez-Zor, la ville située à 125km en aval de Raqqa sur l’Euphrate. Pour l’Armée d’Assad, appuyée par ses acolytes perses et libanais, qui, depuis l’offensive victorieuse des FDS face à l’Etat Islamique – mais uniquement à partir de ce moment – progresse sur trois fronts, nord, centre et sud, l’objectif est d’arriver à Deïr ez-Zor avant les Américains et leurs alliés kurdes. D’abord pour libérer les soldats gouvernementaux encerclés, mais c’est secondaire, car la finalité stratégique de cette course poursuite, c’est l’occupation de la frontière avec l’Irak afin de permettre la consolidation du corridor terrestre chiite : Téhéran-Bagdad-Damas-Beyrouth. Pour l’Amérique, ses alliés européens, arabes et israéliens, le but stratégique est bien sûr inverse. Nombre d’analystes se demandent cette semaine si les menaces russes et les tirs de missiles iraniens, n’avait pas pour but de tester les Américains et Donald Trump. Pour savoir jusqu’où le nouveau président U.S est prêt à impliquer son armée pour empêcher les Iraniens de parvenir à leur fin. (…) L’enjeu du questionnement est considérable. De l’ « autoroute chiite » dépend par exemple l’avenir du Liban, déjà sous le joug impitoyable de Téhéran mais que les ayatollahs doivent entretenir. Et aussi la confiance que Riyad, Le Caire, les Etats du Golfe et toute l’arabité sunnite ont placée en Donald Trump qui est venu la leur demander. Simplement dit : si Trump laisse les Iraniens et le régime prendre Deïr ez-Zor, la brève lune de miel entre le monde arabe et Trump sera déjà terminée. On comprend soudain le rôle de contrepoids que jouait l’Etat Islamique (sunnite) dans l’est syrien pour contrecarrer l’expansion iranienne (chiite), bien plus menaçante pour les Occidentaux au niveau stratégique que la présence des djihadistes salafistes dans la région. Pendant que la coalition leur assène les derniers coups de boutoir à Raqqa, on réalise à Washington qu’il va falloir remplir le vide que va laisser DAESH le long de la frontière irakienne si l’on ne veut pas perdre la Guerre de Syrie et d’Irak et participer à la création d’un empire persan au Proche et au Moyen-Orient. La neutralisation de l’Etat Islamique, qu’on accusait à tort de tirer les ficelles des attentats terroristes en Europe à partir de Raqqa et Mossoul, a été une erreur. Il suffisait de le circonscrire à l’Est et de couper son cordon ombilical avec Recep Erdogan pour que DAESH continue à servir nos intérêts sans avoir à risquer une confrontation avec les Russes et la régionalisation du conflit. Mais Obama, Catherine Ashton, Federica Mogherini, et les pleutres dirigeants de l’Europe avaient peur de froisser le dictateur constitutionnel turc et l’ont laissé agir. Or les arrangements diplomatiques ne justifient jamais de ne pas prendre les décisions qui s’imposent du point de vue stratégique. L’Occident, qui est en train de s’empêtrer en Syrie, en fait une nouvelle fois l’expérience. Comme s’il était incapable de retenir les leçons de l’histoire.   « L’autoroute chiite » permettrait, premièrement, pour Téhéran, de maintenir le contrôle des territoires conquis. Ensuite de fournir des armes lourdes et encombrantes, dans ces pays, à ses supplétifs. Et pour finir, de dépêcher des conseillers et des soldats dans tout le Moyen-Orient, y compris à la frontière d’Israël, afin d’y instiller l’instabilité et d’y combattre les alliés sunnites de Jérusalem. Mena press
Les forces régulières iraniennes ont profité du vide créé par le retrait de l’Etat islamique et ont conquis les étendues désertiques de la Syrie centrale et orientale. J’estime que l’Iran contrôle maintenant plus de 60% de la Syrie, à la fois directement par les forces régulières des Gardiens de la révolution et indirectement par le Hezbollah et d’autres milices chiites, il s’agit de terrains désertiques à faible densité de population. Les forces militaires iraniennes en Syrie ont des bases importantes qui leur donnent toute liberté d’action. D’abord et avant tout parmi ces bases se trouve l’aéroport de Palmyre qui permet à l’Iran de transférer vers la Syrie par voie aérienne, par des vols directs en provenance d’Iran n’importe quel équipement militaire en particulier des missiles, des obus et d’autres types de munitions. (…) Cela met en évidence un changement fondamental dans le comportement iranien: jusqu’à récemment, l’Iran utilisait des vols commerciaux déguisés pour transférer des armes et des missiles à l’aéroport international de Damas (…) Mais (…)  (…) L’Iran est en train de devenir dans les faits une puissance régionale qui contrôle militairement un immense territoire, de l’Asie centrale à la Méditerranée. Le détail important dans ce contexte est que tout cela se déroule sous l’œil vigilant des deux puissances mondiales, la Russie et les États-Unis, chacune selon son intérêt. Pour les Russes, il s’agit de renforcer le régime d’Assad et d’éliminer toutes les organisations sunnites financées et conseillées par l’Arabie saoudite et les autres Etats arabes sunnites y compris la Turquie. Poutine a réussi à apprivoiser Erdogan qui désormais craint davantage les Kurdes de Syrie qu’il ne déteste Assad et ses alliés iraniens et il est ainsi devenu un maillon important dans la coalition russo-iranienne qui soutient Assad. Les Etats-Unis ont observé le renforcement militaire de l’Iran en Syrie, qui a commencé il y a quatre ans sans s’y être opposés sérieusement, sauf récemment en abattant des drones, un petit coup pour l’Iran. Jusqu’en janvier 2017, les États-Unis ont laissé faire parce qu’Obama a voulu favorisé l’hégémonie des Chiites arabes et iraniens sur le Mashreq, monde arabe situé à l’Est d’Israël, alors que le Maghreb resterait une zone sunnite. Depuis que Trump est entré dans la Maison Blanche, l’objectif principal de l’action américaine en Syrie est la destruction de l’Etat islamique. Les Forces américaines sont engagées principalement dans la formation de forces rebelles modérées et dans l’alliance avec les Kurdes qui avec l’aide des forces aériennes américaines vont éliminer Abou Bakar Al Bagdadi et son Etat. La raison a été la crainte des Américains et des Européens que le modèle politique terroriste de l’Etat islamique devienne un modèle de réussite dans la conscience des musulmans ce qui pourrait conduire à la multiplication de colonies d’Etats islamiques à travers le monde, y compris en Europe, sur la base des communautés musulmanes locales. Il est également possible qu’il y ait une entente entre le gouvernement Trump et les Russes permettant à l’Iran de contrôler les parties centrale et orientale de la Syrie  qui n’intéressent pas les Russes afin que ces zones ne deviennent pas un asile pour l’Etat islamique suivant l’amère expérience des Américains en Afghanistan où les Talibans ont repris le contrôle de vastes territoires alors qu’ils avaient été vaincus. Les forces de la coalition chiite qui ont envahi la Syrie (Iraniens, Libanais, Irakiens, Afghans) sont en train d’effectuer un nettoyage ethnique visant les citoyens syriens sunnites dans différentes régions du pays en les expulsant pour installer dans leurs maisons et dans leurs communautés des immigrants chiites de Syrie, d’Irak et d’Afghanistan. Ainsi, suite aux mauvaises intentions de l’administration Obama et aux choix prioritaires de l’administration Trump, l’Iran est devenu le vainqueur manifeste de la guerre en Syrie. Personne dans le monde ne réussira à chasser l’armée iranienne de Syrie et nous devons – en Israël, en Europe et aux Etats-Unis – s’habituer au fait que l’Iran s’étend désormais sur une grande partie de l’Irak, de la Syrie et du Liban. (…) L’Iran est le vainqueur éclatant, ultime de la guerre civile en Syrie, et le plus tôt, nous en Israël et dans le monde, nous le reconnaitrons, le mieux sera pour nous et pour le monde entier. Mordechai Kedar

Attention: un triomphe peut en cacher un autre !

A l’heure où nos médias nous abreuvent quotidiennement d’images et de communiqués chaque fois plus triomphants de la chute programmée et en cours de l’Etat islamique …

Et où commence le retour lui aussi programmé en Europe des djihadistes aguerris s’apprêtant notamment à rejoindre les quelque 15 000 fichés S et leurs amis prieurs de rue répartis sur le territoire français …

Pendant que comme aux plus beaux jours du Londonistan et entre deux attentats islamistes, Londres laisse appeler dans ses rues drapeau du Hezbollah en tête à la destruction d’Israël …

Et que dans la bouche du néo-filloniste président Macron, Paris appelle en Syrie à la coopération avec Poutine …

Qui prend la peine de rappeler (merci Danilette) …

Derrière la course de vitesse qui est en train de se jouer entre les différentes forces sur le terrain, y compris russes et américaines …

Une autre conséquence jusqu’ici oubliée du funeste retrait des troupes américaines décidées par Obama à la veille de sa réélection de 2012 …

A savoir après celle du feu vert accordé à l’Iran pour l’arme nucléaire

Et le basculement – la nature ayant horreur du vide – de toute la partie sunnite de l’Irak et de la Syrie dans les bras des djihadistes de Rakka …

L’ultime triomphe iranien de la création d’une véritable autoroute Téhéran-Bagdad-Damas-Beyrouth

Permettant au régime terroriste de Téhéran d’acheminer dorénavant en toute tranquillité par la route …

Non seulement les armes et missiles qu’il transférait jusque là par vols commerciaux déguisés à ses supplétifs libanais …

Mais toutes espèces d’armes lourdes, conseillers et soldats à la porte même d’Israël ?

L’Iran a conquis la Syrie
Mordechai Kedar
Adapté par Danilette
2 juillet 2017

Depuis les deux dernières années, nous nous sommes habitués au fait que la Russie a transporté des forces armées en Syrie et contrôle la bande côtière, ses ports et deux bases aériennes. Nous nous sommes également habitués à voir le Hezbollah et les milices libanaises chiites impliqués dans le conflit syrien apportant un renfort important à l’armée d’Assad. Nous avons entendu que d’autres milices chiites supplémentaires sont arrivées d’Irak, Afghanistan sous le commandement des Gardiens de la révolution et que de temps en temps ces forces chiites enregistrent des pertes sur le sol syrien. L’impression qui en résulte est que l’Iran a envoyé plusieurs gangs chiites combattre des gangs sunnites sur le sol syrien.

Mais la situation sur le terrain est totalement différente, car les forces iraniennes qui se trouvent en Syrie ne sont plus depuis longtemps des  gangs ou des milices mais une véritable armée à tout point de vue, dirigée par les Gardiens de la révolution, avec des unités d’infanterie, des commandos, des chars, de l’artillerie, une force aérienne, des unités de renseignements et de logistique et cela s’est construit peu à peu au cours des quatre années écoulées, pratiquement sans couverture médiatique.

L’opération militaire la plus importante effectuée par l’armée iranienne en Syrie a été la libération de la ville d’Alep dans le nord de la Syrie qui s’est terminé en décembre 2016. Cette opération a été une coopération entre la Russie et l’Iran, les forces aériennes russes bombardant alors que les forces iraniennes et le Hezbollah et les autres milices chiites d’infanterie avançaient sur le terrain pour transférer les zones libérées à l’armée d’Assad.

Depuis le début de 2017, l’Iran étend son contrôle sur les déserts central et méridional de la Syrie dont certaines parties étaient contrôlées par l’Etat islamique sunnite jusqu’à il y a quelques mois. Aujourd’hui, cette organisation se bat pour sa survie à trois endroits : dans la ville irakienne de Mossoul, dans sa « capitale », la ville de Raqqa en Syrie et à Deir ez-Zor en Syrie orientale. Quand Mossoul tombera aux mains de l’armée irakienne alors très probablement, Raqqa et Deir al-Zour tomberont à leur tour.

Les forces régulières iraniennes ont profité du vide créé par le retrait de l’Etat islamique et ont conquis les étendues désertiques de la Syrie centrale et orientale. J’estime que l’Iran contrôle maintenant plus de 60% de la Syrie, à la fois directement par les forces régulières des Gardiens de la révolution et indirectement par le Hezbollah et d’autres milices chiites, il s’agit de terrains désertiques à faible densité de population.

Les forces militaires iraniennes en Syrie ont des bases importantes qui leur donnent toute liberté d’action. D’abord et avant tout parmi ces bases se trouve l’aéroport de Palmyre qui permet à l’Iran de transférer vers la Syrie par voie aérienne, par des vols directs en provenance d’Iran n’importe quel équipement militaire en particulier des missiles, des obus et d’autres types de munitions.

Israël était très préoccupé et cette année des cibles ont été attaquées dans la région de Palmyre. Selon des sources étrangères, les cibles visées étaient des dépôts de missiles importés d’Iran.

Cela met en évidence un changement fondamental dans le comportement iranien: jusqu’à récemment, l’Iran utilisait des vols commerciaux déguisées pour transférer des armes et des missiles à l’aéroport international de Damas, et selon des sources étrangères, Israël a attaqué à plusieurs reprises ces entrepôts dans l’aéroport et aux alentours. Les Iraniens en ont conclu que le renseignement israélien a recruté des citoyens syriens travaillant dans l’aéroport ou vivant à proximité qui lui servent de sources d’information. La proximité géographique de Damas permet à l’armée israélienne d’agir efficacement contre des cibles près de la capitale syrienne.

Cependant, l’aéroport de Palmyre se trouvent à des centaines de kilomètres d’Israël, la région est peu peuplée et il est plus difficile d’y trouver des sources d’information sur les transferts d’armes iraniennes. Mais Israël a quand même réussi à lancer une attaque sur Palmyre à partir d’autres sources d’information. Cette question montre comment la guerre des renseignements continue même si le public n’en a pas connaissance, ce qui est mieux.

Récemment des informations ont fait état du fait que l’Iran a mis en service un autre aéroport, Alsin qui se trouve dans le sud de la Syrie dans la région d’Al Tanaf proche de la frontière triangulaire entre la Syrie, l’Irak et la Jordanie, dans cet endroit il y a un poste-frontière entre l’Irak et la Syrie et son contrôle permet aux Iraniens de déplacer des forces sans entrave jusqu’au Liban  qui est déjà depuis longtemps sous le contrôle effectif du Hezbollah, la branche libanaise de la pieuvre iranienne.

L’Iran est en train de devenir dans les faits une puissance régionale qui contrôle militairement un immense territoire, de l’Asie centrale à la Méditerranée.

Le détail important dans ce contexte est que tout cela se déroule sous l’œil vigilant des deux puissances mondiales, la Russie et les États-Unis, chacune selon son intérêt. Pour les Russes, il s’agit de renforcer le régime d’Assad et d’éliminer toutes les organisations sunnites financées et conseillées par l’Arabie saoudite et les autres Etats arabes sunnites y compris la Turquie. Poutine a réussi à apprivoiser Erdogan qui désormais craint davantage les Kurdes de Syrie qu’il ne déteste Assad et ses alliés iraniens et il est ainsi devenu un maillon important dans la coalition russo-iranienne qui soutient Assad.

Les Etats-Unis ont observé le renforcement militaire de l’Iran en Syrie, qui a commencé il y a quatre ans sans s’y être opposés sérieusement, sauf récemment en abattant des drones, un petit coup pour l’Iran. Jusqu’en janvier 2017, les États-Unis ont laissé faire parce qu’Obama a voulu favorisé l’hégémonie des Chiites arabes et iraniens sur le Mashreq, monde arabe situé à l’Est d’Israël, alors que le Maghreb resterait une zone sunnite.
Depuis que Trump est entré dans la Maison Blanche, l’objectif principal de l’action américaine en Syrie est la destruction de l’Etat islamique. Les Forces américaines sont engagées principalement dans la formation de forces rebelles modérées et dans l’alliance avec les Kurdes qui avec l’aide des forces aériennes américaines vont éliminer Abou Bakar Al Bagdadi et son Etat. La raison a été la crainte des Américains et des Européens que le modèle politique terroriste de l’Etat islamique devienne un modèle de réussite dans la conscience des musulmans ce qui pourrait conduire à la multiplication de colonies d’Etats islamiques à travers le monde, y compris en Europe, sur la base des communautés musulmanes locales.

Il est également possible qu’il y ait une entente entre le gouvernement Trump et les Russes permettant à l’Iran de contrôler les parties centrale et orientale de la Syrie  qui n’intéressent pas les Russes afin que ces zones ne deviennent pas un asile pour l’Etat islamique suivant l’amère expérience des Américains en Afghanistan où les Talibans ont repris le contrôle de vastes territoires alors qu’ils avaient été vaincus.

Les forces de la coalition chiite qui ont envahi la Syrie (Iraniens, Libanais, Irakiens, Afghans) sont en train d’effectuer un nettoyage ethnique visant les citoyens syriens sunnites dans différentes régions du pays en les expulsant pour installer dans leurs maisons et dans leurs communautés des immigrants chiites de Syrie, d’Irak et d’Afghanistan.

Ainsi, suite aux mauvaises intentions de l’administration Obama et aux choix prioritaires de l’administration Trump, l’Iran est devenu le vainqueur manifeste de la guerre en Syrie. Personne dans le monde ne réussira à chasser l’armée iranienne de Syrie et nous devons – en Israël, en Europe et aux Etats-Unis – s’habituer au fait que l’Iran s’étend désormais sur une grande partie de l’Irak, de la Syrie et du Liban. Le Hezbollah libanais est désormais relié avec l’Iran et c’est la raison pour laquelle Hassan Nasrallah se sent tellement sûr face à Israël qui hésite même à établir un mur de béton sur son territoire pour protéger ses citoyens contre les snipers du Hezbollah.

Il y a deux ans, alors que la Syrie était pleine désintégration, il y avait des Israéliens pour prétendre que la situation sécuritaire d’Israël s’était améliorée, qu’il n’y avait plus de menaces de la part de la Syrie et que le Hezbollah s’était profondément englué dans la boue syrienne !

Aujourd’hui l’évaluation est complètement différente : à la place de la Syrie, nous avons l’Iran comme voisin immédiat et le Hezbollah n’est plus une organisation isolée au Liban mais un bras important des forces iraniennes vraiment dures et menaçantes, stationnées à une courte distance de la frontière iranienne.

Le pire, c’est le fait que les média israéliens, même s’ils rapportent de temps en temps des nouvelles des forces iraniennes en Syrie, ne montrent pas une image de la situation menaçante résultant de la présence iranienne reliant les points sur la carte du pays qui était autrefois la Syrie.

L’Iran est le vainqueur éclatant, ultime de la guerre civile en Syrie, et le plus tôt, nous en Israël et dans le monde, nous le reconnaitrons, le mieux sera pour nous et pour le monde entier.

Voir aussi:

Syrie : le risque d’affrontement direct USA-Russie a soudainement augmenté
Stéphane Juffa
avec Jean Tsadik et Perwer Emmal
Mena press
21 juin 2017

L’US Air Force abat un Soukhoï syrien. Premiers combats entre les Kurdes et l’Armée gouvernementale.

Pendant que les Forces Démocratiques Syriennes, à forte prééminence kurde, combattent désormais à l’intérieur de Raqqa, où elles ont entamé une manœuvre en tenaille pour couper les quartiers nord de la capitale de l’Etat Islamique (DAESH) du reste de la cité de 200 000 habitants, nous avons assisté, ces trois derniers jours, à une extension majeure du conflit en Syrie.

D’abord, profitant de l’affaiblissement notoire de DAESH, qui se trouve acculé par les FDS et leurs alliés américains sur l’ensemble du front, l’Armée gouvernementale d’al Assad, soutenue par la milice chiite libanaise du Hezbollah, et de plus en plus massivement par des soldats réguliers iraniens, a, pour la première fois, attaqué les FDS.

Les combats se sont déroulés dimanche dans la localité de Ja’din (carte), à 40km au sud-ouest de Raqqa. A 17h43 GMT, ce jour-là, un Soukhoï-22 gouvernemental a largué des bombes sur les positions des FDS dans ce secteur, blessant plusieurs combattants.

L’appareil a immédiatement été abattu par un F/A-18 de l’U.S Air Force, en vertu des règles d’engagement au sein de la coalition et du principe de légitime défense, d’après un communiqué du commandement de la coalition.

« Les projets et les actes hostiles des forces pro-régime à l’encontre de la coalition et de ses partenaires en Syrie qui mènent des opérations anti-EI légitimes, ne seront pas tolérés », a précisé le communiqué.

On y lit encore que la coalition internationale « ne cherche pas à attaquer le régime syrien, les forces russes ou les forces pro-régime qui collaborent avec eux, mais elle n’hésitera pas à défendre la coalition ou ses partenaires face à toute menace éventuelle ».

L’incident a été suivi par des combats au sol opposant l’axe Assad-Iran-Hezbollah aux FDS. Ces dernières ont menacé explicitement le régime de Damas, au cas où les affrontements s’amplifieraient dans la périphérie de Raqqa, de s’emparer des quartiers et de l’aéroport de Qamishli, à 370km au nord-est, où des forces gouvernementales, complètement encerclées par les Peshmerga kurdes, sont encore tolérées. Le même sort serait réservé au minuscule détachement gouvernemental à Assaké.

Ja’din se trouve à proximité immédiate du carrefour stratégique de Resafa, pour l’instant toujours partiellement aux mains de DAESH, qui conduit à Raqqa au Nord, et à Deïr ez Zor au sud-est. Deïr ez-Zor, où la 104ème brigade d’élite aéroportée de la garde Républicaine gouvernementale, commandée par le Brigadier-Général Issam Zahreddine, se trouve complètement encerclée par DAESH depuis deux ans.

Depuis, selon nos informations, les affrontements entre les Forces Démocratiques Syriennes et l’alliance pro-Assad ont cessé, mais les deux armées se regardent en chiens de faïence à quelques kilomètres l’une de l’autre.

Les Russes menacent directement les Américains

En revanche, suite à l’interception du Soukhoï syrien, les relations entre les Russes et les Américains se sont dégradées, au point de courir le risque d’une confrontation armée entre eux. Tout d’abord, avant-hier, lundi, Moscou a déclaré la suspension du canal de communication militaire avec Washington. Car, pour les Russes, les Américains auraient dû l’utiliser afin de prévenir qu’ils s’apprêtaient à abattre le bombardier de leur allié.

Bien plus inquiétant encore, le ministère russe de la Guerre a annoncé que « ses moyens de défense antiaérienne et ses avions suivraient et prendraient pour cibles les appareils et les drones de la coalition évoluant à l’ouest [au sud, dans la région de Raqqa] de l’Euphrate ». Presqu’au même moment, le gouvernement de Vladimir Poutine avait annoncé, plus globalement encore, qu’ « il pointerait ses missiles vers tout avion de la coalition internationale survolant la Syrie ».

Rien ne dit que le Tzarévitch mettra sa menace à exécution, mais il y a lieu de la prendre au sérieux. C’est par exemple ce qu’ont déjà fait les Australiens, qui ont décidé, par mesure de précaution, d’interrompre leurs missions d’attaque en Syrie, après que le Kremlin a déclaré considérer à partir de maintenant les appareils de la coalition comme des « cibles ».

Le contingent australien compte trois cents hommes, six chasseurs-bombardiers F/A-18, un appareil de surveillance et d’alerte avancée E-7A, et un avion de transport et de ravitaillement aérien KC-30A.

Quant aux Américains, dans un souci d’apaisement, ils ont annoncé vouloir rétablir le canal de communication, mais ils ont également déclaré qu’ils réagiraient sans état d’âme à toute attaque visant leurs avions.

En sus de plusieurs douzaines de chasseurs et de bombardiers dont disposent les Russes en Syrie, et qui ont déjà tué des dizaines de milliers de personnes, ils ont également déployé des systèmes de défense antiaériens S-300 et S-400, qui passent pour très performants. Reste que notre analyse est sans appel : les Russes, malgré leur équipement, ne sont pas de taille à se mesurer aux Américains en Syrie ; ce, même si une confrontation armée ne serait assurément pas une partie de plaisir pour les fils de l’Oncle Sam et qu’ils y perdraient des plumes.

La vraie préoccupation est celle d’éviter un affrontement militaire ente les deux plus grandes puissances militaires du globe. Ce, alors que Vladimir Poutine bluffe manifestement, dans le plus pur style de ses prédécesseurs soviétiques, voulant donner l’impression qu’il n’hésiterait pas un instant avant d’actionner la détente de son pistolet. A Métula, nous pensons au contraire qu’il y réfléchira à plusieurs fois avant de se lancer dans une telle aventure dans laquelle il n’a rien à gagner.

L’Iran tire sept de ses missiles les plus précis sur Deïr ez-Zor, seulement deux y parviennent

L’autre nouvelle, c’est le lancement par l’Iran de sept missiles balistiques sol-sol de portée intermédiaire Zulfiqar [le nom du sabre recourbé d’Ali, qu’il aurait reçu des mains du Prophète Mahomet. Ali fut le 4ème calife de l’islam et le 1er imam du chiisme] sur les positions de l’Etat Islamique dans la ville de Deïr ez-Zor.

Ces fusées étaient considérées jusqu’à dimanche comme les plus précises de l’arsenal des ayatollahs, et capables de parcourir entre 7 et 800km. Dimanche, à partir de la ville perse de Kermanshah, ils n’avaient à survoler que 450km, pourtant rien ne s’est passé comme prévu par la dictature chiite. Seuls deux missiles ont atteint leur but, n’infligeant que des dommages mineurs aux islamistes, tandis que trois autres explosaient sur le territoire irakien, et que les deux restants manquaient leur cible de plusieurs kilomètres, explosant dans des zones non habitées de Syrie.

Ce qui devait constituer un message d’intimidation destiné aux USA, aux sunnites et à Israël, de l’aveu même de la presse téhéranaise, a tourné en eau de boudin. Il en faudra beaucoup plus pour impressionner Jérusalem, dont les missiles frappent leurs cibles au mètre près en Syrie. Les Hébreux sont parés pour administrer une correction aux apprentis sorciers iraniens, s’il leur prenait la très mauvaise idée de se frotter à Israël ; à Téhéran, les décideurs ont probablement tiré les leçons de ce fiasco. Tandis qu’à Jérusalem, on se contente, comme l’a répété Binyamin Netanyahu, « de surveiller l’activité de l’Iran en Syrie ».

Deux incidents graves pour un même enjeu

La bataille de Raqqa, du point de vue stratégique, est une affaire classée. L’unique inconnue consiste à savoir combien de temps les 3 000 miliciens islamistes de DAESH acculés et encerclés dans la ville résisteront aux 20 000 combattants kurdes, à leurs 4 000 alliés tribaux arabes dans les FDS, et à l’extraordinaire puissance de feu des avions, des canons et des commandos américains.

On ne voit pas les Alaouites, les Syriens, les chiites libanais ou les Russes se risquer à déranger la ripaille ; pour Raqqa, ils arrivent trop tard.

Le véritable enjeu des incidents de dimanche se nomme Deïr ez-Zor, la ville située à 125km en aval de Raqqa sur l’Euphrate. Pour l’Armée d’Assad, appuyée par ses acolytes perses et libanais, qui, depuis l’offensive victorieuse des FDS face à l’Etat Islamique – mais uniquement à partir de ce moment – progresse sur trois fronts, nord, centre et sud, l’objectif est d’arriver à Deïr ez-Zor avant les Américains et leurs alliés kurdes.

D’abord pour libérer les soldats gouvernementaux encerclés, mais c’est secondaire, car la finalité stratégique de cette course poursuite, c’est l’occupation de la frontière avec l’Irak afin de permettre la consolidation du corridor terrestre chiite : Téhéran-Bagdad-Damas-Beyrouth.

Pour l’Amérique, ses alliés européens, arabes et israéliens, le but stratégique est bien sûr inverse. Nombre d’analystes se demandent cette semaine si les menaces russes et les tirs de missiles iraniens, n’avait pas pour but de tester les Américains et Donald Trump. Pour savoir jusqu’où le nouveau président U.S est prêt à impliquer son armée pour empêcher les Iraniens de parvenir à leur fin.

Nous l’ignorons pour le moment, et ne sommes pas absolument certains que M. Trump ait déjà décidé. Nous sentons les conciliabules se multiplier à Washington et sommes fort intéressés à connaître la position finale qu’adopteront les Etats-Unis.

L’enjeu du questionnement est considérable. De l’ « autoroute chiite » dépend par exemple l’avenir du Liban, déjà sous le joug impitoyable de Téhéran mais que les ayatollahs doivent entretenir. Et aussi la confiance que Riyad, Le Caire, les Etats du Golfe et toute l’arabité sunnite ont placée en Donald Trump qui est venu la leur demander. Simplement dit : si Trump laisse les Iraniens et le régime prendre Deïr ez-Zor, la brève lune de miel entre le monde arabe et Trump sera déjà terminée.

On comprend soudain le rôle de contrepoids que jouait l’Etat Islamique (sunnite) dans l’est syrien pour contrecarrer l’expansion iranienne (chiite), bien plus menaçante pour les Occidentaux au niveau stratégique que la présence des djihadistes salafistes dans la région. Pendant que la coalition leur assène les derniers coups de boutoir à Raqqa, on réalise à Washington qu’il va falloir remplir le vide que va laisser DAESH le long de la frontière irakienne si l’on ne veut pas perdre la Guerre de Syrie et d’Irak et participer à la création d’un empire persan au Proche et au Moyen-Orient. La neutralisation de l’Etat Islamique, qu’on accusait à tort de tirer les ficèles des attentats terroristes en Europe à partir de Raqqa et Mossoul, a été une erreur. Il suffisait de le circonscrire à l’Est et de couper son cordon ombilical avec Recep Erdogan pour que DAESH continue à servir nos intérêts sans avoir à risquer une confrontation avec les Russes et la régionalisation du conflit. Mais Obama, Catherine Ashton, Federica Mogherini, et les pleutres dirigeants de l’Europe avaient peur de froisser le dictateur constitutionnel turc et l’ont laissé agir. Or les arrangements diplomatiques ne justifient jamais de ne pas prendre les décisions qui s’imposent du point de vue stratégique. L’Occident, qui est en train de s’empêtrer en Syrie, en fait une nouvelle fois l’expérience. Comme s’il était incapable de retenir les leçons de l’histoire.

« L’autoroute chiite » permettrait, premièrement, pour Téhéran, de maintenir le contrôle des territoires conquis. Ensuite de fournir des armes lourdes et encombrantes, dans ces pays, à ses supplétifs. Et pour finir, de dépêcher des conseillers et des soldats dans tout le Moyen-Orient, y compris à la frontière d’Israël, afin d’y instiller l’instabilité et d’y combattre les alliés sunnites de Jérusalem.

Parmi les unités entretenues par Téhéran, la plus menaçante pour l’Etat hébreu est probablement celle du « Régiment du Golan ». Une petite organisation pestilentielle, initialement organisée par l’archi-terroriste assassin d’enfants Samir Kuntar, neutralisé par les Israéliens en plein cœur de Damas en décembre 2015, qui regroupe des commandos des Gardiens de la Révolution khomeyniste, des chefs du Hezbollah libanais et des Druzes égarés, qui ont déjà changé plusieurs fois de camp.

Eh bien la Ména livre en exclusivité à ses lecteurs l’information qu’elle a reçue de ses amis du côté syrien du Golan : Majid Hammoud, le chef du « Régiment du Golan » et successeur de Kuntar, aurait été liquidé samedi dernier dans la ville de Khan Arnabeh, à 6km d’Israël, qui abrite le quartier général de cette organisation. La neutralisation de Hammoud succède à celle, le 19 mars dernier, de Yasser Hussein al-Sayyed, qui avait précédé Majid Hammoud à son poste, où on ne vit ostensiblement pas jusqu’à l’âge de la retraite. Il avait été stoppé net dans son automobile par un drone alors qu’il se rendait à Damas. Deux ans plus tôt, le 18 janvier 2015, le jeune chef militaire du Hezbollah, Jihad Morgnieh, cinq autres membres de son organisation criminelle, de même qu’un général iranien de la Force al Quds [Jérusalem], Mohammad Ali Allahdadi, avaient également été éliminés alors qu’ils participaient à des activités du « Régiment du Golan », non loin de la frontière israélienne.

A noter que le weekend dernier, le Wall Street Journal a donné des indications concernant la coopération entre Tsahal et certaines unités de la rébellion, côté syrien du Golan, afin de contrer l’expansion iranienne et de préserver notre frontière. Des informations que les lecteurs de la Ména connaissent de manière bien plus détaillée que ce qu’a publié le WSJ depuis plusieurs années.

Voir également:

L’Iran teste les USA dans le Sud-Syrien
Jforum
Juin 7, 2017

Les principales puissances impliquées dans la guerre en Syrie sont éngagés dans une course visant à engranger le maximum de bénéfices tirés de l’effondrement de l’Etat Islamique, dans l’Est et le Sud de la Syrie. Les avancées continues des forces du régime syrien et demilices appuyées par l’Iran vers la base d’Al-Tanf tenue par les forces spéciales américaines et occidentales – ainsi que les avancées potentielles des deux côtés de la frontière irakienne – élève le risque d’affrontements supplémentaires susceptibles d’entraîner lers Etats-Unis et la Russie, bien que cette dernière n’aient pas voulu défier les Etats-Unis, après leurs frappes délibérée contre un convoi et des avions de chasse syriens.

Les brigades Sayyid al Shuhada contrôlées par Téhéran ont reconnu un mort et six blessés à la suite de cette frappe et ont posté une vidéo en ligne, faisant de cette frappe la première de la part des Etats-Unis contre de telles ms irakiennes pro-iraniennes au cours de cette guerre qui dure depuis 6 ans. 

La milice classe son appartenance aux Forces de Mobilisation Populaire (FMP) comme représentant sa 14ème Brigade.

Des forces spéciales américaines, britanniques et norvégiennes opèrent dans cette zone, aux côtés de groupes appartenant à l’Armée Libre Syrienne, depuis des mois.

Les forces soutenues, d’une part, par l’Iran, de l’autre par les Etats-Unis se sont confrontées du côté du carrefour de Zaza, près d’Al-Tanf, selon la  Brigade de l’Imam Ali et des groupes paramilitaires soutenus par les USA. Le mois dernier, des forces du régime avaient arraché le contrôle du carrefour aux forces appuyées par l’Amérique, plusieurs jours avant la frappe américaine.

Les groupes portant le label de l’Armée Libre Syrienne accusent la Russie d’avoir frappé leurs forces au cours d’une offensive sur Zaza. L’un d’eux prétend auprès de Reuters que des avions russes les auraient touchés alors qu’ils déferlaient sur les défenses des milices appuyées par l’Iran. Les responsables américains doivent encore se prononcer publiquement sur cette assertion. Si elle s’avérait vraie, cette frappe indiquerait que la Russie est décidée à passer à l’action contre les forces soutenues par les Etats-Unis, mais jusqu’à quelle point Moscou souhaite aller reste difficile à déterminer.

Voir encore:

Londres : le maire musulman Sadiq Khan autorise le drapeau du groupe terroriste Hezbollah à une marche anti-israélienne
La mairie de Londres a autorisé la tenue dimanche d’un rassemblement anti-israélien organisé par des sympathisants du groupe terroriste chiite libanais Hezbollah.
Monde juif info
18 Juin 2017

Selon les organisateurs de la Journée d’Al-Quds, les participants ont été autorisés par la mairie à manifester avec le drapeau du groupe terroriste car l’aile politique du Hezbollah n’est pas une organisation proscrite par les autorités britanniques.

Les États-Unis, le Canada, l’Australie et la Ligue arabe ont placé le Hezbollah sur leur liste officielle des organisations terroristes. L’Union européenne ne considère pas l’ensemble du groupe comme terroriste mais a inscrit la branche militaire de l’organisation chiite sur sa liste noire, car « liée à des actes terroristes perpétrés sur le territoire européen ».

Instaurée en 1979 par l’Ayatollah Khomeini, fondateur de la République Islamique d’Iran, la Journée mondiale d’Al-Quds est un événement anti-israélien annuel destiné à protester contre le contrôle israélien sur Jérusalem (Al-Quds en arabe) et à exprimer la solidarité avec le peuple palestinien.

Au cours de cet événement, célébré dans le monde entier dans les communautés chiites, les manifestants scandent des slogans appelant à la destruction d’Israël et brûlent des drapeaux israéliens.

Voir encore:

Pourquoi la paix continue d’être impossible entre Israël et Palestine
Pierre Rehov
Le Figaro
30/06/2017

FIGAROVOX/ANALYSE – Après dix ans de présence du Hamas dans la bande de Gaza, le reporter Pierre Rehov fait le point sur le conflit Israélo-Palestinien. Il rappelle quelles sont les raisons principales qui rendent la paix toujours aussi improbable.


Pierre Rehov est reporter, écrivain et réalisateur de documentaires, dont le dernier, «Unveiling Jérusalem», retrace l’histoire de la ville trois fois sainte.


Un adage largement admis par la sagesse populaire est malmené depuis près de soixante dix ans au Moyen Orient. «On ne peut faire la paix qu’avec ses ennemis». Car, encore faut-il être capable de définir l’ennemi.

La nébuleuse terroriste étant multicéphale, le monde musulman ayant, dans son ensemble, rejeté Israël depuis sa fondation et l’Autorité Palestinienne ne symbolisant qu’un point d’achoppement d’un conflit bien plus large, le simple fait d’avoir rebaptisé le conflit Israélo-Arabe (qui s’étend à l’Iran depuis la révolution de 1979 ) en conflit Israélo-Palestinien, cache une réalité bien plus vaste à laquelle Israël ne cesse d’être confronté.

S’il est tout à fait légitime de critiquer le gouvernement Israélien, comme celui de n’importe quel pays, et même de s’insurger contre nombre de ses politiques, il serait dommageable de passer à coté de certaines vérités, qui font que les israéliens s’inquiètent de la crédibilité du partenaire pour la paix que l’on tente de leur imposer.

1- L’Autorité Palestinienne verse des pensions aux responsables d’attentats terroristes et à leurs familles.

Tout en affirmant avoir une main tendue vers la réconciliation, Mahmud Abbas continue de consacrer une partie du budget de l’autorité palestinienne à la rémunération des terroristes enfermés dans les prisons israéliennes, de leurs familles et de celles dont les membres ont été éliminés au cours d’un attentat. La loi palestinienne est claire dans ce sens. Le montant des allocations et des pensions versées est proportionnel à la lourdeur de la peine, autrement dit au nombre des victimes, juives ou non juives, entrainé par le terroriste bénéficiaire.

Il s’agit d’une pratique décriée depuis longtemps par les gouvernements israéliens successifs et, depuis peu, par la Maison Blanche et certains gouvernements européens.

Pour l’Autorité Palestinienne, s’infiltrer dans une maison et assassiner une jeune fille endormie dans son sommeil, tirer à vue sur des consommateurs attablés à la terrasse d’un restaurant, ou se faire exploser au milieu d’adolescents devant une boite de nuit, est un acte de résistance contre l’occupation israélienne. Soit dit en passant, ces «actes contre l’occupation» étaient monnaie courante avant 1967 et la conquête par Israël des territoires préalablement occupés par l’Egypte et la Jordanie.

Selon le code civil palestinien, ces terroristes bénéficient du titre de mujahid (combattants) lorsqu’ils sont vivants, ou de shahid (martyrs) lorsqu’ils ont perdu la vie au cours de leur «mission».

Très récemment, Mahmud Abbas a été jusqu’à traiter le premier ministre israélien de «raciste» pour avoir osé affirmer que ces sommes monstrueuses, (7% du budget de l’AP) finançaient et incitaient au terrorisme. Interrogé sur la nécessité et la raison de cette pratique, il a répondu que c’était son «obligation sociale inscrite dans la loi».

Imaginons un instant la France voulant faire la paix avec Daesh, tandis que Daesh continue à promettre des retraites à vie et autres récompenses, à quiconque renouvellerait le massacre du Bataclan ou de la promenade des Anglais à Nice.

Impensable.

C’est pourtant la situation à laquelle est confrontée Israël, tant que son seul interlocuteur reste l’Autorité Palestinienne.

2 – Mahmud Abbas, élu pour 4 ans en 2005, est toujours au pouvoir

Ce simple fait affaiblit la position du Président de l’Autorité Palestinienne qui n’a donc aucune légitimité démocratique. Un moindre mal dans une région accoutumée aux dictatures. Mais si les dirigeants occidentaux continuent de lui accorder leur soutien total, c’est qu’il est talonné dans les sondages par l’organisation terroriste Hamas. En acceptant la moindre concession en faveur d’Israël, qui lui permettrait de retourner à la table de négociations, Abbas risque de perdre le peu de légitimité dont il bénéficie encore et peut-être même de se faire assassiner. Il ne souhaite pas, non plus, entrer dans l’histoire comme le premier dirigeant palestinien ayant normalisé ses relations avec l’ennemi sioniste.

3 – Les Arabes de Palestine ne sont pas prêts à renoncer au «droit au retour»

Si nombre d’exigences arabes sont négociables, il va sans dire que le droit au retour des descendants de descendants des «réfugiés» de 48, maintenus dans des camps par les pays arabes avoisinant, et privés de la quasi totalité de leurs droits, notamment au Liban et en Syrie, est une impossibilité majeure, qui entrainerait la disparition d’Israël sous un flot incontrôlable d’individus sans qualification et nourris dans la haine d’Israël.

Interrogé sur ce point, Abbas répond systématiquement que c’est leur droit inaliénable.

Sa vision de la paix, issue du concept «deux pays pour deux peuples» se résume à une Palestine judenrein ( dans laquelle aucun Juif ne serait toléré) d’un coté, et une nation multiculturelle de l’autre, que la démographie musulmane rendrait rapidement majoritaire.

Autrement dit, deux pays pour un peuple. Un concept inscrit dans la Charte du Fatah et de l’OLP, déclaré caduque par Yasser Arafat, mais qui n’en a jamais été retiré.

Incidemment, aucune mention n’est jamais faite du million de Juifs spoliés et chassés des pays arabes après 1948.

4 – Les manuels scolaires palestiniens ne reconnaissent pas l’existence de l’état d’Israël

Un rapport publié par l’Institut de Suivi de la Paix et de la Tolérance Culturelle, établit que «le programme pour les écoles élémentaires de l’AP, apprend aux élèves à être des martyrs, diabolise et nie l’existence d’Israël, et se concentre sur un retour à un pays exclusivement palestinien». Parmi les documents cités dans le rapport, il y a notamment des cartes dans lesquelles Israël ne figure pas et des passages qui semblent glorifier les attaquants. Récemment, l’UNRWA, organisation créée par l’ONU en 1948 pour venir au secours des réfugiés palestiniens, que l’on ne peut soupçonner de sympathie à l’égard d’Israël, s’est même insurgé contre le contenu des nouveaux manuels scolaires, provoquant l’ire de l’Autorité Palestinienne qui refuse d’en changer le contenu.

5 – L’Autorité Palestinienne voudrait faire annuler la declaration Balfour de 1917

En demandant à l’Angleterre de s’excuser un siècle plus tard pour la déclaration Balfour, qui promettait aux Juifs d’établir un foyer national sur leur terre ancestrale, et en manipulant l’UNESCO et autres organisations dépendant de l’ONU pour systématiquement diaboliser Israël, grâce à la majorité arabe automatique dont elle dispose et aux abstentions européennes, l’AP se met en porte à faux vis à vis des Accords d’Oslo, qui lui interdisent de tenter de résoudre le conflit en dehors de négociations directes.

6 – Yasser Arafat et Mahmud Abbas n’ont jamais accepté les propositions de paix faites par Israël

Arafat l’avait indiqué le 10 mai 1994, à la grande mosquée de Johannesburg, juste après avoir signé les accords d’Oslo. «Ce compromis n’a d’autre valeur que l’agrément accordé à la tribu Koraichi par le prophète Mahomet.» Autrement dit, tout accord avec Israël ne peut être que provisoire et avoir pour but sa disparition.

En août et septembre 2000, en réponse à la proposition de Ehud Barak de reconnaître un état Palestinien démilitarisé, sur 94% des territoires, avec Jérusalem Est pour capitale, et le partage des lieux saints, Yasser Arafat s’est enfui de Camp David, pour annoncer avec fierté à son peuple qu’il avait rejeté les pressions israéliennes et américaines. Résultat: la seconde indifada, avec son concert d’attentats terroristes et de représailles, faisant des milliers de victimes des deux cotés, et laissant à tout jamais deux peuples meurtris et méfiants.

Le successeur d’Arafat, considéré comme modéré comparativement à l’ancien chef terroriste, a également rejeté la proposition encore plus généreuse d’Ehud Olmert en 2006, qui lui aurait accordé le contrôle absolu de 98% des territoires, un droit au retour limité et le contrôle total du Mont du Temple, rebaptisé «Esplanade des mosquées». De fait, Mahmud Abbas n’a même jamais daigné répondre à Olmert, et s’en vante sous divers prétextes chaque fois qu’il en a l’occasion.

7 – Le retrait de Gaza a entrainé la prise de pouvoir du Hamas, et trois guerres meurtrières

La restitution du Sinaï à l’Egypte ayant abouti à un fragile accord de paix entre les deux pays, scrupuleusement respecté depuis, le Premier Ministre Ariel Sharon a voulu retenté l’expérience, en offrant l’intégralité de Gaza à l’Autorité Palestinienne en 2005, déracinant par la même occasion plus de 10,000 habitants juifs de la bande. L’idée était de faire de cette ancienne enclave égyptienne un nouveau Singapour, avec l’aide de la communauté internationale. Un coup d’état suivi d’une purge sanguinaire ont malheureusement conduit l’organisation terroriste Hamas au pouvoir. Les roquettes ont commencé de pleuvoir sur Israël, provoquant trois confrontations, en 2009, 2012 et 2014.

8 – L’Autorité Palestinienne voudrait obtenir en préalable à toute négociation l’intégralité de ce qui pourrait lui accordé en cas d’accord final

Mahmud Abbas le répète à l’envie. Toute négociation avec Israël doit être basée sur la création d’un Etat Palestinien dans les frontières de 67, avec Jérusalem pour capitale et une juste résolution du problème des réfugiés.

Autrement dit, en préalable à tout nouveau processus de paix, l’AP doit être garantie d’obtenir ce qu’elle souhaite, sans faire de son coté aucune concession.

Chaque fois qu’Israël s’insurge contre son intransigeance, l’AP l’accuse de détruire le processus de paix, ce qui la justifie d’avoir recour au terrorisme.

Ces huit points étant des faits incontestables, ont conduit l’actuelle administration américaine à reconsidérer son implication au Moyen Orient, après la visite expresse de Jason Greenblatt et Jared Kushner auprès des deux parties.

Mais la situation au Proche Orient s’affirmant de plus en plus volatile, un nouveau projet de processus plus global, impliquant les pays limitrophes semble se profiler à l’horizon.

Trump et ses conseillers, sans se ranger complètement du coté de la position israélienne, ont fini par comprendre qu’Israël n’a aucun intérêt à accepter une paix telle que définie par l’Autorité Palestinienne, et qui n’impliquerait pas la participation intégrale du monde arabe.

La confrontation décadaire pourrait bien de la sorte reprendre son identité de conflit Israelo-Arabe, duquel il ressortirait enfin un authentique projet de paix. Car on ne peut faire la paix qu’avec ses ennemis… dans leur ensemble et pas seulement avec la partie immergée de l’Iceberg.

Voir de plus:

L’Irak annonce la fin de «l’Etat illusoire» de Daesh après la prise de la mosquée Al-Nouri à Mossoul
Russia Today
29 juin 2017

Les forces irakiennes affirment avoir délogé les combattants de l’Etat islamique de la mosquée Al-Nouri de Mossoul, haut lieu symbolique de la ville mais également du pouvoir des djihadistes en Irak.

Les forces irakiennes ont annoncé ce 29 juin avoir pris le contrôle de la mosquée Al-Nouri de Mossoul, où Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, le chef de l’Etat islamique, avait donné en juillet 2014 son premier prêche en tant que chef de l’Etat islamique – sa dernière apparition publique connue à ce jour.

L’annonce a été faite par l’armée irakienne selon qui les Forces spéciales avaient pris la mosquée aux djihadistes. Un commandant des Forces spéciales a cependant précisé à l’AFP que le site n’avait pas encore été repris mais que ses forces étaient sur le point de le faire. «Le Service du contre-terrorisme (CTS) contrôle la mosquée Al-Nouri et (le minaret) Al-Hadba», a déclaré le Commandement des opérations conjointes dans un communiqué.

Mais le général Abdelwahab al-Saadi a, lui, affirmé que les forces irakiennes étaient près de s’emparer de la mosquée, et qu’elles se trouvaient à une vingtaine de mètres des lieux. Le général-brigadier Yahya Rasool se félicite de son côté d’une victoire qui, selon lui, marque un triomphe sur l’Etat islamique. «Leur Etat illusoire s’est effondré», s’est-il réjoui.

«Nous assistons à la fin du faux Etat de Daesh», a déclaré le Premier ministre irakien Haider al-Abadi en anglais sur son compte Twitter.

Ce bâtiment construit au XIIe siècle, ainsi que le minaret penché, connu sous le nom de «Hadba» (la bossue), détruits la semaine dernière par les djihadistes, étaient des monuments emblématiques de Mossoul, mais aussi symboliques du règne des terroristes dans la ville. C’est dans cette mosquée qu’Al-Baghdadi était apparu peu après que les djihadistes se furent emparés de la deuxième ville d’Irak, appelant dans un prêche les musulmans à lui obéir.

Le 22 juin dernier, la Russie annonçait la mort «très probable» d’Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi. «Il est hautement probable que le chef de l’Etat islamique [Abou Bakr] al-Baghdadi ait été éliminé par une frappe de l’aviation russe sur un centre de commandement situé dans la banlieue sud de la ville de Raqqa, à la fin du mois de mai», avait déclaré le vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères Oleg Syromolotov, citant des données collectées par le ministère de la Défense.

Voir enfin:

L’Etat islamique au bord de l’effondrement militaire et financier
L’EI a vu ses revenus divisés par 5 en quelques mois et est en passe de perdre ses capitales syrienne et irakienne
Yves Bourdillon
Les Echos
02/07/2017

Daech est aux abois. L’armée irakienne a repris jeudi, symbole fort, le site quasi détruit de la mosquée Al Nouri, où le chef de l’Etat islamique en Syrie et Irak (EI, Daech) avait proclamé le « califat » islamiste il y a exactement trois ans dans la ville irakienne de Mossoul. Vendredi, l’armée irakienne a annoncé que la victoire sur l’EI serait proclamée dans les prochains jours. Il ne resterait plus que 200-300 djihadistes dans un carré de quelques centaines de mètres de côté dans la vieille ville. Un général américain a confirmé le même jour que la reprise totale de Mossoul était « une question de jours ».

Parallèlement, les djihadistes sont désormais encerclés à Raqqa, la capitale syrienne de leur califat. Les forces kurdo-arabes soutenues par des commandos et l’aviation des Occidentaux ont coupé jeudi leur dernière voie de sortie. Londres estime que l’EI dispose encore de 2.500 combattants dans Raqqa.

60 % de territoire perdu

En sus de la chute imminente de ces deux places fortes, l’EI a perdu la plus grande partie de son territoire et de ses revenus, selon une évaluation divulguée jeudi par le cabinet de référence des questions militaires et de conflits, IHS Markit. A son apogée à l’été 2014, il assurait une souveraineté quasi étatique (armée, taxes, justice expéditive, versement d’allocations, administration) sur environ 8 millions de personnes et un territoire grand comme 4 régions françaises, quoique largement désertique. Depuis lors, il a perdu 60 % de ce territoire, estime IHS Markit (ex-Jane’s), dont 40 % depuis janvier.

Son effondrement financier est encore plus spectaculaire. Les revenus de l’EI sont tombés à 16 millions au deuxième trimestre 2017, exactement 5 fois moins qu’il y a deux ans. Les salaires des combattants avaient été divisés par 2, à 400 dollars par mois pour les djihadistes étrangers, début 2016 et auraient encore été baissés cette année. IHS ne donne pas d’indication sur les réserves de l’EI, censées avoir atteint 1 milliard de dollars en 2014 à la suite du pillage (non confirmé) de la succursale de la Banque centrale d’Irak à Mossoul.

Les revenus pétroliers de l’EI ont été divisés par 10 à cause de la chute mondiale des cours, de la destruction de ses puits par l’aviation russe et occidentale et des pertes de territoires. Les autres revenus de l’EI, trafic d’antiquités, racket et rançons, ont, pour leur part, été divisés par 5 en raison, là aussi, de la perte de territoires, souligne Ludovico Carlino, analyste à IHS Markit.

700 Français dans ses rangs

« Le projet de gouvernance du califat a échoué », conclut Columb Strack, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient à IHS. Mais IHS estime que l’EI va tenter d’intensifier sa campagne terroriste en Occident pour compenser ses pertes territoriales. Les pressions des gouvernements égyptien et saoudien sur les religieux pour qu’ils interprètent le Coran dans un sens « plus moderne » risquent de pousser certains conservateurs à basculer dans la violence, avertit IHS, qui affirme que le « risque terroriste va augmenter ». Paris estime que 700 Français ont rejoint l’EI. Quelque 200 d’entre eux sont revenus et un nombre équivalent a été abattu. C’est de loin le plus fort contingent parmi les 3.000 djihadistes européens.

Publicités

Syrie: Obama a menti, des milliers ont péri (With Syria and Iran, we’re coming to grips with the human and strategic price of the Obama administration’s mendacity)

13 avril, 2017

Bush a menti, des milliers ont péri. Slogan bien connu (2003)
Il est 3 heures du matin, le téléphone sonne à la Maison Blanche. Qui voulez-vous voir au bout du fil ? Hillary Clinton
Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria. Ariel Sharon (Israel’s Channel 2, Dec. 23, 2002)
Dans l’immédiat, notre attention doit se porter en priorité sur les domaines biologique et chimique. C’est là que nos présomptions vis-à-vis de l’Iraq sont les plus significatives : sur le chimique, nous avons des indices d’une capacité de production de VX et d’ypérite ; sur le biologique, nos indices portent sur la détention possible de stocks significatifs de bacille du charbon et de toxine botulique, et une éventuelle capacité de production.  Dominique De Villepin (05.02.2003)
Damascus has an active CW development and testing program that relies on foreign suppliers for key controlled chemicals suitable for producing CW. George Tenet (CIA, March 2004)
Saddam transferred the chemical agents from Iraq to Syria. No one went to Syria to find it. Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon
There are weapons of mass destruction gone out from Iraq to Syria, and they must be found and returned to safe hands. I am confident they were taken over. (…) Saddam realized, this time, the Americans are coming. They handed over the weapons of mass destruction to the Syrians. General Georges Sada (2006)
Comme l’exemple d’usage chimique contre les populations kurdes de 1987-1988 en avait apporté la preuve, ces armes avaient aussi un usage interne. Thérèse Delpech (mars 2003)
Les inspecteurs n’ont jamais pu vérifier ce qu’il était advenu de 3,9 tonnes de VX (…) dont la production entre 1988 et 1990 a été reconnue par l’Irak. Bagdad a déclaré que les destructions avaient eu lieu en 1990 mais n’en a pas fourni de preuves. En février 2003 (…) un document a été fourni [par Bagdad] à l’Unmovic pour tenter d’expliquer le devenir d’environ 63 % du VX manquant. Auparavant, les Irakiens prétendaient ne pas détenir un tel document. » Idem pour l’anthrax, dont l’Irak affirmait avoir détruit le stock en 1991. Mais, « en mars 2003, l’Unmovic concluait qu’il existait toujours, très probablement, 10 000 litres d’anthrax non détruits par l’Irak... Comme pour le VX, l’Irak a fourni à l’ONU, en février 2003, un document sur ce sujet qui ne pouvait permettre de conclure quelles quantités avaient été détruites … Thérèse Delpech (2004)
While Western governments were able to pressure Moscow to alter its weapons shipments, Bashar al-Assad may not have limited himself to over-the-counter weapons purchases. The Syrian military’s unconventional weapons arsenal already has a significant stockpile of sarin. The Syrian regime has also attempted to produce other toxic agents in order to advance its inventory of biological weapons. Several different intelligence sources raised red flags about suspicious truck convoys from Iraq to Syria in the days, weeks, and months prior to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. These concerns first became public when, on December 23, 2002, Ariel Sharon stated on Israeli television, « Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria. » About three weeks later, Israel’s foreign minister repeated the accusation. The U.S., British, and Australian governments issued similar statements. The Syrian foreign minister dismissed such charges as a U.S. attempt to divert attention from its problems in Iraq. But even if the Syrian regime were sincere, Bashar al-Assad’s previous statement— »I don’t do everything in this country, »—suggested that Iraqi chemical or biological weapons could cross the Syrian frontier without regime consent. Rather than exculpate the Syrian regime, such a scenario makes the presence of Iraqi weapons in Syria more worrisome, for it suggests that Assad might either eschew responsibility for their ultimate custody or may not actually be able to prevent their transfer to terrorist groups that enjoy close relations with officials in his regime. Two former United Nations weapon inspectors in Iraq reinforced concerns about illicit transfer of weapon components into Syria in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s fall. Richard Butler viewed overhead imagery and other intelligence suggesting that Iraqis transported some weapons components into Syria. Butler did not think « the Iraqis wanted to give them to Syria, but … just wanted to get them out of the territory, out of the range of our inspections. Syria was prepared to be the custodian of them. » Former Iraq Survey Group head David Kay obtained corroborating information from the interrogation of former Iraqi officials. He said that the missing components were small in quantity, but he, nevertheless, felt that U.S. intelligence officials needed to determine what reached Syria. Baghdad and Damascus may have long been rivals, but there was precedent for such Iraqi cooperation with regional competitors when faced with an outside threat. In the run-up to the 1991 Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait, the Iraqi regime flew many of its jets to Iran, with which, just three years previous, it had been engaged in bitter trench warfare. Subsequent reports by the Iraq Survey Group at first glance threw cold water on some speculation about the fate of missing Iraqi weapons, but a closer read suggests that questions about a possible transfer to Syria remain open. The September 30, 2004 Duelfer report, while inconclusive, left open such a possibility. While Duelfer dismissed reports of official transfer of weapons material from Iraq into Syria, the Iraq Survey Group was not able to discount the unofficial movement of limited material. Duelfer described weapons smuggling between both countries prior to Saddam’s ouster. In one incident detailed by a leading British newspaper, intelligence sources assigned to monitor Baghdad’s air traffic raised suspicions that Iraqi authorities had smuggled centrifuge components out of Syria in June 2002. The parts were initially stored in the Syrian port of Tartus before being transported to Damascus International Airport. The transfer allegedly occurred when Iraqi authorities sent twenty-four planes with humanitarian assistance into Syria after a dam collapsed in June 2002, killing twenty people and leaving some 30,000 others homeless. Intelligence officials do not believe these planes returned to Iraq empty. Regardless of the merits of this one particular episode, it is well documented that Syria became the main conduit in Saddam Hussein’s attempt to rebuild his military under the 1990-2003 United Nations sanctions, and so the necessary contacts between regimes and along the border would already have been in place. Indeed, according to U.S. Defense Department sources, the weapons smuggling held such importance for the Syrian regime that the trade included Assad’s older sister and his brother-in-law, Assaf Shawqat, deputy chief of Syria’s military intelligence organization. Numerous reports also implicate Shawqat’s two brothers who participated in the Syrian-Iraqi trade during the two years before Saddam’s ouster. While the Duelfer report was inconclusive, part of its failure to tie up all loose ends was due to declining security conditions in Iraq, which forced the Iraq Survey Group to curtail its operations. The cloud of suspicion over the Syrian regime’s role in smuggling Iraq’s weapons—and speculation as to the nature of those weapons—will not dissipate until Damascus reveals the contents of truck convoys spotted entering Syria from Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. U.S. intelligence officials and policymakers also will not be able to end speculation until Bashar al-Assad completely and unconditionally allows international inspectors to search suspected depots and interview key participants in the Syrian-Iraqi weapons trade. Four repositories in Syria remain under suspicion. Anonymous U.S. sources have suggested that some components may have been kept in an ammunition facility adjacent to a military base close to Khan Abu Shamat, 30 miles (50 kilometers) west of Damascus. In addition, three sites in the western part of central Syria, an area where support for the Assad regime is strong, are reputed to house suspicious weapons components. These sites include an air force factory in the village of Tall as-Sinan; a mountainous tunnel near Al-Baydah, less than five miles from Al-Masyaf (Masyaf); and another location near Shanshar. While the Western media often focus on the fate of Iraqi weapons components, just as important to Syrian proliferation efforts has been the influx of Iraqi weapons scientists. The Daily Telegraph reported prior to the 2003 Iraq war that Iraq’s former special security organization and Shawqat arranged for the transfer into Syria of twelve mid-level Iraqi weapons specialists, along with their families and compact disks full of research material on their country’s nuclear initiatives. According to unnamed Western intelligence officials cited in the report, Assad turned around and offered to relocate the scientists to Iran, on the condition that Tehran would share the fruits of their research with Damascus. The Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2005)
Syria’s President Bashir al-Asad is in secret negotiations with Iran to secure a safe haven for a group of Iraqi nuclear scientists who were sent to Damascus before last year’s war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Western intelligence officials believe that President Asad is desperate to get the Iraqi scientists out of his country before their presence prompts America to target Syria as part of the war on terrorism.The issue of moving the Iraqi scientists to Iran was raised when President Asad made a visit to Teheran in July. Intelligence officials understand that the Iranians have still to respond to the Syrian leader’s request.  A group of about 12 middle-ranking Iraqi nuclear technicians and their families were transported to Syria before the collapse of Saddam’s regime. The transfer was arranged under a combined operation by Saddam’s now defunct Special Security Organisation and Syrian Military Security, which is headed by Arif Shawqat, the Syrian president’s brother-in-law. The Iraqis, who brought with them CDs crammed with research data on Saddam’s nuclear programme, were given new identities, including Syrian citizenship papers and falsified birth, education and health certificates. Since then they have been hidden away at a secret Syrian military installation where they have been conducting research on behalf of their hosts. Growing political concern in Washington about Syria’s undeclared weapons of mass destruction programmes, however, has prompted President Asad to reconsider harbouring the Iraqis. American intelligence officials are concerned that Syria is secretly working on a number of WMD programmes. They have also uncovered evidence that Damascus has acquired a number of gas centrifuges – probably from North Korea – that can be used to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb. Relations between Washington and Damascus have been strained since last year’s war in Iraq, with American commanders accusing the Syrians of allowing foreign fighters to cross the border into Iraq, where they carry out terrorist attacks against coalition forces. (…) Under the terms of the deal President Asad offered the Iranians, the Iraqi scientists and their families would be transferred to Teheran together with a small amount of essential materials. The Iraqi team would then assist Iranian scientists to develop a nuclear weapon. Apart from paying the relocation expenses, President Asad also wants the Iranians to agree to share the results of their atomic weapons research with Damascus. The Syrian offer comes at a time when Iran is under close scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is investigating claims that Iran is maintaining a secret nuclear bomb programme.  The Daily Telegraph
The pilots told Mr. Sada that two Iraqi Airways Boeings were converted to cargo planes by removing the seats, Mr. Sada said. Then Special Republican Guard brigades loaded materials onto the planes, he said, including « yellow barrels with skull and crossbones on each barrel. » The pilots said there was also a ground convoy of trucks. The flights – 56 in total, Mr. Sada said – attracted little notice because they were thought to be civilian flights providing relief from Iraq to Syria, which had suffered a flood after a dam collapse in June of 2002. (…) Mr. Sada said that the Iraqi official responsible for transferring the weapons was a cousin of Saddam Hussein named Ali Hussein al-Majid, known as « Chemical Ali. » The Syrian official responsible for receiving them was a cousin of Bashar Assad who is known variously as General Abu Ali, Abu Himma, or Zulhimawe. (…) Syria is one of only eight countries that has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, a treaty that obligates nations not to stockpile or use chemical weapons. Syria’s chemical warfare program, apart from any weapons that may have been received from Iraq, has long been the source of concern to America, Israel, and Lebanon. The NY Sun
Even when viewed through a post-war lens, documentary evidence of messages are consistent with the Iraqi Survey Group’s conclusion that Saddam was at least keeping a WMD program primed for a quick re-start the moment the UN Security Council lifted sanctions. Iraqi Perpectives Project (March 2006)
By late 2003, even the Bush White House’s staunchest defenders were starting to give up on the idea that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But WikiLeaks’ newly-released Iraq war documents reveal that for years afterward, U.S. troops continued to find chemical weapons labs, encounter insurgent specialists in toxins and uncover weapons of mass destruction. Wired magazine (2010)
It’s more than a little ironic that, with its newest document dump from the Iraq campaign, WikiLeaks may have just bolstered one of the Bush administration’s most controversial claims about the Iraq war: that Iran supplied many of the Iraq insurgency’s deadliest weapons and worked hand-in-glove with some of its most lethal militias. The documents indicate that Iran was a major combatant in the Iraq war, as its elite Quds Force trained Iraqi Shiite insurgents and imported deadly weapons like the shape-charged Explosively Formed Projectile bombs into Iraq for use against civilians, Sunni militants and U.S. troops. A report from 2006 claims “neuroparalytic” chemical weapons from Iran were smuggled into Iraq. (It’s one of many, many documents recounting WMD efforts in Iraq.) Others indicate that Iran flooded Iraq with guns and rockets, including the Misagh-1 surface-to-air missile, .50 caliber rifles, rockets and much more. As the New York Times observes, Iranian agents plotted to kidnap U.S. troops from out of their Humvees — something that occurred in Karbala in 2007, leaving five U.S. troops dead. (It’s still not totally clear if the Iranians were responsible.) Wired (2010)
Les lamentations sur ce qui est advenu de la politique étrangère américaine au Moyen-Orient passent à côté de l’essentiel. Le plus remarquable concernant la diplomatie du président Obama dans la région, c’est qu’elle est revenue au point de départ – jusqu’au début de sa présidence. La promesse d’ « ouverture » vers l’Iran, l’indulgence envers la tyrannie de Bashar Assad en Syrie, l’abandon des gains américains en Irak et le malaise systématique à l’égard d’Israël — tels étaient les traits distinctifs de l’approche du nouveau président en politique étrangère. A présent, nous ne faisons qu’assister aux conséquences alarmantes d’une perspective aussi malavisée que naïve. Fouad Ajami (oct. 2013)
The policy of “leading from behind” and the crudity of “We came, we saw, he [Qaddafi] died” have left a human tragedy in Libya. Backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was an inexplicable choice, and it almost ruined the country. The United States did not need to hound and jail an innocent video maker in order to concoct a myth to cover up the culpable lax security in Benghazi. Yemen was strangely declared a model of our anti-terrorism efforts — just weeks before it ignited into another Somalia or Congo. ISIS was airily written off as a jayvee bunch as it spread beyond Syria and Iraq. There is little need to do a detailed comparison of Iraq now and Iraq in February 2009 (when it was soon to be the administration’s “greatest achievement,” a “stable” and “self-reliant” nation); the mess in between is attributable to Obama’s use of the aftermath of the Iraq War for pre-election positioning. Ordering Assad to flee while ignoring the violence in Syria and proclaiming a faux red line has now tragically led to a million refugees in Europe (and another 4 million in the neighborhood) and more than 200,000 dead. Israel is now considered not an ally, not even a neutral, but apparently a hostile state worthy of more presidential invective than is Iran. We have few if any reliable friends any more in the Gulf. Iran will become a nuclear power. The only mystery over how that will happen is whether Obama was inept or whether he deliberately sought to make the theocracy some sort of a strategic power and U.S. ally. The Middle East over the next decade may see three or four additional new nuclear powers. The Russia of kleptocrat Vladimir Putin is seen in the region as a better friend than is the U.S. — and certainly a far more dangerous enemy to provoke. There is no easy cure for all this; it will take years just to sort out the mess. Victor Davis Hanson
Ce que les Rosenberg avaient fait pour Staline, Obama le fait aujourd’hui pour l’ayatollah Khamenei. Le méprisable accord nucléaire d’Obama avec l’Iran a déjà précipité l’agression iranienne dans la région. En réponse aux concessions faites par Obama, Hillary Clinton et John Kerry, l’Iran raidissait son attitude et devenait plus agressif. À l’heure actuelle, l’Iran est impliqué dans des guerres dans la région, entrainant déjà les États-Unis dans leur sillage. Si l’Iran se dote de l’arme nucléaire, ces guerres s’aggraveront et deviendront beaucoup plus dévastatrices. Ce n’est pas seulement Chamberlain. C’est Quisling et Philippe Pétain. Il ne s’agit nullement d’un mauvais jugement. Il s’agit d’une trahison. (…) En ouvrant à l’Iran la voie vers la bombe nucléaire, Obama a transformé les conflits lents du terrorisme classique en crise de civilisations catastrophique. Une bombe nucléaire iranienne ne se faufilera pas discrètement comme le fait la crise démographique de la migration musulmane avec son complément de terrorisme. Ce ne sera pas un problème progressif. Une course aux armes nucléaires entre sunnites et chiites impliquant des terroristes des deux côtés qui emploient des armes nucléaires rendra insoutenable toute la structure de la civilisation occidentale. L’attaque du 11/9 a vu l’usage de quelques jets pour dévaster une ville. La prochaine vague d’armes pourrait tuer des millions, pas des milliers. Les traîtres qui ont fait de l’URSS une puissance capable de détruire le monde étaient motivés par le même agenda caché des partisans à l’accord nucléaire iranien. Ils croyaient que le monopole nucléaire américain conduirait à l’arrogance et au bellicisme. Ils étaient convaincus que la puissance américaine devrait être surveillée en s’assurant que l’union soviétique puisse égaler l’oncle Sam, nucléaire pour nucléaire. Ceux qui ont ouvert les portes du nucléaire à Téhéran aujourd’hui croient qu’un Iran nucléaire aura un effet dissuasif contre l’impérialisme américain dans la région. Leur nombre inclut Barack Obama.(…) Obama a trahi l’Amérique. Il a trahi les victimes américaines du terrorisme iranien. Il a trahi les soldats américains qui ont été assassinés, mutilés et torturés par les armées terroristes iraniennes. Il a trahi des centaines de millions d’Américains dans leur patrie, et qui seront contraints d’élever leurs enfants sous l’égide de la terreur nucléaire iranienne. Sa trahison nucléaire est non seulement une trahison de l’Amérique. Pour la première fois depuis la fin de la guerre froide, elle ouvre les portes de l’assassinat en masse de millions d’américains par un ennemi vicieux. Obama a appauvri des millions d’Américains, il a le sang des soldats et des policiers sur ses mains, mais son héritage final peut être la collaboration dans un acte d’assassinat en masse qui pourrait rivaliser avec Adolf Hitler. Daniel Greenfield
Pour nous, la ligne rouge, c’est l’utilisation d’armes chimiques  ; ça changerait ma vision des choses. Barack Hussein Obama
Je suis convaincu que si cet accord-cadre mène à un accord total et définitif, notre pays, nos alliés et le monde seront plus en sécurité. L’Iran sera « plus inspecté que n’importe quel autre pays dans le monde. Si l’Iran triche, le monde le saura. Si nous voyons quelque chose de louche, nous mènerons des inspections.  Cet accord n’est pas basé sur la confiance, il est basé sur des vérifications sans précédent. Barack Hussein Obama (2015)
Il y a un manuel de stratégie à Washington que les présidents sont censés utiliser. (…) Et le manuel de stratégie prescrit des réponses aux différents événements, et ces réponses ont tendance à être des réponses militarisées. (…) Au milieu d’un défi international comme la Syrie, vous êtes jugé sévèrement si vous ne suivez pas le manuel de stratégie, même s’il y a de bonnes raisons. (…) Je suis très fier de ce moment.  Le poids écrasant de la sagesse conventionnelle et la machinerie de notre appareil de sécurité nationale était allés assez loin. La perception était que ma crédibilité était en jeu, que la crédibilité de l’Amérique était en jeu. Et donc pour moi d’appuyer sur le bouton arrêt à ce moment-là, je le savais, me coûterait cher politiquement. Le fait que je pouvais me débarrasser des pressions immédiates et réfléchir sur ce qui  était dans l’intérêt de l’Amérique, non seulement à l’égard de la Syrie, mais aussi à l’égard de notre démocratie, a été une décision très difficile – et je crois que finalement, ce fut la bonne décision à prendre. (…) Je suppose que vous pourriez me qualifier de réaliste qui croit que nous ne pouvons pas soulager toute la misère du monde. Barack Hussein Obama (2016)
Je ne regrette pas du tout d’avoir dit que si je voyais Bachar al-Assad utiliser des armes chimiques contre son peuple, cela changerait mon évaluation sur ce que nous étions prêts à faire ou pas en Syrie. J’aurais fait une plus grande erreur si j’avais dit ‘Eh, des armes chimiques. Ça ne change pas vraiment mes calculs’. Je pense qu’il était important pour moi en tant que président des États-Unis d’envoyer le message qu’il y a bien quelque chose de différent sur les armes chimiques. Et malgré la façon dont ça s’est fini (…) ce qui est vrai c’est qu’Assad s’est débarrassé de ses armes chimiques. Barack Hussein Obama (15.01.2017)
Nous avons réussi à faire en sorte que le gouvernement syrien abandonne volontairement et de manière évidente son stock d’armes chimiques. Susan Rice (16.01.2017)
Cette interrogation n’en finit pas de tourmenter  Barack Obama. A-t-il pris, ce jour-là, la bonne décision  ? De cette décision il a affirmé être  « fier », mais il a aussi assuré, dans une même interview, que  le dossier syrien est  «  son plus grand regret  ».  Par prudence, mieux vaut dire tout et son contraire, car il  sait ce qu’on en pense  : sa décision a changé la face  du monde. La plus grave attaque chimique depuis  la Seconde Guerre mondiale demeurée impunie  ? La  victoire de Bachar el-Assad  ? L’ascension des djihadistes  ? La montée en puissance des Russes au Moyen- Orient, en Europe et au-delà  ? L’effacement de l’Occident  ? Peut-être même la victoire de Donald Trump  ?  Tout partirait de son choix, de cette journée-là. Le 30 août 2013 (…) Le matin même,  il a annoncé publiquement réfléchir à  «  une action limitée contre Bachar  ».  Ses alliés français, la Ligue arabe,  l’Australie fourbissent leurs armes. Kerry a quasiment  annoncé la réplique américaine  :  « La crédibilité du président comme celle des Etats-Unis sont engagées.  »  Et même  :  « L’Histoire nous jugerait sévèrement si on ne faisait rien » … A  vrai  dire,  il  n’aurait  jamais  pensé  se  retrouver  dans cette situation. Autour de la table, chacun a en  tête  sa  conférence  de  presse  donnée  un  an  auparavant, presque jour pour jour, le 20 août 2012, et une  phrase. Un journaliste lui avait demandé ce qui pourrait infléchir sa position, pour le moins prudente, sur  le conflit syrien, lui qui refuse d’armer les rebelles.  «  Pour nous, la ligne rouge, c’est l’utilisation d’armes chimiques  ; ça changerait ma vision des choses  »,  avait-il  répondu. A question imprévue réponse non préparée. Ses  conseillers avaient été interloqués. Certes, El-Assad  avait été mis en garde par des canaux discrets, mais  rendre  publique  une  ligne  rouge  n’est  jamais  une   bonne chose. On s’était promptement rassuré  ; le régime  syrien  semblait  tellement  affaibli  qu’il  n’oserait pas s’attirer les foudres du président des Etats-Unis. Il a pourtant osé, comme en témoignent les schémas et les photos satellites qu’on diffuse dans la salle  de crise. Il y a eu d’abord de petites attaques chimiques  au printemps. Puis, devant l’absence de réactions, le  21 août 2013, cette attaque d’ampleur dans la banlieue  de Damas, plus tard contestée  (…).  Bachar  a-t-il voulu tester les Etats-Unis  ? Ou, simplement, son  armée n’avait-elle pas d’autres moyens de terrifier sa  population insurgée  ? On ne sait pas. Auprès de Philip Gordon, Obama a insisté  :  «  Il nous faut des preuves.  »  «  Le président était hanté par l’Irak et ne voulait pas entrer  en  guerre  sur  la  base  de  simples  suspicions» ,  témoigne   Gordon. Mais les preuves sont là. Les obus au gaz sarin tirés par le camp loyaliste ont tué environ 1  400  personnes, dont beaucoup d’enfants, selon une note de  la CIA dont chacun, dans la pièce, a reçu une copie.  Plus  contraignantes  que  les  preuves,  les  images.   Atroces, elles ont fait le tour du monde. Ce père qui  tient sa fillette morte dans les bras et qui l’interpelle,  lui, le président des Etats-Unis  :  «  Je vous en prie  ! Ce  ne sont que des enfants  ! Ils n’ont encore rien vu de la vie.  Du chimique ! »  Il est contraint de répondre. Un tabou,  depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, a été transgressé,  les traités internationaux ont été violés, l’ordre du  monde menacé, l’Amérique défiée. (….) Tout le pousse à intervenir… Mais… Le Parlement  britannique  a  mis  son  veto  la  veille.  C’est  une  première alerte. (…) Il converse  pendant trois quarts d’heure avec son plus proche allié,  le  Français  François  Hollande,  dont  les  Rafale   chargent leurs missiles de croisière Scalp. Il l’assure  que rien n’est changé. L’après-midi s’achève. (…) Il n’aime guère  les  choix  tranchés,  préférant  le  consensus. (…) Il propose à un homme  de confiance d’aller se promener dans le jardin de la  Maison-Blanche. Cet homme, c’est son chef de l’ad ministration, Denis McDonough  : ni un militaire ni  un diplomate, mais son collaborateur le plus loyal.  Pendant une heure, il lui livre ses doutes. Tout cela  est trop incertain. Ne va-t-il pas engager son pays dans  une nouvelle guerre alors qu’il a été élu pour se dé sengager de conflits coûteux  ? Et puis, cela ne risque- t-il pas de mettre en péril son grand œuvre, l’accord  nucléaire avec l’Iran  ? Trop de risques. Il teste une idée  auprès de McDonough  : demander une autorisation  préalable au Congrès. Une manière de reculer, car chacun sait qu’un soutien du Congrès est plus qu’incertain. (…) En  début  de  soirée,  il  convoque  à  nouveau  ses   conseillers dans son bureau. L’ambiance est décontractée. Il leur annonce la nouvelle. Ils n’en reviennent  pas. Ils insistent  :  «  Ce sera dévastateur pour votre autorité politique »,  le préviennent-ils. Il tient bon. Gordon  nous avoue avoir été estomaqué. Devant lui, Obama  raisonne en politique  :  «  Si ça ne dissuade pas Assad de  recommencer, si des inspecteurs de l’Onu sont pris comme  boucliers humains, si on perd un pilote, j’aurai l’opinion,  le Congrès sur le dos. On me reprochera tout et son contraire,  d’être intervenu, de ne pas être intervenu plus fortement,  de ne pas être intervenu plus légèrement.  »  Gordon se souvient  d’un  autre  argument  du  président   :  le  risque   d’engrenage.  Si  Assad  ou  ses  parrains  russes  et  iraniens  décidaient  d’une  nouvelle  attaque  chimique   «  trois semaines plus tard  »,  alors  «  on devrait frapper de nouveau, et plus fort, et ainsi de suite  ».  Il ne serait plus  maître du processus, craint-il, alors qu’Assad le serait.  Cela, cet homme qui veut tout contrôler ne peut l’accepter. Et rien n’est moins contrôlable qu’une guerre. (…) Il prévient Kerry, qui est furieux.  «  L’Histoire nous jugera  avec une sévérité extrême  »,  lâche ce dernier à ses collaborateurs et à certains de ses homologues étrangers.  Le lendemain, à 18 heures, quelques heures avant l’attaque, il contacte aussi Hollande, qui tombe de haut.  (…) Puis (…) sur le perron de la Maison-Blanche, Barack Obama tient une conférence de presse  : « J’ai décidé d’intervenir,  proclame-t-il, avant d’ajouter  :  mais je demanderai que cet usage de la force soit approuvé par le Congrès.  »  Il s’est donné du temps. C’est fini. Il vient de changer l’ordre du monde sans pouvoir, à cet instant, le  deviner.  Certains  comprennent  en  revanche  que  rien ne sera plus comme avant. Sur les hauteurs de Damas, Bachar el-Assad comprend qu’il n’a plus rien à craindre des Occidentaux.  Il se paiera même le luxe d’utiliser de nouveau des  armes  chimiques  deux  ans  plus  tard.  L’opposition   «  modérée  », autour de l’Armée syrienne libre, sent  que l’Occident l’abandonne. Les djihadistes, mieux  armés, recrutent les déçus et montent en puissance,  scellant le piège qui permettra au président syrien de se présenter comme rempart contre le chaos. Au Kremlin, Vladimir Poutine se jette sur l’occasion. Aux Américains il offre de convaincre El-Assad  de  détruire  ses  armes  chimiques  contre  l’abandon  de tout projet d’intervention. Comment refuser, après  avoir reculé le 30 août  ? La Russie prend la main en  Syrie.  Plus  tard,  Poutine  estimera  ne  rien  redouter  du  président  américain  et  envahira  la  Crimée.  Les   Républicains et un certain Donald Trump, admirateur  de  Poutine,  ne  cesseront  de  dénoncer  ce  nouveau  Munich  et  ce  président  qui  a  affaibli  une   Amérique qu’il faudrait rendre  « great  again ». Il ne lui reste que des questions sans réponses. Que  se serait-il passé s’il avait frappé  ? Ce 30 août 2013 est-il  le jour où Obama a mis fin au règne des Etats-Unis  comme seule superpuissance mondiale  ? Le jour où  le  camp  des  démocraties  a  dû  renoncer  à  se  battre  pour ses valeurs  ? Antoine Vatkine
This is the president’s mendacity continuing to a degree that is really quite remarkable. « There are people on both sides and beyond » – so he means Republicans at home and Israelis – « who are against the diplomatic resolution ». That’s a lie. They are against this diplomatic resolution, the deal he’s doing, that any observer will tell you paves the road to an Iranian nuclear weapon that is legitimate and accepted by the international community. It is a disaster. That’s why it is opposed. People are not opposed to diplomacy, they are opposed to a specific deal. And to address this to Iranians as if Iran is a democracy when it’s a dictatorship that put down a democratic revolution in 2009 of which he turned his face and never supported is disgraceful. Charles Krauthammer
The disgusting aspect of the last eight years is that Obama mistook the sidelines for the moral high ground. So he would use all this lofty rhetoric about red lines and he would stand there would be people killing each other, slaughtering each other, dead babies and he’d stand there with his hand on his hip giving a speech. And he stripped words of their meaning. And Trump isn’t as articulate. He isn’t as polished but his words have meaning. And to do that while is he having dinner with the Chinese. You said did he tell him over the salad bowl, as I understand it, he told him over the creme brulee or the tiramisu. How cool is that to actually make the Chinese politburo sit through a night of American targeted bombing? I think he’s accomplished certain things. He sent a message to the Chinese as they are sitting across the dinner table from him. He sent a message to Putin, and, thereby, incidentally also made all these stupid investigations of investigations of investigations that the Senate and the House are chasing their tails and look absolutely ridiculous. You know, he has picked a fight with Putin at a when Congress has spent and Susan Rice has spent a year investigating whether he is Putin stooge. How stupid do they look? I think they understand this is really — last night was inauguration day. That America is back in the world. Mark Steyn
L’actualité de ces dernières semaines a mené certains à douter de la maîtrise de Trump sur son personnel et sur sa politique intérieure, tandis que d’autres le disaient carrément indifférent aux affaires étrangères. D’abord le fiasco Ryancare. Fidèle à ses promesses, Trump a voulu abroger l’Obamacare, mais mal lui en a pris de faire confiance au si peu fiable Speaker de la Chambre, Paul Ryan, et de s’engager à ses côtés, croyant pouvoir ainsi gagner des votes démocrates. Le « plan en 3 phases » du technocrate Ryan, trop compliqué et n’abrogeant pas les pires mesures de la loi d’Obama, ne pouvait que rencontrer l’opposition ferme du Freedom Caucus, la trentaine de représentants les plus conservateurs de la base électorale de Trump. L’échec est pour Ryan. Trump s’en sort plutôt bien, même si le poids fiscal d’Obamacare perdure et va donc le gêner dans sa réforme fiscale d’envergure. Au moins a-t-il appris, sur le tas, qu’il ne servait à rien de courtiser des démocrates obtus et qu’il valait mieux pour lui s’impliquer le moins possible dans les jeux du Congrès. Puis, font désordre les disputes de personnel au sein des divers ministères et le fait que Trump, soi-disant complètement ballotté entre des avis divergents, tarderait à débarrasser son administration « des restes d’Obama », même à des postes élevés, parce que, en gros, il subirait l’influence de Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster et Kushner (le « Premier Gendre »), tous des centristes-interventionnistes, en opposition radicale au nationaliste-isolationniste Bannon… Tout cela sur fond de l’exécrable Russiagate, servi tous les jours par les démocrates dans l’espoir de délégitimer Trump et de l’empêcher de gouverner. Lassant, le feuilleton se retourne contre ses auteurs avec le scandale des écoutes de l’équipe de transition de Trump : ex-ambassadeur à l’ONU et ex-Conseiller à la Sécurité nationale, l’incroyable Susan Rice, après avoir nié (ce n’était jamais que la 4e fois qu’elle mentait pour protéger Obama), reconnaît avoir « dévoilé » l’identité de plusieurs personnes et autorisé des fuites à la presse… Rappelons que les démocrates ne s’émouvaient pas des ingérences russes lorsque celles-ci semblaient favoriser leur candidate et que ce sont eux qui ont un long passé de connivence avec la Russie : de Roosevelt et Staline aux espions à la solde de l’URSS sous Truman, jusqu’à la « flexibilité » promise par Obama en 2012 à Medvedev, concrétisée en 2013 par l’abandon pur et simple de ses responsabilités au Moyen-Orient à Poutine… La réalité est que Trump peuple ses agences de gens d’avis opposés, exprès, afin d’appréhender toutes les possibilités pour trancher par lui-même. Pragmatique, mais n’hésitant pas à prendre des risques, il vient de prouver qu’il était bien maître à bord. Tous les pourparlers à l’amiable ayant échoué, Trump riposte à l’intolérable par les frappes de 59 missiles Tomahawk sur la base syrienne de Shayrat, chargée du largage de gaz sarin. Fait remarquable : sans toucher aux 5 autres bases aériennes de l’armée syrienne et sans causer le moindre dommage aux installations russes. Simple avertissement, parfaitement ciblé et mesuré, destiné à protéger les quelque mille militaires américains présents sur le théâtre d’opérations et à montrer que l’Amérique est de retour et qu’il faut désormais compter avec sa détermination. La Syrie et l’État islamique, mais aussi la Chine, la Russie, l’Iran, la Corée du Nord peuvent en prendre note, tandis que les alliés traditionnels au Moyen-Orient et en Asie se rassurent, comme devraient se rassurer les Européens s’il leur restait quelque bon sens. Et c’est tout ! Il n’y a pas d’escalade, ni d’intention de régler les affaires de la Syrie, ni (hélas !) de reprendre le bâton de policier du monde. Seulement l’intention de ne plus rester passif face aux agressions… Evelyne Joslain
Syria is weird for reasons that transcend even the bizarre situation of bombing an abhorrent Bashar al-Assad who was bombing an abhorrent ISIS — as we de facto ally with Iran, the greater strategic threat, to defeat the more odious, but less long-term strategic threat, ISIS. Trump apparently hit a Syrian airfield to express Western outrage over the likely Syrian use of chemical weapons. Just as likely, he also sought to remind China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that he is unpredictable and not restrained by self-imposed cultural, political, and ethical bridles that seemed to ensure that Obama would never do much over Chinese and Russian cyber-warfare, or Iranian interception of a U.S. warship or the ISIS terror campaign in the West or North Korea’s increasingly creepy and dangerous behavior. But the strike also raised as many questions as it may have answered. (…) Trump campaigned on not getting involved in Syria, deriding the Iraq War, and questioning the Afghan effort. Does his sudden strike signal a Jacksonian effort to hit back enemies if the mood comes upon us — and therefore acceptable to his base as a sort of one-off, don’t-tread-on-me hiss and rattle? Or does the strike that was so welcomed by the foreign-policy establishment worry his supporters that Trump is now putting his suddenly neocon nose in someone’s else’s business? And doing so without congressional authorizations or much exegesis? Does the Left trash Trump for using force or keep quiet, given the ostensible humanitarian basis for the strike, and the embarrassing contrast with Obama, whose reset with Russia led to inviting Putin into the Middle East to solve the WMD problem that we could not, and which Obama and Susan Rice not long ago assured us was indeed solved by our de facto friend at the time Putin? These dilemmas, apart from Obama’s prior confusion about Syria and Russia, arise in part because Trump never thought it wise or necessary to resolve contradictions in Trumpism — especially at what point the long overdue need to restore U.S. respect and deterrence to end “lead from behind” appeasement becomes overseas entanglements not commensurate with Trump’s “America First” assurances. Victor Davis Hanson
Now we’re coming to grips with the human and strategic price of the Obama administration’s mendacity. The sham agreement gave Assad confidence that he could continue to murder his opponents indefinitely without fear of Western reprisal. It fostered the view that his regime was preferable to its opponents. It showed Tehran that it could drive a hard diplomatic bargain over its nuclear file, given that the administration was so plainly desperate for face-saving excuses for inaction. And it left Mr. Obama’s successor with a lousy set of options. Rex Tillerson and Nikki Haley erred badly by announcing, just days before last week’s sarin attack, that the Trump administration had no plans to depose Assad. They gave the dictator reason to believe he had as little to fear from this U.S. president as he did from the last one. But, unlike their predecessors, the secretary of state and U.N. ambassador deserve credit for learning from that mistake—as does the president they serve. The core of the problem in Syria isn’t Islamic State, dreadful as it is. It’s a regime whose appetite for unlimited violence is one of the main reasons ISIS has thrived. To say there is no easy cure for Syria should not obscure the fact that there won’t be any possibility of a cure until Assad falls. Mr. Obama and his advisers will never run out of self-justifications for their policy in Syria. They can’t outrun responsibility for the consequences of their lies. Bret Stephens

Attention: un mensonge peut en cacher un autre !

Au terme d’une semaine à donner le tournis …

Où l’on redécouvre non seulement en Syrie les armes chimiques soi-disant inexistantes de Saddam Hussein

Mais où après avoir tant critiqué les guerres d’Irak – prétendus mensonges sur les ADM compris – et d’Afghanistan ou appelé à la retenue sur la Syrie …

Le champion de l’Amérique d’abord et de la non-ingérence surprend tout son monde …

Avec le bombardement d’une base aérienne syrienne d’où aurait été lancé une attaque chimique de populations civiles …

Comment au-delà des nombreuses questions que soulève le revirement du président Trump …

Ne pas voir l’incroyable propension au mensonge d’une Administration …

Qui sans compter la mise sur écoutes et l’autorisation de fuites à la presse concernant l’équipe de son futur successeur …

Se vantait jusqu’il y a trois mois de son accord d’élimination des ADM syriennes ?

Et surtout ne pas s’inquiéter de l’autre grand motif de fierté de ladite administration Obama …

A savoir l’accord prétendument sans faille sur le nucléaire iranien ?

The Price of Obama’s Mendacity
The consequences of his administration’s lies about Syria are becoming clear
Bret Stephens
The Wall Street Journal
April 10, 2017

Last week’s cruise-missile strike against a Syrian air base in response to Bashar Assad’s use of chemical weapons has reopened debate about the wisdom of Barack Obama’s decision to forgo a similar strike, under similar circumstances, in 2013.

But the real issue isn’t about wisdom. It’s about honesty.

On Sept. 10, 2013, President Obama delivered a televised address in which he warned of the dangers of not acting against Assad’s use of sarin gas, which had killed some 1,400 civilians in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta the previous month.

“If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons,” Mr. Obama said. “As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them. Over time, our troops would again face the prospect of chemical weapons on the battlefield. And it could be easier for terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons, and use them to attack civilians.”

It was a high-minded case for action that the president immediately disavowed for the least high-minded reason: It was politically unpopular. The administration punted a vote to an unwilling Congress. It punted a fix to the all-too-willing Russians. And it spent the rest of its time in office crowing about its success.

In July 2014 Secretary of State John Kerry claimed “we got 100% of the chemical weapons out.” In May 2015 Mr. Obama boasted that “Assad gave up his chemical weapons. That’s not speculation on our part. That, in fact, has been confirmed by the organization internationally that is charged with eliminating chemical weapons.” This January, then-National Security Adviser Susan Rice said “we were able to get the Syrian government to voluntarily and verifiably give up its chemical weapons stockpile.”

Today we know all this was untrue. Or, rather, now all of us know it. Anyone paying even slight attention has known it for years.

In June 2014 U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power noted “discrepancies and omissions related to the Syrian government’s declaration of its chemical weapons program.” But that hint of unease didn’t prevent her from celebrating the removal “of the final 8% of chemical weapons materials in Syria’s declaration” of its overall stockpile.

The following summer, The Wall Street Journal’s Adam Entous and Naftali Bendavid reported “U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the [Assad] regime didn’t give up all of the chemical weapons it was supposed to.” In February 2016, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed the Journal’s story, telling Congress “Syria has not declared all the elements of its chemical weapons program.”

Why did Mr. Obama and his senior officials stick to a script that they knew was untethered from the facts? Let’s speculate. They thought the gap between Assad’s “declared” and actual stockpile was close enough for government work. They figured a credulous press wouldn’t work up a sweat pointing out the difference. They didn’t imagine Assad would use what was left of his chemical arsenal for fear of provoking the U.S.

And they didn’t want to disturb the public narrative that multilateral diplomacy was a surer way than military action to disarm rogue Middle Eastern regimes of their illicit weapons. Two months after Mr. Obama’s climb-down with Syria, he signed on to the interim nuclear deal with Iran. The remainder of his term was spent trying not to upset the fragile beauty of his nuclear diplomacy.

Now we’re coming to grips with the human and strategic price of the Obama administration’s mendacity. The sham agreement gave Assad confidence that he could continue to murder his opponents indefinitely without fear of Western reprisal. It fostered the view that his regime was preferable to its opponents. It showed Tehran that it could drive a hard diplomatic bargain over its nuclear file, given that the administration was so plainly desperate for face-saving excuses for inaction.

And it left Mr. Obama’s successor with a lousy set of options.

Rex Tillerson and Nikki Haley erred badly by announcing, just days before last week’s sarin attack, that the Trump administration had no plans to depose Assad. They gave the dictator reason to believe he had as little to fear from this U.S. president as he did from the last one.

But, unlike their predecessors, the secretary of state and U.N. ambassador deserve credit for learning from that mistake—as does the president they serve. The core of the problem in Syria isn’t Islamic State, dreadful as it is. It’s a regime whose appetite for unlimited violence is one of the main reasons ISIS has thrived. To say there is no easy cure for Syria should not obscure the fact that there won’t be any possibility of a cure until Assad falls.

Mr. Obama and his advisers will never run out of self-justifications for their policy in Syria. They can’t outrun responsibility for the consequences of their lies.

Voir aussi:

Hall of Mirrors in Syria
Victor Davis Hanson
The National Review Corner
April 10, 2017

Syria is weird for reasons that transcend even the bizarre situation of bombing an abhorrent Bashar al-Assad who was bombing an abhorrent ISIS — as we de facto ally with Iran, the greater strategic threat, to defeat the more odious, but less long-term strategic threat, ISIS.

Trump apparently hit a Syrian airfield to express Western outrage over the likely Syrian use of chemical weapons. Just as likely, he also sought to remind China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that he is unpredictable and not restrained by self-imposed cultural, political, and ethical bridles that seemed to ensure that Obama would never do much over Chinese and Russian cyber-warfare, or Iranian interception of a U.S. warship or the ISIS terror campaign in the West or North Korea’s increasingly creepy and dangerous behavior.

But the strike also raised as many questions as it may have answered.

Is Trump saying that he can send off a few missiles anywhere and anytime rogues go too far? If so, does that willingness to use force enhance deterrence? (probably); does it also risk further escalation to be effective? (perhaps); and does it solve the problem of an Assad or someone similar committing more atrocities? (no).

Was the reason we hit Assad, then, because he is an especially odious dictator and kills his own, or that the manner in which he did so was cruel and barbaric (after all, ISIS burns, drowns, and cuts apart its victims without much Western reprisals until recently)? Or is the reason instead that he used WMD, and since 1918 with a few exceptions (largely in the Middle East), “poison” gas has been a taboo weapon among the international community? (Had Assad publicly beheaded the same number who were gassed, would we have intervened?)

Do we continue to sort of allow ISIS to fight it out with Syria/Iran/Hezbollah in the manner of our shrug during the Iran-Iraq War and in the fashion until Pearl Harbor that we were okay with the Wehrmacht and the Red Army killing each other en masse for over five months in Russia? Or do we say to do so cynically dooms innocents in a fashion that they are not quite as doomed elsewhere, or at least not doomed without chance of help as is true in North Korea?

Trump campaigned on not getting involved in Syria, deriding the Iraq War, and questioning the Afghan effort. Does his sudden strike signal a Jacksonian effort to hit back enemies if the mood comes upon us — and therefore acceptable to his base as a sort of one-off, don’t-tread-on-me hiss and rattle?

Or does the strike that was so welcomed by the foreign-policy establishment worry his supporters that Trump is now putting his suddenly neocon nose in someone’s else’s business? And doing so without congressional authorizations or much exegesis?

Does the Left trash Trump for using force or keep quiet, given the ostensible humanitarian basis for the strike, and the embarrassing contrast with Obama, whose reset with Russia led to inviting Putin into the Middle East to solve the WMD problem that we could not, and which Obama and Susan Rice not long ago assured us was indeed solved by our de facto friend at the time Putin?

These dilemmas, apart from Obama’s prior confusion about Syria and Russia, arise in part because Trump never thought it wise or necessary to resolve contradictions in Trumpism — especially at what point the long overdue need to restore U.S. respect and deterrence to end “lead from behind” appeasement becomes overseas entanglements not commensurate with Trump’s “America First” assurances. At some point, does talking and tweeting toughly (“bomb the sh** out of ISIS”) require a Tomahawk missile to retain credibility? And does “Jacksonianism” still allow blowing some stuff up, but not doing so at great cost and for the ideals of consensual government rather than immediate U.S. security?

Most likely for now, Trump’s strike resembles Reagan’s 1986 Libyan bombing that expressed U.S. outrage over Libyan support for then recent attacks on Americans in Berlin. But Reagan’s dramatic act (in pursuit of U.S. interests, not international norms) did not really stop Moammar Qaddafi’s support for terrorists (cf. the 1988 likely Libyan-inspired retaliatory Lockerbie bombing) or do much else to muzzle Qaddafi.

About all we can say, then, about Trump’s action was that he felt like it was overdue — or like a high-school friend once put to me after unexpectedly unloading on a school bully who daily picked on weaklings, “It seemed a good idea at the time.”

Voir également:

La semaine de Trump.Virage à 180 degrés sur la Syrie
Gabriel Hassan
Courrier international
07/04/2017

Attaque à l’arme chimique en Syrie, rencontres avec les présidents égyptien et chinois : la semaine de Donald Trump a été très chargée sur le front diplomatique. Avec des déclarations à donner le tournis.

Le départ de Bachar El-Assad de Syrie ne faisait pas partie jusqu’ici des priorités du président Trump. L’attaque chimique qui a eu lieu dans la région d’Idlib pourrait changer les choses.

  • Les États-Unis attaquent Bachar El-Assad

Donald Trump change de cap. Trois jours après l’attaque chimique à Khan Cheikhoun, dans la région d’Idlib (nord-ouest de la Syrie), le président américain a ordonné le bombardement d’une base aérienne syrienne.

Dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi – vers 20 h 40 heure de Washington – 59 missiles Tomahawk ont été tirés par la marine américaine. Il s’agit de “la première attaque américaine contre le régime de Bachar El-Assad depuis le début de la guerre en Syrie”, il y a six ans, souligne The Washington Post. Et de la première intervention militaire de la présidence Trump.

Le président américain a déclaré cette nuit qu’“il [était] dans l’intérêt national et vital des États-Unis de prévenir et de décourager la propagation et le recours aux armes chimiques mortelles”, rapporte The New York Times.

Réuni en urgence à l’Organisation des Nations unies mercredi soir, le Conseil de sécurité avait, à l’exception de la Russie, fermement condamné le régime de Bachar El-Assad. Brandissant des photos de victimes, l’ambassadrice américaine Nikki Haley avait assuré que les États-Unis étaient prêts à agir unilatéralement en cas de mésentente.

L’opération militaire de la nuit dernière constitue un revirement important. Il y a une semaine, Nikki Haley avait laissé entendre que Washington s’accommoderait de Bachar El-Assad, mais l’attaque à l’arme chimique perpétrée près d’Idlib, qui a fait des dizaines de victimes, semble avoir tout remis en question. Le 5 avril, Trump a déclaré que le président syrien avait franchi “beaucoup, beaucoup de lignes”, laissant ainsi entendre qu’il devrait peut-être partir.

  • Deux hommes forts en visite

Le président égyptien Abdelfattah Al-Sissi en début de semaine à la Maison-Blanche, le président chinois Xi Jinping jeudi 6 et vendredi 7 avril à Mar-a-Lago, en Floride : Trump aura reçu en quelques jours deux présidents très autoritaires.

Le dirigeant américain a fait un véritable éloge du leader égyptien, saluant son “boulot fantastique, dans une situation très difficile”. Pour une large partie de la presse américaine, ce soutien affiché à un régime brutal est une erreur, qui ne sert qu’en apparence les intérêts américains.

Les discussions s’annonçaient plus difficiles avec le président chinois, accueilli dans la résidence personnelle de Donald Trump en Floride. Sur Twitter, avant leur rencontre, le locataire de la Maison-Blanche avait mis la pression, car il a besoin de la coopération de Pékin en matière commerciale, et surtout concernant le brûlant dossier nord-coréen. Xi Jinping avait donc beaucoup de cartes en main. Et Trump ne pouvait pas cette fois pratiquer la “diplomatie du golf”, un sport mal vu chez les officiels chinois.

  • Lutte de clans à la Maison-Blanche

L’influence de Steve Bannon, l’éminence grise de Trump, n’est apparemment plus sans limite. Le stratège en chef de Donald Trump a été évincé le 5 avril du Conseil de sécurité nationale, où sa nomination avait fait polémique. Une victoire pour le conseiller de Trump pour la sécurité nationale, le lieutenant général H. R. McMaster.

À travers lui, c’est le clan des “nationalistes économiques”, tenants d’une ligne populiste, qui essuie un revers.

À l’inverse, Jared Kushner, gendre de Trump et membre, selon un chroniqueur du Washington Post, du clan des “New-Yorkais” ou “démocrates”, n’en finit plus d’accumuler les missions. À son programme : réformer l’État fédéral, instaurer la paix au Proche-Orient, servir d’intermédiaire avec la Chine ou le Mexique. Rien que cela… En visite en Irak en début de semaine, l’époux d’Ivanka Trump a même devancé le secrétaire d’État américain sur ce terrain hautement stratégique dans la lutte contre Daech.

  • Encore des accusations

Rares sont les semaines où Trump ne fait pas de déclaration polémique. Le président a encore émis des accusations sans preuve, visant cette fois Susan Rice, conseillère de Barack Obama pour la sécurité nationale. D’après lui, cette dernière pourrait avoir commis un crime en demandant à ce que soient dévoilés les noms de collaborateurs de Trump mentionnés de manière incidente dans des communications interceptées lors de la présidence d’Obama. Reprenant à son compte des accusations lancées par des médias conservateurs, Trump a déclaré au New York Times :

C’est une affaire tellement importante pour notre pays et pour le monde. C’est une des grandes affaires de notre temps.”

Pour ses détracteurs, cette assertion n’est que la dernière tentative en date pour détourner l’attention des questions au sujet des liens de son entourage avec la Russie. En mars, Trump avait accusé Obama de l’avoir “mis sur écoute” à la Trump Tower durant la campagne présidentielle.

  • Neil Gorsuch élu à la Cour suprême

C’était une promesse du candidat républicain Donald Trump : “Neil Gorsuch est devenu, vendredi 7 avril, le neuvième juge de la Cour suprême”, annonce le NewYork Times.

Depuis plus d’un an, démocrates et républicains s’opposaient sur le remplacement du juge Antonin Scalia, décédé soudainement en février 2016. Quelques jours après son investiture, le président américain avait annoncé la nomination de M. Gorsuch à laquelle s’opposaient farouchement les démocrates.

Minoritaires au Sénat – composé de 52 démocrates et 48 républicains – les partisans de Donald Trump avaient prévenu qu’ils passeraient en force. Chose faite ce vendredi : les républicains ont abaissé la majorité requise pour permettre ce scrutin, un changement historique des règles, explique le quotidien américain.

Favorables aux armes à feu et fermement opposé à l’avortement, Neil Gorsuch siégera donc dans la chambre haute du Congrès à partir de la mi-avril. Il a été nommé à vie.

  • Twitter poursuit Washington en justice

Le bras de fer se poursuit entre la Maison-Blanche et Twitter. Il y a quelques semaines, le président américain demandait au réseau social de lui fournir les données et l’identité des personnes qui se cachaient derrière les comptes hostiles à sa politique.

Mais, jeudi 6 avril, Twitter, refusant de fournir une quelconque information, a saisi la justice. La plateforme, citée par The Washington Post, rappelle que “les droits à la liberté d’expression accordés aux utilisateurs de Twitter et à Twitter lui-même en vertu du premier amendement de la Constitution incluent un droit à diffuser des propos politiques anonymes ou sous pseudonyme”. Donald Trump n’a, pour l’heure, pas rétorqué.

 Voir encore:

Trump peut-il gouverner ?
Evelyne Joslain
Les 4 vérités
10 avril, 2017

L’actualité de ces dernières semaines a mené certains à douter de la maîtrise de Trump sur son personnel et sur sa politique intérieure, tandis que d’autres le disaient carrément indifférent aux affaires étrangères.

D’abord le fiasco Ryancare. Fidèle à ses promesses, Trump a voulu abroger l’Obamacare, mais mal lui en a pris de faire confiance au si peu fiable Speaker de la Chambre, Paul Ryan, et de s’engager à ses côtés, croyant pouvoir ainsi gagner des votes démocrates.

Le « plan en 3 phases » du technocrate Ryan, trop compliqué et n’abrogeant pas les pires mesures de la loi d’Obama, ne pouvait que rencontrer l’opposition ferme du Freedom Caucus, la trentaine de représentants les plus conservateurs de la base électorale de Trump.

L’échec est pour Ryan. Trump s’en sort plutôt bien, même si le poids fiscal d’Obamacare perdure et va donc le gêner dans sa réforme fiscale d’envergure.

Au moins a-t-il appris, sur le tas, qu’il ne servait à rien de courtiser des démocrates obtus et qu’il valait mieux pour lui s’impliquer le moins possible dans les jeux du Congrès.

Puis, font désordre les disputes de personnel au sein des divers ministères et le fait que Trump, soi-disant complètement ballotté entre des avis divergents, tarderait à débarrasser son administration « des restes d’Obama », même à des postes élevés, parce que, en gros, il subirait l’influence de Tillerson, Mattis, McMaster et Kushner (le « Premier Gendre »), tous des centristes-interventionnistes, en opposition radicale au nationaliste-isolationniste Bannon…

Tout cela sur fond de l’exécrable Russiagate, servi tous les jours par les démocrates dans l’espoir de délégitimer Trump et de l’empêcher de gouverner. Lassant, le feuilleton se retourne contre ses auteurs avec le scandale des écoutes de l’équipe de transition de Trump : ex-ambassadeur à l’ONU et ex-Conseiller à la Sécurité nationale, l’incroyable Susan Rice, après avoir nié (ce n’était jamais que la 4e fois qu’elle mentait pour protéger Obama), reconnaît avoir « dévoilé » l’identité de plusieurs personnes et autorisé des fuites à la presse… Rappelons que les démocrates ne s’émouvaient pas des ingérences russes lorsque celles-ci semblaient favoriser leur candidate et que ce sont eux qui ont un long passé de connivence avec la Russie : de Roosevelt et Staline aux espions à la solde de l’URSS sous Truman, jusqu’à la « flexibilité » promise par Obama en 2012 à Medvedev, concrétisée en 2013 par l’abandon pur et simple de ses responsabilités au Moyen-Orient à Poutine…

La réalité est que Trump peuple ses agences de gens d’avis opposés, exprès, afin d’appréhender toutes les possibilités pour trancher par lui-même.

Pragmatique, mais n’hésitant pas à prendre des risques, il vient de prouver qu’il était bien maître à bord. Tous les pourparlers à l’amiable ayant échoué, Trump riposte à l’intolérable par les frappes de 59 missiles Tomahawk sur la base syrienne de Shayrat, chargée du largage de gaz sarin. Fait remarquable : sans toucher aux 5 autres bases aériennes de l’armée syrienne et sans causer le moindre dommage aux installations russes.

Simple avertissement, parfaitement ciblé et mesuré, destiné à protéger les quelque mille militaires américains présents sur le théâtre d’opérations et à montrer que l’Amérique est de retour et qu’il faut désormais compter avec sa détermination.

La Syrie et l’État islamique, mais aussi la Chine, la Russie, l’Iran, la Corée du Nord peuvent en prendre note, tandis que les alliés traditionnels au Moyen-Orient et en Asie se rassurent, comme devraient se rassurer les Européens s’il leur restait quelque bon sens.

Et c’est tout ! Il n’y a pas d’escalade, ni d’intention de régler les affaires de la Syrie, ni (hélas !) de reprendre le bâton de policier du monde. Seulement l’intention de ne plus rester passif face aux agressions…

Et Trump gouverne bel et bien, malgré les obstacles et les commentaires malveillants.

La liste de ses accomplissements est déjà longue. Signe de confiance, les indices boursiers sont bons. Les emplois reviennent grâce aux dérégulations signées par décret exécutif. Les syndicats du privé sont apaisés et le climat est redevenu favorable aux petites entreprises, tandis que sont mis en œuvre des moyens nouveaux pour réduire le poids de l’État fédéral. Des milliers de récidivistes illégaux ont été déportés, 1 500 hackers pédophiles arrêtés…

En fait, les bonnes nouvelles n’arrêtent pas !

Voir par ailleurs:

Le jour où Obama a flanché
Exclusif.  En 2013, l’ex-président américain renonçait, au dernier  moment et malgré sa promesse, à frapper El-Assad. Le documentariste  Antoine Vitkine nous révèle les coulisses de cette volte-face
Antoine Vitkine
Le Point
13 avril 2017

Cette interrogation n’en finit pas de tourmenter  Barack Obama. A-t-il pris, ce jour-là, la bonne décision  ? De cette décision il a affirmé être  « fier », mais il a aussi assuré, dans une même interview, que  le dossier syrien est  «  son plus grand regret  ».  Par prudence, mieux vaut dire tout et son contraire, car il  sait ce qu’on en pense  : sa décision a changé la face  du monde. La plus grave attaque chimique depuis  la Seconde Guerre mondiale demeurée impunie  ? La  victoire de Bachar el-Assad  ? L’ascension des djihadistes  ? La montée en puissance des Russes au Moyen- Orient, en Europe et au-delà  ? L’effacement de l’Occident  ? Peut-être même la victoire de Donald Trump  ?  Tout partirait de son choix, de cette journée-là.

Le 30 août 2013, l’été s’achève à Washington dans  une épuisante touffeur. Tout juste rentré de quelques  jours de vacances sur l’île de Martha’s Vineyard, où il  a fait du VTT avec Michelle, il lui faut de nouveau assumer une charge harassante. A quoi bon cette réunion  ? Le sort n’en est-il pas jeté  ? Ce vendredi, en début  d’après-midi, dans la salle de crise de la Maison-Blanche,  il participe à une ultime réunion du Conseil de sécurité consacrée à l’intervention militaire contre le régime syrien. Autour de lui, ses conseillers, dont Philip   Gordon, qui s’occupe du Moyen-Orient,  les dirigeants de l’armée, ses ministres les plus importants, dont John Kerry, son secrétaire d’Etat. Pour tous,  l’intervention ne fait aucun doute. Le matin même,  il a annoncé publiquement réfléchir à  «  une action limitée contre Bachar  ».  Ses alliés français, la Ligue arabe,  l’Australie fourbissent leurs armes. Kerry a quasiment  annoncé la réplique américaine  :  « La crédibilité du président comme celle des Etats-Unis sont engagées.  »  Et même  :  « L’Histoire nous jugerait sévèrement si on ne faisait rien » …

A  vrai  dire,  il  n’aurait  jamais  pensé  se  retrouver   dans cette situation. Autour de la table, chacun a en  tête  sa  conférence  de  presse  donnée  un  an  auparavant, presque jour pour jour, le 20 août 2012, et une  phrase. Un journaliste lui avait demandé ce qui pourrait infléchir sa position, pour le moins prudente, sur  le conflit syrien, lui qui refuse d’armer les rebelles.  «  Pour nous, la ligne rouge, c’est l’utilisation d’armes chimiques  ; ça changerait ma vision des choses  »,  avait-il  répondu. A question imprévue réponse non préparée. Ses  conseillers avaient été interloqués. Certes, El-Assad  avait été mis en garde par des canaux discrets, mais  rendre  publique  une  ligne  rouge  n’est  jamais  une   bonne chose. On s’était promptement rassuré  ; le régime  syrien  semblait  tellement  affaibli  qu’il  n’oserait pas s’attirer les foudres du président des Etats-Unis.

Il a pourtant osé, comme en témoignent les schémas et les photos satellites qu’on diffuse dans la salle  de crise. Il y a eu d’abord de petites attaques chimiques  au printemps. Puis, devant l’absence de réactions, le  21 août 2013, cette attaque d’ampleur dans la banlieue  de Damas, plus tard contestée  (voir ci-contre).  Bachar  a-t-il voulu tester les Etats-Unis  ? Ou, simplement, son  armée n’avait-elle pas d’autres moyens de terrifier sa  population insurgée  ? On ne sait pas. Auprès de Philip Gordon, Obama a insisté  :  «  Il nous faut des preuves.  »  «  Le président était hanté par l’Irak et ne voulait pas entrer  en  guerre  sur  la  base  de  simples  suspicions» ,  témoigne   Gordon. Mais les preuves sont là. Les obus au gaz sarin tirés par le camp loyaliste ont tué environ 1  400  personnes, dont beaucoup d’enfants, selon une note de  la CIA dont chacun, dans la pièce, a reçu une copie.  Plus  contraignantes  que  les  preuves,  les  images.   Atroces, elles ont fait le tour du monde. Ce père qui  tient sa fillette morte dans les bras et qui l’interpelle,  lui, le président des Etats-Unis  :  «  Je vous en prie  ! Ce  ne sont que des enfants  ! Ils n’ont encore rien vu de la vie.  Du chimique ! »  Il est contraint de répondre. Un tabou,  depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, a été transgressé,  les traités internationaux ont été violés, l’ordre du  monde menacé, l’Amérique défiée.

Devant ses conseillers, il assume sa phrase.  «  Il nous  a dit  : “Quand j’ai parlé d’une ligne rouge, c’est vraiment  ce  que  je  voulais  dire”   »,   se  souvient  Gordon.  Tous  le   poussent à agir, et d’abord les plus proches, les plus réalistes, Gordon, justement, ou l’avisé Antony Blinken, qui lâche  :  «  Une superpuissance ne bluffe pas.  » « La  frappe doit servir d’avertissement à l’Iran, au Hezbollah  ou à la Corée du Nord si un jour ils songeaient à recourir  à des armes de destruction massive  » , déclare pour sa part  Kerry. Ils lui présentent les différentes options. Le général Flynn, alors chef du renseignement militaire, a  participé à la sélection des cibles  : aéroports, centres  de commandement, bases militaires, dépôts d’armes.  «  Cela aurait été dévastateur et aurait considérablement  atténué la capacité du régime à frapper des non-combattants »,   nous  déclare-t-il.  Autour  de  la  table,  Martin   Dempsey, chef d’état-major, fait savoir  :  «  On a le doigt  sur la détente.  »  Faut-il une journée de frappes ou plusieurs  ? Les militaires prônent plusieurs jours d’intervention.  Il  suit  leur  avis.  Des  frappes  aériennes  en   Syrie seront déclenchées le lendemain dans la nuit, à  3  heures GMT. La réunion s’achève : les derniers choix  militaires  sont  arrêtés.  Les  conseillers  quittent  les   lieux. Remarquent-ils qu’il n’a pas donné d’ordre, qu’il  n’a pas dit  « allez-y »  et n’a pas encore signé d’ordre  ? Il  a laissé la décision se prendre toute seule, portée par  sa propre logique, se contentant de suivre l’avis géné ral. Il n’a rien dit des doutes qui l’assaillent.

Tout le pousse à intervenir… Mais… Le Parlement  britannique  a  mis  son  veto  la  veille.  C’est  une  première alerte. Et si le régime s’effondrait à la suite des  frappes  ? L’Amérique deviendrait responsable du chaos  qui pourrait en résulter, après l’Irak, après la Libye. Il  a entre les mains des rapports indiquant que le régime  syrien est plus fébrile que jamais. Des officiers expédient leurs familles hors de Damas. Les opposants se  disent prêts à fondre sur la capitale si le pouvoir, déjà  affaibli, flanchait. Quelle est l’alternative politique au  régime  ? Depuis plusieurs jours, les partisans du soutien à la rébellion ne ménagent pas leurs efforts pour  le rallier à leurs vues, comme Robert Ford, ex-ambassadeur américain à Damas  :  «  Au sein de l’administration,  certains  craignaient  que  les  djihadistes  prennent  le   pouvoir à Damas. Je n’y croyais pas. Les modérés étaient,  à ce moment-là, les plus forts  »,  explique-t-il. Quelques  jours plus tôt, il a rencontré Obama pour le persuader que  «  frapper convaincra le régime de négocier vraiment  à  Genève   ».   Ford  a  l’impression  d’avoir  réussi…   Gordon,  lui  aussi,  s’est  voulu  rassurant   :   « Quelques  jours de frappes ne suffiront pas à décapiter un régime qui  s’accroche au pouvoir.  »  Mais comment en être sûr  ?

L’agenda se rappelle à Barack Obama. Il converse  pendant trois quarts d’heure avec son plus proche allié,  le  Français  François  Hollande,  dont  les  Rafale   chargent leurs missiles de croisière Scalp. Il l’assure  que rien n’est changé. L’après-midi s’achève. Son emploi du temps lui laisse enfin un répit. Il n’aime guère  les  choix  tranchés,  préférant  le  consensus.  Mais  la   machine est lancée. Il est président, il peut encore faire marche arrière, mais il faut aller vite  et, cette fois, se décider.  «  J’ai dit  : “Pause. On réfléchit.  J’ai voulu m’extraire des pressions”  »,  confiera-t-il en 2016  au  journaliste  Jeffrey  Goldberg.  Il  a  besoin  de  marcher pour avoir les idées claires. Il propose à un homme  de confiance d’aller se promener dans le jardin de la  Maison-Blanche. Cet homme, c’est son chef de l’ad ministration, Denis McDonough  : ni un militaire ni  un diplomate, mais son collaborateur le plus loyal.  Pendant une heure, il lui livre ses doutes. Tout cela  est trop incertain. Ne va-t-il pas engager son pays dans  une nouvelle guerre alors qu’il a été élu pour se dé sengager de conflits coûteux  ? Et puis, cela ne risque- t-il pas de mettre en péril son grand œuvre, l’accord  nucléaire avec l’Iran  ? Trop de risques. Il teste une idée  auprès de McDonough  : demander une autorisation  préalable au Congrès. Une manière de reculer, car chacun sait qu’un soutien du Congrès est plus qu’incertain. McDonough approuve la prudence de son boss.

En  début  de  soirée,  il  convoque  à  nouveau  ses   conseillers dans son bureau. L’ambiance est décontractée. Il leur annonce la nouvelle. Ils n’en reviennent  pas. Ils insistent  :  «  Ce sera dévastateur pour votre autorité politique »,  le préviennent-ils. Il tient bon. Gordon  nous avoue avoir été estomaqué. Devant lui, Obama  raisonne en politique  :  «  Si ça ne dissuade pas Assad de  recommencer, si des inspecteurs de l’Onu sont pris comme  boucliers humains, si on perd un pilote, j’aurai l’opinion,  le Congrès sur le dos. On me reprochera tout et son contraire,  d’être intervenu, de ne pas être intervenu plus fortement,  de ne pas être intervenu plus légèrement.  »  Gordon se souvient  d’un  autre  argument  du  président   :  le  risque   d’engrenage.  Si  Assad  ou  ses  parrains  russes  et  iraniens  décidaient  d’une  nouvelle  attaque  chimique   «  trois semaines plus tard  »,  alors  «  on devrait frapper de nouveau, et plus fort, et ainsi de suite  ».  Il ne serait plus  maître du processus, craint-il, alors qu’Assad le serait.  Cela, cet homme qui veut tout contrôler ne peut l’accepter. Et rien n’est moins contrôlable qu’une guerre.

Il a désormais quelques annonces délicates à faire.  Il prévient Kerry, qui est furieux.  «  L’Histoire nous jugera  avec une sévérité extrême  »,  lâche ce dernier à ses collaborateurs et à certains de ses homologues étrangers.  Le lendemain, à 18 heures, quelques heures avant l’attaque, il contacte aussi Hollande, qui tombe de haut.  Présent, Laurent Fabius, ministre des Affaires étrangères, nous résume le contenu de la conversation  :  « Il  nous a dit  : c’est plus difficile que prévu, il faut que je consulte…  Bref, plus de ligne rouge. Il n’était pas question pour la  France d’agir seule. Le château de cartes s’est effondré.  » Puis, dans la fournaise d’une fin de journée d’été,  sur le perron de la Maison-Blanche, Barack Obama  tient une conférence de presse  : « J’ai décidé d’intervenir,  proclame-t-il, avant d’ajouter  :  mais je demanderai que cet usage de la force soit approuvé par le Congrès.  »  Il s’est donné du temps. C’est fini. Il vient de changer l’ordre du monde sans pouvoir, à cet instant, le  deviner.  Certains  comprennent  en  revanche  que  rien ne sera plus comme avant.

Sur les hauteurs de Damas, Bachar el-Assad comprend qu’il n’a plus rien à craindre des Occidentaux.  Il se paiera même le luxe d’utiliser de nouveau des  armes  chimiques  deux  ans  plus  tard.  L’opposition   «  modérée  », autour de l’Armée syrienne libre, sent  que l’Occident l’abandonne. Les djihadistes, mieux  armés, recrutent les déçus et montent en puissance,  scellant le piège qui permettra au président syrien de se présenter comme rempart contre le chaos.

Au Kremlin, Vladimir Poutine se jette sur l’occasion. Aux Américains il offre de convaincre El-Assad  de  détruire  ses  armes  chimiques  contre  l’abandon  de tout projet d’intervention. Comment refuser, après  avoir reculé le 30 août  ? La Russie prend la main en  Syrie.  Plus  tard,  Poutine  estimera  ne  rien  redouter  du  président  américain  et  envahira  la  Crimée.  Les   Républicains et un certain Donald Trump, admirateur  de  Poutine,  ne  cesseront  de  dénoncer  ce  nouveau  Munich  et  ce  président  qui  a  affaibli  une   Amérique qu’il faudrait rendre  « great  again ».

Il ne lui reste que des questions sans réponses. Que  se serait-il passé s’il avait frappé  ? Ce 30 août 2013 est-il  le jour où Obama a mis fin au règne des Etats-Unis  comme seule superpuissance mondiale  ? Le jour où  le  camp  des  démocraties  a  dû  renoncer  à  se  battre  pour ses valeurs  ? A-t-il été trop raisonnable dans une  période troublée où un homme d’Etat ne devrait pas  l’être  ? Ou bien est-ce le jour où lui, un sage président,  a évité au Moyen-Orient de vivre un chaos supplémentaire et à l’Amérique de s’y trouver empêtrée  ?

* Ecrivain, documentariste, a réalisé «  Bachar, moi ou le chaos. »


Désinformation: Le mensonge de Chirac sur l’Irak (Even Chirac thought Iraq had WMD’s: Trump’s serial invocations of the war are good reminders of just how mythical Iraq has now become)

25 février, 2016
ChirakWhere was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place on 1983 AD (1403 A.H). You were turned into scattered pits and pieces at that time; 241 mainly marines solders were killed. And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you to leave Aden in lees than twenty four hours! But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where- after vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order- you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousands American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge, but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the “heart” of every Muslim and a remedy to the “chests” of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut , Aden and Mogadishu. Osama bin Laden (Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, Aug. 23, 1996)
Il n’y a pas de devoir plus important que de repousser les Américains hors de la terre sainte. La présence des forces militaires croisées des Etats-Unis est le danger le plus menaçant pour le plus grand pays producteur de pétrole au monde. Osama bin Laden
Si le monde nous dit d’abandonner toutes nos armes et de ne garder que des épées, nous le ferons… Mais s’ils gardent un fusil et qu’ils me disent de ne posséder qu’une épée, alors nous refuserons. Saddam Hussein
Il y a un problème, c’est la possession probable d’armes de destruction massive par un pays incontrôlable, l’Irak. La communauté internationale a raison de s’émouvoir de cette situation. Et elle a eu raison de décider qu’il fallait désarmer l’Irak. (…) Il faut laisser aux inspecteurs le temps de le faire. Jacques Chirac
Dans l’immédiat, notre attention doit se porter en priorité sur les domaines biologique et chimique. C’est là que nos présomptions vis-à-vis de l’Iraq sont les plus significatives : sur le chimique, nous avons des indices d’une capacité de production de VX et d’ypérite ; sur le biologique, nos indices portent sur la détention possible de stocks significatifs de bacille du charbon et de toxine botulique, et une éventuelle capacité de production.  Dominique De Villepin (05.02.03)
Les visées militaires du programme nucléaire iranien ne font plus de doute mais les possibilités de négociations avec le régime de Téhéran n’ont pas été épuisées. (…) De l’avis des experts, d’ici deux à trois ans, l’Iran pourrait être en possession d’une arme nucléaire. Rapport parlementaire français (17 décembre 2008)
Avec la fin de la guerre froide, nous ne faisons actuellement l’objet d’aucune menace directe de la part d’une puissance majeure. Mais la fin du monde bipolaire n’a pas fait disparaître les menaces contre la paix. Dans de nombreux pays se diffusent des idées radicales prônant la confrontation des civilisations, des cultures et des religions. Aujourd’hui, cette volonté de confrontation se traduit par des attentats odieux, qui viennent régulièrement nous rappeler que le fanatisme et l’intolérance mènent à toutes les folies. Demain, elle pourrait prendre d’autres formes, encore plus graves, impliquant des Etats. (…) Notre monde est également marqué par l’apparition d’affirmations de puissance qui reposent sur la possession d’armes nucléaires, biologiques ou chimiques. D’où la tentation de certains Etats de se doter de la puissance nucléaire, en contravention avec les traités. Des essais de missiles balistiques, dont la portée ne cesse d’augmenter, se multiplient partout dans le monde. C’est ce constat qui a conduit le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies à reconnaître que la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, et de leurs vecteurs associés, constituait une menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationale. (…) Mais ce serait faire preuve d’angélisme que de croire que la prévention, seule, suffit à nous protéger. Pour être entendu, il faut aussi, lorsque c’est nécessaire, être capable de faire usage de la force. Nous devons donc disposer d’une capacité importante à intervenir en dehors de nos frontières, avec des moyens conventionnels, afin de soutenir ou de compléter cette stratégie. (…) La dissuasion nucléaire, je l’avais souligné au lendemain des attentats du 11 septembre 2001, n’est pas destinée à dissuader des terroristes fanatiques. Pour autant, les dirigeants d’Etats qui auraient recours à des moyens terroristes contre nous, tout comme ceux qui envisageraient d’utiliser, d’une manière ou d’une autre, des armes de destruction massive, doivent comprendre qu’ils s’exposeraient à une réponse ferme et adaptée de notre part. Cette réponse peut être conventionnelle. Elle peut aussi être d’une autre nature. (…) Nous sommes en mesure d’infliger des dommages de toute nature à une puissance majeure qui voudrait s’en prendre à des intérêts que nous jugerions vitaux. Contre une puissance régionale, notre choix n’est pas entre l’inaction et l’anéantissement. La flexibilité et la réactivité de nos forces stratégiques nous permettraient d’exercer notre réponse directement sur ses centres de pouvoir, sur sa capacité à agir. Toutes nos forces nucléaires ont été configurées en conséquence. C’est dans ce but que, par exemple, le nombre de têtes nucléaires a été réduit sur certains des missiles de nos sous-marins. Mais notre concept d’emploi des armes nucléaires reste bien le même. Il ne saurait, en aucun cas, être question d’utiliser des moyens nucléaires à des fins militaires lors d’un conflit. C’est dans cet esprit que les forces nucléaires sont fréquemment qualifiées « d’armes de non-emploi ». Cette formule ne doit cependant pas laisser planer le doute sur notre volonté et notre capacité à mettre en oeuvre nos armes nucléaires. La menace crédible de leur utilisation pèse en permanence sur les dirigeants animés d’intentions hostiles à notre égard. Elle est essentielle pour les ramener à la raison, leur faire prendre conscience du coût démesuré qu’auraient leurs actes, pour eux-mêmes et pour leurs Etats. Par ailleurs, nous nous réservons toujours le droit d’utiliser un ultime avertissement pour marquer notre détermination à protéger nos intérêts vitaux. Jacques Chirac (19.01.2006)
Dieu merci, l’Europe n’a pas encore atteint le stade où elle se retrouve  nue et sans défense dans le conflit iranien et où elle tremble devant les délires d’un ancien gardien de la révolution devenu fou. Merci, Monsieur le Président Chirac, d’avoir été aussi clair. (…) La France possède encore près de 300 têtes nucléaires dans son arsenal et dispose des engins de lancement les plus modernes pour envoyer ces armes sur n’importe quel point du globe. Ce potentiel de destruction n’a pas vocation à servir de musée, mais à effrayer d’éventuels agresseurs. L’Iran se contente pour l’instant d’agressions verbales – mais combien de temps le resteront-elles ? C’est une bonne chose que Chirac ait placé Téhéran dans sa ligne de mire nucléaire ». Die Presse (Autriche, 20.01.2006)
Un Jacques Chirac inédit a lancé hier un avertissement très dur et inhabituel contre les Etats terroristes. Ambassadeur du pacifisme, de la tempérance et de la mesure pendant la phase préliminaire à la guerre en Irak, et opposé à l’usage de la force contre le régime de Saddam Hussein, le président français change radicalement de terrain. Chirac n’a mentionné aucun Etat en particulier. Il a préféré l’abstraction et a bâti son discours sur la puissance nucléaire de la France, jusqu’ici symbole de la résistance pacifique et pacifiste à la ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’ menée par les Etats-Unis après le 11 septembre. Le président gaulois a rangé sa panoplie de pacifiste et déplié la carte du terrorisme international, considérée comme la feuille de route d’un avenir imprévisible. Et très changeant. ABC (Espagne, 20.01.2006)
Les Etats-Unis n’ont pas envahi l’Irak mais sont intervenus dans un conflit déjà en cours.  Kiron Skinner (conseillère à la sécurité du président Bush)
L’affaire Boidevaix-Mérimée est-elle l’arbre qui cache la forêt ? Certaines sources au Quai d’Orsay l’insinuent. « Il est impossible que Mérimée se soit mouillé pour une telle somme (156 000 dollars), qui n’est pas si importante au regard des risques encourus et des profits possibles », estime un diplomate qui a côtoyé l’ancien représentant de la France au Conseil de sécurité. « Nous sommes plusieurs à penser que les sommes en jeu sont en réalité colossales. » Olivier Weber (Le Point 01/12/05)
Those who still oppose war in Iraq think containment is an alternative — a middle way between all-out war and letting Saddam Hussein out of his box. They are wrong. Sanctions are inevitably the cornerstone of containment, and in Iraq, sanctions kill. In this case, containment is not an alternative to war. Containment is war: a slow, grinding war in which the only certainty is that hundreds of thousands of civilians will die. The Gulf War killed somewhere between 21,000 and 35,000 Iraqis, of whom between 1,000 and 5,000 were civilians. Based on Iraqi government figures, UNICEF estimates that containment kills roughly 5,000 Iraqi babies (children under 5 years of age) every month, or 60,000 per year. Other estimates are lower, but by any reasonable estimate containment kills about as many people every year as the Gulf War — and almost all the victims of containment are civilian, and two-thirds are children under 5. Each year of containment is a new Gulf War. (…) The sanctions exist only because Saddam Hussein has refused for 12 years to honor the terms of a cease-fire he himself signed. In any case, the United Nations and the United States allow Iraq to sell enough oil each month to meet the basic needs of Iraqi civilians. Hussein diverts these resources. Hussein murders the babies. (…) But … it is not the only cost of containment. Containment allows Saddam Hussein to control the political climate of the Middle East. If it serves his interest to provoke a crisis, he can shoot at U.S. planes. He can mobilize his troops near Kuwait. He can support terrorists and destabilize his neighbors. The United States must respond to these provocations. Worse, containment forces the United States to keep large conventional forces in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the region. That costs much more than money. The existence of al Qaeda, and the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, are part of the price the United States has paid to contain Saddam Hussein. Walter Russell Mead
Il est maintenant clair que les assurances données par Chirac ont joué un rôle crucial, persuadant Saddam Hussein de ne pas offrir les concessions qui auraient pu éviter une guerre et le changement de régime. Selon l’ex-vice président Tareq Aziz, s’exprimant depuis sa cellule devant des enquêteurs américains et irakiens, Saddam était convaincu que les Français, et dans une moindre mesure, les Russes allaient sauver son régime à la dernière minute. Amir Taheri
 Les inspecteurs n’ont jamais pu vérifier ce qu’il était advenu de 3,9 tonnes de VX (…) dont la production entre 1988 et 1990 a été reconnue par l’Irak. Bagdad a déclaré que les destructions avaient eu lieu en 1990 mais n’en a pas fourni de preuves. Thérèse Delpech
Comme l’exemple d’usage chimique contre les populations kurdes de 1987-1988 en avait apporté la preuve, ces armes avaient aussi un usage interne. Thérèse Delpech
L’Irak (…) pourrait être l’un des grands succès de cette administration. Joe Biden (10.02.10)
Nous croyons qu’une réussite, la démocratie en Irak peut devenir un modèle pour toute la région. Obama (12.12.11)
Nous ne savons toujours pas ce que l’Irak fait ou s’il a les matériaux nécessaires pour construire des armes nucléaires. Je ne suis pas belliqueux. Mais si nous décidons que nous avons besoin de frapper l’Irak à nouveau, il serait fou de ne pas mener la mission jusqu’à son terme. Si nous ne le faisons pas, nous aurons droit à une situation pire que tout: l’Irak restera une menace et aura plus de motivation que jamais pour nous attaquer. Donald Trump (2000)
Oui, je suppose que oui [j’étais en faveur d’une invasion de l’Irak]. J’aurais aimé que la première invasion se passe mieux. Donald Trump (Sept. 11, 2002)
[George W. Bush] doit faire quelque chose ou ne rien faire, parce peut-être qu’il est trop tôt et qu’il faut peut-être attendre les Nations unies, vous savez. Il subit une grosse pression. Je pense qu’il fait un très bon boulot. Donald Trump (2003)
Je suis le seul sur cette scène à avoir dit « N’allez pas en Irak. N’attaquez pas l’Irak ». Personne d’autre sur cette scène n’a dit ça. Et je l’ai dit haut et fort. Et j’étais dans le secteur privé. Je n’étais pas en politique, heureusement. Mais je l’ai dit, et je l’ai dit haut et fort: « Vous allez déstabiliser le Moyen-Orient ». C’est exactement ce qui s’est passé. Donald Trump (2015)
Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec une gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille filnale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour. C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris presque neuf ans. Et aujourd’hui nous nous souvenons de tout ce que vous avez fait pour le rendre possible. (…) Dur travail et sacrifice. Ces mots décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée. Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles. Près de 4.500 Américains ont perdu la vie, dont 202 héros tombés au champ d’honneur venus d’ici, Fort Bragg. (…) Les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak. Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir. Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays, car malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires. Obama (14.12.11)
Mr. Speaker, I do not think any Member of this body disagrees that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, a murderer, and a man who has started two wars. He is clearly someone who cannot be trusted or believed. The question, Mr. Speaker, is not whether we like Saddam Hussein or not. The question is whether he represents an imminent threat to the American people and whether a unilateral invasion of Iraq will do more harm than good. Mr. Speaker, the front page of The Washington Post today reported that all relevant U.S. intelligence agencies now say, despite what we have heard from the White House, that « Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States. » Even more importantly, our intelligence agencies say that should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he might at that point launch a chemical or biological counterattack. In other words, there is more danger of an attack on the United States if we launch a precipitous invasion. (…) In my view, the U.S. must work with the United Nations to make certain within clearly defined timelines that the U.N. inspectors are allowed to do their jobs. These inspectors should undertake an unfettered search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and destroy them when found, pursuant to past U.N. resolutions. If Iraq resists inspection and elimination of stockpiled weapons, we should stand ready to assist the U.N. in forcing compliance. Bernie Sanders
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had told [general] Tommy Franks that Iraq had biological weapons and was certain to use them on our troops [but] Mubarak refused to make the allegation in public for fear of inciting the Arab street. (…) Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, the kingdom’s longtime ambassador to Washington and a friend of mine since dad’s presidency, came to the Oval Office and told me our allies in the Middle East wanted a decision. George W. Bush
Senior military officers and former Regime officials were uncertain about the existence of WMD during the sanctions period and the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom because Saddam sent mixed messages. Early on, Saddam sought to foster the impression with his generals that Iraq could resist a Coalition ground attack using WMD. Then, in a series of meetings in late 2002, Saddam appears to have reversed course and advised various groups of senior officers and officials that Iraq in fact did not have WMD. His admissions persuaded top commanders that they really would have to fight the United States without recourse to WMD. In March 2003, Saddam created further confusion when he implied to his ministers and senior officers that he had some kind of secret weapon. The CIA
Somewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France’s President Jacques Chirac told Time magazine last February, « There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right … in having decided Iraq should be disarmed. » In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. (…) Saddam’s behavior may have been driven by completely different considerations. (…) ever since the Iran-Iraq war WMD had been an important element of Saddam’s strength within Iraq. He used them against the Kurds in the late 1980s, and during the revolts that broke out after the Gulf War, he sent signals that he might use them against both the Kurds and the Shiites. He may have feared that if his internal adversaries realized that he no longer had the capability to use these weapons, they would try to move against him. In a similar vein, Saddam’s standing among the Sunni elites who constituted his power base was linked to a great extent to his having made Iraq a regional power—which the elites saw as a product of Iraq’s unconventional arsenal. Thus openly giving up his WMD could also have jeopardized his position with crucial supporters. (…) The war was not all bad. I do not believe that it was a strategic mistake, although the appalling handling of postwar planning was. There is no question that Saddam Hussein was a force for real instability in the Persian Gulf, and that his removal from power was a tremendous improvement. There is also no question that he was pure evil, and that he headed one of the most despicable regimes of the past fifty years. I am grateful that the United States no longer has to contend with the malign influence of Saddam’s Iraq in this economically irreplaceable and increasingly fragile part of the world; nor can I begrudge the Iraqi people one day of their freedom. What’s more, we should not forget that containment was failing. The shameful performance of the United Nations Security Council members (particularly France and Germany) in 2002-2003 was final proof that containment would not have lasted much longer; Saddam would eventually have reconstituted his WMD programs, although further in the future than we had thought. Kenneth M. Pollak
If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction program. Bill Clinton (1998)
Iraq is a long way from [the USA], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face. Secretary of State Madeline Albright (1998)
He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983. Sandy Berger (Clinton’s National Security Adviser, 1998)
Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons-of-mass-destruction technology, which is a threat to countries in the region, and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process. Nancy Pelosi
There is no doubt that . . . Saddam Hussein has invigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical, and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf war status. In addition, Saddam continues to redefine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies. Sen. Bob Graham
Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations, and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. Sen. Carl Levin
In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical- and biological-weapons stock, his missile-delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (October 2002)
There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. . . . We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction. Sen. Jay Rockefeller (vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee)
We know that [Saddam] has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country. Al Gore (September 2002)
Iraq’s search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to deter, and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power. Al Gore (2002)
I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force—if necessary—to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security. John Kerry (2002)
We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction. Sen. Ted Kennedy (2002)
The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in October of 1998. We are confident that Saddam Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to build up his chemical- and biological-warfare capabilities. Intelligence reports indicate that he is seeking nuclear weapons. Sen. Robert Byrd (2002)
Without further outside intervention, Iraq should be able to rebuild weapons and missile plants within a year [and] future military attacks may be required to diminish the arsenal again. (…) it is hard to negotiate with a tyrant who has no intention of honoring his commitments and who sees nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as his country’s salvation. The New York Times
Of all the booby traps left behind by the Clinton administration, none is more dangerous—or more urgent—than the situation in Iraq. Over the last year, Mr. Clinton and his team quietly avoided dealing with, or calling attention to, the almost complete unraveling of a decade’s efforts to isolate the regime of Saddam Hussein and prevent it from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. That leaves President Bush to confront a dismaying panorama in the Persian Gulf [where] intelligence photos . . . show the reconstruction of factories long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons. The Washington Post (January 2001)
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option. George W. Bush (January 2003)
Although Saddam’s attitude to al-Qaida has not always been consistent, he has generally rejected suggestions of cooperation. Intelligence nonetheless indicates that … meetings have taken place between senior Iraqi representatives and senior al-Qaida operatives. Butler report (2002)
It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999. The British government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence was credible. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium, and the British government did not claim this. Butler report
I can’t tell you why the French, the Germans, the Brits, and us thought that most of the material, if not all of it, that we presented at the UN on 5 February 2003 was the truth. I can’t. I’ve wrestled with it. [But] when you see a satellite photograph of all the signs of the chemical-weapons ASP—Ammunition Supply Point—with chemical weapons, and you match all those signs with your matrix on what should show a chemical ASP, and they’re there, you have to conclude that it’s a chemical ASP, especially when you see the next satellite photograph which shows the UN inspectors wheeling in their white vehicles with black markings on them to that same ASP, and everything is changed, everything is clean. . . . But George [Tenet] was convinced, John McLaughlin [Tenet’s deputy] was convinced, that what we were presented [for Powell’s UN speech] was accurate. People say, well, INR dissented. That’s a bunch of bull. INR dissented that the nuclear program was up and running. That’s all INR dissented on. They were right there with the chems and the bios. Lawrence Wilkerson
I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did. Three people added that they believed Iraq was also operating a secret calutron plant (a facility for separating uranium isotopes). Kenneth Pollack (National Security Council under Clinton, 2002)
Yet even stipulating—which I do only for the sake of argument—that no weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq in the period leading up to the invasion, it defies all reason to think that Bush was lying when he asserted that they did. To lie means to say something one knows to be false. But it is as close to certainty as we can get that Bush believed in the truth of what he was saying about WMD in Iraq. How indeed could it have been otherwise? George Tenet, his own CIA director, assured him that the case was “a slam dunk.” This phrase would later become notorious, but in using it, Tenet had the backing of all fifteen agencies involved in gathering intelligence for the United States. (…) The intelligence agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Israel, and—yes—France all agreed with this judgment. And even Hans Blix—who headed the UN team of inspectors trying to determine whether Saddam had complied with the demands of the Security Council that he get rid of the weapons of mass destruction he was known to have had in the past—lent further credibility to the case in a report he issued only a few months before the invasion (…) So, once again, did the British, the French, and the Germans, all of whom signed on in advance to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s reading of the satellite photos he presented to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. Norman Podhoretz
Throughout the Bush years, liberals repeated “Bush lied, people died” like a mantra. That slander wasn’t true then and it’s not anymore true now that it has resurfaced. There are many legitimate criticisms of the way the Bush Administration conducted the war in Iraq and even more of the way Obama threw away all the blood and treasure we spent there for the sake of politics, but you have to be malicious or just an imbecile at this point to accuse Bush of lying about WMDs. To begin with, numerous foreign intelligence agencies also believed that Saddam Hussein had an active WMD program. The « intelligence agencies of Germany, Israel, Russia, Britain, China and France » all believed Saddam had WMDs. CIA Director George Tenet also rather famously said that it was a “slam dunk” that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. (…) Additionally, many prominent Democrats who had access to the same intelligence that George Bush did came to the same conclusion and said so publicly. If George W. Bush lied, then by default you have to also believe that Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, John Kerry, John Edwards, Robert Byrd, Tom Daschle, Nancy Pelosi and Bernie Sanders also lied. Even Bernie Sanders, who opposed the war from the beginning, publicly said he believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. (…) Given all of that, it’s no surprise that everyone from the head of the CIA to Bernie Sanders to the British thought that Saddam had WMDs; yet George W. Bush is the one who is accused of deliberately sending American soldiers to their deaths over a lie. No honest person can read all of this and STILL repeat the disgusting smear that George W. Bush lied about WMDs to get us into war in Iraq. John Hawkins
In October 2002, President Bush asked for the consent of Congress — unlike the Clinton resort to force in the Balkans and the later Obama bombing in Libya, both by executive action — before using arms to reify existing American policy. Both the Senate (with a majority of Democrats voting in favor) and the House overwhelmingly approved 23 writs calling for Saddam’s forced removal. The causes of action included Iraq’s violation of well over a dozen U.N. resolutions, Saddam’s harboring of international terrorists (including those who had tried and failed to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993), his plot to murder former president George H. W. Bush, his violations of no-fly zones, his bounties to suicide bombers on the West Bank, his genocidal policies against the Kurds and Marsh Arabs, and a host of other transgressions. Only a few of the causes of action were directly related to weapons of mass destruction. (…) No liberal supporters of the war ever alleged that the Bush administration had concocted WMD evidence ex nihilo in Iraq — and for four understandable reasons: one, the Clinton administration and the United Nations had already made the case about Saddam Hussein’s dangerous possession of WMD stockpiles; two, the CIA had briefed congressional leaders in September and October 2002 on WMD independently and autonomously from its White House briefings (a “slam-dunk case”), as CIA Director George Tenet, a Clinton appointee, later reiterated; three, WMD were only a small concern, at least in the congressional authorization for war, which for the most part dealt with Iraq’s support for terrorism in the post–9/11 climate, violation of the U.N. mandates, and serial genocidal violence directed at Iraq’s own people and neighboring countries; and, four, the invasion was initially successful and its results seemed to have justified it. (…) The surge engineered by General David Petraeus worked so well that Iraq was not much of an issue in the 2008 general election. President-elect Barack Obama entered office with a quiet Iraq. For example, about 60 American soldiers died in 2010 in combat-related operations in Iraq — or roughly 4 percent of all U.S. military deaths that year (1,485), the vast majority of these due to non-combat causes (motor-vehicle and training accidents, non-combat violence, suicide, drugs, illness, etc.). (…) No wonder, then, that Vice President Joe Biden in February 2010 claimed that Iraq was so successful that it might well become one of the administration’s “greatest achievements.” Obama himself was eager, given the apparent calm, to pull out all U.S. peacekeepers before the 2012 election. A mostly quiet Iraq, contrasted with the escalating violence in Afghanistan and the turmoil of the Arab Spring, apparently made that withdrawal possible — so much so that Obama declared: “We’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.” (…) Predictably, the departure of several thousand U.S. peacekeepers from Iraq allowed the Shiite partisan Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to renege on his promises of equitable treatment for all Iraqi factions. Iran sensed the void and sent in Shiite operatives. The extremism of the Arab Spring finally reached Iraq. ISIS was the new Islamic terrorist hydra head that replaced the al-Qaeda head, which had been lopped off in Iraq during the surge. Iraq went from “self-reliant” to being the nexus of Middle East unrest. All President Obama’s euphemisms for ISIS violence did not mask the reality of the disintegration of Iraq. (…) Had Eisenhower, in Obama-like worry over his 1956 reelection bid, yanked out all U.S. peacekeepers in December 1955, and blamed the resulting debacle on his Democratic predecessor (“Truman’s War”), while writing off the North Korean aggressors as jayvees, we can imagine a quick North Korean absorption of the South, with the sort of death and chaos we are now seeing in Iraq. (…) We can surely argue about Iraq, but we must not airbrush away facts. The mystery of the current Iraq fantasy is not that a prevaricating Donald Trump misrepresents the war in the fashion of Democratic senators and liberal pundits who once eagerly supported it, but that his Republican opponents so easily let him do it. Victor Davis Hanson

Attention: un mensonge peut en cacher un autre !

Services de renseignements américains, britanniques, russes, allemands, français et israéliens, inspecteurs internationaux en Irak, officiers de Saddam, Mubarak, Prince Bandar, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, John Kerry, John Edwards, Robert Byrd, Tom Daschle, Nancy Pelosi, Bernie Sanders …

A l’heure où, les mythes ont la vie dure, le candidat républicain Donald Trump entonne à son tour le refrain du prétendu mensonge de l’ancien président George W. Bush sur les ADM de Saddam à la veille de l’invasion américaine du printemps 2003 …

Et pour ceux qui, 13 ans après, n’ont toujours pas compris que la question n’était pas l’existence des ADM de Saddam, ce dont tout le monde – services de renseignements français et officiers de Saddam compris – étaient convaincus, mais la manière de traiter le problème …

Devinez qui, évoquant dans une interview à Time de février 2003 le « problème » de la « possession probable d’armes de destruction massive par l’Irak » et la nécessité, certes par la voie non-militaire des inspections, de le « désarmer » …

S’était joint à l’interminable liste desdits  » menteurs » …

Interview de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à « Time Magazine » du 16 février 2003, sur sa position en faveur de la poursuite des inspections en Irak, le rôle positif de la présence militaire américaine au Moyen Orient pour le désarmement irakien, les relations franco-américaines et la question d’une nouvelle résolution de l’ONU autorisant des frappes militaires contre l’Irak.

QUESTION – Est-ce que le rapport des inspecteurs, la semaine dernière, a marqué un tournant dans le débat sur l’Iraq ?

LE PRESIDENT – J’avais reçu dans les deux jours précédents une série de coups de téléphone de chefs d’Etat, membres du Conseil de sécurité ou d’ailleurs non membres du Conseil de sécurité. Et j’en avais tiré la conclusion que la recherche déterminée d’une solution au désarmement de l’Iraq par un processus pacifique était partagée par une majorité de responsables politiques.

QUESTION – En cas de guerre, quelles conséquences voyez-vous pour le Moyen Orient ?

LE PRESIDENT – Les conséquences d’une guerre seraient considérables : sur le plan humain, sur le plan politique, par une déstabilisation de l’ensemble de cette région. J’ajoute qu’il est très difficile d’expliquer que l’on va dépenser des sommes colossales pour faire la guerre alors qu’il y a peut-être une autre solution et que l’on ne peut pas assumer le minimum de responsabilité dans le domaine de l’aide au développement.

QUESTION – Pourquoi, plus que Tony BLAIR ou George BUSH, vous attendez-vous à des conséquences aussi graves ?

LE PRESIDENT – Simplement, je n’ai pas la même appréciation. Parmi les conséquences négatives de cette guerre, il y aurait une réaction de la part de l’opinion publique arabe et musulmane. A tort ou à raison, mais c’est un fait. Une guerre de cette nature ne peut pas ne pas donner une forte impulsion au terrorisme. Elle pourrait créer des vocations pour un grand nombre de petits BEN LADEN.

Les musulmans et les chrétiens ont beaucoup à se dire. Et ce n’est pas par la guerre qu’on favorisera ce dialogue. Je suis contre le choc des civilisations. Cela fait le jeu des intégristes.

Il y a un problème, c’est la possession probable d’armes de destruction massive par un pays incontrôlable, l’Iraq. La communauté internationale a raison de s’émouvoir de cette situation. Et elle a eu raison de décider qu’il fallait désarmer l’Iraq.

Alors, les inspections ont commencé. C’est naturellement un travail long et difficile. Il faut laisser aux inspecteurs le temps de le faire. Et, probablement, cela c’est la position de la France, renforcer leurs moyens, notamment leurs moyens d’observation aérienne. Pour le moment, rien ne permet de dire qu’elle ne marche pas.

QUESTION – Est-ce que la France ne se dérobe pas à ses responsabilités sur le plan militaire envers son plus vieil allié ?

LE PRESIDENT – La France n’est pas un pays pacifiste. Nous avons dans les Balkans plus de soldats que les Etats-Unis. La France n’est évidemment pas un pays anti-américain. Elle est profondément amie des Etats-Unis. Elle l’a toujours été. Et la France n’a pas pour vocation de soutenir un régime dictatorial, ni en Iraq, ni ailleurs.

Nous n’avons pas non plus de divergences de vues sur l’objectif : l’élimination des armes de destruction massive de Saddam HUSSEIN. Et, pour tout dire, si Saddam HUSSEIN pouvait disparaître, ce serait certainement le meilleur service qu’il pourrait rendre à son peuple et au monde. Mais nous pensons que cet objectif peut être atteint sans mettre en oeuvre une guerre.

QUESTION – Vous avez l’air de placer davantage la responsabilité sur les inspecteurs, pour qu’ils trouvent les armes, plutôt que sur Saddam HUSSEIN, pour qu’il déclare ce qu’il a ?

LE PRESIDENT – Y-a-t-il en Iraq des armes nucléaires ? Je ne le pense pas. Y-a-t-il d’autres armes de destruction massive ? C’est probable. Il faut donc les trouver et les détruire. Dans la situation où il est actuellement et contrôlé comme il l’est, est-ce que l’Iraq représente un danger important et immédiat pour la région ? Je ne le crois pas. Et donc, dans ces conditions, je préfère poursuivre sur la voie définie par le Conseil de sécurité. Puis, on verra.

QUESTION – Quelle circonstance pourrait justifier la guerre ?

LE PRESIDENT – C’est aux inspecteurs de faire rapport. On leur fait confiance. On leur a donné une mission et on leur fait confiance. S’il faut augmenter leurs moyens, on augmente leurs moyens. Donc, c’est à eux de venir dire un jour au Conseil : « nous avons gagné, c’est terminé, il n’y a plus d’armes de destruction massive », ou bien : « il est impossible pour nous de remplir la mission que vous nous avez donnée, nous nous heurtons à des mauvaises volontés et à des blocages de la part de l’Iraq ». Alors, le Conseil de sécurité serait fondé à délibérer sur ce rapport et à prendre sa décision. Et, dans cette hypothèse, la France n’exclut naturellement aucune option.

QUESTION – Mais, sans la coopération iraquienne, même 300 inspecteurs ne peuvent faire le travailà

LE PRESIDENT – Ça, il n’y a pas l’ombre d’un doute. Mais c’est aux inspecteurs de le dire. Moi, je fais simplement le pari qu’on peut obtenir de l’Iraq une plus grande coopération. Si je me trompe, il sera toujours temps d’en tirer les conséquences.

Quand un régime comme celui de Saddam se trouve pris entre la mort certaine et l’abandon de ses armes, il doit faire le bon choix. Mais je ne suis pas sûr qu’il le fera.

QUESTION – Si, aux Nations Unies, les Etats Unis venaient à présenter une résolution en faveur de la guerre, est-ce que la France utiliserait son droit de veto ?

LE PRESIDENT – J’estime qu’il n’y a pas de raison de faire une nouvelle résolution. Nous sommes dans le cadre de la résolution 1441, poursuivons. Je ne vois pas ce qu’une nouvelle résolution pourrait apporter de plus.

QUESTION – Certains vous accusent d’être animé par l’anti-américanisme ?

LE PRESIDENT – Je connais les Etats-Unis depuis longtemps, j’y suis allé souvent, j’y ai fait des études. J’ai été « fork-lift operator » pour Anheuser-Busch à Saint Louis, j’ai été « soda jerk » chez Howard Johnson. J’ai traversé dans tous les sens les Etats-Unis en auto-stop. J’ai été journaliste et j’ai écrit un article pour le « Times Picayune » de la Nouvelle Orleans qui est paru en une.

Je connais les Etats-Unis mieux peut-être que beaucoup de Français et, j’aime beaucoup les Etats-Unis. J’ai beaucoup de très bons amis là-bas. C’est un pays où je me sens bien. J’aime beaucoup la « junk food » et, chaque fois que je vais aux Etats-Unis, je reviens avec un nombre excessif de kilos.

J’ai toujours été un partisan, un supporter de la solidarité transatlantique. Quand j’entends dire que je suis un anti-américain, je suis triste. Je ne suis pas en colère. Mais je suis triste.

QUESTION – Pensez-vous que le fait que l’Amérique soit la seule superpuissance est un problème ?

LE PRESIDENT – Une société où il y a un seul puissant est toujours une société dangereuse et qui provoque des réactions. C’est pour cela que je suis pour un monde multipolaire dans lequel il est évident que l’Europe a sa place. De toute façon, le monde ne sera pas unipolaire. Dans les cinquante ans qui viennent, la Chine représentera une puissance considérable. Donc, le monde sera différent. Et donc, autant essayer de l’organiser dès maintenant. La solidarité transatlantique restera à la base de ce monde multipolaire de demain dans lequel l’Europe a un rôle à jouer.

QUESTION – Les tensions à cause de l’Iraq n’ont-elles pas empoisonné la relation transatlantique ?

LE PRESIDENT – Je le répète : il faut désarmer l’Iraq. Pour cela, l’Iraq doit faire plus qu’il ne le fait aujourd’hui. Si l’on désarme l’Irak, l’objectif recherché par les Américains sera atteint. Et si on le fait, il n’y a pas de doute sur le fait que ce sera dû en grande partie à la présence de l’armada américaine sur place. S’il n’y avait pas eu l’armée américaine, il n’est pas du tout évident que Saddam aurait accepté de jouer le jeu.

Si l’on va au terme des inspections, les Américains auront en fait gagné dans la mesure où c’est essentiellement grâce à la pression qu’ils auront exercée qu’on aura pu désarmer l’Iraq.

QUESTION – Vous ne pensez pas qu’il serait politiquement extrêmement difficile pour le Président BUSH de faire machine arrière sur la guerre ?

LE PRESIDENT – Je ne suis pas si sûr. Il aurait deux avantages s’il ramène ses soldats. Je me place dans la situation où les inspecteurs diraient : « Maintenant il n’y a plus rien », ce qui prendra encore un certain nombre de semaines. Si l’Iraq n’a pas coopéré et que les inspecteurs disent : « ça ne marche pas », cela pourrait signifier la guerre. Mais si l’Iraq est objectivement désarmé, ses armes de destruction massive éliminées, et que c’est vérifié par les inspecteurs, à ce moment-là, Monsieur BUSH pourra dire deux choses : premièrement,  » grâce à mon intervention, l’Iraq a été désarmé ». Et, deuxièmement, « je l’ai fait sans faire couler le sang ». Dans la vie d’un homme d’Etat, cela compte. Sans faire couler le sang.

QUESTION – Oui, mais Washington pourrait bien aller à la guerre malgré votre plan.

LE PRESIDENT – C’est leur responsabilité. Si jamais ils me demandaient mon conseil, ce n’est pas ce que je leur recommanderais.

Voir aussi:

Le gros mensonge de Donald Trump sur la guerre en Irak

Donald Trump lors d’un meeting organisé à Raleigh en Caroline du Nord le 4 décembre 2015 |REUTERS / Jonathan Drake

Le candidat à l’investiture républicaine affirme qu’il s’était opposé à l’intervention de 2003. Un récit que ne confirment pas vraiment ses propos de l’époque…

Depuis qu’il s’est lancé dans la course à la Maison Blanche, le milliardaire Donald Trump essaye de faire valoir son expertise en politique internationale en affirmant, entre autres, qu’il a toujours été opposé à la guerre en Irak, lancée en mars 2003. Par exemple, le 13 février dernier, lors d’un débat en Caroline du Sud, il a déclaré, face à ses concurrents:

«Je suis le seul sur cette scène à avoir dit « N’allez pas en Irak. N’attaquez pas l’Irak ». Personne d’autre sur cette scène n’a dit ça. Et je l’ai dit haut et fort. Et j’étais dans le secteur privé. Je n’étais pas en politique, heureusement. Mais je l’ai dit, et je l’ai dit haut et fort: « Vous allez déstabiliser le Moyen-Orient ». C’est exactement ce qui s’est passé.»

Son assurance a évidemment fait tiquer bon nombre de journalistes américains, qui ont décidé de fouiller dans le passé du candidat pour retrouver cette soi-disant déclaration prémonitoire. Et comme le montre le site Politifact et le Washington Post, les sources permettant d’étayer ses propos sont très maigres. Le 28 janvier 2003, quelques mois avant l’invasion, Trump était assez indécis sur le sujet devant les caméras de Fox News:

«[George W. Bush] doit faire quelque chose ou ne rien faire, parce peut-être qu’il est trop tôt et qu’il faut peut-être attendre les Nations unies, vous savez. Il subit une grosse pression. Je pense qu’il fait un très bon boulot.»

Une semaine après l’invasion, lors d’une soirée post-Oscars, au bras d’une mannequin qui allait devenir sa femme deux ans plus tard, il explique que la guerre pourrait poser problème, parce que «la guerre est un bordel». Mais quelques jours après, il estimera aussi que «le marché va grimper comme une roquette» avec ce conflit.

Ce n’est qu’un an et demi plus tard que l’homme d’affaires va se montrer très virulent envers une invasion devenue catastrophique. En août 2004, dans Esquire, il parle du «bordel dans lequel nous sommes» et affirme qu’il n’aurait pas géré le conflit de la sorte. Chez Larry King, trois mois plus tard, il dira encore: «Je ne crois pas que nous ayons pris la bonne décision en allant en Irak, vous savez, j’espère que l’on va s’en sortir.»

Jusque-là, rien à voir donc avec ses affirmations du 13 février dernier. Et puis Buzzfeed a retrouvé la trace d’une interview de Trump à l’automne 2002, au micro d’Howard Stern. Un an pile après les attentats du 11 septembre, le célèbre animateur lui demande s’il était en faveur d’une invasion de l’Irak. «Oui, je suppose que oui, avait-il alors répondu. J’aurais aimé que la première invasion [en 1991, ndlr] se passe mieux.»

Cette semaine, sur CNN, Anderson Cooper lui a logiquement demandé de réagir à cet extrait. «J’ai pu dire ça, a répondu Trump. Personne ne m’a demandé ça. Je n’étais pas en politique. C’était certainement la première fois que l’on me posait la question.»

Mais Buzzfeed a aussi ressorti un passage très politique de l’un des nombreux livres de l’homme d’affaires, The America We Deserve («L’Amérique que nous méritons»), publié en 2000:

«Nous ne savons toujours pas ce que l’Irak fait ou s’il a les matériaux nécessaires pour construire des armes nucléaires. Je ne suis pas belliqueux. Mais si nous décidons que nous avons besoin de frapper l’Irak à nouveau, il serait fou de ne pas mener la mission jusqu’à son terme. Si nous ne le faisons pas, nous aurons droit à une situation pire que tout: l’Irak restera une menace et aura plus de motivation que jamais pour nous attaquer.»

Difficile donc de comprendre la position de Donald Trump sur cette guerre très coûteuse pour les Etats-Unis. Mais il apparaît clair aujourd’hui que son discours soi-disant visionnaire ressemble à tout sauf à la vérité.

Flashback to 13 Years Ago: My Statement Opposing the Iraq War
Bernie Sanders

The Huffington Post

10/10/2015

Thirteen years ago, on October 9, 2002, I made the following statement on the floor of the House of Representatives:

Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New Jersey for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think any Member of this body disagrees that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant, a murderer, and a man who has started two wars. He is clearly someone who cannot be trusted or believed. The question, Mr. Speaker, is not whether we like Saddam Hussein or not. The question is whether he represents an imminent threat to the American people and whether a unilateral invasion of Iraq will do more harm than good.

Mr. Speaker, the front page of The Washington Post today reported that all relevant U.S. intelligence agencies now say, despite what we have heard from the White House, that « Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States. » Even more importantly, our intelligence agencies say that should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he might at that point launch a chemical or biological counterattack. In other words, there is more danger of an attack on the United States if we launch a precipitous invasion.

Mr. Speaker, I do not know why the President feels, despite what our intelligence agencies are saying, that it is so important to pass a resolution of this magnitude this week and why it is necessary to go forward without the support of the United Nations and our major allies including those who are fighting side by side with us in the war on terrorism.

But I do feel that as a part of this process, the President is ignoring some of the most pressing economic issues affecting the well-being of ordinary Americans. There has been virtually no public discussion about the stock market’s loss of trillions of dollars over the last few years and that millions of Americans have seen the retirement benefits for which they have worked their entire lives disappear. When are we going to address that issue? This country today has a $340 billion trade deficit, and we have lost 10 percent of our manufacturing jobs in the last 4 years, 2 million decent-paying jobs. The average American worker today is working longer hours for lower wages than 25 years ago. When are we going to address that issue?

Mr. Speaker, poverty in this country is increasing and median family income is declining. Throughout this country family farmers are being driven off of the land; and veterans, the people who put their lives on the line to defend us, are unable to get the health care and other benefits they were promised because of government underfunding. When are we going to tackle these issues and many other important issues that are of such deep concern to Americans?

Mr. Speaker, in the brief time I have, let me give five reasons why I am opposed to giving the President a blank check to launch a unilateral invasion and occupation of Iraq and why I will vote against this resolution. One, I have not heard any estimates of how many young American men and women might die in such a war or how many tens of thousands of women and children in Iraq might also be killed. As a caring Nation, we should do everything we can to prevent the horrible suffering that a war will cause. War must be the last recourse in international relations, not the first. Second, I am deeply concerned about the precedent that a unilateral invasion of Iraq could establish in terms of international law and the role of the United Nations. If President Bush believes that the U.S. can go to war at any time against any nation, what moral or legal objection could our government raise if another country chose to do the same thing?

Third, the United States is now involved in a very difficult war against international terrorism as we learned tragically on September 11. We are opposed by Osama bin Laden and religious fanatics who are prepared to engage in a kind of warfare that we have never experienced before. I agree with Brent Scowcroft, Republican former National Security Advisor for President George Bush, Sr., who stated, « An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken. »

Fourth, at a time when this country has a $6 trillion national debt and a growing deficit, we should be clear that a war and a long-term American occupation ofIraq could be extremely expensive.

Fifth, I am concerned about the problems of so-called unintended consequences. Who will govern Iraq when Saddam Hussein is removed and what role will the U.S. play in ensuing a civil war that could develop in that country? Will moderate governments in the region who have large Islamic fundamentalist populations be overthrown and replaced by extremists? Will the bloody conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority be exacerbated? And these are just a few of the questions that remain unanswered.

If a unilateral American invasion of Iraq is not the best approach, what should we do? In my view, the U.S. must work with the United Nations to make certain within clearly defined timelines that the U.N. inspectors are allowed to do their jobs. These inspectors should undertake an unfettered search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and destroy them when found, pursuant to past U.N. resolutions. If Iraq resists inspection and elimination of stockpiled weapons, we should stand ready to assist the U.N. in forcing compliance.

Voir également:

Iraq: The Real Story

Victor Davis Hanson

National Review

February 23, 2016

Donald Trump constantly brings up Iraq to remind voters that Jeb Bush supported his brother’s war, while Trump, alone of the Republican candidates, supposedly opposed it well before it started.

That is a flat-out lie. There is no evidence that Trump opposed the war before the March 20, 2003 invasion. Like most Americans, he supported the invasion and said just that very clearly in interviews. And like most Americans, Trump quickly turned on a once popular intervention — but only when the postwar occupation was beginning to cost too much in blood and treasure. Trump’s serial invocations of the war are good reminders of just how mythical Iraq has now become.

We need to recall a few facts. Bill Clinton bombed Iraq (Operation Desert Fox) on December 16 to 19, 1998, without prior congressional or U.N. approval. As Clinton put it at the time, our armed forces wanted “to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors. Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world. Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons.” At the time of Clinton’s warning about Iraq’s WMD capability, George W. Bush was a relatively obscure Texas governor.

Just weeks earlier, Clinton had signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law, after the legislation passed Congress on a House vote of 360 to 38 and the Senate unanimously. The act formally called for the removal of Saddam Hussein, a transition to democracy for Iraq, and a forced end to Saddam’s WMD program. As President Clinton had also warned when signing the act — long before the left-wing construction of neo-con bogeymen and “Bush lied, thousands died” sloganeering — without such an act, Saddam Hussein “will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he’ll use the arsenal.” Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, often voiced warnings about Saddam’s aggression and his possession of deadly stocks of WMD (e.g., “Iraq is a long way from [here], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face”). Indeed, most felt that the U.S. had been too lax in allowing Saddam to gas the Kurds when it might have prevented such mass murdering.

In October 2002, President Bush asked for the consent of Congress — unlike the Clinton resort to force in the Balkans and the later Obama bombing in Libya, both by executive action — before using arms to reify existing American policy. Both the Senate (with a majority of Democrats voting in favor) and the House overwhelmingly approved 23 writs calling for Saddam’s forced removal. The causes of action included Iraq’s violation of well over a dozen U.N. resolutions, Saddam’s harboring of international terrorists (including those who had tried and failed to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993), his plot to murder former president George H. W. Bush, his violations of no-fly zones, his bounties to suicide bombers on the West Bank, his genocidal policies against the Kurds and Marsh Arabs, and a host of other transgressions. Only a few of the causes of action were directly related to weapons of mass destruction.

Go back and review speeches on the floor of Congress in support of the Bush administration’s using force. Some of the most muscular were the arguments of Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Harry Reid, and Chuck Schumer. Pundits as diverse as Al Franken, Thomas Friedman, Nicholas Kristof, David Remnick, Andrew Sullivan, Matthew Yglesias, and Fareed Zakaria all wrote or spoke passionately about the need to remove the genocidal Saddam Hussein. All voiced their humanitarian concerns about finally stopping Saddam’s genocidal wars against the helpless. The New York Times estimated that 1 million had died violently because of Saddam’s governance. And all would soon damn those with whom they once agreed.

No liberal supporters of the war ever alleged that the Bush administration had concocted WMD evidence ex nihilo in Iraq — and for four understandable reasons: one, the Clinton administration and the United Nations had already made the case about Saddam Hussein’s dangerous possession of WMD stockpiles; two, the CIA had briefed congressional leaders in September and October 2002 on WMD independently and autonomously from its White House briefings (a “slam-dunk case”), as CIA Director George Tenet, a Clinton appointee, later reiterated; three, WMD were only a small concern, at least in the congressional authorization for war, which for the most part dealt with Iraq’s support for terrorism in the post–9/11 climate, violation of the U.N. mandates, and serial genocidal violence directed at Iraq’s own people and neighboring countries; and, four, the invasion was initially successful and its results seemed to have justified it.

The WMD issue was largely a postbellum mechanism of blaming conspiracies rather than anyone’s own judgment when violence flared. Did the disappearance of WMD stocks really nullify all 23 congressional writs?

Support for the invasion reached its apex not before the war but directly at its conclusion, when polls in April 2003 revealed approval ratings between 70 and 90 percent, owing to Saddam’s sudden downfall, the relatively rapid end to the fighting, and the avoidance of catastrophic American casualties.

In late April 2003, initial worry about the absence of WMD stockpiles was soon noted — after all, the 2004 presidential primaries were less than a year away — but largely dismissed, given that Congress had sanctioned the war on a variety of grounds that had nothing to do with WMD, and it was not clear where or how known stockpiles had mysteriously disappeared, after their prior demonstrable use by Saddam. (Did Clinton get them all in his 1998 Desert Fox campaign? Did Saddam himself stealthily destroy them? Did he send out false intelligence about them to create deterrence? Or were they moved to Syria — where WMD turned up later during the Obama “red-line” controversy?)

Only as the postwar violence spiked in June and July 2003 did the fallback position arise of having been cajoled by “bogus” intelligence and thus having been “misled” into going along with the “Bush and Cheney” agenda. Had the occupation gone as well as the initial war, missing WMD would have been noted in the context of there having been roughly 20 other writs for going into Iraq.

A veritable circus of opportunistic protestations followed as violence continued. Barack Obama — who had opposed the war in 2003 but, as an Illinois state senator, was not in a position to vote against it — predicated his 2008 presidential candidacy on pulling out all troops. As a senator in 2007, he opposed the surge. He predicted that it would not only fail, but also make things worse.

When the surge made things far better, Obama dropped most mentions of Iraq from his campaign website. He certainly never referred to his confessions during his Senate campaign of 2004 that he then had had no major disagreements with Bush’s policies during the postwar occupation (e.g., “There’s not much of a difference between my position on Iraq and George Bush’s position at this stage”). Nor did he recall that, also in 2004, he confessed to having no idea whether he would have voted for the war. (“I’m not privy to Senate intelligence reports. What would I have done? I don’t know.”) Obama seemed to suggest that the Senate had its own intelligence avenues apparently separate from the Bush–Chaney nexus.

The surge engineered by General David Petraeus worked so well that Iraq was not much of an issue in the 2008 general election. President-elect Barack Obama entered office with a quiet Iraq. For example, about 60 American soldiers died in 2010 in combat-related operations in Iraq — or roughly 4 percent of all U.S. military deaths that year (1,485), the vast majority of these due to non-combat causes (motor-vehicle and training accidents, non-combat violence, suicide, drugs, illness, etc.). Although Obama had once stated that Iraq was the unwise war (in comparison to the wise Afghan war that he supported during the 2008 campaign), the relative post-surge quiet had changed somewhat, for a third time, popular attitudes about the war. Indeed, Afghanistan by 2010 was the problematic conflict, Iraq the apparently successful occupation.

No wonder, then, that Vice President Joe Biden in February 2010 claimed that Iraq was so successful that it might well become one of the administration’s “greatest achievements.” Obama himself was eager, given the apparent calm, to pull out all U.S. peacekeepers before the 2012 election. A mostly quiet Iraq, contrasted with the escalating violence in Afghanistan and the turmoil of the Arab Spring, apparently made that withdrawal possible — so much so that Obama declared: “We’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.”

Suddenly the Iraq War was no longer “Bush’s war.” Instead, it was referred to in terms of “we” — and was seen as a far preferable scenario to the violence in either Afghanistan or the newly bombed Libya.

Predictably, the departure of several thousand U.S. peacekeepers from Iraq allowed the Shiite partisan Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to renege on his promises of equitable treatment for all Iraqi factions. Iran sensed the void and sent in Shiite operatives. The extremism of the Arab Spring finally reached Iraq. ISIS was the new Islamic terrorist hydra head that replaced the al-Qaeda head, which had been lopped off in Iraq during the surge.

Iraq went from “self-reliant” to being the nexus of Middle East unrest. All President Obama’s euphemisms for ISIS violence did not mask the reality of the disintegration of Iraq. WMD mysteriously reappeared as a national-security issue, but now in Assad’s Syria — and to such a degree that an anguished President Obama (“We have been very clear to the Assad regime . . . that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.”) himself threatened to bomb Assad if he dared re-employ WMD (Assad did, and we did not bomb him). No one asked how or where Assad had gained access to such plentiful chemical-weapon stocks — other than the administration’s later insistence that Syria’s use of chlorine gas did not really constitute WMD usage.

The truth is that, before Bush entered office, most Americans had been convinced by the Clinton administration and the Congress that Saddam Hussein was a danger that had to be addressed. Bush sent in troops because Clinton’s prior bombing, Saddam’s violations of U.N. resolutions, and over a decade of porous no-fly zones had left Americans fearing that Saddam was uncontainable. The invasion was brilliantly conducted, and polls and politics both revealed consensus on that point. Yet securing Iraq was poorly managed from summer 2003 until autumn 2007. And polls, two elections, and political reinventions certainly illustrated that fact as well.

It is legitimate to change opinions about a war or to rue a flawed occupation. But it is not ethical to deny prior positions or invent reasons why what once seemed prudent later seemed reckless.

Finally, Korea offers some bases for comparison and elucidation. Harry Truman sent in U.S. troop reinforcements in August 1950, in an optional war to stop Communist aggression and recreate deterrence in the region. He acted with the approval of the American public (near 80 percent approval), with U.N. sanction, and, at least in budgetary terms, with agreement from the U.S. Congress.

However, poor planning, ill-preparedness due to the rapid disarmament after World War II, the megalomania of General Douglas MacArthur, the November invasion by the Chinese Red Army, nuclear saber-rattling by the Soviet Union, and soaring U.S. casualties (by summer 1953 reaching over 36,000 deaths and over 130,000 wounded and missing) made the war a bloody quagmire and roundly detested — with over 50 percent disapproval. Even the genius of General Matthew Ridgway, who saved South Korea from ruin in a brilliant 100-day campaign in late 1950 and early 1951, could not regain solid public support for the intervention.

The Korean War may have saved millions of Koreans from a Stalinist nightmare, but it ruined the Truman administration (Truman left office in January 1953 with a 23 percent approval rating, far worse than George W. Bush’s departing 33 percent). Popular anger ensured the election of Republican Dwight David Eisenhower.

But despite all the opportunistic campaign rhetoric, the newly elected President Eisenhower more or less followed Truman’s policies. By July 1953 he had achieved an armistice. And by keeping sizable U.S. deployments of peacekeepers in place, he also ensured what would become a long evolution to democracy in South Korea and the country’s current dynamic economy. Had Eisenhower, in Obama-like worry over his 1956 reelection bid, yanked out all U.S. peacekeepers in December 1955, and blamed the resulting debacle on his Democratic predecessor (“Truman’s War”), while writing off the North Korean aggressors as jayvees, we can imagine a quick North Korean absorption of the South, with the sort of death and chaos we are now seeing in Iraq.

Korea today would be unified under the unhinged Kim Jong-un regime, with twice its present resources. Samsung and Kia would be pipedreams, and we would still be arguing over Truman’s folly, the futility of nation-building, the loss of Korea, and the needless sacrifice of 36,000 American lives. No one knows what effects a rapid U.S. flight in 1954 or 1955, the implosion of South Korea, and a Chinese–North Korean victory would have had on the larger course of the ongoing Cold War in Asia, especially in relationship to neighboring Japan and Taiwan. But we can imagine that the South China Sea in 1956 might have resembled something akin to the mess of the current Eastern Mediterranean.

We can surely argue about Iraq, but we must not airbrush away facts. The mystery of the current Iraq fantasy is not that a prevaricating Donald Trump misrepresents the war in the fashion of Democratic senators and liberal pundits who once eagerly supported it, but that his Republican opponents so easily let him do it.

— NRO contributor Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author, most recently, of The Savior Generals.

Voir aussi:

Who Is Lying About Iraq?

Norman Podhoretz

Commentary

November 23, 2005

Among the many distortions, misrepresentations, and outright falsifications that have emerged from the debate over Iraq, one in particular stands out above all others. This is the charge that George W. Bush misled us into an immoral and/or unnecessary war in Iraq by telling a series of lies that have now been definitively exposed.

What makes this charge so special is the amazing success it has enjoyed in getting itself established as a self-evident truth even though it has been refuted and discredited over and over again by evidence and argument alike. In this it resembles nothing so much as those animated cartoon characters who, after being flattened, blown up, or pushed over a cliff, always spring back to life with their bodies perfectly intact. Perhaps, like those cartoon characters, this allegation simply cannot be killed off, no matter what.

Nevertheless, I want to take one more shot at exposing it for the lie that it itself really is. Although doing so will require going over ground that I and many others have covered before, I hope that revisiting this well-trodden terrain may also serve to refresh memories that have grown dim, to clarify thoughts that have grown confused, and to revive outrage that has grown commensurately dulled.

The main “lie” that George W. Bush is accused of telling us is that Saddam Hussein possessed an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, or WMD as they have invariably come to be called. From this followed the subsidiary “lie” that Iraq under Saddam’s regime posed a two-edged mortal threat. On the one hand, we were informed, there was a distinct (or even “imminent”) possibility that Saddam himself would use these weapons against us and/or our allies; and on the other hand, there was the still more dangerous possibility that he would supply them to terrorists like those who had already attacked us on 9/11 and to whom he was linked.

This entire scenario of purported deceit has been given a new lease on life by the indictment in late October of I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, then chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney. Libby stands accused of making false statements to the FBI and of committing perjury in testifying before a grand jury that had been convened to find out who in the Bush administration had “outed” Valerie Plame, a CIA agent married to the retired ambassador Joseph C. Wilson, IV. The supposed purpose of leaking this classified information to the press was to retaliate against Wilson for having “debunked” (in his words) “the lies that led to war.”

Now, as it happens, Libby was not charged with having outed Plame but only with having lied about when and from whom he first learned that she worked for the CIA. Moreover, Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the special prosecutor who brought the indictment against him, made a point of emphasizing that

[t]his indictment is not about the war. This indictment is not about the propriety of the war. And people who believe fervently in the war effort, people who oppose it, people who have mixed feelings about it should not look to this indictment for any resolution of how they feel or any vindication of how they feel.

This is simply an indictment that says, in a national-security investigation about the compromise of a CIA officer’s identity that may have taken place in the context of a very heated debate over the war, whether some person—a person, Mr. Libby—lied or not.

No matter. Harry Reid, the Democratic leader in the Senate, spoke for a host of other opponents of the war in insisting that

[t]his case is bigger than the leak of classified information. It is about how the Bush White House manufactured and manipulated intelligence in order to bolster its case for the war in Iraq and to discredit anyone who dared to challenge the President.

Yet even stipulating—which I do only for the sake of argument—that no weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq in the period leading up to the invasion, it defies all reason to think that Bush was lying when he asserted that they did. To lie means to say something one knows to be false. But it is as close to certainty as we can get that Bush believed in the truth of what he was saying about WMD in Iraq.

How indeed could it have been otherwise? George Tenet, his own CIA director, assured him that the case was “a slam dunk.” This phrase would later become notorious, but in using it, Tenet had the backing of all fifteen agencies involved in gathering intelligence for the United States. In the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2002, where their collective views were summarized, one of the conclusions offered with “high confidence” was that

Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.

The intelligence agencies of Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Israel, and—yes—France all agreed with this judgment. And even Hans Blix—who headed the UN team of inspectors trying to determine whether Saddam had complied with the demands of the Security Council that he get rid of the weapons of mass destruction he was known to have had in the past—lent further credibility to the case in a report he issued only a few months before the invasion:

The discovery of a number of 122-mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. . . . They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

Blix now claims that he was only being “cautious” here, but if, as he now also adds, the Bush administration “misled itself” in interpreting the evidence before it, he at the very least lent it a helping hand.

So, once again, did the British, the French, and the Germans, all of whom signed on in advance to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s reading of the satellite photos he presented to the UN in the period leading up to the invasion. Powell himself and his chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, now feel that this speech was the low point of his tenure as Secretary of State. But Wilkerson (in the process of a vicious attack on the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense for getting us into Iraq) is forced to acknowledge that the Bush administration did not lack for company in interpreting the available evidence as it did:

I can’t tell you why the French, the Germans, the Brits, and us thought that most of the material, if not all of it, that we presented at the UN on 5 February 2003 was the truth. I can’t. I’ve wrestled with it. [But] when you see a satellite photograph of all the signs of the chemical-weapons ASP—Ammunition Supply Point—with chemical weapons, and you match all those signs with your matrix on what should show a chemical ASP, and they’re there, you have to conclude that it’s a chemical ASP, especially when you see the next satellite photograph which shows the UN inspectors wheeling in their white vehicles with black markings on them to that same ASP, and everything is changed, everything is clean. . . . But George [Tenet] was convinced, John McLaughlin [Tenet’s deputy] was convinced, that what we were presented [for Powell’s UN speech] was accurate.

Going on to shoot down a widespread impression, Wilkerson informs us that even the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was convinced:

People say, well, INR dissented. That’s a bunch of bull. INR dissented that the nuclear program was up and running. That’s all INR dissented on. They were right there with the chems and the bios.

In explaining its dissent on Iraq’s nuclear program, the INR had, as stated in the NIE of 2002, expressed doubt about

Iraq’s efforts to acquire aluminum tubes [which are] central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear-weapons program. . . . INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors . . . in Iraq’s nuclear-weapons program.

But, according to Wilkerson,

The French came in in the middle of my deliberations at the CIA and said, we have just spun aluminum tubes, and by God, we did it to this RPM, et cetera, et cetera, and it was all, you know, proof positive that the aluminum tubes were not for mortar casings or artillery casings, they were for centrifuges. Otherwise, why would you have such exquisite instruments?

In short, and whether or not it included the secret heart of Hans Blix, “the consensus of the intelligence community,” as Wilkerson puts it, “was overwhelming” in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq that Saddam definitely had an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and that he was also in all probability well on the way to rebuilding the nuclear capability that the Israelis had damaged by bombing the Osirak reactor in 1981.

Additional confirmation of this latter point comes from Kenneth Pollack, who served in the National Security Council under Clinton. “In the late spring of 2002,” Pollack has written,

I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did. Three people added that they believed Iraq was also operating a secret calutron plant (a facility for separating uranium isotopes).

No wonder, then, that another conclusion the NIE of 2002 reached with “high confidence” was that

Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.1

But the consensus on which Bush relied was not born in his own administration. In fact, it was first fully formed in the Clinton administration. Here is Clinton himself, speaking in 1998:

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction program.

Here is his Secretary of State Madeline Albright, also speaking in 1998:

Iraq is a long way from [the USA], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face.

Here is Sandy Berger, Clinton’s National Security Adviser, who chimed in at the same time with this flat-out assertion about Saddam:

He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983.

Finally, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, was so sure Saddam had stockpiles of WMD that he remained “absolutely convinced” of it even after our failure to find them in the wake of the invasion in March 2003.

Nor did leading Democrats in Congress entertain any doubts on this score. A few months after Clinton and his people made the statements I have just quoted, a group of Democratic Senators, including such liberals as Carl Levin, Tom Daschle, and John Kerry, urged the President

to take necessary actions (including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites) to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.

Nancy Pelosi, the future leader of the Democrats in the House, and then a member of the House Intelligence Committee, added her voice to the chorus:

Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons-of-mass-destruction technology, which is a threat to countries in the region, and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process.

This Democratic drumbeat continued and even intensified when Bush succeeded Clinton in 2001, and it featured many who would later pretend to have been deceived by the Bush White House. In a letter to the new President, a number of Senators led by Bob Graham declared:

There is no doubt that . . . Saddam Hussein has invigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical, and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf war status. In addition, Saddam continues to redefine delivery systems and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop longer-range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies.

Senator Carl Levin also reaffirmed for Bush’s benefit what he had told Clinton some years earlier:

Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations, and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton agreed, speaking in October 2002:

In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical- and biological-weapons stock, his missile-delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members.

Senator Jay Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, agreed as well:

There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. . . . We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction.

Even more striking were the sentiments of Bush’s opponents in his two campaigns for the presidency. Thus Al Gore in September 2002:

We know that [Saddam] has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.

And here is Gore again, in that same year:

Iraq’s search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to deter, and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power.

Now to John Kerry, also speaking in 2002:

I will be voting to give the President of the United States the authority to use force—if necessary—to disarm Saddam Hussein because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a real and grave threat to our security.

Perhaps most startling of all, given the rhetoric that they would later employ against Bush after the invasion of Iraq, are statements made by Senators Ted Kennedy and Robert Byrd, also in 2002:

Kennedy: We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.

Byrd: The last UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in October of 1998. We are confident that Saddam Hussein retains some stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and that he has since embarked on a crash course to build up his chemical- and biological-warfare capabilities. Intelligence reports indicate that he is seeking nuclear weapons.2

Liberal politicians like these were seconded by the mainstream media, in whose columns a very different tune would later be sung. For example, throughout the last two years of the Clinton administration, editorials in the New York Times repeatedly insisted that

without further outside intervention, Iraq should be able to rebuild weapons and missile plants within a year [and] future military attacks may be required to diminish the arsenal again.

The Times was also skeptical of negotiations, pointing out that it was

hard to negotiate with a tyrant who has no intention of honoring his commitments and who sees nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as his country’s salvation.

So, too, the Washington Post, which greeted the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001 with the admonition that

[o]f all the booby traps left behind by the Clinton administration, none is more dangerous—or more urgent—than the situation in Iraq. Over the last year, Mr. Clinton and his team quietly avoided dealing with, or calling attention to, the almost complete unraveling of a decade’s efforts to isolate the regime of Saddam Hussein and prevent it from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. That leaves President Bush to confront a dismaying panorama in the Persian Gulf [where] intelligence photos . . . show the reconstruction of factories long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons.3

All this should surely suffice to prove far beyond any even unreasonable doubt that Bush was telling what he believed to be the truth about Saddam’s stockpile of WMD. It also disposes of the fallback charge that Bush lied by exaggerating or hyping the intelligence presented to him. Why on earth would he have done so when the intelligence itself was so compelling that it convinced everyone who had direct access to it, and when hardly anyone in the world believed that Saddam had, as he claimed, complied with the sixteen resolutions of the Security Council demanding that he get rid of his weapons of mass destruction?

Another fallback charge is that Bush, operating mainly through Cheney, somehow forced the CIA into telling him what he wanted to hear. Yet in its report of 2004, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee, while criticizing the CIA for relying on what in hindsight looked like weak or faulty intelligence, stated that it

did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence, or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities.

The March 2005 report of the equally bipartisan Robb-Silberman commission, which investigated intelligence failures on Iraq, reached the same conclusion, finding

no evidence of political pressure to influence the intelligence community’s pre-war assessments of Iraq’s weapons programs. . . . [A]nalysts universally asserted that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments.

Still, even many who believed that Saddam did possess WMD, and was ruthless enough to use them, accused Bush of telling a different sort of lie by characterizing the risk as “imminent.” But this, too, is false: Bush consistently rejected imminence as a justification for war.4 Thus, in the State of the Union address he delivered only three months after 9/11, Bush declared that he would “not wait on events while dangers gather” and that he would “not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.” Then, in a speech at West Point six months later, he reiterated the same point: “If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long.” And as if that were not clear enough, he went out of his way in his State of the Union address in 2003 (that is, three months before the invasion), to bring up the word “imminent” itself precisely in order to repudiate it:

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.

What of the related charge that it was still another “lie” to suggest, as Bush and his people did, that a connection could be traced between Saddam Hussein and the al-Qaeda terrorists who had attacked us on 9/11? This charge was also rejected by the Senate Intelligence Committee. Contrary to how its findings were summarized in the mainstream media, the committee’s report explicitly concluded that al Qaeda did in fact have a cooperative, if informal, relationship with Iraqi agents working under Saddam. The report of the bipartisan 9/11 commission came to the same conclusion, as did a comparably independent British investigation conducted by Lord Butler, which pointed to “meetings . . . between senior Iraqi representatives and senior al-Qaeda operatives.”5

Which brings us to Joseph C. Wilson, IV and what to my mind wins the palm for the most disgraceful instance of all.

The story begins with the notorious sixteen words inserted—after, be it noted, much vetting by the CIA and the State Department—into Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address:

The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

This is the “lie” Wilson bragged of having “debunked” after being sent by the CIA to Niger in 2002 to check out the intelligence it had received to that effect. Wilson would later angrily deny that his wife had recommended him for this mission, and would do his best to spread the impression that choosing him had been the Vice President’s idea. But Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times, through whom Wilson first planted this impression, was eventually forced to admit that “Cheney apparently didn’t know that Wilson had been dispatched.” (By the time Kristof grudgingly issued this retraction, Wilson himself, in characteristically shameless fashion, was denying that he had ever “said the Vice President sent me or ordered me sent.”) And as for his wife’s supposed non-role in his mission, here is what Valerie Plame Wilson wrote in a memo to her boss at the CIA:

My husband has good relations with the PM [the prime minister of Niger] and the former minister of mines . . . , both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.

More than a year after his return, with the help of Kristof, and also Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, and then through an op-ed piece in the Times under his own name, Wilson succeeded, probably beyond his wildest dreams, in setting off a political firestorm.

In response, the White House, no doubt hoping to prevent his allegation about the sixteen words from becoming a proxy for the charge that (in Wilson’s latest iteration of it) “lies and disinformation [were] used to justify the invasion of Iraq,” eventually acknowledged that the President’s statement “did not rise to the level of inclusion in the State of the Union address.” As might have been expected, however, this panicky response served to make things worse rather than better. And yet it was totally unnecessary—for the maddeningly simple reason that every single one of the sixteen words at issue was true.

That is, British intelligence had assured the CIA that Saddam Hussein had tried to buy enriched uranium from the African country of Niger. Furthermore—and notwithstanding the endlessly repeated assertion that this assurance has now been discredited—Britain’s independent Butler commission concluded that it was “well-founded.” The relevant passage is worth quoting at length:

a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.

b. The British government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger’s exports, the intelligence was credible.

c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium, and the British government did not claim this.

As if that were not enough to settle the matter, Wilson himself, far from challenging the British report when he was “debriefed” on his return from Niger (although challenging it is what he now never stops doing6), actually strengthened the CIA’s belief in its accuracy. From the Senate Intelligence Committee report:

He [the CIA reports officer] said he judged that the most important fact in the report [by Wilson] was that Niger officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Niger prime minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium.

And again:

The report on [Wilson’s] trip to Niger . . . did not change any analysts’ assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original CIA reports on the uranium deal.

This passage goes on to note that the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research—which (as we have already seen) did not believe that Saddam Hussein was trying to develop nuclear weapons—found support in Wilson’s report for its “assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq.” But if so, this, as the Butler report quoted above points out, would not mean that Iraq had not tried to buy it—which was the only claim made by British intelligence and then by Bush in the famous sixteen words.

The liar here, then, was not Bush but Wilson. And Wilson also lied when he told the Washington Post that he had unmasked as forgeries certain documents given to American intelligence (by whom it is not yet clear) that supposedly contained additional evidence of Saddam’s efforts to buy uranium from Niger. The documents did indeed turn out to be forgeries; but, according to the Butler report,

[t]he forged documents were not available to the British government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine [that assessment].7

More damning yet to Wilson, the Senate Intelligence Committee discovered that he had never laid eyes on the documents in question:

[Wilson] also told committee staff that he was the source of a Washington Post article . . . which said, “among the envoy’s conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because ‘the dates were wrong and the names were wrong.’” Committee staff asked how the former ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the “dates were wrong and the names were wrong” when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports.

To top all this off, just as Cheney had nothing to do with the choice of Wilson for the mission to Niger, neither was it true that, as Wilson “confirmed” for a credulous New Republic reporter, “the CIA circulated [his] report to the Vice President’s office,” thereby supposedly proving that Cheney and his staff “knew the Niger story was a flatout lie.” Yet—the mind reels—if Cheney had actually been briefed on Wilson’s oral report to the CIA (which he was not), he would, like the CIA itself, have been more inclined to believe that Saddam had tried to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger.

So much for the author of the best-selling and much acclaimed book whose title alone—The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Led to War and Betrayed My Wife’s CIA Identity—has set a new record for chutzpah.

But there is worse. In his press conference on the indictment against Libby, Patrick Fitzgerald insisted that lying to federal investigators is a serious crime both because it is itself against the law and because, by sending them on endless wild-goose chases, it constitutes the even more serious crime of obstruction of justice. By those standards, Wilson—who has repeatedly made false statements about every aspect of his mission to Niger, including whose idea it was to send him and what he told the CIA upon his return; who was then shown up by the Senate Intelligence Committee as having lied about the forged documents; and whose mendacity has sent the whole country into a wild-goose chase after allegations that, the more they are refuted, the more they keep being repeated—is himself an excellent candidate for criminal prosecution.

And so long as we are hunting for liars in this area, let me suggest that we begin with the Democrats now proclaiming that they were duped, and that we then broaden out to all those who in their desperation to delegitimize the larger policy being tested in Iraq—the policy of making the Middle East safe for America by making it safe for democracy—have consistently used distortion, misrepresentation, and selective perception to vilify as immoral a bold and noble enterprise and to brand as an ignominious defeat what is proving itself more and more every day to be a victory of American arms and a vindication of American ideals.


NORMAN PODHORETZ is the editor-at-large of COMMENTARY and the author of ten books. The most recent, The Norman Podhoretz Reader, edited by Thomas L. Jeffers, appeared in 2004. His essays on the Bush Doctrine and Iraq, including “World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win” (September 2004) and “The War Against World War IV” (February 2005), can be found by clicking here.


1 Hard as it is to believe, let alone to reconcile with his general position, Joseph C. Wilson, IV, in a speech he delivered three months after the invasion at the Education for Peace in Iraq Center, offhandedly made the following remark: “I remain of the view that we will find biological and chemical weapons and we may well find something that indicates that Saddam’s regime maintained an interest in nuclear weapons.”

2 Fuller versions of these and similar statements can be found at http://www.theconversationcafe.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-3134.htmland. Another source is http://www.rightwingnews.com/quotes/demsonwmds.php.

3 These and numerous other such quotations were assembled by Robert Kagan in a piece published in the Washington Post on October 25, 2005.

4 Whereas both John Edwards, later to become John Kerry’s running mate in 2004, and Jay Rockefeller, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, actually did use the word in describing the threat posed by Saddam.

5 In early November, the Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee, who last year gave their unanimous assent to its report, were suddenly mounting a last-ditch effort to take it back on this issue (and others). But to judge from the material they had already begun leaking by November 7, when this article was going to press, the newest “Bush lied” case is as empty and dishonest as the one they themselves previously rejected.

6 Here is how he put it in a piece in the Los Angeles Times written in late October of this year to celebrate the indictment of Libby: “I knew that the statement in Bush’s speech . . . was not true. I knew it was false from my own investigative trip to Africa. . . . And I knew that the White House knew it.”

7 More extensive citations of the relevant passages from the Butler report can be found in postings by Daniel McKivergan at http://www.worldwidestandard.com. I have also drawn throughout on materials cited by the invaluable Stephen F. Hayes in the Weekly Standard.

Voir également:

Throughout the Bush years, liberals repeated “Bush lied, people died” like a mantra. That slander wasn’t true then and it’s not anymore true now that it has resurfaced. There are many legitimate criticisms of the way the Bush Administration conducted the war in Iraq and even more of the way Obama threw away all the blood and treasure we spent there for the sake of politics, but you have to be malicious or just an imbecile at this point to accuse Bush of lying about WMDs.

To begin with, numerous foreign intelligence agencies also believed that Saddam Hussein had an active WMD program. The « intelligence agencies of Germany, Israel, Russia, Britain, China and France«  all believed Saddam had WMDs. CIA Director George Tenet also rather famously said that it was a “slam dunk” that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Incidentally, it’s hard to fault the CIA for their conclusions when even, “In private conversations that were intercepted by U.S. intelligence, Iraqi officials spoke as if Saddam continued to possess WMD. Even Iraqi generals believed he did. In the fall of 2002, the Iraqi military conducted exercises in chemical protective gear – but not because they thought the U.S.-led coalition was going to use chemical weapons.”

Additionally, many prominent Democrats who had access to the same intelligence that George Bush did came to the same conclusion and said so publicly. If George W. Bush lied, then by default you have to also believe that Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, John Kerry, John Edwards, Robert Byrd, Tom Daschle, Nancy Pelosi and Bernie Sanders also lied. Some of them, like Hillary Clinton, even alleged that Saddam was working on nuclear weapons.

“In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. Should he succeed in that endeavor, he could alter the political and security landscape of the Middle East, which as we know all too well affects American security.” — Hillary Clinton, October 10, 2002

Even Bernie Sanders, who opposed the war from the beginning, publicly said he believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, the front page of The Washington Post today reported that all relevant U.S. intelligence agencies now say, despite what we have heard from the White House, that « Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States. » Even more importantly, our intelligence agencies say that should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he might at that point launch a chemical or biological counterattack. In other words, there is more danger of an attack on the United States if we launch a precipitous invasion.

You can’t blame Bernie and Hillary too much for thinking Iraq had WMDs because privately, even former weapons UN inspectors were saying the same thing.

Additional confirmation of this latter point comes from Kenneth Pollack, who served in the National Security Council under Clinton. “In the late spring of 2002,” Pollack has written,

I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did.

Furthermore, as even the New York Times has been forced to admit, large numbers of pre-Gulf War WMDs have actually been found in Iraq.

From 2004 to 2011, American and American-trained Iraqi troops repeatedly encountered, and on at least six occasions were wounded by, chemical weapons remaining from years earlier in Saddam Hussein’s rule.

In all, American troops secretly reported finding roughly 5,000 chemical warheads, shells or aviation bombs, according to interviews with dozens of participants, Iraqi and American officials, and heavily redacted intelligence documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

One of the reasons Saddam Hussein went to such great lengths to hide what he was doing was because he did have thousands of old WMDS stockpiled.  However, that wasn’t all there was to it. Even though the ultimate conclusion of the Iraqi Survey Group was that Saddam didn’t have an active WMD program, his hands were far from clean on the WMD front.

As David Kay noted in his report back in 2003,

…When Saddam had asked a senior military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard.

Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid-2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin.”

— “…(O)ne scientist confirmed that the production line…..could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.”

…With regard to Iraq’s nuclear program, the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.

They have told ISG that Saddam… remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions.”

“1. Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.”

The Duelfer report also noted that Saddam had every intention of making more WMDs.

“(S)ources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.”

In other words, it is true that no stockpiles of new WMDS were found and the people in the best position to know didn’t conclude the weapons were moved to Syria. However, had Saddam Hussein not been taken out, he would have still had stockpiles of old WMDs available and he had every intention of making more.

Given all of that, it’s no surprise that everyone from the head of the CIA to Bernie Sanders to the British thought that Saddam had WMDs; yet George W. Bush is the one who is accused of deliberately sending American soldiers to their deaths over a lie.

No honest person can read all of this and STILL repeat the disgusting smear that George W. Bush lied about WMDs to get us into war in Iraq.

Would you vote for Carly Fiorina in the 2016 presidential election?

Voir de plus:

Bush: Mubarak Informed US that Iraq Had Biological Weapons
Diaa Bekheet
VOA

November 10, 2010

Former U.S. President George W. Bush says Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak informed the U.S. that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. He also spoke of other people who had influence on his decision to invade Iraq.

The revelation comes in Bush’s memoirs, Decision Points, in which he highlighted mistakes made during the Iraq war campaign, and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in the country.

« President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had told [general] Tommy Franks that Iraq had biological weapons and was certain to use them on our troops, » Bush revealed in his newly-released book.

The former president said Mubarak « refused to make the allegation in public for fear of inciting the Arab street. »

So far, the Egyptian government has issued no reaction to Bush’s claim.

Bush explained that the « intelligence from a Middle Eastern leader who knew [former Iraqi president] Saddam [Hussein] well had an impact on my thinking. »

« Just as there were risks to actions, there were risks to inaction as well, »  he wrote in Decision Points.

Bush says the diplomatic process drifted along, the pressure for action had been mounting. He says in early 2003, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told him the uncertainty was hurting the economy. There was also concern among America’s Middle East allies.

« Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, the kingdom’s longtime ambassador to Washington and a friend of mine since dad’s presidency, came to the Oval Office and told me our allies in the Middle East wanted a decision, » Bush explained.

Another person who had a deep impact on his war decision was holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Elie Wiesel.

« There was passion in his 74-year-old eyes when he compared Saddam Hussein’s brutality to the Nazi genocide, » the former president remembered.

« Mr. President, » Wiesel said, « You have a moral obligation to act against evil, » Bush wrote.

He also wrote about his reaction when WMDs were not found.

« No one was more shocked or angry than I was when we didn’t find the weapons [of mass destruction]. I had a sickening feeling every time I thought about it. I still do, » Bush said.

The former chief of state admits the fight in Iraq was more difficult than expected, but he believes the consequence of the American occupation was a chance for democracy to take root on the Persian Gulf.

In his book,  Bush revisits other controversial war decisions and defends them vigorously.  He says the war on Afghanistan [launched in October 2001 following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in America) was necessary to uproot al-Qaida and the Taliban.

Bush wrote: « History can debate the decisions I made, the policies I chose, and the tools I left behind. But there can be no debate about one fact: After the nightmare of September 11, America went seven and a half years without another successful terrorist attack on our soil. If I had to summarize my most meaningful accomplishment as president in one sentence, that would be it. »

The former president closes his memoirs by saying he’s comfortable knowing that history’s verdict on his presidency will come after he’s gone.

« Whatever the verdict on my presidency, I’m comfortable with the fact that I won’t be around to hear it. That’s a decision point only history will reach, » Bush wrote.

Decision Points was released in bookstores on November 9.

Voir de même:

Woodward: Tenet told Bush WMD case a ‘slam dunk’
Says Bush didn’t solicit Rumsfeld, Powell on going to war
CNN

April 19, 2004

WASHINGTON (CNN) — About two weeks before deciding to invade Iraq, President Bush was told by CIA Director George Tenet there was a « slam dunk case » that dictator Saddam Hussein had unconventional weapons, according to a new book by Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward.

That declaration was « very important » in his decision making, according to « Plan of Attack, » which is being excerpted this week in The Post.

Bush also made his decision to go to war without consulting Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or Secretary of State Colin Powell, Woodward’s book says.

Powell was not even told until after the Saudi ambassador was allowed to review top-secret war plans in an effort to enlist his country’s support for the invasion, according to Woodward, who has written or co-written several best-selling books on Washington politics, including « All the President’s Men » with Carl Bernstein.

The book also reports that in the summer of 2002, $700 million was diverted from a congressional appropriation for the war in Afghanistan to develop a war plan for Iraq.

Woodward suggests the diversion may have been illegal, and that Congress was deliberately kept in the dark about what had been done.

Woodward talked about his book Sunday on CBS’s « 60 Minutes. »

The book is based on interviews with 75 people involved in planning for the war, including Bush, the only source who spoke for attribution.

Woodward quotes Bush as saying he did not feel the need to ask his principal advisers, including Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell, whether they thought he ought to go to war because « I could tell what they thought. »

But he said he did discuss his thinking with Condoleezza Rice, his national security adviser.

« I didn’t need to ask them their opinion about Saddam Hussein. If you were sitting where I sit, you could be pretty clear. I think we’ve got an environment where people feel free to express themselves, » Bush is quoted as saying.

In the book, Woodward reports that on November 21, 2001 — about three months after the September 11 attacks and shortly after the Taliban regime crumbled in Afghanistan — Bush took Rumsfeld aside, ordered him to develop a war plan for Iraq and told him to keep it secret.

‘The best we’ve got?’
As the war planning progressed, on December 21, 2002, Tenet and his top deputy, John McLaughlin, went to the White House to brief Bush and Cheney on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Woodward reports.

The president, unimpressed by the presentation of satellite photographs and intercepts, pressed Tenet and McLaughlin, saying their information would not « convince Joe Public » and asking Tenet, « This is the best we’ve got? » Woodward reports.

According to Woodward, Tenet reassured the president that « it’s a slam dunk case » that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.

In his CBS interview, Woodward said he « asked the president about this, and he said it was very important to have the CIA director, ‘slam-dunk’ is as I interpreted it, a sure thing, guaranteed. »

About two weeks later, shortly after New Year’s Day 2003, Bush — frustrated with unfruitful U.N. weapons inspections — made up his mind to go to war after consulting with Rice, according to Woodward.

She urged him to act on his stated threat to take military action if Saddam did not provide a full accounting of his weapons of mass destruction, Woodward reports.

« If you’re going to carry out coercive diplomacy, you have to live with that decision, » Rice is quoted as telling Bush.

On « Face The Nation » Sunday, Rice insisted that Bush’s conversation with her in January did not amount to a decision to go to war, which she said wasn’t made until March when military strikes were ordered.

« Part of the relationship between a national security adviser and a president is that the president, in a sense, kind of thinks out loud, if I could put it that way, » she said.

Questions about Hans Blix
Woodward also reports that U.S. officials were skeptical about the weapons inspections because they were receiving intelligence information indicating that chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix was not reporting everything he had uncovered and was not doing everything he said he was doing.

Some of the president’s top advisers thought Blix was a liar, according to the book.

Shortly after the meeting with Rice, Bush told Rumsfeld, « Look, we’re going to have to do this, I’m afraid, » according to the book.

Subsequently, on January 11, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard Myers met in Cheney’s office with Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States.

At that meeting, Myers showed Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador, a map labeled « top secret noforn, » meaning that it was not to be seen by any foreign national, Woodward told CBS.

The map outlined the U.S. battle plan for Iraq, which was to begin with an air attack, followed by land invasions moving north from Kuwait and south from Turkey, according to the book.

Myers said Sunday on CNN’s « Late Edition » that though he had not read Woodward’s book, he was familiar with the account of the meeting, and it was « basically correct. »

« At that time, we were looking for support of our allies and partners in the region. Saudi Arabia’s been a strategic partner in the region over a very long time, » he said.

Powell’s skepticism
Two days after the meeting with Bandar, on January 13, Bush met with Powell in the Oval Office to inform his chief diplomat that he had decided to go to war.

« You know you’re going to be owning this place? » Powell is reported as telling Bush, cautioning him that the United States would be assuming the responsibility for the postwar situation.

Bush told Powell that he understood the ramifications, Woodward said.

Despite his reservations about the policy, Powell told the president he would support him, deciding that it would be « an unthinkable act of disloyalty » to both Bush and U.S. troops to walk away at that point, according to Woodward.

In her interview with « Face The Nation, » Rice disputed the suggestion that Powell was kept less in the loop than the Saudi ambassador.

She said again that the decision to go to war did not take place until March, well after Bush had informed Powell of his intentions and after his U.N. presentation.

« The secretary of state was privy to all of the conversations with the president, all of the briefings for the president, » she said.

« It’s just not the proper impression that somehow Prince Bandar was in the know in a way that Secretary Powell was not. »

Voir enfin:

Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong

How could we have been so far off in our estimates of Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs? A leading Iraq expert and intelligence analyst in the Clinton Administration—whose book The Threatening Storm proved deeply influential in the run-up to the war—gives a detailed account of how and why we erred

Kenneth M. Pollack January/February 2004

Let’s start with one truth: last March, when the United States and its coalition partners invaded Iraq, the American public and much of the rest of the world believed that after Saddam Hussein’s regime sank, a vast flotsam of weapons of mass destruction would bob to the surface. That, of course, has not been the case. In the words of David Kay, the principal adviser to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an organization created late last spring to search for prohibited weaponry, « I think all of us who entered Iraq expected the job of actually discovering deployed weapons to be easier than it has turned out to be. » Many people are now asking very reasonable questions about why they were misled.

Democrats have typically accused the Bush Administration of exaggerating the threat posed by Iraq in order to justify an unnecessary war. Republicans have typically claimed that the fault lay with the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, which they say overestimated the threat from Iraq—a claim that carries the unlikely implication that Bush’s team might not have opted for war if it had understood that Saddam was not as dangerous as he seemed.

Both sides appear to be at least partly right. The intelligence community did overestimate the scope and progress of Iraq’s WMD programs, although not to the extent that many people believe. The Administration stretched those estimates to make a case not only for going to war but for doing so at once, rather than taking the time to build regional and international support for military action.

This issue has some personal relevance for me. I began my career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA, where I saw an earlier generation of technical analysts mistakenly conclude that Saddam Hussein was much further away from having a nuclear weapon than the post-Gulf War inspections revealed. I later moved on to the National Security Council, where I served two tours, in 1995-1996 and 1999-2001. During the latter stint the intelligence community convinced me and the rest of the Clinton Administration that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programs following the withdrawal of the UN inspectors, in 1998, and was only a matter of years away from having a nuclear weapon. In 2002 I wrote a book called Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, in which I argued that because all our other options had failed, the United States would ultimately have to go to war to remove Saddam before he acquired a functioning nuclear weapon. Thus it was with more than a little interest that I pondered the question of why we didn’t find in Iraq what we were so certain we would.
What We Thought We Knew

The U.S. intelligence community’s belief that Saddam was aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction pre-dated Bush’s inauguration, and therefore cannot be attributed to political pressure. It was first advanced at the end of the 1990s, at a time when President Bill Clinton was trying to facilitate a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and was hardly seeking assessments that the threat from Iraq was growing.

In congressional testimony in March of 2002 Robert Einhorn, Clinton’s assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, summed up the intelligence community’s conclusions about Iraq at the end of the Clinton Administration:

« How close is the peril of Iraqi WMD? Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons against its neighbors (albeit attacks that would be ragged, inaccurate, and limited in size). Within four or five years it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing fissile material produced indigenously—and to threaten U.S. territory with such weapons delivered by nonconventional means, such as commercial shipping containers. If it managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much sooner. »

In October of 2002 the National Intelligence Council, the highest analytical body in the U.S. intelligence community, issued a classified National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD, representing the consensus of the intelligence community. Although after the war some complained that the NIE had been a rush job, and that the NIC should have been more careful in its choice of language, in fact the report accurately reflected what intelligence analysts had been telling Clinton Administration officials like me for years in verbal briefings.

A declassified version of the 2002 NIE was released to the public in July of last year. Its principal conclusions:

« Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. » (The classified version of the NIE gave an estimate of five to seven years.)

« Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess [that] Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. »

« If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year … Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade. »

« Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX … Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents. »

« All key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW [biological warfare] program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war … Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war. »

U.S. government analysts were not alone in these views. In the late spring of 2002 I participated in a Washington meeting about Iraqi WMD. Those present included nearly twenty former inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the force established in 1991 to oversee the elimination of WMD in Iraq. One of the senior people put a question to the group: Did anyone in the room doubt that Iraq was currently operating a secret centrifuge plant? No one did. Three people added that they believed Iraq was also operating a secret calutron plant (a facility for separating uranium isotopes).

Other nations’ intelligence services were similarly aligned with U.S. views. Somewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France’s President Jacques Chirac told Time magazine last February, « There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right … in having decided Iraq should be disarmed. » In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

What We Think We Know Now

But it appears that Iraq may not have had any actual weapons of mass destruction. A number of caveats are in order. We do not yet have a complete picture of Iraq’s WMD programs. Initial U.S. efforts to seek out WMD caches were badly lacking: an American artillery unit that had too few people for the task and virtually no plan of action had been hastily assigned the mission. Not surprisingly, its efforts garnered little useful information. According to Judith Miller, a New York Times reporter who was embedded with the unit, by mid-June—nearly two months after the end of major combat operations—the United States had interviewed only thirteen out of hundreds of Iraqi scientists. Documents relating to the programs are known to have been destroyed. Much of Iraq is yet to be explored; as David Kay, of the Iraq Survey Group, which took over the search for WMD in June, told Congress, only ten of Iraq’s 130 major ammunition dumps had been thoroughly checked as of early October (the time of his testimony). Now that Saddam Hussein is in custody, it is possible that new information may be forthcoming, or that closemouthed Iraqis will offer fresh details.

Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the ISG will probably not change dramatically, at least not in their broad contours. Kay summarized those findings in his October testimony.

Iraq had preserved some of its technological nuclear capability from before the Gulf War. However, no evidence suggested that Saddam had undertaken any significant steps after 1998 toward reconstituting the program to build nuclear weapons or to produce fissile material.

Little evidence surfaced that Iraq had continued to produce chemical weapons; only a minimal amount of clandestine research had been done on them. For instance, the production line at the Fallujah II facility (the plant that intelligence officers believed was Iraq’s principal site for making chlorine, an ingredient in some chemical-warfare agents) turned out to be in derelict condition and had not operated since the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Iraqi officials seemed to believe that they could convert existing civilian pharmaceutical plants to chemical-weapons production, and that Saddam was interested in their ability to do so.

Iraq made determined efforts to retain some capabilities for biological warfare. It maintained an undeclared network of laboratories and other facilities within the apparatus of its security services, and as Kay put it, « this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. » To disguise its biological-warfare programs Baghdad had scientists working on overt projects that were closely related to proscribed activities.

Iraq seemed to have been most aggressive in pursuing proscribed missiles. In Kay’s words, « detainees and cooperative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least [240 miles] and up to [620 miles] and that measures to conceal these projects from [UN inspectors] were initiated in late 2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. » The Iraqis were also working on clustering liquid-fueled rocket engines in order to produce a longer-range missile, and were trying to convert certain surface-to-air missiles into surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 150 miles. Most troubling of all, the ISG uncovered evidence that from 1999 to 2002 Iraq had negotiated with North Korea to buy technology for No Dong missiles, which have a range of 800 miles.

Overall, these findings suggest that Iraq did retain prohibited WMD programs, but that those programs were not so extensive, advanced, or threatening as the National Intelligence Estimate maintained.

More-cautious analysts had argued that the NIE’s assessment that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons was unlikely, because such munitions deteriorate rapidly and can be quickly produced in bulk if production lines and precursor agents are available (making stockpiles unnecessary as well as inefficient). These analysts instead believed that Iraq had a « just-in-time » production capability—that it could churn out these weapons as needed, using hidden or dual-use facilities. But not even this more conservative scenario was borne out by the ISG’s investigations. Sources told the group that Saddam and his son Uday had each, on separate occasions in 2001 and 2002, asked officials associated with Iraq’s chemical-warfare program how long it would take to produce chemical agents and weapons. One official reportedly told Saddam that it would take six months to produce mustard gas (among the easiest such agents to manufacture); another told Uday that it would take two months to produce mustard gas and two years to produce sarin (a simple nerve agent). The questions do not suggest the presence of large stockpiles. The answers do not support a just-in-time capability.

The ISG’s findings to date are most damning in the nuclear arena—as it happens, the segment of Iraq’s WMD program in which the initial findings are most likely to be correct, because nuclear-weapons production is extremely difficult to conceal. The perceived nuclear threat was always the most disturbing one. The U.S. intelligence community’s belief toward the end of the Clinton Administration that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and was close to acquiring nuclear weapons led me and other Administration officials to support the idea of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, albeit not right away. The NIE’s judgment to the same effect was the real linchpin of the Bush Administration’s case for an invasion.

What we have found in Iraq since the invasion belies that judgment. Saddam did retain basic elements for a nuclear-weapons program and the desire to acquire such weapons at some point, but the program itself was dormant. Saddam had not ordered its resumption (although some reports suggest that he considered doing so in 2002). In all probability Iraq was considerably further from having a nuclear weapon than the five to seven years estimated in the classified version of the NIE.

The View From Baghdad

Figuring out why we overestimated Iraq’s WMD capabilities involves figuring out what the Iraqis, especially Saddam Hussein, were thinking and doing throughout the 1990s. The story starts right after the Gulf War. An Iraqi document that fell into the inspectors’ hands revealed that in April of 1991 a high-level Iraqi committee had ordered many of the country’s WMD activities to be hidden from UN inspectors, even though compliance with the inspections was a condition for the lifting of economic sanctions imposed after the invasion of Kuwait. The document was a report from a nuclear-weapons plant describing how it carried out this order. According to UNSCOM’s final report, « The facility was instructed to remove evidence of the true activities at the facility, evacuate documents to hide sites, make physical alterations to the site to hide its true purpose, develop cover stories, and conduct mock inspections to prepare for UN inspectors. »

A great deal of other information substantiates the idea that Saddam at first decided to try to keep a considerable portion of his WMD programs intact and hidden. His efforts probably included retaining some munitions, but mainly concerned production and research elements. In other words, Saddam did initially try to maintain a « just-in-time » capability. However, it became increasingly clear how difficult this would be. In the summer of 1991 inspectors tracked down and destroyed Saddam’s calutrons. Their discoveries may have convinced him that he would have to put his WMD programs on hold until after the sanctions were lifted—something he reportedly thought would happen within a matter of months.

But the inspectors proved more tenacious and the international community more steadfast than the Iraqis had expected. Accordingly, from June of 1991 to May of 1992 Iraq unilaterally destroyed parts of its WMD programs (as we know from subsequent Iraqi admissions). This action appears to have served two purposes: It got rid of unnecessary munitions and secondary equipment that the inspectors might have found, which would have constituted proof of Iraqi noncompliance. And it helped Baghdad conceal more-important elements of the programs, because the regime could point to the unilateral destructions as evidence of cooperation and could claim that even more material had been destroyed. (Since the fall of Baghdad scientists have told the ISG that key equipment was in fact diverted from these destructions and hidden.)

In 1995 matters changed. That August, Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law and the head of Iraq’s WMD programs, defected to Jordan, prompting a panicked Baghdad to hurriedly turn over hundreds of thousands of pages of new documentation to the United Nations. According to the former chief UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus, Kamel’s statements and the Iraqi documents squared with what UNSCOM had been finding: although all actual weapons had been eliminated, either by the UN or in the earlier destructions, Iraq had preserved production and R&D programs. Although the Iraqis tried to withhold any highly incriminating documents from the UN (and, ridiculously, claimed that Kamel had been running the programs on his own, without anyone else’s knowledge), in their rush they overlooked several containing crucial information about previously concealed aspects of the nuclear and biological programs.

Other secrets were laid bare that same year. A U.S.-UN sting operation caught the Iraqis trying to smuggle 115 missile gyroscopes through Jordan. (UN inspectors later found other gyroscopes hidden at the bottom of the Tigris River.) Iraq was forced to admit to the existence of a facility to build Scud-missile engines, and to destroy a hidden plant for manufacturing modified Scud missiles. It was also forced to admit to having made much greater progress on its nuclear program before the Gulf War than it had previously acknowledged. Most important, it was forced to admit that a very large biological-weapons plant at al-Hakim, whose existence had been concealed from UN inspectors, had produced 500,000 liters of biological agents in 1989 and 1990, and that it was still functional in 1995. Three years after this confession Lieutenant General Amer al-Saadi, Saddam’s principal liaison with the UN, told inspectors that Iraq would offer no excuse or defense for having denied the existence of its biological-weapons program. He stated matter-of-factly that Iraq had made a political decision to conceal it.

Either late in 1995 or at some point in 1996 Saddam probably recognized that trying to retain his just-in-time capability had become counterproductive. The inspectors kept finding pieces of the programs, and each discovery pushed the lifting of the sanctions further into the future. It’s important to keep in mind several other events of this period. Saddam’s internal position was very shaky. He had faced disturbances in several of his most loyal Sunni tribes. In addition to Kamel, a number of high-ranking officials had defected to the West, including Saddam’s chief of military intelligence, Wafic Samarai. Coup plots abounded. In 1995 the Kurds smashed two Iraqi infantry brigades at Irbil, humiliating the Iraqi army. In 1996 Iraqi intelligence uncovered a CIA-backed coup attempt whose participants had penetrated some of Saddam’s most sensitive intelligence services. Iraq’s economy was suffocating under the sanctions, and inflation was rampant. Given this precarious situation, Saddam probably decided to scale back his WMD programs (with the likely exception of work on proscribed missiles, which could be concealed by Iraq’s permitted missile program) by destroying additional equipment, keeping the bare minimum needed to rebuild them at some point, in order to reduce the risk of further discoveries. This would have meant giving up the idea of just-in-time production capabilities and limiting his efforts to hiding documents and only key pieces of equipment. In short, Saddam switched from trying to hang on to the maximum production and research assets of his WMD programs to trying to keep only the minimum necessary to reconstitute the programs at some point after the sanctions had been lifted.

What Was Saddam Thinking?

Having decided to give up so much of his WMD capability, why didn’t Saddam change his behavior toward the UN inspectors and demonstrate a spirit of candor and cooperation? Even after 1996 the Iraqis took a confrontational posture toward UNSCOM, fighting to prevent inspectors from going where they wanted to go and seeing what they wanted to see. The governments of the world inferred from this defiance that Saddam was still not complying with the UN resolutions, and the sanctions therefore stayed in place.

The first and most obvious answer is that Saddam still had some things to hide, and was fearful of their discovery. Although he did unquestionably have some things to hide, this answer is not entirely satisfying. Iraq was able to conceal the minimized remnants of its WMD programs so well that UNSCOM found little incriminating evidence in 1997 and 1998. This early success should have given Saddam the confidence to begin to cooperate more fully with the UN resolutions. But throughout the period leading up to the war Saddam remained as obstinate as ever.

An alternative explanation, offered by Iraq’s former UN ambassador, Tariq Aziz, and other officials captured after last year’s war, goes like this: Saddam was pretending to have WMD in order to enhance his prestige among the other Arab nations. This explanation doesn’t ring completely true either. It is certainly the case that Saddam garnered a great deal of admiration from Arabs of many countries by appearing to have such weapons, and that he aspired to dominate the Arab world. But this theory assumes that he was willing to incur severe penalties for the UN’s belief that he still had WMD without reaping any tangible benefits from actually having them. If prestige had been more important to him than the lifting of the sanctions, it would have been more logical and more in keeping with his character to simply retain all his WMD capabilities.

Saddam’s behavior may have been driven by completely different considerations. Saddam has always evinced much greater concern for his internal position than for his external status. He has made any number of highly foolish foreign-policy decisions—for example, invading Kuwait and then deciding to stick around and fight the U.S.-led coalition—in response to domestic problems that he feared threatened his grip on power. The same forces may have been at work here; after all, ever since the Iran-Iraq war WMD had been an important element of Saddam’s strength within Iraq. He used them against the Kurds in the late 1980s, and during the revolts that broke out after the Gulf War, he sent signals that he might use them against both the Kurds and the Shiites. He may have feared that if his internal adversaries realized that he no longer had the capability to use these weapons, they would try to move against him. In a similar vein, Saddam’s standing among the Sunni elites who constituted his power base was linked to a great extent to his having made Iraq a regional power—which the elites saw as a product of Iraq’s unconventional arsenal. Thus openly giving up his WMD could also have jeopardized his position with crucial supporters.

Furthermore, Saddam may have felt trapped by his initial reckoning that he could fool the UN inspectors and that the sanctions would be short-lived. Because of this mistaken calculation he had subjected Iraq to terrible hardships. Suddenly cooperating with the inspectors would have meant admitting to both his opponents and his supporters that his course of action had been a mistake and that, having now given up most of his WMD programs, he had devastated Iraqi society for no reason.

This suggests that in 1995-1996 Saddam took one of his famous gambles—gambles that almost never worked out for him. He chose not to « come clean » and cooperate with the UN for fear that this would make him look weak to both his domestic enemies and his domestic allies, either of whom might then have moved against him. But he would try to greatly diminish the chances that UNSCOM would find more evidence of his continuing noncompliance by reducing his WMD programs to the bare minimum, in hopes that the absence of evidence would lead to the lifting of sanctions—something he desperately sought in 1996.

In other respects Saddam’s fortunes began to rise in 1996. Although the CIA-backed coup attempt may have signified internal weakness, the fact that Saddam snuffed it out, as he had many previous attempts, signified strength. Also, to avenge the Iraqi army’s 1995 defeat at Irbil, Saddam manipulated infighting among the Kurds so as to allow his Republican Guards to drive into the city, smash the Kurd defenders, and arrest several hundred CIA-backed rebels. As the historian Amatzia Baram has persuasively argued in his book Building Toward Crisis (1998), these successes made Saddam feel secure enough to swallow his pride and accept UN Resolution 986, the oil-for-food program, which he had previously rejected as an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. Oil-for-food turned out to be an enormous boon for the Iraqi economy, and commodity prices fell quickly, stabilizing the dinar.

The oil-for-food program itself gave Saddam clout to apply toward the lifting of the sanctions. Under Resolution 986 Iraq could choose to whom it would sell its oil and from whom it would buy its food and medicine. Baghdad could therefore reward cooperative states with contracts. Not surprisingly, France and Russia regularly topped the list of Iraq’s oil-for-food partners. In addition, Iraq could set the prices—and since Saddam did not really care whether he was importing enough food and medicine for his people’s needs, he could sell oil on the cheap and buy food and medicine at inflated prices as additional payoff to friendly governments. He made it clear that he wanted his trading partners to ignore Iraqi smuggling and try to get the sanctions lifted.

By 1997 the international environment had changed markedly, in ways that probably convinced Saddam that he didn’t need to cooperate with the inspectors. The same international outcry—against the suffering inflicted by the Iraq sanctions—that prompted the United States to craft the oil-for-food deal was creating momentum for lifting the sanctions completely. At that point it was reasonable for Saddam to believe that in the not too distant future the sanctions either would be lifted or would be so undermined as to be effectively meaningless, and that he would never have to reveal the remaining elements of his WMD programs. Only in 2002, when the Bush Administration suddenly focused its attention on Iraq, would Saddam have had any reason to change this view. And then, according to a variety of Iraqi sources, he simply refused to believe that the Americans were serious and would actually invade.

Another explanation should be posited. This is the notion that Saddam did not order the program scaled down, but Iraqi scientists ensured that it did not progress and deceived Saddam into believing that it was much further along than it in fact was. Numerous Iraqi scientists have claimed that although Saddam ordered them to produce particular things for the WMD programs, they dragged their feet or found other ways to avoid delivering them. There is most likely a germ of truth to these stories: prevarication on the part of some Iraqi scientists may have helped to account for the modest state of Iraq’s WMD programs in 2003. But they probably form only a part of the explanation. Many of the accounts of scientists’ quietly thwarting Saddam are undoubtedly self-serving, concocted in the aftermath of his defeat. As we have heard time and again from Iraqi defectors, those who did not meet Saddam’s demands risked torture and murder for themselves and their families. We have consistently found that in Saddam’s Iraq very few people took that risk.

One last element may also have been at work all along: the possibility that Saddam genuinely feared that the inspections were a cover for a CIA campaign to overthrow or assassinate him. The Iraqis repeatedly cited this fear in denying UNSCOM access to certain « sensitive » sites—particularly palaces—that were associated with Saddam personally. The rest of the world assumed that it was merely an excuse to keep inspectors out of places that contained evidence of WMD programs. However, the Iraqis may have been telling the truth on this point (and the initial debriefing of Saddam lends some credence to this scenario). After all, as various sources have now disclosed, the United States did run a covert-action campaign against Saddam, starting in 1991, and U.S. intelligence did use UNSCOM operations (without UNSCOM’s knowledge) to gather intelligence for that campaign.

The Perils of Prediction

Everyone outside Iraq missed the 1995-1996 shift in Saddam’s strategy—that is, to scale back his WMD programs to minimize the odds of further discoveries—and assumed that Iraq’s earlier behavior was continuing more or less in a straight line. This misperception took on considerable weight in the following years.

Context is crucial to understanding any intelligence assessment. No matter how objective the analyst may be, he or she begins with a set of basic assumptions that create a broad perspective on an issue; this helps the analyst to sort through evidence.

The context for the 2002 NIE assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs began to take shape before the Gulf War. Prior to 1991 the intelligence communities in the United States and elsewhere believed that Iraq was at least five, and probably closer to ten, years away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Of course, after the war we learned that in 1991 Iraq had been only six to twenty-four months away from having a workable nuclear weapon. This revelation stunned the analysts responsible for following the Iraqi nuclear program. The lessons they took from it were that Iraq was determined to acquire nuclear weapons and would go to any lengths to do so; that in pursuit of this goal Iraq was willing to use technology that Westerners considered crude and obsolete; that the Iraqis were superb at concealment and deception; and that inspections were inherently flawed—after all, there had been inspectors in Iraq prior to 1990, and they had been completely fooled.

These lessons were strongly reinforced by the revelation of Iraq’s attempts in the first four years after the war to preserve significant parts of its WMD programs. By about 1994 UNSCOM believed, incorrectly, that it had largely disarmed Iraq; its members were privately discussing switching its operations from active inspections to passive monitoring. Many intelligence analysts in the United States, Britain, and Israel disagreed with UNSCOM’s assessment, but they were hard-pressed to substantiate their suspicions—until Hussein Kamel’s defection, in 1995, and subsequent Iraqi admissions regarding the extent of deception. These developments came as a profound shock to the UN inspectors, who resolved that Iraq could never again be trusted. Thus, just when Iraq was in all likelihood giving up efforts to maintain its just-in-time production capability, the rest of the world became hardened in its conviction that Saddam would never abandon or even reduce his efforts to acquire WMD.

Another important contribution to the context is the continuation of Saddam’s hostility toward the inspectors. If anything, the Iraqis became even less accommodating over time. By 1998 they were physically harassing the inspectors—on one occasion firing two rocket-propelled grenades into an UNSCOM building in Baghdad, on another grabbing the controls of an UNSCOM helicopter in flight and nearly causing it to crash. Western intelligence agencies understandably took these actions to mean that nothing in Saddam’s weaponry plans had changed.

In December of 1998 the inspectors withdrew from the country. Their decision to do so came after Iraq announced, in August of that year, that it would no longer cooperate with them at all, and after repeated crises demonstrated that Baghdad’s announcement was not just bluster.

The end of the UN inspections appears in retrospect to have been a much greater problem than anyone recognized at the time. The inspectors had been the best source of information on Iraq and its WMD programs. UNSCOM had a large and highly capable cadre of weapons specialists who focused exclusively on Iraq. Many Western intelligence agencies, faced with other issues that demanded their resources, increasingly relied on UNSCOM’s data and assessments and did little to bolster their own (meager) capabilities in Iraq. And UNSCOM had something that American intelligence did not—physical access to Iraq. Without an embassy there it was very hard for U.S. case officers to penetrate the country.

The end of the inspections eliminated the single best means of vetting what information intelligence agencies could gather independently about Iraq. These agencies usually shared (in some form) new information or analyses about the WMD programs with UNSCOM. If a defector claimed that biological-weapons material was stored at a given site, inspectors would look for it. If satellite imagery indicated unusual activity at a particular location, inspectors would try to confirm it. Although Iraq’s counterintelligence efforts were formidable (UNSCOM estimated that only six of its roughly 250 inspections actually caught the Iraqis by surprise), UNSCOM was usually able to gauge, if only broadly, whether a source or a deduction was correct.

When the inspectors suddenly left, the various intelligence agencies were caught psychologically and organizationally off balance. Desperate for information on Iraq, they began to trust sources that they would previously have had UNSCOM vet. If a defector came out of Iraq after 1998, the CIA had to gauge his credibility by comparing his account with those of other defectors—who might be unreliable or just unproven—or by checking it against whatever they could glean from satellites and other indirect sources. With so little to go on, intelligence agencies believed many reports that now seem deeply suspect.

In the absence of hard evidence, the intelligence analysts tended to fall back on the underlying assumptions they had begun with. Those assumptions included the belief that Saddam was determined to preserve his extant WMD capabilities and acquire new ones. And now there were no weapons inspectors to hinder him. The inspectors had also been a moderating influence on Western intelligence agencies; the information they provided, and the mere fact of their presence in Iraq, helped those agencies stick to reasonable suppositions and keep unsubstantiated fears at bay. After 1998 many analysts increasingly entertained worst-case scenarios—scenarios that gradually became mainstream estimates.

Another element that contributed to faulty assessments before the 2003 invasion was Iraqi rhetoric. Imagine that you were a CIA analyst in June of 2000 and heard Saddam make the following statement: « If the world tells us to abandon all our weapons and keep only swords, we will do that. We will destroy all the weapons, if they destroy their weapons. But if they keep a rifle and then tell me that I have the right to possess only a sword, then we would say no. As long as the rifle has become a means to defend our country against anybody who may have designs against it, then we will try our best to acquire the rifle. » It would be very difficult not to interpret Saddam’s remarks as an announcement that he intended to reconstitute his WMD programs.

The final element in the context for our pre-invasion analysis involved discrepancies between how much WMD material went into Iraq and how much Iraq could prove it had destroyed. Before the Gulf War (and to a certain extent afterward) Baghdad imported enormous quantities of equipment and raw materials for WMD. The UN inspectors, with remarkable diligence, obtained virtually all the import figures, either from the Iraqis or from their suppliers. They then asked the Iraqis to either produce the materials or account for their destruction. In many cases the Iraqis could not. The difference between what they had imported and what they could account for was seen as important evidence of an ambitious clandestine WMD program. These are the numbers—of bombs, of liters of precursor chemicals, and so on—that the world regularly heard Bush Administration officials intone during the run-up to the 2003 war.

In hindsight there are legitimate reasons to question these numbers. According to David Kay, a number of Iraqi sources have told the ISG that some of the material that was unaccounted for was diverted from the unilateral destructions that took place from 1991 to 1996. However, it is not clear whether or not any of that material was destroyed later. And it is likely that some of the discrepancies between UNSCOM and Iraqi figures are no more than the result of sloppiness. Saddam’s Iraq was not exactly an efficient state, and many of his chief lieutenants were semi-literate thugs with no understanding of esoteric technical matters and little regard for how things should be done—their only concern was that Saddam’s demands be met.

The Politics of Persuasion

The intelligence community’s overestimation of Iraq’s WMD capability is only part of the story of why we went to war last year. The other part involves how the Bush Administration handled the intelligence. Throughout the spring and fall of 2002 and well into 2003 I received numerous complaints from friends and colleagues in the intelligence community, and from people in the policy community, about precisely that. According to them, many Administration officials reacted strongly, negatively, and aggressively when presented with information or analysis that contradicted what they already believed about Iraq. Many of these officials believed that Saddam Hussein was the source of virtually all the problems in the Middle East and was an imminent danger to the United States because of his perceived possession of weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism. Many also believed that CIA analysts tended to be left-leaning cultural relativists who consistently downplayed threats to the United States. They believed that the Agency, not the Administration, was biased, and that they were acting simply to correct that bias.

Intelligence officers who presented analyses that were at odds with the pre-existing views of senior Administration officials were subjected to barrages of questions and requests for additional information. They were asked to justify their work sentence by sentence: « Why did you rely on this source and not this other piece of information? » « How does this conclusion square with this other point? » « Please explain the history of Iraq’s association with the organization you mention in this sentence. » Reportedly, the worst fights were those over sources. The Administration gave greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities. In many cases intelligence analysts were distrustful of those sources, or knew unequivocally that they were wrong. But when they said so, they were not heeded; instead they were beset with further questions about their own sources.

On many occasions Administration officials’ requests for additional information struck the analysts as being made merely to distract them from their primary mission. Some officials asked for extensive historical analyses—a hugely time-consuming undertaking, for which most intelligence analysts are not trained. Requests were constantly made for detailed analyses of newspaper articles that conformed to the views of Administration officials—pieces by conservative newspaper columnists such as Jim Hoagland, William Safire, and George F. Will. These columnists may be highly intelligent men, but they have no claim to superior insight into the workings of Iraq, or to any independent intelligence-collection capabilities.

Of course, no policymaker should accept intelligence estimates unquestioningly. While I was at the NSC, I regularly challenged analysts as to why they believed what they did. I asked for additional material and required them to do significant additional work. Any official who does less is derelict in his or her duty. However, at a certain point curiosity and diligence become a form of pressure. If your employer asks you every so often about your health and seems to take an appropriate interest in the answer, you probably feel that he or she is kind and considerate. If your employer asks you about your health every ten minutes, in highly detailed, probing questions, you may have a more nervous reaction.

As Seymour Hersh, among others, has reported, Bush Administration officials also took some actions that arguably crossed the line between rigorous oversight of the intelligence community and an attempt to manipulate intelligence. They set up their own shop in the Pentagon, called the Office of Special Plans, in order to sift through the information on Iraq themselves. To a great extent OSP personnel « cherry-picked » the intelligence they passed on, selecting reports that supported the Administration’s pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest.

Most problematic of all, the OSP often chose to believe reports that trained intelligence officers considered unreliable or downright false. In particular it gave great credence to reports from the Iraqi National Congress, whose leader was the Administration-backed Ahmed Chalabi. It is true that the intelligence community believed some of the material that came from the INC—but not most of it. (In retrospect, of course, it seems that even the intelligence professionals gave INC reporting more credence than it deserved.) One of the reasons the OSP generally believed Chalabi and the INC was that they were telling it what it wanted to hear—giving the OSP, in a kind of vicious circle, further incentive to trust these sources over differing, and ultimately more reliable, ones. Thus intelligence analysts spent huge amounts of time fighting bad information and trying to persuade Administration officials not to make policy decisions based on it. From my own experience I know that it is hard enough to figure out what the reliable evidence indicates—and vast battles are fought over that. To have to also fight over what is clearly bad information is a Sisyphean task.

The Bush officials who created the OSP gave its reports directly to those in the highest levels of government, often passing raw, unverified intelligence straight to the Cabinet level as gospel. Senior Administration officials made public statements based on these reports—reports that the larger intelligence community knew to be erroneous (for instance, that there was hard and fast evidence linking Iraq to al-Qaeda). Another problem arising from the machinations of the OSP is that whenever the principals of the National Security Council met with the President and his staff, two completely different versions of reality were on the table. The CIA, the State Department, and the uniformed military services would present one version, consistent with the perspective of intelligence and foreign-policy professionals, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Vice President would present another, based on the perspective of the OSP. These views were too far apart to allow for compromise. As a result, the Administration found it difficult, if not impossible, to make certain important decisions. And it made some that were fatally flawed, including many relating to postwar planning, when the OSP’s view—that Saddam’s regime simultaneously was very threatening and could easily be replaced by a new government—prevailed.

For the most part, the problems discussed so far have more to do with the methods of Administration officials than with their motives, which were often misguided and dangerous, but were essentially well-intentioned. The one action for which I cannot hold Administration officials blameless is their distortion of intelligence estimates when making the public case for going to war.

As best I can tell, these officials were guilty not of lying but of creative omission. They discussed only those elements of intelligence estimates that served their cause. This was particularly apparent in regard to the time frame for Iraq’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon—the issue that most alarmed the American public and the rest of the world. Remember that the NIE said that Iraq was likely to have a nuclear weapon in five to seven years if it had to produce the fissile material indigenously, and that it might have one in less than a year if it could obtain the material from a foreign source. The intelligence community considered it highly unlikely that Iraq would be able to obtain weapons-grade material from a foreign source; it had been trying to do so for twenty-five years with no luck. However, time after time senior Administration officials discussed only the worst-case, and least likely, scenario, and failed to mention the intelligence community’s most likely scenario. Some examples:

In a radio address on September 14, 2002, President Bush warned, « Today Saddam Hussein has the scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear-weapons program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. »

On October 7, 2002, the President told a group in Cincinnati, « If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. »

On November 1, 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton told the Second Global Conference on Nuclear, Bio/Chem Terrorism, « We estimate that once Iraq acquires fissile material—whether from a foreign source or by securing the materials to build an indigenous fissile-material capability—it could fabricate a nuclear weapon within one year. »

Vice President Cheney said on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 14, 2003, « The judgment in the NIE was that if Saddam could acquire fissile material, weapons-grade material, that he would have a nuclear weapon within a few months to a year. That was the judgment of the intelligence community of the United States, and they had a high degree of confidence in it. »

None of these statements in itself was untrue. However, each told only a part of the story—the most sensational part. These statements all implied that the U.S. intelligence community believed that Saddam would have a nuclear weapon within a year unless the United States acted at once.

Some defenders of the Administration have reportedly countered that all it did was make the best possible case for war, playing a role similar to that of a defense attorney who is charged with presenting the best possible case for a client (even if the client is guilty). That is a false analogy. A defense attorney is responsible for presenting only one side of a dispute. The President is responsible for serving the entire nation. Only the Administration has access to all the information available to various agencies of the U.S. government—and withholding or downplaying some of that information for its own purposes is a betrayal of that responsibility.

What Is to Be Done?

What we have learned about Iraq’s WMD programs since the fall of Baghdad leads me to conclude that the case for war with Iraq was considerably weaker than I believed beforehand. Because of the consensus among American and foreign intelligence agencies, outside experts, and former UN weapons inspectors, I had been convinced that Iraq was only years away from having a nuclear weapon—probably only four or five years, as Robert Einhorn had testified. That estimate was clearly off, possibly by quite a bit. My reluctant conviction that war was our only option (although not at the time or in the manner in which the Bush Administration pursued it) was not entirely based on the nuclear threat, but that threat was the most important factor in it.

The war was not all bad. I do not believe that it was a strategic mistake, although the appalling handling of postwar planning was. There is no question that Saddam Hussein was a force for real instability in the Persian Gulf, and that his removal from power was a tremendous improvement. There is also no question that he was pure evil, and that he headed one of the most despicable regimes of the past fifty years. I am grateful that the United States no longer has to contend with the malign influence of Saddam’s Iraq in this economically irreplaceable and increasingly fragile part of the world; nor can I begrudge the Iraqi people one day of their freedom. What’s more, we should not forget that containment was failing. The shameful performance of the United Nations Security Council members (particularly France and Germany) in 2002-2003 was final proof that containment would not have lasted much longer; Saddam would eventually have reconstituted his WMD programs, although further in the future than we had thought. That said, the case for war—and for war sooner rather than later—was certainly less compelling than it appeared at the time. At the very least we should recognize that the Administration’s rush to war was reckless even on the basis of what we thought we knew in March of 2003. It appears even more reckless in light of what we know today.

The problems that led to our mistaken beliefs about the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction must be addressed immediately. Unfortunately, to some extent the problems are contradictory, and therefore the solutions may work against one another. For example, a remedy used in the past to address influence from the executive branch on the intelligence process has been to increase oversight of intelligence operations and analysis by Congress. However, in this instance increasing congressional oversight could have exacerbated another problem: the failure of the intelligence community to sufficiently challenge its own assumptions about Saddam’s strategy. The more that intelligence agencies must report to both Congress and the White House, the more they fear becoming a political football, and the more they will tone down their estimates, stick to mainstream judgments, and avoid taking controversial positions. Arguing that Iraq had minimized its WMD holdings after 1996 would have been a very controversial position indeed.

Some of the problems that led to our misunderstanding of Iraq’s WMD may be insoluble, at least by bureaucratic changes. The forms of pressure exerted on the intelligence community by the Bush Administration were perfectly legal; it would probably be impossible to regulate against them. Moreover, doing so could preclude useful and necessary questioning of intelligence analysts by Administration officials. Still, some fixes do suggest themselves.

In the future we as a nation must be willing to devote enough resources to intelligence so that we will always be able to sustain a large, aggressive program to collect all manner of information and a sophisticated analysis program on all high-priority issues. In retrospect, our over-reliance on UNSCOM inspectors lulled us into a false sense of security; this in turn contributed to our inflated estimates of Iraq’s WMD progress after 1998. Even though Iraq was a difficult environment for any intelligence service to operate in, and the CIA did devote substantial assets to it at all times, it would have made some difference if the Agency could have devoted still greater resources to it, even when that seemed redundant with UNSCOM’s missions.

Our failings in the WMD experience also argue for a more powerful and independent director of central intelligence. The DCI currently serves at the pleasure of the President, and although he is the nominal head of the entire intelligence community, in reality he does not have much authority over most of the intelligence agencies, whose budgets and personnel come largely from the Department of Defense. The United States could make the DCI position similar to that of the director of the FBI: the President would nominate a candidate who would then need to be confirmed by Congress, and who would serve a fixed term. And the DCI could be made the true head of intelligence, with control over the budgets and personnel of all the intelligence agencies. Many of the intelligence agencies that currently report to the Secretary of Defense, including the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office, to name just two, should instead report to the DCI. These changes would put the DCI in a stronger position to resist pressure from the executive branch (or Congress) and to protect his people from the same.

Strengthening the DCI and increasing his independence might make for smarter, bolder analysis. The less intelligence analysts have to worry that the DCI is going to take heat for unpopular if accurate judgments, the more willing they will be to make them. This is not a slur against DCI George Tenet, who I think handled the difficulties of his situation extraordinarily well. But it is a recognition that DCIs must not be put in the position that Tenet was forced into.

Another step worth considering is forbidding the CIA or anyone else in government from making any intelligence estimates public for five or ten years. As someone firmly committed to the concept of open government, who believes that the CIA has benefited from its efforts in the past decade to be more open to the public, I dislike the idea of greater secrecy. However, when intelligence estimates become public, they have a huge impact on the course of foreign-policy debates, and administrations therefore find themselves with a great incentive to make sure the Agency’s estimates support the Administration’s preferred policy. If such estimates were not made public, an administration would have little reason to try to influence them. The government could still produce white papers, but they should come from the State Department—the agency that is, after all, officially charged with public diplomacy.

Finally, the U.S. government must admit to the world that it was wrong about Iraq’s WMD and show that it is taking far-reaching action to correct the problems that led to this error. Iraq is not going to be the last foreign-policy challenge in which we must make choices based on ambiguous evidence. When the United States confronts future challenges, the exaggerated estimates of Iraq’s WMD will loom like an ugly shadow over the diplomatic discussions. Fairly or not, no foreigner trusts U.S. intelligence to get it right anymore, or trusts the Bush Administration to tell the truth. The only way that we can regain the world’s trust is to demonstrate that we understand our mistakes and have changed our ways.

Voir enfin:

« France Is Not a Pacifist Country »
James Graff and Bruce Crumley

Time

Feb. 16, 2003

On the question of Iraq, America’s oldest ally has turned into one of its principal adversaries, as Paris and Washington disagree about whether United Nations inspectors should be given more time to do their job. The French President doesn’t feel isolated. In fact, he told TIME in an exclusive interview in the Elysee Palace, he’s ready to offer some « friendly advice » to President Bush on how the American Chief Executive might honorably back away from the brink of war. Excerpts:Do last week’s U.N. inspectors’ reports mark a turning point in the debate over Iraq? In the preceding two days, I received phone calls from several heads of state, both members and nonmembers of the Security Council, and I came to the conclusion that a majority of world leaders share our determination to search for a peaceful solution to disarming Iraq.

If there is a war, what do you see as the consequences for the Middle East? The consequences of war would be considerable in human terms. In political terms, it would destabilize the entire region. It’s very difficult to explain that one is going to spend colossal sums of money to wage war when there may be another solution yet is unable to provide adequate aid to the developing world.

Why do you think fallout from a war would be so much graver than Tony Blair and George Bush seem to? I simply don’t analyze the situation as they do. Among the negative fallout would be inevitably a strong reaction from Arab and Islamic public opinion. It may not be justified, and it may be, but it’s a fact. A war of this kind cannot help giving a big lift to terrorism. It would create a large number of little bin Ladens. Muslims and Christians have a lot to say to one another, but war isn’t going to facilitate that dialogue. I’m against the clash of civilizations; that plays into the hands of extremists. There is a problem—the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right to be disturbed by this situation, and it’s right in having decided Iraq should be disarmed. The inspections began, and naturally it is a long and difficult job. We have to give the inspectors time to do it. And probably—and this is France’s view—we have to reinforce their capacities, especially those of aerial surveillance. For the moment, nothing allows us to say inspections don’t work.

Isn’t France ducking its military responsibilities to its oldest ally? France is not a pacifist country. We currently have more troops in the Balkans than the Americans. France is obviously not anti-American. It’s a true friend of the United States and always has been. It is not France’s role to support dictatorial regimes in Iraq or anywhere else. Nor do we have any differences over the goal of eliminating Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. For that matter, if Saddam Hussein would only vanish, it would without a doubt be the biggest favor he could do for his people and for the world. But we think this goal can be reached without starting a war.

But you seem willing to put the onus on inspectors to find arms rather than on Saddam to declare what he’s got. Are there nuclear arms in Iraq? I don’t think so. Are there other weapons of mass destruction? That’s probable. We have to find and destroy them. In its current situation, does Iraq—controlled and inspected as it is—pose a clear and present danger to the region? I don’t believe so. Given that, I prefer to continue along the path laid out by the Security Council. Then we’ll see.

What evidence would justify war? It’s up to the inspectors to decide. We gave them our confidence. They were given a mission, and we trust them. If we have to give them greater means, we’ll do so. It’s up to them to come before the Security Council and say, « We won. It’s over. There are no more weapons of mass destruction, » or « It’s impossible for us to fulfill our mission. We’re coming up against Iraqi ill will and impediments. » At that point, the Security Council would have to discuss this report and decide what to do. In that case, France would naturally exclude no option.

But without Iraqi cooperation, even 300 inspectors can’t do the job. That’s correct, no doubt. But it’s up to the inspectors to say so. I’m betting that we can get Iraq to cooperate more. If I’m wrong, there will still be time to draw other conclusions. When a regime like Saddam’s finds itself caught between certain death and abandoning its arms, I think it will make the right choice. But I can’t be certain.

If the Americans were to bring a resolution for war before the U.N., would France use its veto? In my view, there’s no reason for a new resolution. We are in the framework of (U.N. Security Council Resolution) 1441, and let’s go on with it. I don’t see what any new resolution would add.

Some charge you are motivated by anti-Americanism. I’ve known the U.S. for a long time. I visit often, I’ve studied there, worked as a forklift operator for Anheuser-Busch in St. Louis and as a soda jerk at Howard Johnson’s. I’ve hitchhiked across the whole United States; I even worked as a journalist and wrote a story for the New Orleans Times-Picayune on the front page. I know the U.S. perhaps better than most French people, and I really like the United States. I’ve made many excellent friends there, I feel good there. I love junk food, and I always come home with a few extra pounds. I’ve always worked and supported transatlantic solidarity. When I hear people say that I’m anti-American, I’m sad—not angry, but really sad.

Do you think America’s role as the sole superpower is a problem? Any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions. That’s why I favor a multipolar world, in which Europe obviously has its place. Anyway, the world will not be unipolar. Over the next 50 years, China will become a global power, and the world won’t be the same. So it’s time to start organizing. Transatlantic solidarity will remain the basis of the world order, in which Europe has its role to play.

Haven’t tensions over Iraq poisoned transatlantic relationships? I repeat: Iraq must be disarmed, and for that it must cooperate more than it does now. If we disarm Iraq, the goal set by the Americans will have been fulfilled. And if we do that, there can be no doubt that it will bex due in large part to the presence of American forces on the spot. If there hadn’t been U.S. soldiers present, Saddam might not have agreed to play the game. If we go through with the inspections, the Americans will have won, since it would essentially be thanks to the pressure they exercised that Iraq was disarmed.

Don’t you think it would be extremely difficult politically for President Bush to pull back from war? I’m not so sure about that. He would have two advantages if he brought his soldiers back. I’m talking about a situation, obviously, where the inspectors say now there’s nothing left, and that will take a certain number of weeks. If Iraq doesn’t cooperate and the inspectors say this isn’t working, it could be war. If Iraq is stripped of its weapons of mass destruction and that’s been verified by the inspectors, then Mr. Bush can say two things: first, « Thanks to my intervention, Iraq has been disarmed, » and second, « I achieved all that without spilling any blood. » In the life of a statesman, that counts—no blood spilled.

Yet Washington may well go to war despite your plan. That will be their responsibility. But if they were to ask me for my friendly advice, I would counsel against it.


Moyen-Orient : Seul un Sunnistan peut nous débarrasser de l’Etat islamique (What if Bush had been right ?)

30 novembre, 2015
kurdsL’Irak (…) pourrait être l’un des grands succès de cette administration. Joe Biden (10.02.10)
We think a successful, democratic Iraq can be a model for the entire region. Obama
Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec une gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille filnale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour. C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris presque neuf ans. Et aujourd’hui nous nous souvenons de tout ce que vous avez fait pour le rendre possible. (…) Dur travail et sacrifice. Ces mots décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée. Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles. Près de 4.500 Américains ont perdu la vie, dont 202 héros tombés au champ d’honneur venus d’ici, Fort Bragg. (…) Les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak. Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir. Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays, car malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires. Obama (14.12.11)
Iraq would serve as the base of a new Islamic caliphate to extend throughout the Middle East, and which would threaten legitimate governments in Europe, Africa and Asia. Don Rumsfeld (2005)
They will try to re-establish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world. Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do, from Hitler’s world in ‘Mein Kampf,’, we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words. General Abizaid (2005)
The word getting the workout from the nation’s top guns these days is « caliphate » – the term for the seventh-century Islamic empire that spanned the Middle East, spread to Southwest Asia, North Africa and Spain, then ended with the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258. The term can also refer to other caliphates, including the one declared by the Ottoman Turks that ended in 1924. (…) A number of scholars and former government officials take strong issue with the administration’s warning about a new caliphate, and compare it to the fear of communism spread during the Cold War. They say that although Al Qaeda’s statements do indeed describe a caliphate as a goal, the administration is exaggerating the magnitude of the threat as it seeks to gain support for its policies in Iraq. In the view of John L. Esposito, an Islamic studies professor at Georgetown University, there is a difference between the ability of small bands of terrorists to commit attacks across the world and achieving global conquest. « It is certainly correct to say that these people have a global design, but the administration ought to frame it realistically, » said Mr. Esposito, the founding director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown. « Otherwise they can actually be playing into the hands of the Osama bin Ladens of the world because they raise this to a threat that is exponentially beyond anything that Osama bin Laden can deliver. » Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, said Al Qaeda was not leading a movement that threatened to mobilize the vast majority of Muslims. A recent poll Mr. Telhami conducted with Zogby International of 3,900 people in six countries – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon – found that only 6 percent sympathized with Al Qaeda’s goal of seeking an Islamic state. The notion that Al Qaeda could create a new caliphate, he said, is simply wrong. « There’s no chance in the world that they’ll succeed, » he said. « It’s a silly threat. » (On the other hand, more than 30 percent in Mr. Telhami’s poll said they sympathized with Al Qaeda, because the group stood up to America.) The term « caliphate » has been used internally by policy hawks in the Pentagon since the planning stages for the war in Iraq, but the administration’s public use of the word has increased this summer and fall, around the time that American forces obtained a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, called for the establishment of a militant Islamic caliphate across Iraq before Al Qaeda’s moving on to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and then a battle against Israel. In recent weeks, the administration’s use of « caliphate » has only intensified, as Mr. Bush has begun a campaign of speeches to try to regain support for the war. He himself has never publicly used the term, although he has repeatedly described the caliphate, as he did in a speech last week when he said that the terrorists want to try to establish « a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain. » Six days earlier, Mr. Edelman, the under secretary of defense, made it clear. « Iraq’s future will either embolden terrorists and expand their reach and ability to re-establish a caliphate, or it will deal them a crippling blow, » he said. « For us, failure in Iraq is just not an option. » NYT (2005)
They demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate of all Muslim nations. Tony Blair (2005)
I remember having a conversation with one of the colonels out in the field, and although he did not believe that a rapid unilateral withdrawal would actually be helpful, there was no doubt that the US occupation in Iraq was becoming an increasing source of irritation. And that one of the things that we’re going to need to do – and to do sooner rather than later – is to transition our troops out of the day-to-day operations in Iraq and to have a much lower profile and a smaller footprint in the country over the coming year. On the other hand, I did also ask some people who were not particularly sympathetic to the initial war, but were now trying to make things work in Iraq – what they thought would be the result of a total withdrawal and I think the general view was that we were in such a delicate situation right now and that there was so little institutional capacity on the part of the Iraqi government, that a full military withdrawal at this point would probably result in significant civil war and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths. This by the way was a message that was delivered also by the Foreign Minister of Jordan, who I’ve been meeting with while here in Amman, Jordan. The sense, I think, throughout the entire region among those who opposed the US invasion, that now that we’re there it’s important that we don’t act equally precipitously in our approach to withdrawal, but that we actually stabilize the situation and allow time for the new Iraqi government to develop some sort of capacity. Barack Obama (January 9, 2006)
Having visited Iraq, I’m also acutely aware that a precipitous withdrawal of our troops, driven by Congressional edict rather than the realities on the ground, will not undo the mistakes made by this Administration. It could compound them. It could compound them by plunging Iraq into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis. We must exit Iraq, but not in a way that leaves behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide that could engulf large swaths of the Middle East and endanger America. We have both moral and national security reasons to manage our exit in a responsible way. Barack Obama (June 21, 2006)
To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we are ready … would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaeda. It would mean that we’d be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we’d allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan. It would mean increasing the probability that American troops would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous. George Bush (2007)
Most Arabs are too in awe of American might to believe that the United States is deliberately adopting a minimalist approach.The reason is that the Americans aren’t doing the job people expect them to do. Mosul was lost and the Americans did nothing. Syria was lost and the Americans did nothing. Paris is attacked and the Americans aren’t doing much. So people believe this is a deliberate policy. They can’t believe the American leadership fails to understand the developments in the region, and so the only other explanation is that this is part of a conspiracy. Mustafa Alani (Gulf Research Center, Dubai)
Bush announced that the war in Afghanistan was going to be fought on behalf of women’s rights. Everybody deeply laughed at that and for reasons I can understand because in the United States Bush has not been a promoter of women’s rights. Still, the result of the war was in fact that women’s rights in Afghanistan have made a forward leap larger than anywhere in the world in history. From a certain point of view this has been the first feminist war in all of history. (…) His initial instinct was to oppose this sort of thing. He was against nation-building. Events have driven him to engage in nation-building, but he’s done it in a halfhearted way. Although he’s done some of these things which are admirable, he has not been able to enlist the world’s sympathy or support. (…) One of the scandals is that we’ve had millions of people marching through the streets calling for no war in Iraq, but we haven’t had millions of people marching in the streets calling for freedom in Iraq. Nobody’s marching in the streets on behalf of Kurdish liberties. The interests of the liberal dissidents of Iraq and the Kurdish democrats are in fact also our interests. The more those people prosper, the safer we are. This is a moment in which what should be our ideals — the ideals of liberal democracy and social solidarity — are also materially in our interest. Bush has failed to articulate this, and a large part of the left has failed to see this entirely. (…) The problem of weapons of mass destruction is certainly a real problem, although as our experience with box-cutters shows, weapons of mass destruction are hardly necessary for random massacres. But we have every reason to be much more alarmed than before. Those of us who consider ourselves on the left now have to consider national security issues in a way which has never been our habit in the past. The response of many people on the left is to think that if the United States will just withdraw its troops here and there and bury its head in the sand, everything will be OK. That’s delusional. (…)  There really is a long history of excellent people with the best of hearts and the best of intentions ending up inadvertently collaborating with the worst of totalitarians. There’s a long history of this. To look into your own heart and ask yourself if you’re good and honest and to examine yourself to see if your own analyses are moral and well-intended is not enough. You may have the best of intentions and the purest of hearts and the warmest of feelings of solidarity for other people and yet be led by some failure of imagination to end up more or less aligned with the baddest of bad guys. (…) The simplest history is of the fellow travelers of Stalin. But there’s even more grotesque examples of it — that of the French socialists in the 1930s. They wanted to avoid a new outbreak of the First World War; they refused to believe that millions of people in Germany had gone out of their minds and supported the Nazi movement. They didn’t want to believe that a mass pathological movement had taken power in Germany, they wanted to be open-minded to what the Germans were saying and to the German grievances of the First World War. And the French socialists, in their open-minded, warm-hearted effort to avoid seeing anything like the First World War occur again, went out of their way to try and find what was reasonable and plausible in the arguments of Hitler. They really did end up thinking that the greatest danger to world peace was not posed by Hitler but by the hawks in their own society, in France. These people were the antiwar socialists of France, they were good people. Yet one thing led to another, they opposed France’s army against Hitler, and many of them ended up supporting the Vichy regime and they ended up fascists! (…) It’s not impossible to see something like that today. People want to avoid a war in the Middle East, they say they’re not for Saddam but yet they don’t really want to do anything against Saddam. They see Iraqi liberals and Kurdish democrats struggling against Saddam, and they really don’t want to help these people. They see pathological movements in Palestine and elsewhere engaging in acts of random murder for the purest of irrational reasons and these people, the warmhearted, good-souled antiwar socialists of the Western countries, fall all over themselves in finding ways to justify the terrible things that are happening elsewhere and find ways to prevent themselves from showing solidarity with the victims. (…) What we need is a politics (… is a new radicalism which is going to be against the cynical so-called realism of American conservatism and traditional American policy, in which liberal ideas are considered irrelevant to foreign policy. And also against the head-in-the-sand blindness of a large part of the American left, which can only think that all problems around the world are caused by American imperialism and there’s nothing else to worry about. What we need is a third alternative — a politics of liberal solidarity, of anti-fascism, a politics that’s willing to be interventionist when tyrants or political movements really do threaten us and the people in their own countries, a politics that’s going to be aggressive in spreading and promoting liberal ideas and values in regions of the world where people who hold those values are persecuted. A politics of active solidarity, not just expressions of solidarity, but actions of solidarity with liberal-minded people in other parts of the world. It’s scandalous to me that large parts of the political spectrum aren’t acting on this now. Where are all the universities and human rights foundations and trade unions and all the other civic associations in the United States? Where are those groups now? Why aren’t those groups acting now to establish links of solidarity with people of the Middle East and Muslim world? To try to foment movements, or even revolutions, on behalf of liberal ideals? (…) So I wish Bush had gone about it differently. But now that the thing is getting under way, I fervently hope it goes well. And I think that the attitude of everyone with the best of motives who have opposed the war, should now shift dramatically. The people who have demanded that Bush refrain from action should now demand that the action be more thorough. The danger now is that we will go in and go out too quickly and leave the job half-done. The position of the antiwar movement and of liberals should be that the United States fulfill entirely its obligations to replace Saddam with a decent or even admirable system. We’ve done this in Afghanistan but only in most halfhearted way. We should now do more in Afghanistan and do a lot in Iraq. The people who’ve opposed the war should now demand that Bush do more. Paul Berman
Nous, les modernes, croyons en la doctrine des « causes profondes », selon laquelle de fortes pressions sociales sont toujours à l’origine de la rage meurtrière, mais les poètes de l’Antiquité ne voyaient pas les choses de cette manière. Ils considéraient la rage meurtrière comme un trait constant de la nature humaine. Nous, les modernes, préférons néanmoins les chercheurs en sciences sociales aux poètes (…) qui, apparemment, n’ont aucune difficulté à en cerner la cause : c’est une question d’identité professionnelle. Que nous disent les économistes ? Que la folie terroriste a bien une cause profonde : la pauvreté. Et les géographes ? Que c’est l’aridification du Moyen-Orient qui a provoqué cette vague de terrorisme. Il y a autant de « causes profondes » du terrorisme islamiste qu’il y a d’experts en sciences sociales. Et elles disent tout et son contraire. On nous explique que la cause profonde du djihad islamiste est l’invasion et l’occupation militaire de puissances étrangères, comme en Tchétchénie et en Palestine, alors même qu’à Rakka, et ailleurs qu’en Syrie, ce sont les djihadistes eux-mêmes qui représentent des occupants étrangers. On nous dit que le chaos qui suivit le renversement des dictateurs ayant sévi pendant des décennies est à l’origine des mouvements terroristes, comme en Libye, alors que, dans le cas des terroristes marocains, c’est la frustration suscitée par l’impossibilité de renverser la monarchie qui est en cause. On nous explique que c’est le despotisme du général Sissi qui a entraîné l’explosion du terrorisme en Egypte, mais que c’est la fin du despotisme de Ben Ali qui en est la cause en Tunisie. On nous dit que le sionisme est la cause du terrorisme islamiste partout dans le monde, mais, en Syrie, les leaders mondiaux de l’antisionisme nous ont fait comprendre que, au final, ils préféraient se massacrer entre eux. Avant 2011, on considérait que la présence américaine en Irak était à l’origine du terrorisme qui sévissait dans une partie du monde ; après 2011, c’est le retrait américain qui en est devenu responsable. Les inégalités économiques expliquent tout… comme les contrariétés de la vie dans les républiques égalitaires scandinaves. Le chômage explique tout ? Pourtant des terroristes surgissent au Royaume-Uni, où le taux de chômage est remarquablement bas. Le manque d’éducation explique tout ? Pourtant l’Etat islamique est dirigé par un homme diplômé en sciences islamiques, qui est à la tête du réseau de propagande sur Internet et sur les médias sociaux le plus sophistiqué du monde. On nous dit que l’islamophobie est la cause du terrorisme islamiste – alors que l’immense majorité des terroristes islamistes viennent de pays musulmans où l’islamophobie n’est vraiment pas le problème. Ailleurs dans le monde, en France, par exemple, c’est l’exigence intolérante faite aux immigrés de se conformer à la culture française qui aurait fait naître le terrorisme islamiste ; au Royaume-Uni, ce serait au contraire le refus multiculturaliste d’exiger d’eux une adaptation. Il se pourrait que ce soit la doctrine des causes profondes elle-même, telle qu’elle se trouve développée en sciences sociales, qui échoue totalement à cerner les causes du terrorisme. (…) Après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, de nombreuses personnes ont considéré que l’Amérique avait eu ce qu’elle méritait. Il y a dix mois en France, on entendait que les caricaturistes de Charlie Hebdo l’avaient bien cherché, que les juifs l’avaient bien cherché. Et on commence déjà à entendre la même rengaine à propos des supporteurs du Stade de France, des gens venus dîner au restaurant ou écouter du rock. De cette manière, la doctrine des causes profondes, qui promeut une certaine forme d’aveuglement, nous enlève jusqu’à l’envie de résister. Paul Berman
Today’s reality is that Iraq and Syria as we have known them are gone. The Islamic State has carved out a new entity from the post-Ottoman Empire settlement, mobilizing Sunni opposition to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Iran-dominated government of Iraq. Also emerging, after years of effort, is a de facto independent Kurdistan. If, in this context, defeating the Islamic State means restoring to power Mr. Assad in Syria and Iran’s puppets in Iraq, that outcome is neither feasible nor desirable. Rather than striving to recreate the post-World War I map, Washington should recognize the new geopolitics. The best alternative to the Islamic State in northeastern Syria and western Iraq is a new, independent Sunni state. (…) As we did in Iraq with the 2006 “Anbar Awakening,” the counterinsurgency operation that dislodged Al Qaeda from its stronghold in that Iraqi province, we and our allies must empower viable Sunni leaders, including tribal authorities who prize their existing social structures. No doubt, this will involve former Iraqi and Syrian Baath Party officials; and there may still be some moderate Syrian opposition leaders. All are preferable to the Islamist extremists. (…) Russia and Iran want the Sunni territories returned to Baghdad’s control, reinforcing Iran’s regional influence. (…) Sunnis today support the Islamic State for many of the same reasons they once supported Al Qaeda in Iraq — as a bulwark against being ruled by Tehran via Baghdad. Telling these Sunni people that their reward for rising against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will be to put them back in thrall to Mr. Assad and his ilk, or to Shiite-dominated Baghdad, will simply intensify their support for the jihadists. Why would they switch sides? (…) The Anbar Awakening and the American military’s 2007 “surge” provide the model, as do Kurdish successes against the Islamic State. Local fighters armed, trained and advised by the United States would combine with Arab and American conventional forces. Richard Bolton

Et si c’était le va-t-en guerre Bush qui avait raison?

Devant le chaos qui a suivi l’exaucement, à la tête du monde libre, du voeu depuis si longtemps caressé et à présent presque regretté par l’Europe et le reste du monde d’une Amérique enfin faible  …

Et qui notamment dans le cas du Moyen-Orient, a vu la minorité sunnite du nord de l’Irak reprendre mèche, sous la pression des milices chiites de Bagdad, avec les djihadistes d’Al Qaeda qu’ils avaient chassé quelques années plus tôt …

Alors qu’après avoir accusé l’Occident et l’Amérique de tous les maux, l’on nous propose à présent la pire des solutions pour combattre le monstre de l’Etat islamique …

A savoir solliciter l’aide des mêmes chiites qui l’ont enfanté …

Comment ne pas voir, avec l’ancien ambassadeur américain à l’ONU Richard Bolton, l’évidence …

A savoir que rien ne pourra être réglé dans cette région tant qu’on n’accordera pas enfin aux Sunnites comme aux Kurdes irakiens ou syriens …

L’Etat qu’on leur a toujours refusé ?

Game of Thrones au Moyen-Orient, ou la création d’un «Sunnistan» pour contrer Daesh
RT

26 nov. 2015

Comment détruire Daesh ? C’est la question à laquelle a tenté de répondre dans une tribune John Bolton, ancien ambassadeur américain aux Nations Unies, proche des néo-conservateurs. Et pour lui, cela passera par la création d’un «Sunnistan».

C’est dans le New York Times que John Bolton a développé sa vision stratégique d’un Moyen-Orient complétement redécoupé pour mieux combattre Daesh mais également afin de contrer la vision russo-iranienne de la situation.

Selon le néo-conservateur, d’abord pas de doute, la politique actuelle de Barack Obama manque d’une vision stratégique pour le Moyen-Orient et ne permet pas de répondre à la seule question qui vaille : Quoi après l’Etat islamique ? Or «il est essentiel de résoudre cette question avant d’envisager des plans opérationnels» pour défaire Daesh.

Une nouvelle donne territoriale et géopolitique : le «sunnistan»

Et l’ancien ambassadeur de développer ses idées : pour lui, la réalité est que l’Irak et la Syrie comme entités étatiques indépendantes n’existent plus. L’État islamique s’est taillé un territoire dans des pans entiers de ces deux pays. Ajoutez à cela l’émergence de facto d’un Kurdistan indépendant et vous avez un Moyen-Orient à la physionomie totalement inédite.

Dès lors, pour John Bolton, Washington doit reconnaître cette nouvelle donne géopolitique. La meilleure alternative à l’État islamique dans le nord-ouest de l’Irak et la Syrie est un nouvel Etat sunnite indépendant.

Avantage de cette création étatique ex-nihilo : son potentiel économique certain en tant que producteur de pétrole. Il pourrait aussi constituer un rempart à la fois contre la Syrie de Bachar el-Assad allié à l’Iran chiite, lui-même de Bagdad.

Les premiers gagnants de cette hypothèse développée par John Bolton seraient évidemment les Etats arabes sunnites du Golfe. Ceux-ci «qui ont dû maintenant comprendre le risque pour leur propre sécurité de financer l’extrémisme islamiste, pourraient fournir un financement important» à la nouvelle entité. Et même la Turquie y trouverait son avantage en voyant sa frontière sud stabilisée par ce nouveau «sunnistan». Enfin, même les Kurdes pourraient profiter de la situation, pour peu qu’un Kurdistan voie le jour, officiellement reconnu par Les Etats-Unis.

Pas ou peu de démocratie mais sécurité et stabilité

Si John Bolton envisage ainsi un redécoupage à la serpe du Moyen-Orient, il ne se fait pourtant visiblement pas d’illusion sur le caractère démocratique de la future entité sunnite qu’il appelle de ses voeux. Mais pour cette région instable, la sécurité et la stabilité sont «des ambitions suffisantes».

Pour consolider cet Etat, l’ancien ambassadeur affirme qu’il faudra s’appuyer sur les structures sociales existantes et également sur les anciens responsables irakiens et syriens du parti Baas, préférables selon lui aux extrémistes islamistes. Seulement ce que semble oublier John Bolton est que Daesh a justement prospéré sur le vide politique créé par l’éviction par les Américains de ces membres du parti Baas en Irak.

Contrer l’axe russo-iranien

Cette proposition d’un Etat sunnite sous protectorat américain diffère nettement, selon John Bolton, de la vision russo-iranienne «et de ses alliés, Hezbollah, Bachar el-Assad et Bagdad». Pour lui, l’ambition de cet «axe» serait de restaurer les gouvernements irakien et syrien dans leurs anciennes frontières. Or ce but est «fondamentalement contraire aux intérêts américains, israéliens et à ceux des Etats arabes amis», avertit le néo-conservateur.

Selon lui, Moscou veut s’assurer ainsi la pérennité de ses bases navales de Tartous et de Lattaquié qui lui assurent un accès à la Méditerranée. Téhéran souhaite maintenir le pouvoir alaouite et une protection pour le Hezbollah au Liban. Surtout, l’Iran et la Russie souhaiteraient que les territoires sunnites retournent sous le contrôle du gouvernement chiite de Bagdad, renforçant ainsi de fait l’influence régionale de l’Iran.

En créant cette entité sunnite, John Bolton entend également couper le soutien des populations sunnites à l’Etat islamique en leur garantissant qu’elles ne seront plus sous contrôle alaouite syrien ou chiite irakien.

Voilà pourquoi, après avoir détruit Daesh, les Etats-Unis devraient veiller à créer cette entité sunnite ajoute John Bolton. Evidemment, il faudrait alors déployer des troupes américaines au sol assure-t-il également, même s’il envisage l’aide de «troupes arabes». Mais, conclut-il très tranquillement, «l’opération militaire n’est pas la partie la plus difficile de cette vision post-État islamique». Une opinion qui ne sera peut-être pas partagée par Barack Obama dont la vision militaire se résume à «no boots on the ground» (pas de troupes au sol) et qui refuse désormais tout enlisement de ses troupes au Moyen-Orient.

Voir aussi:

To Defeat ISIS, Create a Sunni State

America is debating how to respond to the terrorist attacks in Paris. Unfortunately, both President Obama’s current policy and other recent proposals lack a strategic vision for the Middle East once the Islamic State, or ISIS, is actually defeated. There are no answers, or only outmoded ones, to the basic question: What comes after the Islamic State?

Before transforming Mr. Obama’s ineffective efforts into a vigorous military campaign to destroy the Islamic State, we need a clear view, shared with NATO allies and others, about what will replace it. It is critical to resolve this issue before considering any operational plans. Strategy does not come from the ground up; instead, tactics flow deductively once we’ve defined the ultimate objectives.

Today’s reality is that Iraq and Syria as we have known them are gone. The Islamic State has carved out a new entity from the post-Ottoman Empire settlement, mobilizing Sunni opposition to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and the Iran-dominated government of Iraq. Also emerging, after years of effort, is a de facto independent Kurdistan.

If, in this context, defeating the Islamic State means restoring to power Mr. Assad in Syria and Iran’s puppets in Iraq, that outcome is neither feasible nor desirable. Rather than striving to recreate the post-World War I map, Washington should recognize the new geopolitics. The best alternative to the Islamic State in northeastern Syria and western Iraq is a new, independent Sunni state.

This “Sunni-stan” has economic potential as an oil producer (subject to negotiation with the Kurds, to be sure), and could be a bulwark against both Mr. Assad and Iran-allied Baghdad. The rulers of the Arab Gulf states, who should by now have learned the risk to their own security of funding Islamist extremism, could provide significant financing. And Turkey — still a NATO ally, don’t forget — would enjoy greater stability on its southern border, making the existence of a new state at least tolerable.

The functional independence of Kurdistan reinforces this approach. The Kurds have finally become too big a force in the region for Baghdad or Damascus to push them around. They will not be cajoled or coerced into relinquishing territory they now control to Mr. Assad in Syria or to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

The Kurds still face enormous challenges, with dangerously uncertain borders, especially with Turkey. But an independent Kurdistan that has international recognition could work in America’s favor.

Make no mistake, this new Sunni state’s government is unlikely to be a Jeffersonian democracy for many years. But this is a region where alternatives to secular military or semi-authoritarian governments are scarce. Security and stability are sufficient ambitions.

As we did in Iraq with the 2006 “Anbar Awakening,” the counterinsurgency operation that dislodged Al Qaeda from its stronghold in that Iraqi province, we and our allies must empower viable Sunni leaders, including tribal authorities who prize their existing social structures. No doubt, this will involve former Iraqi and Syrian Baath Party officials; and there may still be some moderate Syrian opposition leaders. All are preferable to the Islamist extremists.

The Arab monarchies like Saudi Arabia must not only fund much of the new state’s early needs, but also ensure its stability and resistance to radical forces. Once, we might have declared a Jordanian “protectorate” in an American “sphere of influence”; for now, a new state will do.

This Sunni state proposal differs sharply from the vision of the Russian-Iranian axis and its proxies (Hezbollah, Mr. Assad and Tehran-backed Baghdad). Their aim of restoring Iraqi and Syrian governments to their former borders is a goal fundamentally contrary to American, Israeli and friendly Arab state interests. Notions, therefore, of an American-Russian coalition against the Islamic State are as undesirable as they are glib.

In Syria, Moscow wants to dominate the regime (with or without Mr. Assad) and safeguard Russia’s Tartus naval base and its new Latakia air base. Tehran wants a continuing Alawite supremacy, with full protection for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria.

As for Iraq, Russia and Iran want the Sunni territories returned to Baghdad’s control, reinforcing Iran’s regional influence. They may wish for the same in Kurdistan, but they lack the capability there.

Sunnis today support the Islamic State for many of the same reasons they once supported Al Qaeda in Iraq — as a bulwark against being ruled by Tehran via Baghdad. Telling these Sunni people that their reward for rising against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will be to put them back in thrall to Mr. Assad and his ilk, or to Shiite-dominated Baghdad, will simply intensify their support for the jihadists. Why would they switch sides?

This is why, after destroying the Islamic State, America should pursue the far-reaching goal of creating a new Sunni state. Though difficult in the near term, over time this is more conducive to regional order and stability.

Creating an American-led anti-Islamic State alliance instead of Moscow’s proposed coalition will require considerable diplomatic and political effort. American ground combat forces will have to be deployed to provide cohesion and leadership. But this would be necessary to defeat the Islamic State even if the objective were simply to recreate the status quo ante.

The Anbar Awakening and the American military’s 2007 “surge” provide the model, as do Kurdish successes against the Islamic State. Local fighters armed, trained and advised by the United States would combine with Arab and American conventional forces.

The military operation is not the hardest part of this post-Islamic State vision. It will also require sustained American attention and commitment. We cannot walk away from this situation as we did from Iraq in 2011.

The new “Sunni-stan” may not be Switzerland. This is not a democracy initiative, but cold power politics. It is consistent with the strategic objective of obliterating the Islamic State that we share with our allies, and it is achievable.


Héritage Obama: A quand le retrait des troupes américaines de Corée ? (Dennis Rodman of politics: Is there anything Obama will not do to burnish his precious legacy ?)

18 août, 2015
image

After two years of negotiations, we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a bomb. Barack Hussein Obama

More than a decade later, we still live with the consequences of the decision to invade Iraq . . . Today, Iraq remains gripped by sectarian conflict, and the emergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq has now evolved into ISIL. Barack Hussein Obama
« The president said many times he’s willing to step out of the rut of history.” (…) Once again Rhodes has, perhaps inadvertently, exposed the president’s premises more clearly than the president likes to do. The rut of history: It is a phrase worth pondering. It expresses a deep scorn for the past, a zeal for newness and rupture, an arrogance about old struggles and old accomplishments, a hastiness with inherited precedents and circumstances, a superstition about the magical powers of the present. It expresses also a generational view of history, which, like the view of history in terms of decades and centuries, is one of the shallowest views of all.expresses also a generational view of history, which, like the view of history in terms of decades and centuries, is one of the shallowest views of all. This is nothing other than the mentality of disruption applied to foreign policy. In the realm of technology, innovation justifies itself; but in the realm of diplomacy and security, innovation must be justified, and it cannot be justified merely by an appetite for change. Tedium does not count against a principled alliance or a grand strategy. Indeed, a continuity of policy may in some cases—the Korean peninsula, for example: a rut if ever there was one—represent a significant achievement. (…) Obama seems to believe that the United States owes Iran some sort of expiation. As he explained to Thomas Friedman the day after the nuclear agreement was reached, “we had some involvement with overthrowing a democratically elected regime in Iran” in 1953. Six years ago, when the streets of Iran exploded in a democratic rebellion and the White House stood by as it was put down by the government with savage force against ordinary citizens, memories of Mohammad Mosaddegh were in the air around the administration, as if to explain that the United States was morally disqualified by a prior sin of intervention from intervening in any way in support of the dissidents. The guilt of 1953 trumped the duty of 2009. But what is the alternative? This is the question that is supposed to silence all objections. It is, for a start, a demagogic question. This agreement was designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. If it does not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons—and it seems uncontroversial to suggest that it does not guarantee such an outcome—then it does not solve the problem that it was designed to solve. And if it does not solve the problem that it was designed to solve, then it is itself not an alternative, is it? The status is still quo. Or should we prefer the sweetness of illusion to the nastiness of reality? For as long as Iran does not agree to retire its infrastructure so that the manufacture of a nuclear weapon becomes not improbable but impossible, the United States will not have transformed the reality that worries it. We will only have mitigated it and prettified it. We will have found relief from the crisis, but not a resolution of it. The administration’s apocalyptic rhetoric about the deal is absurd: The temporary diminishments of Iran’s enrichment activities are not what stand between the Islamic Republic and a bomb. The same people who assure us that Iran has admirably renounced its aspiration to a nuclear arsenal now warn direly that a failure to ratify the accord will send Iranian centrifuges spinning madly again. They ridicule the call for more stringent sanctions against Iran because the sanctions already in place are “leaky” and crumbling, and then they promise us that these same failing measures can be speedily and reliably reconstituted in a nifty mechanism called “snapback.” Leon Wieseltier
La Corée du Nord a appris au monde qu’au poker nucléaire la folie feinte vous vaut de l’aide étrangère ou l’attention planétaire — du fait que même la certitude qu’on a affaire à un bluff à 99% reste suffisante pour effrayer les opinions publiques occidentales. La Corée du nord est le proverbial envieux psychopathe du quartier qui agresse constamment ses voisins prospères d’à côté, en partant du principe que les voisins ne pourront manquer de prendre en compte ses menaces aussi sauvages qu’absurdes parce qu’il n’a rien et qu’ils ont tout à perdre. (…) L’Iran pourrait reprendre à l’infini le modèle de Kim — menaçant une semaine de rayer Israël de la carte, faisant machine arrière la semaine d’après sous prétexte de problèmes de traduction. L’objectif ne serait pas nécessairement de détruire Israël (ce qui vaudrait à l’Iran la destruction de la culture persane pour un siècle), mais d’imposer une telle atmosphère d’inquiétude et de pessimisme à l’Etat juif que son économie en serait affaiblie, son émigration en serait encouragée et sa réputation géostratégique en serait érodée. La Corée du nord est passée maître dans de telles tactiques de chantage nucléaire. A certains moments, Pyongyang a même réussi à réduire les deux géants asiatiques – Japon et Corée du Sud – à la quasi-paralysie. (…) Un Iran nucléaire n’aurait à s’inquiéter ni d’un ennemi existentiel avec une population d’un milliard d’habitants à côté tel que l’Inde ni d’un mécène tout aussi peuplé comme la Chine susceptible d’imposer des lignes rouges à ses crises de folie périodiques. Téhéran serait libre au contraire de faire et de dire ce qu’il veut. Et son statut de puissance nucléaire deviendrait un multiplicateur de force pour son énorme richesse pétrolière et son statut auto-proclamé de leader mondial des musulmans chiites. Si la Corée du Nord est un danger, alors un Iran nucléaire plus gros, plus riche et sans dissuasion serait un cauchemar. Victor Davis Hanson
The definition of appeasement is to accept demands from an aggressor and then declare that the resulting concessions were of no real importance in the first place. Victor Davis Hanson
When Obama entered office in January 2009, post-surge Iraq was quiet. By the end of his first year in office, three Americans had been killed. In 2010, fewer Americans were lost in Iraq each month than in accidents involving the U.S. military. That is why Joe Biden thought Iraq would be the administration’s “greatest achievement,” and Obama himself declared the country “stable and self-reliant.” Pulling all U.S. troops out at the end of 2011, against the advice of almost all sober military and diplomatic experts, achieved the desired talking point for the 2012 reelection campaign, but collapsed the country and birthed ISIL. Obama’s demagoguery is as if President Dwight Eisenhower had pulled all U.S. troops out of South Korea in 1955 to prep for his 1956 reelection campaign — and then blamed the ensuing North Korean victory and devastation of South Korea on Harry Truman for entering the Korean War in the first place in 1950. (…) All the contortions that Barack Obama has offered about Iraq — damning the invasion in 2003; claiming in 2004 that he had no policy differences on Iraq with the Bush administration; declaring in 2007 that the surge would fail; demanding in 2008 as a presidential candidate that all U.S. troops be brought home; assuring the world in 2011 that Iraq was “stable” and “self-reliant” as he pulled out all American peacekeepers; reassuring the world in 2014 that Iraq’s ISIS was not a real threat; and then deciding in 2015 that it was, as he ordered forces back in — have been predicated on perceived political advantage. That also explains why the deal was not presented as a treaty requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate, as the Constitution outlines. Victor Davis Hanson

Après l’Iran et Cuba, la Corée du nord ?

A l’heure ou emporté par son obsession du changement pour le changement et sa place dans l’histoire …

Le maître-démagogue et pire président américain depuis Carter …

Confirme qu’il est bel et bien prêt de l’Irak à l’Afghanistan où à Cuba et sans oublier ses alliés les plus fidèles comme Israël …

A passer aux pertes et profits, littéralement les yeux fermés, les gains chèrement acquis et héritages combinés de l’ensemble de ses prédécesseurs depuis la Guerre froide …

Comment ne pas se poser la question suggérée en creux par la dernière tribune de l’historien américain Victor Davis Hanson …

De la Corée du nord ?

Ou, pour l’ineffable bonheur d’être le premier à le faire, notre Dennis Rodman de la politique pourrait bien retirer les troupes américaines de Corée du sud …

Et enfin serrer la paluche du dernier dictateur stalinien de la planète ?

Obama: Tougher on Congress than on Khamenei

Obama’s Unpresidential Iran Speech: The speech was mean-spirited and dishonest ─ and may have been counterproductive.

Victor Davis Hanson

National Review Online

August 11, 2015
President Obama’s speech last week advocating congressional approval of the Iran deal was mostly made-up history mixed with invective. Indeed, he talked far more roughly about his congressional partners than he did about our Iranian enemies, who have worked so hard to kill Americans over the last 35 years.
Obama assured us that in the past a “nonproliferation treaty . . . prohibited nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.” One wonders, then, how India, China, North Korea, and Pakistan ever obtained them, given they were all forbidden to do so under “new agreements” forged by Democratic and Republican presidents. Is there much logic in the assertion that the intelligence was flawed when we went to war with what proved to be a non-nuclear Iraq, but that we can trust the same intelligence agencies to apprise us precisely of the nuclear status of Iran?

“After two years of negotiations,” Obama went on, “we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a bomb.”

The deal does no such thing. Iran can still possess some enriched uranium. It can still operate centrifuges. It is not subject to anytime, anywhere inspections. And it will be almost impossible to restore international sanctions should Iran be caught cheating. As in the case of Obamacare, most of Obama’s pre-negotiation assurances are now either forgotten or ignored.

Obama, as is his wont, derides any who disagree with him: “Between now and the congressional vote in September, you are going to hear a lot of arguments against this deal, backed by tens of millions of dollars in advertising. And if the rhetoric in these ads and the accompanying commentary sounds familiar, it should, for many of the same people who argued for the war in Iraq are now making the case against the Iran nuclear deal.”

Yet even as Obama spoke those words, an array of Hollywood liberals was appearing in commercials drumming up support for the treaty. China and Russia are said to be lobbying senators to vote for it. When the president drones on ad nauseam about those “same people” who “argued for the war,” whom exactly does he include in the stable of Iraq War supporters — neocons like Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Fareed Zakaria, and Thomas Friedman? When Obama blasts the “tens of millions of dollars in advertising,” with suggestions of the nefarious role of the “same people” who wanted the Iraq War, I think we are meant to understand the old wink-and-nod dual-loyalty trope about American supporters of Israel.

Obama claimed that the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq was “a preference for military action over diplomacy.” Yet the Iraq War was authorized by both houses of Congress, with a majority of Democratic senators voting in favor, and the resolution contained 23 writs of action — all following up, in the post-9/11 climate, on the regime-change and liberation acts signed into law by former president Bill Clinton. The Bush administration spent months at the United Nations seeking to persuade Security Council members France and Russia (each enjoying valuable oil concessions from Saddam Hussein) to authorize military action in order to enforce U.N. sanctions. In contrast, Obama went to war in Libya without congressional approval. By bombing Moammar Qaddafi into extinction (as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, “We came, we saw, he died”), Obama exceeded the U.N. authorization, which limited U.S. action to humanitarian support and no-fly zones. If Hillary wanted to quote classical Latin concerning the Libyan aftermath, she would have done better to invoke Tacitus: “Where they make a desert, they call it peace.”

The most disingenuous element of Obama’s entire speech was his assertion that “More than a decade later, we still live with the consequences of the decision to invade Iraq . . . Today, Iraq remains gripped by sectarian conflict, and the emergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq has now evolved into ISIL.”

When Obama entered office in January 2009, post-surge Iraq was quiet. By the end of his first year in office, three Americans had been killed. In 2010, fewer Americans were lost in Iraq each month than in accidents involving the U.S. military. That is why Joe Biden thought Iraq would be the administration’s “greatest achievement,” and Obama himself declared the country “stable and self-reliant.”

Pulling all U.S. troops out at the end of 2011, against the advice of almost all sober military and diplomatic experts, achieved the desired talking point for the 2012 reelection campaign, but collapsed the country and birthed ISIL. Obama’s demagoguery is as if President Dwight Eisenhower had pulled all U.S. troops out of South Korea in 1955 to prep for his 1956 reelection campaign — and then blamed the ensuing North Korean victory and devastation of South Korea on Harry Truman for entering the Korean War in the first place in 1950.

Obama, again, blames George W. Bush for most of the problems he himself has caused. For instance, he claims that the Iranians started spinning centrifuges while Bush was in office, conveniently forgetting two key points. First, as a senator, Obama voted to deny the Bush administration the ability to use military force to deter Iran, and he voted against the designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization, despite its then-recent efforts to kill Americans in Iraq. Second, far more centrifuges have come on line during the Obama administration than did during the Bush administration.

What mostly brought Iran to the negotiating table was not skillful Obama diplomacy, but the ongoing increases in global gas and oil supplies, and the resulting collapse of oil prices, which assuaged our Asian and European allies’ worries about skyrocketing oil prices should Iranian oil go off the market. The prospect of a glut persuaded them to join in sanctioning Iran. The plunge in oil prices that strengthened the Obama administration’s hand came about as a result of private exploration in the U.S. that occurred despite rather than because of Obama’s efforts.

When Obama claims that so far his diplomacy has curtailed Iranian enrichment, he has no idea whether that will prove to be an accurate assessment, given the secrecy of the Iranian project and the Iranians’ refusal to allow inspectors full and open access to their facilities. But if Obama is correct that the interim deal worked so well, and if sanctions brought Iran to the table, why in the world would he discard the status quo?

When he details all the things Iran must and will certainly do, why would he think it is any more likely that Iran will follow the letter of the treaty than that Qassem Suleimani — a high-ranking Iranian general and commander of the Quds Force, which carries out terrorist operations — would obey international travel bans? In fact, shortly after listening to Obama’s speech, Suleimani brazenly broke the ban and traveled to see Putin, apparently to negotiate Russian arms sales with his newly released $150 billion in formerly embargoed funds.

Obama says there is “daily access” to Iran’s “key” nuclear sites. But what if Iran declares a site not “key” and therefore off limits? Obama likewise assures us, “This access can be with as little as 24 hours’ notice.” Does anyone really believe that? Not Obama himself, for he immediately qualified that with, “And while the process for resolving a dispute about access can take up to 24 days, once we’ve identified a site that raises suspicion, we will be watching it continuously until inspectors get in.” If a 24-day wait is no hindrance to inspection, why then have it at all? The definition of appeasement is to accept demands from an aggressor and then declare that the resulting concessions were of no real importance in the first place.

Obama insists: “Congressional rejection of this deal leaves any U.S. administration that is absolutely committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with one option, another war in the Middle East. I say this not to be provocative, I am stating a fact.”

That is not a fact. And it is shameful to suggest that it is. Again, the alternative to the deal is not war now, but rather continued sanctions, and a continuation of the increased oil production by the U.S. and the Gulf monarchies that brought a cash-strapped Iran to the table. Both measures could be ratcheted up even further. Obama talks of a “game changer” — another regrettable selection of words when we remember the history of that phrase in the context of the Syrian pink line. Iran was getting weaker by the day even as Obama’s tenure was running out. The urgency came from both Iran and Obama. The former was fearful that it would be both poorer and weaker when a possibly very different president takes office in 2017; the latter in desperation was looking for a legacy after the detritus of reset, Libya, ISIS, Syria, and the growing estrangement from long-term allies such as Egypt and Israel.

Obama assumes Tehran will spend its impending windfall on domestic projects, and told us that such investment “improves the economy and benefits the lives of the Iranian people” — as if theocratic authoritarians are sober and judicious officials who feel that improving health care or building freeways would best serve their interests, rather than bullying neighbors and thus raising their own military and political statures. From Hitler to Saddam, there is little evidence that dictators think like the technocrats of social democracies.

Obama reassures us that Iran’s “conventional capabilities will never compare to Israel’s.” Israel is a country of 8 million people, Iran one of nearly 78 million — with appendages in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the West Bank, and Lebanon that together perhaps already have more conventional missiles pointed at Israel than Israel has bombers that can reach them.

Obama downplays Iran’s Hitlerian rhetoric: “Just because Iranian hardliners chant ‘Death to America’ does not mean that that’s what all Iranians believe.” That is an adolescent remark — analogous to saying that just because Hitler promised a “final solution of the Jewish question” did not mean that all Germans shared his anti-Semitism. What would it matter even if such an assertion were true?

Even if a million Iranians once again hit the streets to protest the theocracy — a movement shunned in 2009 by Obama himself — they would probably not be able to sway the policies of their fascist government. Whether most Germans disagreed with the Nazis’ anti-Semitic policy in 1939 was about as relevant as whether Iranians today privately object to the theocrats’ rhetoric.

President Obama should know better. The problem is not that Iranian “hardliners” are chanting “Death to America.” Rather, to take one example, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in good Mein Kampf fashion, has just published a book of 400-plus pages outlining the de facto end of Israel.

It is beneath a president of the United States to equate U.S. congressional representatives with theocratic fascists. But that comparison is about what Obama offered when he declared, “It’s those hardliners who are most comfortable with the status quo. It’s those hardliners chanting ‘Death to America’ who have been most opposed to the deal. They’re making common cause with the Republican caucus.”

One wonders whether Obama includes in his weird Iran/U.S. Congress “common cause” the man designated to succeed Harry Reid as the Democrats’ leader in the Senate, Chuck Schumer, who, after listening to Obama’s speech, promptly came out against the pact — to the rejoicing, no doubt, of Iranian “hardliners.” Or are the allies of the hardliners the majority of the American people, who also oppose the Obama deal? And what about the Chinese and Russian leaders who wholeheartedly support Obama’s deal, whether out of the desire for lucre, or for humiliation of the U.S. in the present and in the future — or both? Does Obama envision himself and the Iranian theocracy allied against American and Iranian “hardliners” — as if his affinities to the Khamenei clique trump those to, say, Senator Marco Rubio or Senator John McCain?

It is rich from Obama to declare that critics of the deal are playing politics and endangering U.S. credibility: this, from a man who, as senator, in the middle of the critical surge in Iraq in 2007 declared it a failure and advocated pulling out all U.S. troops in the spring of 2008. It was Obama who destroyed U.S. credibility by setting empty deadlines with Iran, empty step-over lines with Russia, and an empty red line with Syria, while promising to shepherd Libya to a stable postwar government, a policy whose natural trajectory ended in Benghazi.

All the contortions that Barack Obama has offered about Iraq — damning the invasion in 2003; claiming in 2004 that he had no policy differences on Iraq with the Bush administration; declaring in 2007 that the surge would fail; demanding in 2008 as a presidential candidate that all U.S. troops be brought home; assuring the world in 2011 that Iraq was “stable” and “self-reliant” as he pulled out all American peacekeepers; reassuring the world in 2014 that Iraq’s ISIS was not a real threat; and then deciding in 2015 that it was, as he ordered forces back in — have been predicated on perceived political advantage. That also explains why the deal was not presented as a treaty requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate, as the Constitution outlines.

The final irony? President Obama’s rambling and mean-spirited speech may well achieve the opposite effect of its apparent intention. It may persuade some members of his own party that they could do a lot better than joining a dishonest deal and a disingenuous deal-maker.

Voir aussi:

Iran’s North Korean Future

Victor Davis Hanson

National review

April 11, 2013

The idea of a nuclear Iran — and of preventing a nuclear Iran — terrifies security analysts.

Those who argue for a preemptive strike against Iran cannot explain exactly how American planes and missiles would take out all the subterranean nuclear facilities without missing a stashed nuke or two — or whether they might as well expand their target lists to Iranian military assets in general. None can predict the fallout on world oil prices, global terrorism, and the politically fragile Persian Gulf, other than that it would be uniformly bad.

In contrast, those who favor containment of a nuclear Iran do not quite know how the theocracy could be deterred — or how either Israel or the regional Sunni Arab regimes will react to such a powerful and unpredictable neighbor.

The present crisis with North Korea offers us a glimpse of what, and what not, to expect should Iran get the bomb. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would gain the attention currently being paid to Kim Jong Un — attention not otherwise earned by his nation’s economy or cultural influence.

We should assume that the Iranian theocracy, like the seven-decade-long Kim dynasty in North Korea, would periodically sound lunatic: threatening its neighbors and promising a firestorm in the region — if not eventually in the United States and Europe as well.

An oil-rich, conventionally armed Iran has already used that playbook. When it becomes nuclear, those previously stale warnings of ending Israel or attacking U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf will not be entirely laughed off, just as Kim Jong Un’s insane diatribes are now not so easily dismissed.

North Korea has taught the world that feigned madness in nuclear poker earns either foreign aid or worldwide attention — given that even a 99 percent surety of a bluff can still scare Western publics. North Korea is the proverbial nutty failed neighbor who constantly picks on the successful suburbanites next door, on the premise that the neighbors will heed his wild, nonsensical threats because he has nothing and they have everything to lose.

Iran could copy Kim’s model endlessly — one week threatening to wipe Israel off the map, the next backing down and complaining that problems in translation distorted the actual, less bellicose communiqué. The point would not necessarily be to actually nuke Israel (which would translate into the end of Persian culture for a century), but to create such an atmosphere of worry and gloom over the Jewish state as to weaken its economy, encourage emigration, and erode its geostrategic reputation.

North Korea is a past master of such nuclear-shakedown tactics. At times Pyongyang has reduced two Asian powerhouses — Japan and South Korea — to near paralysis. Can the nations that gave the world Toyota and Samsung really count on the American defense umbrella? Should they go nuclear themselves? Can North Korean leadership be continually bought off with foreign aid, or is it really as crazy serious as it sounds?

Iran would also be different from other nuclear rogue states. The West often fears a nuclear Pakistan, given that a large part of its tribal lands is ungovernable and overrun with Islamic radicals. Its government is friendly to the West only to the degree that American aid continues.

Yet far larger and more powerful India deters nuclear Pakistan. For all the wild talk from both the Pakistani government and tribal terrorists, there is general fear in Pakistan that India has superior conventional and nuclear forces. India is also unpredictable and not the sort of nation that can be periodically threatened and shaken down for concessions.

Iran has no comparable existential enemy of a billion people — only a tiny Israel of some seven million. The result is that there is no commensurate regional deterrent.

Nor does Iran have a tough master like nuclear China. Even Beijing finally pulls on the leash when its unpredictable North Korean client has threatened to bully neighbors and create too unprofitable a fuss.

Of course, China enjoys the angst that its subordinate causes its rivals. It also sees North Korea as a valuable impediment to a huge, unified, and Westernized Korea on its borders. But that said, China does not want a nuclear war in its backyard. That fact ultimately means North Korea is muzzled once its barking becomes too obnoxious.

A nuclear Iran would worry about neither a billion-person nuclear existential enemy nearby such as India, nor a billion-person patron such as China that would establish redlines to its periodic madness. Instead, Tehran would be free to do and say what it pleased. And its nuclear status would become a force multiplier to its enormous oil wealth and self-acclaimed world leadership of Shiite Muslims.

If North Korea has been a danger, then a bigger, richer, and undeterred nuclear Iran would be a nightmare.

Voir encore:

Obama’s Legacy and the Iran Nuclear Agreement

Gary C. Gambill
The National Post
August 18, 2015

Originally published under the title, « Obama’s Legacy-Making Agreement »

U.S. President Barack Obama’s choice of American University, where John F. Kennedy gave a famous 1963 speech calling for peace and nuclear disarmament, to deliver his most impassioned defence of the recently signed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) earlier this month was no accident. In seeking to convince Congress and the American people that the JCPOA adequately defuses the Iranian nuclear threat, the White House and its supporters have been routinely referring to the agreement as the cornerstone of his foreign policy legacy.

This messaging is partly intended as a signal of resolve to fence-sitting Democrats, who might think twice about opposing the signature foreign policy initiative of a president from their own party. But there is a deeper message implicit in the endless repetition of this talking point — that Obama wouldn’t be foolish enough to double down on the JCPOA if what the critics are saying about it is true. « Look, 20 years from now, I’m still going to be around, God willing, » the president told The Atlantic in May. « If Iran has a nuclear weapon, it’s my name on this. »

This argument, which National Review opinion editor Patrick Brennan paraphrases as, « Settle on a deal that would ruin my foreign policy legacy? But I want to have a good legacy! » is not without logic. Obama’s a smart guy, with the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus at his disposal. If he’s willing to bet his own farm on the JCPOA, it can’t be that bad, can it?

Legacy-making and the defence of U.S. national interests are two different things.

Unfortunately, yes. If smarts, knowledge and the desire to be judged favourably by history guaranteed foreign policy success, presidents would seldom make mistakes. Obama says he has « never been more certain about a policy decision than this one, » but he also thought overthrowing Qaddafi would be a hoot and look how that turned out. Clearly he’s not omniscient.

But the larger problem with the my-name-on-it argument is that legacy-making and the defence of U.S. national interests are two different things. Good policy decisions don’t always highlight White House leadership in ways that can fill a wing of a presidential library. Whatever the merits of Obama’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, presidential historians don’t rave about preventing a bad situation from getting worse.

Moreover, a favourable legacy doesn’t always require the clear-cut advancement of U.S. national interests in the here and now. Legacy-making concerns how one’s actions will be perceived by future generations who have little sense of the context and details. Whereas elected officials ordinarily strive to be responsive to the interests and preferences of constituents, a legacy-seeking president seeks vindication in the political hereafter.

Good policy doesn’t always highlight White House leadership in ways that can fill a wing of a presidential library.

This is a slippery slope for a progressive like Obama, who surely assumes that future generations will be more sympathetic to his worldview than his contemporaries. He may therefore reason that a charitable judgment can best be ensured by staying true to himself, as it were, even if it entails serious security risks, all the more so because his administration has deviated from these presumed future norms in other areas (e.g., drone strikes).

This may have given Obama reason to prefer a deeply flawed agreement that embodies his worldview over walking away from the table with nothing at all. Failed negotiations — or a continued succession of interim agreements that hands the ball to his successor — don’t interest Steven Spielberg. At a time when prospects of an unvarnished domestic policy triumph have dimmed, and after his ambitious effort to jump-start Israeli-Palestinian talks went nowhere, the Iran negotiations were his last chance to do something big.

Whatever his reasons, Obama’s approach has been to extract as many concessions from Iran as possible before he leaves office, but not leave the table without an agreement. Unfortunately, the Iranians correctly ascertained that he could not afford to take no for an answer, and that standing firm on unreasonable demands would bring American flexibility. The end result is that an « international effort, buttressed by six UN resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option, » former secretary of state Henry Kissinger explained in congressional testimony early this year, soon became « an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability, » with the scope of capability acceptable to the administration widening dramatically as the negotiations wore on.

Congress and the American people should give the Obama administration a fair hearing and evaluate the JCPOA on its merits, but pay no attention to the president’s expressions of boundless confidence in the agreement. It’s a good bet even he never imagined he’d have to settle for such a crappy deal.

Gary C. Gambill is a research fellow at the Middle East Forum.


Memorial Day/Irak: C’est une réussite extraordinaire qui a pris presque neuf ans (And today, we remember everything that you did to make it possible)

25 mai, 2015
  Pour beaucoup d’entre nous, ce Memorial Day est particulièrement significatif; c’est le premier depuis la fin de la guerre d’Afghanistan. Aujourd’hui, c’est le premier Memorial Day depuis 14 ans où les États-Unis ne sont pas engagés dans une guerre majeure au sol. Barack Hussein Obama
L’Irak (…) pourrait être l’un des grands succès de cette administration. Joe Biden (10.02.10)
Nous croyons qu’une réussite, la démocratie, en Irak peut devenir un modèle pour toute la région. Obama
Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec une gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille filnale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour. C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris presque neuf ans. Et aujourd’hui nous nous souvenons de tout ce que vous avez fait pour le rendre possible. (…) Dur travail et sacrifice. Ces mots décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée. Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles. Près de 4.500 Américains ont perdu la vie, dont 202 héros tombés au champ d’honneur venus d’ici, Fort Bragg. (…) Les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak. Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir. Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays, car malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires. Obama (14.12.11)
If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal. President Clinton (February 1998)
[La mission des forces armées américaines et britanniques est d’]attaquer les programmes d’armement nucléaires, chimiques et biologiques de l’Irak et sa capacité militaire à menacer ses voisins (…) On ne peut laisser Saddam Hussein menacer ses voisins ou le monde avec des armements nucléaires, des gaz toxiques, ou des armes biologiques. » (…) Il y a six semaines, Saddam Hussein avait annoncé qu’il ne coopérerait plus avec l’Unscom [la commission chargée du désarmement en Irak (…). D’autres pays [que l’Irak possèdent des armements de destruction massive et des missiles balistiques. Avec Saddam, il y a une différence majeure : il les a utilisés. Pas une fois, mais de manière répétée (…). Confronté au dernier acte de défiance de Saddam, fin octobre, nous avons mené une intense campagne diplomatique contre l’Irak, appuyée par une imposante force militaire dans la région (…). J’avais alors décidé d’annuler l’attaque de nos avions (…) parce que Saddam avait accepté nos exigences. J’avais conclu que la meilleure chose à faire était de donner à Saddam une dernière chance (…).  Les inspecteurs en désarmement de l’ONU ont testé la volonté de coopération irakienne (…). Hier soir, le chef de l’Unscom, Richard Butler, a rendu son rapport au secrétaire général de l’ONU [Kofi Annan. Les conclusions sont brutales, claires et profondément inquiétantes. Dans quatre domaines sur cinq, l’Irak n’a pas coopéré. En fait, il a même imposé de nouvelles restrictions au travail des inspecteurs (…). Nous devions agir et agir immédiatement (…).  J’espère que Saddam va maintenant finalement coopérer avec les inspecteurs et respecter les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Mais nous devons nous préparer à ce qu’il ne le fasse pas et nous devons faire face au danger très réel qu’il représente. Nous allons donc poursuivre une stratégie à long terme pour contenir l’Irak et ses armes de destruction massive et travailler jusqu’au jour où l’Irak aura un gouvernement digne de sa population (…). La dure réalité est qu’aussi longtemps que Saddam reste au pouvoir il menace le bien-être de sa population, la paix de la région et la sécurité du monde. La meilleure façon de mettre un terme définitif à cette menace est la constitution d’un nouveau gouvernement, un gouvernement prêt à vivre en paix avec ses voisins, un gouvernement qui respecte les droits de sa population. Bill Clinton (16.12.98)
Dans l’immédiat, notre attention doit se porter en priorité sur les domaines biologique et chimique. C’est là que nos présomptions vis-à-vis de l’Iraq sont les plus significatives : sur le chimique, nous avons des indices d’une capacité de production de VX et d’ypérite ; sur le biologique, nos indices portent sur la détention possible de stocks significatifs de bacille du charbon et de toxine botulique, et une éventuelle capacité de production.  Dominique De Villepin
 Iraq would serve as the base of a new Islamic caliphate to extend throughout the Middle East, and which would threaten legitimate governments in Europe, Africa and Asia. Don Rumsfeld (2005)
They will try to re-establish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world. Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do, from Hitler’s world in ‘Mein Kampf,’, we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words. General Abizaid (2005)
The word getting the workout from the nation’s top guns these days is « caliphate » – the term for the seventh-century Islamic empire that spanned the Middle East, spread to Southwest Asia, North Africa and Spain, then ended with the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258. The term can also refer to other caliphates, including the one declared by the Ottoman Turks that ended in 1924. (…) A number of scholars and former government officials take strong issue with the administration’s warning about a new caliphate, and compare it to the fear of communism spread during the Cold War. They say that although Al Qaeda’s statements do indeed describe a caliphate as a goal, the administration is exaggerating the magnitude of the threat as it seeks to gain support for its policies in Iraq. In the view of John L. Esposito, an Islamic studies professor at Georgetown University, there is a difference between the ability of small bands of terrorists to commit attacks across the world and achieving global conquest. « It is certainly correct to say that these people have a global design, but the administration ought to frame it realistically, » said Mr. Esposito, the founding director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown. « Otherwise they can actually be playing into the hands of the Osama bin Ladens of the world because they raise this to a threat that is exponentially beyond anything that Osama bin Laden can deliver. » Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, said Al Qaeda was not leading a movement that threatened to mobilize the vast majority of Muslims. A recent poll Mr. Telhami conducted with Zogby International of 3,900 people in six countries – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon – found that only 6 percent sympathized with Al Qaeda’s goal of seeking an Islamic state. The notion that Al Qaeda could create a new caliphate, he said, is simply wrong. « There’s no chance in the world that they’ll succeed, » he said. « It’s a silly threat. » (On the other hand, more than 30 percent in Mr. Telhami’s poll said they sympathized with Al Qaeda, because the group stood up to America.) The term « caliphate » has been used internally by policy hawks in the Pentagon since the planning stages for the war in Iraq, but the administration’s public use of the word has increased this summer and fall, around the time that American forces obtained a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, called for the establishment of a militant Islamic caliphate across Iraq before Al Qaeda’s moving on to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and then a battle against Israel. In recent weeks, the administration’s use of « caliphate » has only intensified, as Mr. Bush has begun a campaign of speeches to try to regain support for the war. He himself has never publicly used the term, although he has repeatedly described the caliphate, as he did in a speech last week when he said that the terrorists want to try to establish « a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain. » Six days earlier, Mr. Edelman, the under secretary of defense, made it clear. « Iraq’s future will either embolden terrorists and expand their reach and ability to re-establish a caliphate, or it will deal them a crippling blow, » he said. « For us, failure in Iraq is just not an option. » NYT (2005)
They demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate of all Muslim nations. Tony Blair (2005)
I remember having a conversation with one of the colonels out in the field, and although he did not believe that a rapid unilateral withdrawal would actually be helpful, there was no doubt that the US occupation in Iraq was becoming an increasing source of irritation. And that one of the things that we’re going to need to do – and to do sooner rather than later – is to transition our troops out of the day-to-day operations in Iraq and to have a much lower profile and a smaller footprint in the country over the coming year. On the other hand, I did also ask some people who were not particularly sympathetic to the initial war, but were now trying to make things work in Iraq – what they thought would be the result of a total withdrawal and I think the general view was that we were in such a delicate situation right now and that there was so little institutional capacity on the part of the Iraqi government, that a full military withdrawal at this point would probably result in significant civil war and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths. This by the way was a message that was delivered also by the Foreign Minister of Jordan, who I’ve been meeting with while here in Amman, Jordan. The sense, I think, throughout the entire region among those who opposed the US invasion, that now that we’re there it’s important that we don’t act equally precipitously in our approach to withdrawal, but that we actually stabilize the situation and allow time for the new Iraqi government to develop some sort of capacity. Barack Obama (January 9, 2006)
Having visited Iraq, I’m also acutely aware that a precipitous withdrawal of our troops, driven by Congressional edict rather than the realities on the ground, will not undo the mistakes made by this Administration. It could compound them. It could compound them by plunging Iraq into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis. We must exit Iraq, but not in a way that leaves behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide that could engulf large swaths of the Middle East and endanger America. We have both moral and national security reasons to manage our exit in a responsible way. Barack Obama (June 21, 2006)
To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we are ready … would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaeda. It would mean that we’d be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we’d allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan. It would mean increasing the probability that American troops would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous. George Bush (2007)
L’Irak a besoin d’une présence américaine et d’instructeurs américains, parce que nous ne sommes pas capables de défendre notre ciel et nos eaux, ainsi que d’utiliser les armes que nous avons achetées ou que nous avons obtenus auprès des Etats-Unis. Jalal Talabani (président irakien, novembre 2011)
Ce n’est pas parce qu’une équipe de juniors porte le maillot des Lakers que cela en fait des Kobe Bryant. Je pense qu’il y a une différence entre les moyens et la portée d’un Ben Laden, d’un réseau qui planifie activement des attaques terroristes de grande envergure contre notre territoire, et ceux de jihadistes impliqués dans des luttes de pouvoir locales, souvent de nature ethnique. Barack Obama (janvier 2014)
Non, je ne pense pas que nous perdons. (…) Il y a eu un revers tactique, c’est incontestable, même si Ramadi était vulnérable depuis très longtemps (…) L’EI a été considérablement affaibli à travers le pays  et il ya eu des progrès significatifs dans le nord et dans les régions où les Peshmergas (forces kurdes) participent. Dans les zones à dominante chiite, « il n’y pas d’avancée de l’EI (…) il ne fait aucun doute que, dans les secteurs sunnites, nous allons devoir renforcer non seulement l’entraînement mais aussi la détermination, et qu’il faut mobiliser les tribus sunnites plus qu’elles ne le sont actuellement (…) L’entraînement des forces de sécurité irakiennes (…) ne va pas assez vite à Al-Anbar (…) il y a une leçon qu’il est important de tirer de ce qui est arrivé, c’est que si les Irakiens eux-mêmes ne sont pas disposés ou capables d’arriver à des compromis politiques nécessaires pour gouverner, si elles ne sont pas prêts à se battre pour la sécurité de leur pays, nous ne pouvons pas le faire pour eux. Obama (2015)
Now, Iraq is not a perfect place. It has many challenges ahead. But we’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people. We’re building a new partnership between our nations. And we are ending a war not with a final battle, but with a final march toward home. This is an extraordinary achievement, nearly nine years in the making.  And today, we remember everything that you did to make it possible. (…) Hard work and sacrifice.  Those words only begin to describe the costs of this war and the courage of the men and women who fought it. We know too well the heavy cost of this war.  More than 1.5 million Americans have served in Iraq — 1.5 million.  Over 30,000 Americans have been wounded, and those are only the wounds that show.  Nearly 4,500 Americans made the ultimate sacrifice — including 202 fallen heroes from here at Fort Bragg — 202.  (…) Policymakers and historians will continue to analyze the strategic lessons of Iraq — that’s important to do.  Our commanders will incorporate the hard-won lessons into future military campaigns — that’s important to do.  But the most important lesson that we can take from you is not about military strategy –- it’s a lesson about our national character. For all of the challenges that our nation faces, you remind us that there’s nothing we Americans can’t do when we stick together. (…) Because of you — because you sacrificed so much for a people that you had never met, Iraqis have a chance to forge their own destiny.  That’s part of what makes us special as Americans.  Unlike the old empires, we don’t make these sacrifices for territory or for resources.  We do it because it’s right.  There can be no fuller expression of America’s support for self-determination than our leaving Iraq to its people.  That says something about who we are. Because of you, in Afghanistan we’ve broken the momentum of the Taliban.  Because of you, we’ve begun a transition to the Afghans that will allow us to bring our troops home from there.  And around the globe, as we draw down in Iraq, we have gone after al Qaeda so that terrorists who threaten America will have no safe haven, and Osama bin Laden will never again walk the face of this Earth.  (…) So here’s what I want you to know, and here’s what I want all our men and women in uniform to know:  Because of you, we are ending these wars in a way that will make America stronger and the world more secure. The war in Iraq will soon belong to history.  Your service belongs to the ages.  Never forget that you are part of an unbroken line of heroes spanning two centuries –- from the colonists who overthrew an empire, to your grandparents and parents who faced down fascism and communism, to you –- men and women who fought for the same principles in Fallujah and Kandahar, and delivered justice to those who attacked us on 9/11. (…) And years from now, your legacy will endure in the names of your fallen comrades etched on headstones at Arlington, and the quiet memorials across our country; in the whispered words of admiration as you march in parades, and in the freedom of our children and our grandchildren.  And in the quiet of night, you will recall that your heart was once touched by fire.  You will know that you answered when your country called; you served a cause greater than yourselves; you helped forge a just and lasting peace with Iraq, and among all nations. I could not be prouder of you, and America could not be prouder of you. Obama
Internationally, I’m proud of the fact that we’ve responsibly ended two wars. Now, people will say, well, you’re back in Iraq, but we’re not back in Iraq with an occupying army, we’re back with a coalition of 60 countries helping to stabilize the situation. Obama
No, I don’t think we’re losing, and I just talked to our CENTCOM commanders and the folks on the ground. There’s no doubt there was a tactical setback, although Ramadi had been vulnerable for a very long time, primarily because these are not Iraqi security forces that we have trained or reinforced. They have been there essentially for a year without sufficient reinforcements, and the number of ISIL that have come into the city now are relatively small compared to what happened in [the Iraqi city of] Mosul. But it is indicative that the training of Iraqi security forces, the fortifications, the command-and-control systems are not happening fast enough in Anbar, in the Sunni parts of the country. You’ve seen actually significant progress in the north, and those areas where the Peshmerga [Kurdish forces] are participating. Baghdad is consolidated. Those predominantly Shia areas, you’re not seeing any forward momentum by ISIL, and ISIL has been significantly degraded across the country. (…) there’s no doubt that in the Sunni areas, we’re going to have to ramp up not just training, but also commitment, and we better get Sunni tribes more activated than they currently have been. So it is a source of concern. We’re eight months into what we’ve always anticipated to be a multi-year campaign, and I think [Iraqi] Prime Minister Abadi recognizes many of these problems, but they’re going to have to be addressed. (…) As you said, I’m very clear on the lessons of Iraq. I think it was a mistake for us to go in in the first place, despite the incredible efforts that were made by our men and women in uniform. Despite that error, those sacrifices allowed the Iraqis to take back their country. That opportunity was squandered by Prime Minister Maliki and the unwillingness to reach out effectively to the Sunni and Kurdish populations. (…) I know that there are some in Republican quarters who have suggested that I’ve overlearned the mistake of Iraq, and that, in fact, just because the 2003 invasion did not go well doesn’t argue that we shouldn’t go back in. And one lesson that I think is important to draw from what happened is that if the Iraqis themselves are not willing or capable to arrive at the political accommodations necessary to govern, if they are not willing to fight for the security of their country, we cannot do that for them. (…) But we can’t do it for them, and one of the central flaws I think of the decision back in 2003 was the sense that if we simply went in and deposed a dictator, or simply went in and cleared out the bad guys, that somehow peace and prosperity would automatically emerge, and that lesson we should have learned a long time ago. And so the really important question moving forward is: How do we find effective partners—not just in Iraq, but in Syria, and in Yemen, and in Libya—that we can work with, and how do we create the international coalition and atmosphere in which people across sectarian lines are willing to compromise and are willing to work together in order to provide the next generation a fighting chance for a better future? Obama (2015)
The fact that you are anti-Semitic, or racist, doesn’t preclude you from being interested in survival. It doesn’t preclude you from being rational about the need to keep your economy afloat; it doesn’t preclude you from making strategic decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme leader is anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that this overrides all of his other considerations. You know, if you look at the history of anti-Semitism, Jeff, there were a whole lot of European leaders—and there were deep strains of anti-Semitism in this country (…) They may make irrational decisions with respect to discrimination, with respect to trying to use anti-Semitic rhetoric as an organizing tool. At the margins, where the costs are low, they may pursue policies based on hatred as opposed to self-interest. But the costs here are not low, and what we’ve been very clear [about] to the Iranian regime over the past six years is that we will continue to ratchet up the costs, not simply for their anti-Semitism, but also for whatever expansionist ambitions they may have. That’s what the sanctions represent. That’s what the military option I’ve made clear I preserve represents. And so I think it is not at all contradictory to say that there are deep strains of anti-Semitism in the core regime, but that they also are interested in maintaining power, having some semblance of legitimacy inside their own country, which requires that they get themselves out of what is a deep economic rut that we’ve put them in, and on that basis they are then willing and prepared potentially to strike an agreement on their nuclear program. Obama (2015)
There is no question that the United States was divided going into that war. But I think the United States is united coming out of that war. We all recognize the tremendous price that has been paid in lives, in blood. And yet I think we also recognize that those lives were not lost in vain. (…) As difficult as [the Iraq war] was, and the cost in both American and Iraqi lives, I think the price has been worth it, to establish a stable government in a very important region of the world. Leon Panetta  (secrétaire américain à la Défense)
You don’t get to live life in reverse. What a leader has to do is make a decision, at the moment of decision, based on the best information he has. George Bush did that in 2002 and 2003 and he was supported by Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden and John Kerry and every western country’s intelligence agency. (…) The indictment of President Obama’s policy is much worse than the purported indictment of President Bush’s policy because everyone questions if we had known then what we know now. « It’s hard to analyze hypotheticals in history; I’m confident that the world is a better place and the world is a safer place with Saddam Hussein removed from power. (…) President Obama knew then what was going to happen, because his military commanders were advising him that they needed a small stay-behind force of 10,000 to 15,000 troops. « President Obama, for political reasons, knowing what he knew then, still made the decision to withdraw all our troops from Iraq. Tom Cotton (2015)
Even when viewed through a post-war lens, documentary evidence of messages are consistent with the Iraqi Survey Group’s conclusion that Saddam was at least keeping a WMD program primed for a quick re-start the moment the UN Security Council lifted sanctions. Iraqi Perpectives Project (March 2006)
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist operatives monitored closely. Because Saddam’s security organizations and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a de facto link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.  Iraqi Perspectives Project (Saddam and Terrorism, Nov. 2007, released Mar. 2008)
Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 « good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm » in the first year. Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting « Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, ‘the Gulf,’ and Syria. » It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were « sacrificing for the cause » went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of 2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training. But these camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the volunteers participated in a special training event called the « Heroes Attack. » This training event was designed in part to prepare regional Fedayeen Saddam commands to « obstruct the enemy from achieving his goal and to support keeping peace and stability in the province.  » Study (Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia)
The prospect of Iraq’s disintegration is already being spun by the Administration and its media friends as the fault of George W. Bush and Mr. Maliki. So it’s worth understanding how we got here. Iraq was largely at peace when Mr. Obama came to office in 2009. Reporters who had known Baghdad during the worst days of the insurgency in 2006 marveled at how peaceful the city had become thanks to the U.S. military surge and counterinsurgency. In 2012 Anthony Blinken, then Mr. Biden’s top security adviser, boasted that, « What’s beyond debate » is that « Iraq today is less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous. And the United States is more deeply engaged there than at any time in recent history. » Mr. Obama employed the same breezy confidence in a speech last year at the National Defense University, saying that « the core of al Qaeda » was on a « path to defeat, » and that the « future of terrorism » came from « less capable » terrorist groups that mainly threatened « diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. » Mr. Obama concluded his remarks by calling on Congress to repeal its 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force against al Qaeda. If the war on terror was over, ISIS didn’t get the message. The group, known as Tawhid al-Jihad when it was led a decade ago by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was all but defeated by 2009 but revived as U.S. troops withdrew and especially after the uprising in Syria spiraled into chaos. It now controls territory from the outskirts of Aleppo in northwestern Syria to Fallujah in central Iraq. The possibility that a long civil war in Syria would become an incubator for terrorism and destabilize the region was predictable, and we predicted it. « Now the jihadists have descended by the thousands on Syria, » we noted last May. « They are also moving men and weapons to and from Iraq, which is increasingly sinking back into Sunni-Shiite civil war. . . . If Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels threatened by al Qaeda and a Sunni rebellion, he will increasingly look to Iran to help him stay in power. » We don’t quote ourselves to boast of prescience but to wonder why the Administration did nothing to avert the clearly looming disaster. Contrary to what Mr. Blinken claimed in 2012, the « diplomatic surge » the Administration promised for Iraq never arrived, nor did U.S. weapons. « The Americans have really deeply disappointed us by not supplying the Iraqi army with the weapons and support it needs to fight terrorism, » the Journal quoted one Iraqi general based in Kirkuk. That might strike some readers as rich coming from the commander of a collapsing army, but it’s a reminder of the price Iraqis and Americans are now paying for Mr. Obama’s failure to successfully negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement with Baghdad that would have maintained a meaningful U.S. military presence. A squadron of Apache attack helicopters, Predator drones and A-10 attack planes based in Iraq might be able to turn back ISIS’s march on Baghdad. WSJ
Mosul’s fall matters for what it reveals about a terrorism whose threat Mr. Obama claims he has minimized. For starters, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) isn’t a bunch of bug-eyed « Mad Max » guys running around firing Kalashnikovs. ISIS is now a trained and organized army. The seizures of Mosul and Tikrit this week revealed high-level operational skills. ISIS is using vehicles and equipment seized from Iraqi military bases. Normally an army on the move would slow down to establish protective garrisons in towns it takes, but ISIS is doing the opposite, by replenishing itself with fighters from liberated prisons. An astonishing read about this group is on the website of the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War. It is an analysis of a 400-page report, « al-Naba, » published by ISIS in March. This is literally a terrorist organization’s annual report for 2013. It even includes « metrics, » detailed graphs of its operations in Iraq as well as in Syria. One might ask: Didn’t U.S. intelligence know something like Mosul could happen? They did. The February 2014 « Threat Assessment » by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency virtually predicted it: « AQI/ISIL [aka ISIS] probably will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria . . . as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah. » AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq), the report says, is exploiting the weak security environment « since the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. » But to have suggested any mitigating steps to this White House would have been pointless. It won’t listen. In March, Gen. James Mattis, then head of the U.S. Central Command, told Congress he recommended the U.S. keep 13,600 support troops in Afghanistan; he was known not to want an announced final withdrawal date. On May 27, President Obama said it would be 9,800 troops—for just one year. Which guarantees that the taking of Mosul will be replayed in Afghanistan. Let us repeat the most quoted passage in former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s memoir, « Duty. » It describes the March 2011 meeting with Mr. Obama about Afghanistan in the situation room. « As I sat there, I thought: The president doesn’t trust his commander, can’t stand Karzai, doesn’t believe in his own strategy and doesn’t consider the war to be his, » Mr. Gates wrote. « For him, it’s all about getting out. » Daniel Henninger
Nothing that happened in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was pre-ordained; different futures than the one unfolding today were possible. Recall that violence declined drastically during the 2007 U.S. troop surge, and that for the next couple of years both Iraq and the West felt that the country was going in the right direction. But the seeds of Iraq’s unravelling were sown in 2010, when the United States did not uphold the election results and failed to broker the formation of a new Iraqi government. As an adviser to the top U.S. general in Iraq, I was a witness. (…)The national elections took place on March 7, 2010, and went more smoothly than we had dared hope. After a month of competitive campaigning across the country and wide media coverage of the different candidates and parties, 62 percent of eligible Iraqis turned out to vote. (…) We had not expected Iraqiya—a coalition headed by the secular Shia Ayad Allawi and leaders of the Sunni community, and running on a non-sectarian platform—to do so well. The coalition had won 91 seats—two more than the incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. (…) Even though there was no evidence of fraud to justify a recount, the Iraqi electoral commission and the international community agreed to one, fearful of a repeat of the election fiasco in 2009 in Afghanistan, which had tarnished the credibility of elections there. In the meantime, Maliki’s advisers told us he needed two extra seats, either from the recount or through arbitrary de-Ba’athification that could disqualify Iraqiya candidates. Otherwise, he would be blamed for losing Iraq for the Shia, who make up some two-thirds of the population. (…)  General O and I did not think that the Iraqiya candidate, Allawi, would be able to put a government together with himself as prime minister. But we thought he had the right as the winner of the election to have first go—and that this could lead to a political compromise among the leaders, with either Allawi and Maliki agreeing to share power between them or a third person chosen to be prime minister. But … Hill, General O strode down the embassy corridor looking visibly upset. “He told me that Iraq is not ready for democracy, that Iraq needs a Shia strongman,” the general said, “and Maliki is our man.” Odierno had objected that that was not what the Iraqis wanted. They were rid of one dictator, Hussein, and did not want to create another. (…) Sami al-Askari, a Shia politician close to Maliki who believed that an agreement between State of Law and Iraqiya was the best way forward (…) also told me that everyone except the Americans realized that the formation of the government was perceived as a battle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq. The Iranians were active, while the U.S. embassy did nothing. Qasim Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s al-Quds Force, continued to summon Iraqis to Iran in order to put together a pan-Shia coalition. The Iranians, al-Askari said, intended to drag out government formation until after August 31, when all U.S. combat forces were due to leave, in order to score a “victory” over the United States. (…) In the Arabic media, there was confusion as to why the United States and Iran should both choose Maliki as prime minister, and this fuelled conspiracy theories about a secret deal between those two countries. (…) The Obama administration wanted to see an Iraqi government in place before the U.S. mid-term elections in November. Biden believed the quickest way to form a government was to keep Maliki as prime minister, and to cajole other Iraqis into accepting this. (…) I tried to explain the struggle between secularists and Islamists, and how many Iraqis wanted to move beyond sectarianism. But Biden could not fathom this. For him, Iraq was simply about Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.(…) If only President Obama had paid attention to Iraq. He, more than anyone, would understand the complexity of identities, I thought—and that people can change. But his only interest in Iraq, it appeared, was in ending the war. (…) In July 2014, I visited Erbil, Iraq, shortly after the Islamic State had taken control of a third of the country and the Iraqi Army had disintegrated. I met up with Rafi Issawi. (…) Rafi listed for me the Sunni grievances that had steadily simmered since I’d left—until they had finally boiled over. Maliki had detained thousands of Sunnis without trial, pushed leading Sunnis, including Rafi, out of the political process by accusing them of terrorism and reneged on payments and pledges to the Iraqi tribes who had bravely fought Al Qaeda in Iraq. Year-long Sunni protests demanding an end to discrimination were met by violence, with dozens of unarmed protesters killed by Iraqi security forces. Maliki had completely subverted the judiciary to his will, so that Sunnis felt unable to achieve justice. The Islamic State, Rafi explained to me, was able to take advantage of this situation, publicly claiming to be the defenders of the Sunnis against the Iranian-backed Maliki government. The downward spiral, Rafi told me not surprisingly, had begun in 2010—when Iraqiya was not given the first chance to try to form the government. “We might not have succeeded,” he admitted, “but the process itself would have been important in building trust in Iraq’s young institutions.” Emma Sky
La Maison Blanche maintient que la mission était une affaire 100% américaine, et que les généraux de l’armée pakistanaise et ses services secrets n’ont pas été mis au courant de l’assaut à l’avance. C’est faux. (…) En août 2010, un ancien officier des services secrets pakistanais a approché Jonathan Bank, alors chef du bureau de la CIA à l’ambassade américaine d’Islamabad. Il a proposé de dire à la CIA où trouver Ben Laden en échange de la récompense que Washington avait offerte en 2001. Seymour Hersh
Pour moi, l’échec de la guerre est surtout lié à la manière dont nous nous sommes précipitemment retirés d’Irak en 2011 selon un calendrier arbitraire, au lieu de sécuriser nos gains et de garder un levier d’influence. Si nous avions maintenu une force substantielle capable d’influencer le gouvernement irakien, nous aurions pu empêcher les dérives sectaires qui ont mené à l’émergence de l’Etat islamique. Général Barbero
Through the fall of 2011, the main question facing the American military in Iraq was what our role would be now that combat operations were over. When President Obama announced the end of our combat mission in August 2010, he acknowledged that we would maintain troops for a while. Now that the deadline was upon us, however, it was clear to me–and many others–that withdrawing all our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding Iraq together. Privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence. But none was willing to take that position publicly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that any Status of Forces Agreement, which would give legal protection to those forces, would have to be submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval. That made reaching agreement very difficult given the internal politics of Iraq, but representatives of the Defense and State departments, with scrutiny from the White House, tried to reach a deal. We had leverage. We could, for instance, have threatened to withdraw reconstruction aid to Iraq if al-Maliki would not support some sort of continued U.S. military presence. My fear, as I voiced to the President and others, was that if the country split apart or slid back into the violence that we’d seen in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion, it could become a new haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the U.S. Iraq’s stability was not only in Iraq’s interest but also in ours. I privately and publicly advocated for a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq’s military. To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations but never really led them. Officials there seemed content to endorse an agreement if State and Defense could reach one, but without the President’s active advocacy, al-Maliki was allowed to slip away. The deal never materialized. To this day, I believe that a small U.S. troop presence in Iraq could have effectively advised the Iraqi military on how to deal with al-Qaeda’s resurgence and the sectarian violence that has engulfed the country. Leon Panetta
As I sat there, I thought: The president doesn’t trust his commander, can’t stand Karzai, doesn’t believe in his own strategy and doesn’t consider the war to be his. For him, it’s all about getting out. Robert Gates
Toppling Saddam Hussein through military force was a subject discussed at the highest levels of the Clinton administration. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, Genral Hugh Shelton, noted in his 2010 memoir that a member of Clinton’s Cabinet, apparently Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, suggested provoking an incident with Iraq that would allow the United States to « take out Saddam ». Shelton recalled : Early on in my days as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we had small, weekly White House breakfasts in National Security Advisor Sandy Berger’s office that included me, Sandy, Bill Cohen (Secretary of Defense), Madeleine Albright (Secretary of State), George Tenet (head of the CIA), Leon Firth (VP chief of staff for security), Bill Richardson (ambassador to the U.N.), and a few other senior administration officials. These were informal sessions where we would gather around Berger’s table and talk about concerns over coffee and breakfast served by the White House dining facility. It was a comfortable setting that encouraged brainstorming of potential options on a variety of issues of the day. During that time we had U-2 aircraft on reconnaissance sorties over Iraq. These planes were designed to fly at extremely high speeds and altitudes (over seventy thousand feet) both for pilot safety and to avoid detection. At one of my very first breakfasts, while Berger and Cohen were engaged in a sidebar discussion down at one end of the table and Tenet and Richardson were preoccupied in another, one of the Cabinet members present leaned over to me and said, “Hugh, I know I shouldn’t even be asking you this, but what we really need in order to go in and take out Saddam is a precipitous event — something that would make us look good in the eyes of the world. Could you have one of our U-2s fly low enough — and slow enough — so as to guarantee that Saddam could shoot it down?”  The hair on the back of my neck bristled, my teeth clenched, and my fists tightened. I was so mad I was about to explode. I looked across the table, thinking about the pilot in the U-2 and responded, “Of course we can …” which prompted a big smile on the official’s face. “You can?” was the excited reply. “Why, of course we can,” I countered. “Just as soon as we get your ass qualified to fly it, I will have it flown just as low and slow as you want to go.” One can only imagine the congressional and media reaction if such a proposal had been aired openly at a meeting of George W. Bush’s Cabinet, either by Vice President Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, or Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and this had become public. Stephen F. Knott (Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics, pp. 136-137)
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime became official U.S. policy in 1998, when President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act—a bill passed 360-38 by the House of Representatives and by unanimous consent in the Senate. The law called for training and equipping Iraqi dissidents to overthrow Saddam and suggested that the United Nations establish a war-crimes tribunal for the dictator and his lieutenants. The legislation was partly the result of frustration over the undeclared and relatively unheralded « No-Fly Zone War » that had been waged since 1991. Saddam’s military repeatedly fired on U.S. and allied aircraft that were attempting to prevent his regime from destroying Iraqi opposition forces in northern and southern Iraq. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton, in 1997 a key member of President Bill Clinton’s cabinet (thought by most observers to have been Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) asked Gen. Shelton whether he could arrange for a U.S. aircraft to fly slowly and low enough that it would be shot down, thereby paving the way for an American effort to topple Saddam. Kenneth Pollack, a member of Mr. Clinton’s National Security Council staff, would later write in 2002 that it was a question of « not whether but when » the U.S. would invade Iraq. He wrote that the threat presented by Saddam was « no less pressing than those we faced in 1941. » Radicalized by the events of 9/11, George W. Bush gradually concluded that a regime that had used chemical weapons against its own people and poison gas against Iran, invaded Iran and Kuwait, harbored some of the world’s most notorious terrorists, made lucrative payments to the families of suicide bombers, fired on American aircraft almost daily, and defied years of U.N. resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction was a problem. The former chief U.N. weapons inspector, an Australian named Richard Butler, testified in July 2002 that « it is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam’s representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false. » In the U.S., there was a bipartisan consensus that Saddam possessed and continued to develop WMD. Former Vice President Al Gore noted in September 2002 that Saddam had « stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country. » Then-Sen. Hillary Clinton observed that Saddam hoped to increase his supply of chemical and biological weapons and to « develop nuclear weapons. » Then-Sen. John Kerry claimed that « a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his [Saddam’s] hands is a real and grave threat to our security. » Even those opposed to using force against Iraq acknowledged that, as then-Sen. Edward Kennedy put it, « we have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing » WMD. When it came time to vote on the authorization for the use of force against Iraq, 81 Democrats in the House voted yes, joined by 29 Democrats in the Senate, including the party’s 2004 standard bearers, John Kerry and John Edwards, plus Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Sen. Joe Biden, Mrs. Clinton, and Sens. Harry Reid, Tom Harkin, Chris Dodd and Jay Rockefeller. The latter, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, claimed that Saddam would « likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. » Support for the war extended far beyond Capitol Hill. In March 2003, a Pew Research Center poll indicated that 72% of the American public supported President Bush’s decision to use force. If Mr. Bush « lied, » as the common accusation has it, then so did many prominent Democrats—and so did the French, whose foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, claimed in February 2003 that « regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of [Iraq’s] capacity to produce VX and yperite [mustard gas]; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin. » Germany’s intelligence chief August Hanning noted in March 2002 that « it is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years. » According to interrogations conducted after the invasion, Saddam’s own generals believed that he had WMD and expected him to use these weapons as the invasion force neared Baghdad. The war in Iraq was authorized by a bipartisan congressional coalition, supported by prominent media voices and backed by the public. Yet on its 10th anniversary Americans will be told of the Bush administration’s duplicity in leading us into the conflict. Many members of the bipartisan coalition that committed the U.S. to invade Iraq 10 years ago have long since washed their hands of their share of responsibility. We owe it to history—and, more important, to all those who died—to recognize that this wasn’t Bush’s war, it was America’s war. Stephen F. Knott
Iraq is a symbol. You certainly can make a persuasive argument it was a mistake. But there is a time that line going along that Bush and the other people lied about this. I spent 18 months looking at how Bush decided to invade Iraq. And lots of mistakes, but it was Bush telling George Tenet, the CIA director, don’t let anyone stretch the case on WMD. And he was the one who was skeptical. And if you try to summarize why we went into Iraq, it was momentum. The war plan kept getting better and easier, and finally at the end, people were saying, hey, look, it will only take a week or two. And early on it looked like it was going to take a year or 18 months. And so Bush pulled the trigger. A mistake certainly can be argued, and there is an abundance of evidence. But there was no lying in this that I could find. [about 2011] Well, he didn’t [want to keep any troops there]. Look, Obama does not like war. But as you look back on this, the argument from the military was, let’s keep 10,000, 15,000 troops there as an insurance policy. And we all know insurance policies make sense. We have 30,000 troops or more in South Korea still 65 years or so after the war. When you are a superpower, you have to buy these insurance policies. And he didn’t in this case. I don’t think you can say everything is because of that decision, but clearly a factor. Bob Woodward
The military recommended nearly 20,000 troops, considerably fewer than our 28,500 in Korea, 40,000 in Japan, and 54,000 in Germany. The president rejected those proposals, choosing instead a level of 3,000 to 5,000 troops. A deployment so risibly small would have to expend all its energies simply protecting itself — the fate of our tragic, missionless 1982 Lebanon deployment — with no real capability to train the Iraqis, build their U.S.-equipped air force, mediate ethnic disputes (as we have successfully done, for example, between local Arabs and Kurds), operate surveillance and special-ops bases, and establish the kind of close military-to-military relations that undergird our strongest alliances. The Obama proposal was an unmistakable signal of unseriousness. It became clear that he simply wanted out, leaving any Iraqi foolish enough to maintain a pro-American orientation exposed to Iranian influence, now unopposed and potentially lethal. (…) The excuse is Iraqi refusal to grant legal immunity to U.S. forces. But the Bush administration encountered the same problem, and overcame it. Obama had little desire to. Indeed, he portrays the evacuation as a success, the fulfillment of a campaign promise. Charles Krauthammer
The fact is that by the end of Bush’s tenure the war had been won. You can argue that the price of that victory was too high. Fine. We can debate that until the end of time. But what is not debatable is that it was a victory. Bush bequeathed to Obama a success. By whose measure? By Obama’s. As he told the troops at Fort Bragg on Dec. 14, 2011, “We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.” This was, said the president, a “moment of success.” Which Obama proceeded to fully squander. With the 2012 election approaching, he chose to liquidate our military presence in Iraq. We didn’t just withdraw our forces. We abandoned, destroyed or turned over our equipment, stores, installations and bases. We surrendered our most valuable strategic assets, such as control of Iraqi airspace, soon to become the indispensable conduit for Iran to supply and sustain the Assad regime in Syria and cement its influence all the way to the Mediterranean. And, most relevant to the fall of Ramadi, we abandoned the vast intelligence network we had so painstakingly constructed in Anbar province, without which our current patchwork operations there are largely blind and correspondingly feeble. The current collapse was not predetermined in 2003 but in 2011. Isn’t that what should be asked of Hillary Clinton? We know you think the invasion of 2003 was a mistake. But what about the abandonment of 2011? Was that not a mistake? Charles Krauthammer

Attention: une erreur peut en cacher une autre !

En ce Memorial Day où nos amis américains honorent leurs morts au combat …

Et où, après les pertes (pardon: le « revers tactique ») de Mossoul et Ramadi, leur président annonce triomphalement que la guerre est finie

Pendant qu’aux Etats-Unis mêmes les candidats sont passés à la question de ce qu’ils auraient fait en Irak

A la place d’un George Bush dont même Bob Woodward confirme l’inanité des accusations de mensonges …

Comment ne pas repenser …

A cette glorieuse journée de décembre 2011 …

Où au moment d’un retrait d’Irak qui avec l’élimination elle aussi controversée de Ben Laden allait lui valoir sa brillante réélection un an plus tard …

Et tout en rappelant l’énorme coût en morts et en blessés …

Un président américain presque extatique saluait une « réussite extraordinaire » ?

En un pays où – qui s’en souvient ?-  dès fin 2008 une agence de voyage française envisageait des séjours dans le nord kurde du pays …

Mais comment, avec Charles Krauthammer après une telle et aussi coûteuse victoire, ne pas se poser aussi la question …

Non pas tant de l’erreur de l’invasion de 2003 …

Mais de celle de l’abandon de 2011 ?

Obama salue la « réussite » en Irak mais appelle à tirer les leçons du conflit
Le Point
14/12/2011

« Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles », a ajouté le président des USA, en allusion aux séquelles psychologiques dont souffrent certains anciens combattants.
Le président Barack Obama a salué mercredi la « réussite extraordinaire » des Etats-Unis en Irak, en rendant hommage aux soldats quelques jours avant la fin du retrait de l’armée américaine de ce pays.

M. Obama a également évoqué le « prix élevé » de cette guerre de près de neuf ans à laquelle il s’était opposé quand il n’était pas encore à la tête des Etats-Unis, et affirmé que son pays devrait retenir les « leçons » de ce conflit, lors d’un discours devant des soldats à Fort Bragg (Caroline du Nord, sud-est).
« Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec un gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays », a lancé le président devant plusieurs milliers de militaires en uniforme rassemblés dans un hangar de cet énorme complexe, siège des forces spéciales américaines.

« C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris neuf ans », a-t-il dit, en reconnaissant « le dur travail et le sacrifice » qui ont été nécessaires. « Ces mots décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée », a-t-il souligné.

« Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles », a-t-il ajouté, en allusion aux séquelles psychologiques dont souffrent certains anciens combattants.

« Près de 4.500 Américains » ont perdu la vie, a rappelé le président, « dont 202 héros tombés au champ d’honneur venus d’ici, Fort Bragg », a-t-il encore dit. « Et aujourd’hui, nous nous recueillons en prière pour toutes ces familles qui ont perdu ceux qu’ils aimaient, car ils font tous partie de notre grande famille américaine ».

M. Obama, qui avait beaucoup évoqué lors de sa campagne présidentielle victorieuse de 2008 son opposition initiale à la guerre en Irak, en 2002 et 2003 lorsqu’il n’était encore qu’un élu local, a souligné que « les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak ».

« Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir », a indiqué le dirigeant.

« Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays », car « malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires ».

Voir aussi:

L’armée américaine a marqué officiellement son retrait d’Irak
Laurent Lagneau
16-12-2011

Le drapeau des Forces armées américaines en Irak (USF-I) a officiellement été replié lors d’une cérémonie organisée à l’aéroport de Bagdad, lieu symbolique, s’il en est, de l’opération Iraqi Freedom, lancée en mars 2003, puisqu’il s’agit du premier secteur de la capitale irakienne à être occupé par la coalition emmenée par les Etats-Unis pour renverser Saddam Hussein.

« C’est un évènement historique car il y a huit ans, huit mois et 26 jours, j’ai donné l’ordre aux éléments avancés de la troisième division de traverser la frontière » a déclaré le général américain et chef d’état-major adjoint Lloyd Austin.

Conformément l’accord de sécurité conclu entre Bagdad et Washington en 2008, soit avant l’arrivée de Barack Obama à la Maison Blanche, les troupes américaines auront ainsi quitté l’Irak avant la fin de l’année 2011. Après cette date, seulement 160 militaires resteront dans le pays pour être affectés à l’ambassade des Etats-Unis, qui, avec 16.000 employés, sera la plus importante au monde. Ces soldats, aidé par 700 conctractuels, auront pour tâche de former leurs homologues irakiens.

Au cours de ce conflit, qui aurait pu connaître une autre trajectoire si l’erreur de purger l’ancienne armée irakienne de ses cadres n’avait pas été commise, les Etats-Unis ont engagé jusqu’à 170.000 hommes, déployés sur 500 bases. Et plus de 4.500 soldats américains ont perdu la vie au cours de ces 9 ans d’opération.

Prétexte à l’intervention des Etats-Unis, les armes de destruction massive dont Saddam Hussein était soupçonné détenir, n’ont pas été retrouvées. Et l’on se souvient de l’activisme des militants de groupes jihadistes, opérant sous l’étiquette d’al-Qaïda ou non, qui faillit faire basculer l’Irak dans une guerre confessionnelle. Il aura fallu la prise en main des opérations par le général David Petraeus, devenu depuis directeur de la CIA, pour rétablir une situation qui était, au moins jusqu’en 2007, très délicate, grâce à des principes de guerre contre-insurrectionnelle, inspirés par le théoricien français David Galula.

« Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec une gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille filnale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour » a déclaré le président Barack Obama, le 14 décembre, à l’occasion d’un discours prononcé à Fort Bragg pour rendre hommage aux soldats américains engagés en Irak, au moment de la fin de leur retrait d’Irak.

« C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris neuf ans », a-t-il encore lancé, en soulignant « le dur travail et le sacrifice » qui « décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée ».

« Après le sang versé par les Irakiens et les Américains, la mission visant à faire de l’Irak un pays capable de gouverner et d’assurer seul sa sécurité est devenue réalité », a déclaré Leon Panetta, le patron du Pentagone, lors de la cérémonie marquant le retrait officiel des troupes américains.

« L’Irak va devoir faire face à la menace du terrorisme, à ceux qui sèmeront la division, aux problèmes économiques et sociaux », a-t-il tempéré, soulignant que des « défis continuent d’exister » mais que « les Etats-Unis resteront aux côtés du peuple irakien. » Aussi, avant de parler de réussite, encore faudrait-il attendre encore un peu pour voir comment ce pays va évoluer au cours des prochains mois.

En effet, des attentats sont commis régulièrement et les derniers en date ont surtout visé la communauté chiite à l’occasion de la fête de l’Achoura. Aussi, les tensions confessionnelles sont l’un des écueils que l’Irak aura à éviter. Les désaccords entre Bagdad et la minorité kurde, notamment au sujet de l’exploitation prétrolière, devront être réglés. Enfin, la nouvelle armée irakienne n’est pas encore prête à assurer la sécurité du territoire, en raison de ces lacunes capacitaires. Ce qui inquiète d’ailleurs, le président irakien, Jalal Talabani.

« L’Irak a besoin d’une présence américaine et d’instructeurs américains, parce que nous ne sommes pas capables de défendre notre ciel et nos eaux, ainsi que d’utiliser les armes que nous avons achetées ou que nous avons obtenus auprès des Etats-Unis » a-t-il déclaré en novembre dernier.

Ce qui pose la question de l’influence iranienne dans le pays. En effet, Téhéran ne manque pas de relais en Irak, grâce notamment au chiisme. Le régime des mollahs sera-t-il le principal bénéficiaire de l’opération conduite par les Etats-Unis? L’avenir le dira.

En attendant, Washington a adressé une mise en garde aux Iraniens, sans les nommer. « La souveraineté de l’Irak doit être respectée », a ainsi prévenu Barack Obama, le 12 décembre dernier, à l’occasion d’une rencontre avec Nouri al-Maliki, le Premier ministre irakien.

Pour terminer sur une note provocatrice, s’il devait y avoir un vainqueur de cette guerre en Irak, ce serait sans doute la Chine, qui a profité de l’engagement américain pour monter en puissance. Cette intervention aura coûté près de 800 milliards de dollars au contribuable américain (reconstruction, réparation et remplacement des matériels, pensions et soins des blessés, etc…). L’économiste Joseph Stiglitz, prix Nobel d’économie, a même estimé que ce coût pourrait dépasser finalement les 3.000 milliards de dollars à long terme. Et quand l’on sait que Pékin est l’un des principaux créanciers de Washington…

Voir également:

Obama au pied du mur face aux avancées de l’EI
Jean Michel Gradt
Les Echos
22/05 /15

Dans un entretien publié jeudi, le président américain estime que les Etats-Unis ne sont pas en train de perdre le combat contre le groupe djihadiste en Irak et qu’il se refuse à envoyer des troupes au sol en Irak comme en Syrie.

Malgré une campagne aérienne lancée depuis l’été 2014 par la coalition internationale dirigée par les Etats-Unis pour aider le pouvoir en Irak, et les rebelles en Syrie, à stopper la progression de l’EI, le groupe jihadiste a réussi deux coups de force en huit jours : la prise de Ramadi en Irak et celle de Palmyre en Syrie.

« Je ne crois pas que nous soyons en train de perdre » le combat contre les djihadistes de l’organisation Etat islamique, malgré le «  revers stratégique » subi à Ramadi, chef lieu de la province irakienne d’Anbar tombé dimanche dernier aux mains des jihadistes sunnites ultraradicaux, déclare Barack Obama dans un entretien publié jeudi par le magazine The Atlantic . « Il y a eu un revers tactique, c’est incontestable, même si Ramadi était vulnérable depuis très longtemps« , a-t-il ajouté.

« L’EI a été considérablement affaibli à travers le pays« , a encore expliqué le président américain,qui évoque « des progrès significatifs dans le nord et dans les régions où les Peshmergas (forces kurdes) participent ». Dans les zones à dominante chiite, « il n’y pas d’avancée de l’EI« , a-t-il ajouté. Mais «   il ne fait aucun doute que, dans les secteurs sunnites, nous allons devoir renforcer non seulement l’entraînement mais aussi la détermination, et qu’il faut mobiliser les tribus sunnites plus qu’elles ne le sont actuellement  »

Pas de troupes au sol en Irak

Les Etats-Unis sont-ils prêts à envoyer des troupes au sol ? «  Aujourd’hui la question n’est pas si oui ou non nous envoyons des contingents de troupes américaines au sol. Aujourd’hui, la question est de savoir comment nous trouvons des partenaires efficaces pour gouverner dans ces régions de l’Irak qui sont en ce moment ingouvernables et vaincre efficacement l’EI, pas seulement en Irak, mais en Syrie? « 

Puis, évoquant les « erreurs » commises lors de l’invasion américaine de 2003, il ajoute :  » il y a une leçon qu’il est important de tirer de ce qui est arrivé, c’est que si les Irakiens eux-mêmes ne sont pas disposés ou capables d’arriver à des compromis politiques nécessaires pour gouverner, si elles ne sont pas prêts à se battre pour la sécurité de leur pays, nous ne pouvons pas le faire pour eux », poursuit le président, dont les propos ont été recueillis mardi… c’est-à-dire avant la prise de Palmyre par l’EI en Syrie.

Interrogations après la chute de Palmyre

Or depuis jeudi, la situation a empiré. En s’emparant de Palmyre, cité antique vieille de plus de 2.000 ans et véritable carrefour routier qui ouvre sur le grand désert syrien frontalier de l’Irak , l’EI contrôle « désormais plus de 95.000 km2 en Syrie, soit 50% du territoire« , d’après l’Observatoire syrien des droits de l’Homem (OSDH). Le groupe terroriste s’est emparé de la majeure partie des provinces de Deir Ezzor et Raqa (nord), et a une forte présence à Hassaké (nord-est), Alep (nord), Homs la troisième ville du pays et Hama (centre). Il est aussi maître de la quasi-totalité des champs pétroliers et gaziers de Syrie.

Ce deuxième revers en une semaine face à l’EI sera-t-il de nature à modifier la position adoptée par le président américain dans son entretien à « The Atlantic », notamment sur l’envoi de troupes au sol  ? La réponse est : non.Tout en demandant des moyens supplémentaires au Congrès pour lutter contre l’EI, Barack Obama a réaffirmé hier (voir la vidéo ci-dessous) qu’il n’était pas question pour les Etats-Unis d’envoyer des troupes au sol « en Irak ou en Syrie ».

Dans la presse française, les éditorialistes (voir encadré) s’interrogent. « La froide vérité géopolitique est que les États-Unis s’intéressent avant tout à l’Irak, dont ils espèrent encore sauver l’intégrité, et que nul ne sait plus qui soutenir en Syrie, maintenant que les rebelles +modérés+ ont jeté le masque en s’acoquinant avec al-Qaida« , lit-on sous la plume de Philippe Gélie dans le Figaro.

 » La conquête de Palmyre témoigne de la force de Daech. Créée il y a seulement deux ans, cette organisation a effacé la frontière entre l’Irak et la Syrie, contrôlant de vastes territoires et d’importantes ressources pétrolières et gazières », écrit Jean-Christophe Ploquin dans La Croix. Selon lui, « les seuls qui pourraient développer une stratégie globale contre lui aujourd’hui sont les États-Unis. Mais Barack Obama (…) ne veut plus engager de troupes dans un long conflit moyen-oriental. Il n’a pas la capacité de peser sur ses alliés -européens ou arabes- pour les entraîner dans une coalition internationale puissante. C’est dans ce vide stratégique que s’engouffre Daech. »

Interrogations sur la stratégie des Etats-Unis après la chute de Palmyre

Dans Sud Ouest, Bruno Dive, estime que la prise de Palmyre « signe la première défaite directe de l’armée de Bachar el Assad face à Daech. Mais surtout, elle pose avec une acuité grandissante la question du bien-fondé de la stratégie adoptée par les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés (…) Daech s’enracine, et chaque jour qui passe montre qu’elle sera très difficile à déloger, du moins sans l’appui massif de troupes au sol (…) Le temps des choix clairs et fermes est donc venu. Si l’on ne veut pas que tout le Proche-Orient se transforme en champ de ruines. »

Pour Alexandra Schwartzbrod de Libération, la prise de Palmyre appelle au moins un constat et une interrogation. « Le constat, c’est que l’armée syrienne a perdu de sa toute puissance. On ne peut exclure l’hypothèse que le boucher de Damas ait poussé le machiavélisme jusqu’à demander à ses troupes de déserter les lieux, histoire de laisser les jihadistes prendre le contrôle de ce trésor de l’archéologie mondiale afin de pousser le monde à le soutenir, lui, face à eux. Mais ce jeu-là apparaît dangereux (…) La grande interrogation, ce sont les Etats-Unis (…) Que les forces américaines (…) n’aient pas réussi à bloquer la progression des jihadistes paraît incompréhensible. Tétanisé à l’idée d’enliser les boys dans ce nouveau bourbier, Barack Obama semble bien peu sûr de sa stratégie. Seul espoir, que Palmyre serve d’électrochoc. »

Voir encore:

Obama: « Non, nous ne perdons pas » face au groupe Etat islamique
Le président Barack Obama estime que les Etats-Unis ne sont pas en train de perdre le combat engagé contre le groupe Etat islamique en Irak et Syrie, rappelant avoir toujours indiqué que la campagne contre les jihadistes prendrait « plusieurs années ».

AFP
21-05-2015

« Non, je ne pense pas que nous perdons », a-t-il souligné dans un entretien publié jeudi par le magazine en ligne The Atlantic.

« Il y a eu un revers tactique, c’est incontestable, même si Ramadi était vulnérable depuis très longtemps », a-t-il ajouté, évoquant la chute dimanche dernier de la capitale de la province irakienne d’Al-Anbar aux mains des jihadistes sunnites ultraradicaux.

L’entretien réalisé mardi paraît le jour où l’Etat islamique s’est emparé de la ville de Palmyre en Syrie, autre victoire significative qui lui permet d’élargir sa zone d’influence de part et d’autre de la frontière syro-irakienne.

« L’EI a été considérablement affaibli à travers le pays », a encore expliqué le président Obama, évoquant « des progrès significatifs dans le nord et dans les régions où les Peshmergas (forces kurdes) participent ».

Dans les zones à dominante chiite, « il n’y pas d’avancée de l’EI », a-t-il ajouté.

« L’entraînement des forces de sécurité irakiennes (…) ne va pas assez vite à Al-Anbar », a toutefois concédé M. Obama, confirmant qu’il souhaitait renforcer les efforts américains sur ce point.

En s’emparant de Palmyre, cité antique vieille de plus de 2.000 ans et véritable carrefour routier qui ouvre sur le grand désert syrien frontalier de l’Irak, l’EI se rend désormais maître de la moitié du territoire de Syrie et menace Homs, la troisième ville du pays en guerre.

Malgré une campagne aérienne lancée depuis l’été 2014 par la coalition internationale dirigée par les Etats-Unis pour aider en Irak le pouvoir et en Syrie les rebelles, à stopper la progression de l’EI, le groupe jihadiste a réussi ces deux coups de force (prise de Palmyre et Ramadi) en huit jours.

Voir par ailleurs:

You want hypotheticals? Here’s one.
Charles Krauthammer
The Washington Post
May 21

Ramadi falls. The Iraqi army flees. The great 60-nation anti-Islamic State coalition so grandly proclaimed by the Obama administration is nowhere to be seen. Instead, it’s the defense minister of Iran who flies into Baghdad, an unsubtle demonstration of who’s in charge — while the U.S. air campaign proves futile and America’s alleged strategy for combating the Islamic State is in freefall.

It gets worse. The Gulf states’ top leaders, betrayed and bitter, ostentatiously boycott President Obama’s failed Camp David summit. “We were America’s best friend in the Arab world for 50 years,” laments Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief.

Note: “were,” not “are.”

We are scraping bottom. Following six years of President Obama’s steady and determined withdrawal from the Middle East, America’s standing in the region has collapsed. And yet the question incessantly asked of the various presidential candidates is not about that. It’s a retrospective hypothetical: Would you have invaded Iraq in 2003 if you had known then what we know now?

First, the question is not just a hypothetical but an inherently impossible hypothetical. It contradicts itself. Had we known there were no weapons of mass destruction, the very question would not have arisen. The premise of the war — the basis for going to the U.N., to the Congress and, indeed, to the nation — was Iraq’s possession of WMD in violation of the central condition for the cease-fire that ended the 1991 Gulf War. No WMD, no hypothetical to answer in the first place.

Second, the “if you knew then” question implicitly locates the origin and cause of the current disasters in 2003 . As if the fall of Ramadi was predetermined then, as if the author of the current regional collapse is George W. Bush.

This is nonsense. The fact is that by the end of Bush’s tenure the war had been won. You can argue that the price of that victory was too high. Fine. We can debate that until the end of time. But what is not debatable is that it was a victory. Bush bequeathed to Obama a success. By whose measure? By Obama’s. As he told the troops at Fort Bragg on Dec. 14, 2011, “We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.” This was, said the president, a “moment of success.”

Which Obama proceeded to fully squander. With the 2012 election approaching, he chose to liquidate our military presence in Iraq. We didn’t just withdraw our forces. We abandoned, destroyed or turned over our equipment, stores, installations and bases. We surrendered our most valuable strategic assets, such as control of Iraqi airspace, soon to become the indispensable conduit for Iran to supply and sustain the Assad regime in Syria and cement its influence all the way to the Mediterranean. And, most relevant to the fall of Ramadi, we abandoned the vast intelligence network we had so painstakingly constructed in Anbar province, without which our current patchwork operations there are largely blind and correspondingly feeble.

The current collapse was not predetermined in 2003 but in 2011. Isn’t that what should be asked of Hillary Clinton? We know you think the invasion of 2003 was a mistake. But what about the abandonment of 2011? Was that not a mistake?

Voir par ailleurs:

When Everyone Agreed About Iraq
For years before the war, a bipartisan consensus thought Saddam possessed WMD.
Stephen F. Knott
The WSJ
March 15, 2013

At 5:34 a.m. on March 20, 2003, American, British and other allied forces invaded Iraq. One of the most divisive conflicts in the nation’s history would soon be labeled  » Bush’s War. »

The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime became official U.S. policy in 1998, when President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act—a bill passed 360-38 by the House of Representatives and by unanimous consent in the Senate. The law called for training and equipping Iraqi dissidents to overthrow Saddam and suggested that the United Nations establish a war-crimes tribunal for the dictator and his lieutenants.

The legislation was partly the result of frustration over the undeclared and relatively unheralded « No-Fly Zone War » that had been waged since 1991. Saddam’s military repeatedly fired on U.S. and allied aircraft that were attempting to prevent his regime from destroying Iraqi opposition forces in northern and southern Iraq.

According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton, in 1997 a key member of President Bill Clinton’s cabinet (thought by most observers to have been Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) asked Gen. Shelton whether he could arrange for a U.S. aircraft to fly slowly and low enough that it would be shot down, thereby paving the way for an American effort to topple Saddam. Kenneth Pollack, a member of Mr. Clinton’s National Security Council staff, would later write in 2002 that it was a question of « not whether but when » the U.S. would invade Iraq. He wrote that the threat presented by Saddam was « no less pressing than those we faced in 1941. »

Radicalized by the events of 9/11, George W. Bush gradually concluded that a regime that had used chemical weapons against its own people and poison gas against Iran, invaded Iran and Kuwait, harbored some of the world’s most notorious terrorists, made lucrative payments to the families of suicide bombers, fired on American aircraft almost daily, and defied years of U.N. resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction was a problem. The former chief U.N. weapons inspector, an Australian named Richard Butler, testified in July 2002 that « it is essential to recognize that the claim made by Saddam’s representatives, that Iraq has no WMD, is false. »

In the U.S., there was a bipartisan consensus that Saddam possessed and continued to develop WMD. Former Vice President Al Gore noted in September 2002 that Saddam had « stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country. » Then-Sen. Hillary Clinton observed that Saddam hoped to increase his supply of chemical and biological weapons and to « develop nuclear weapons. » Then-Sen. John Kerry claimed that « a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his [Saddam’s] hands is a real and grave threat to our security. »

Even those opposed to using force against Iraq acknowledged that, as then-Sen. Edward Kennedy put it, « we have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing » WMD. When it came time to vote on the authorization for the use of force against Iraq, 81 Democrats in the House voted yes, joined by 29 Democrats in the Senate, including the party’s 2004 standard bearers, John Kerry and John Edwards, plus Majority Leader Tom Daschle, Sen. Joe Biden, Mrs. Clinton, and Sens. Harry Reid, Tom Harkin, Chris Dodd and Jay Rockefeller. The latter, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, claimed that Saddam would « likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. »

Support for the war extended far beyond Capitol Hill. In March 2003, a Pew Research Center poll indicated that 72% of the American public supported President Bush’s decision to use force.

If Mr. Bush « lied, » as the common accusation has it, then so did many prominent Democrats—and so did the French, whose foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, claimed in February 2003 that « regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of [Iraq’s] capacity to produce VX and yperite [mustard gas]; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin. » Germany’s intelligence chief August Hanning noted in March 2002 that « it is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years. »

According to interrogations conducted after the invasion, Saddam’s own generals believed that he had WMD and expected him to use these weapons as the invasion force neared Baghdad.

The war in Iraq was authorized by a bipartisan congressional coalition, supported by prominent media voices and backed by the public. Yet on its 10th anniversary Americans will be told of the Bush administration’s duplicity in leading us into the conflict. Many members of the bipartisan coalition that committed the U.S. to invade Iraq 10 years ago have long since washed their hands of their share of responsibility.

We owe it to history—and, more important, to all those who died—to recognize that this wasn’t Bush’s war, it was America’s war.

Mr. Knott, a professor of national security affairs at the United States Naval War College, is the author of « Rush to Judgment: George W. Bush, the War on Terror, and His Critics » (University Press of Kansas, 2012).

Voir enfin:

Global
‘Look … It’s My Name on This’: Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal

In an interview, the U.S. president ties his legacy to a pact with Tehran, argues ISIS is not winning, warns Saudi Arabia not to pursue a nuclear-weapons program, and anguishes about Israel.

Jeffrey Goldberg
The Atlantic
May 21, 2015

On Tuesday afternoon, as President Obama was bringing an occasionally contentious but often illuminating hour-long conversation about the Middle East to an end, I brought up a persistent worry. “A majority of American Jews want to support the Iran deal,” I said, “but a lot of people are anxiety-ridden about this, as am I.” Like many Jews—and also, by the way, many non-Jews—I believe that it is prudent to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of anti-Semitic regimes. Obama, who earlier in the discussion had explicitly labeled the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, an anti-Semite, responded with an argument I had not heard him make before.

“Look, 20 years from now, I’m still going to be around, God willing. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, it’s my name on this,” he said, referring to the apparently almost-finished nuclear agreement between Iran and a group of world powers led by the United States. “I think it’s fair to say that in addition to our profound national-security interests, I have a personal interest in locking this down.”

The president—the self-confident, self-contained, coolly rational president—appears to have his own anxieties about the nuclear talks. Which isn’t a bad thing.

Jimmy Carter’s name did not come up in our Oval Office conversation, but it didn’t have to. Carter’s tragic encounter with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, is an object lesson in the mysterious power of Iran to undermine, even unravel, American presidencies. Ronald Reagan, of course, also knew something of the Iranian curse. As Obama moves to conclude this historic agreement, one that will—if he is correct in his assessment—keep Iran south of the nuclear threshold not only for the 10- or 15-year period of the deal, but well beyond it, he and his administration have deployed a raft of national security-related arguments to buttress their cause. But Obama’s parting comment to me suggests he knows perfectly well that his personal legacy, and not just the future of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts (among other things), is riding on the proposition that he is not being played by America’s Iranian adversaries, and that his reputation will be forever tarnished if Iran goes sideways, even after he leaves office. Obama’s critics have argued that he is “kicking the can down the road” by striking this agreement with Iran. Obama, though, seems to understand that the can will be his for a very long time.

When we spoke on Tuesday, he mentioned, as he often has, his feelings of personal responsibility to Israel. In the period leading up to the June 30 Iran-negotiation deadline, Obama has been focused on convincing Arab and Jewish leaders—people he has helped to unite over their shared fear of Iran’s hegemonic ambitions—that the nuclear deal will enhance their security. Last week, he gathered leaders of the Gulf Arab states at Camp David in an attempt to provide such reassurance. On Friday, he will be visiting Washington’s Adas Israel Congregation, a flagship synagogue of Conservative Judaism (also, coincidentally, the synagogue I attend) ostensibly in order to give a speech in honor of Jewish American Heritage Month (whatever that is), but actually to reassure American Jews, particularly in the wake of his titanic battles with Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that he still, to quote from my 2012 interview with him, “has Israel’s back.” (There are no plans, as best as I can tell, for Obama to meet with Netanyahu in the coming weeks; this appears to be a bridge too far for the White House, at least at the moment.)

A good part of our conversation on Tuesday concerned possible flaws in the assumptions undergirding the nuclear deal, at least as the deal’s provisional parameters and potential consequences are currently understood. (A full transcript of the conversation appears below.)

Obama also spoke about ISIS’s latest surge in Iraq, and we discussed the worries of Arab states, which remain concerned not only about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but about its regional meddling and its patronage of, among other reprehensible players, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Syria’s Assad regime. Tensions between the U.S. and the Gulf states, I came to see, have not entirely dissipated. Obama was adamant on Tuesday that America’s Arab allies must do more to defend their own interests, but he has also spent much of the past month trying to reassure Saudi Arabia, the linchpin state of the Arab Gulf and one of America’s closest Arab allies, that the U.S. will protect it from Iran. One thing he does not want Saudi Arabia to do is to build a nuclear infrastructure to match the infrastructure Iran will be allowed to keep in place as part of its agreement with the great powers. “Their covert—presumably—pursuit of a nuclear program would greatly strain the relationship they’ve got with the United States,” Obama said of the Saudis.

As in previous conversations I’ve had with Obama (you can find transcripts of these discussions here, here, and here), we spent the bulk of our time talking about a country whose future preoccupies him almost as much as it preoccupies me. In the wake of what seemed to have been a near-meltdown in the relationship between the United States and Israel, Obama talked about what he called his love for the Jewish state; his frustrations with it when it fails to live up to both Jewish and universal values; and his hope that, one day soon, its leaders, including and especially its prime minister, will come to understand Israel’s stark choices as he understands Israel’s stark choices. And, just as he did with Saudi Arabia, Obama issued a warning to Israel: If it proves unwilling to live up to its values—in this case, he made specific mention of Netanyahu’s seemingly flawed understanding of the role Israel’s Arab citizens play in its democratic order—the consequences could be profound.

Obama told me that when Netanyahu asserted, late in his recent reelection campaign, that “a Palestinian state would not happen under his watch, or [when] there [was] discussion in which it appeared that Arab-Israeli citizens were somehow portrayed as an invading force that might vote, and that this should be guarded against—this is contrary to the very language of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which explicitly states that all people regardless of race or religion are full participants in the democracy. When something like that happens, that has foreign-policy consequences, and precisely because we’re so close to Israel, for us to simply stand there and say nothing would have meant that this office, the Oval Office, lost credibility when it came to speaking out on these issues.”

Though Obama’s goal in giving speeches like the one he is scheduled to give at Adas Israel is to reassure Jews of his love for Israel, he was adamant that he would not allow the Jewish right, and the Republican Party, to automatically define criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policies as anti-Israel or anti-Semitic. Referring to the most powerful Jewish figure in conservative America, Obama said that an “argument that I very much have been concerned about, and it has gotten stronger over the last 10 years … it’s less overt than the arguments that a Sheldon Adelson makes, but in some ways can be just as pernicious, is this argument that there should not be disagreements in public” between the U.S. and Israel. (Obama raised Adelson’s name in part because I had mentioned his view of the president—Adelson’s non-subtle criticism is that Obama is going to destroy the Jewish state—earlier in the interview.)

I started the interview by asking Obama if—despite his previous assertion that ISIS was on the defensive—the United States was, in fact, losing the fight against the Islamic State terror group. When we spoke, the Iraqi city of Ramadi, in Anbar Province, had just fallen to ISIS; Palmyra, in Syria, would fall the day after the interview.

“No, I don’t think we’re losing,” he said. He went on to explain, “There’s no doubt there was a tactical setback, although Ramadi had been vulnerable for a very long time, primarily because these are not Iraqi security forces that we have trained or reinforced. … [T]he training of Iraqi security forces, the fortifications, the command-and-control systems are not happening fast enough in Anbar, in the Sunni parts of the country.” When I asked about the continuing role Iraq plays in American politics—I was making a reference to Jeb Bush’s recent Iraq-related conniptions—Obama pivoted from the question to make the argument that Republicans still don’t grasp key lessons about the Iraq invasion ordered 12 years ago by Jeb’s brother.

“I know that there are some in Republican quarters who have suggested that I’ve overlearned the mistake of Iraq, and that, in fact, just because the 2003 invasion did not go well doesn’t argue that we shouldn’t go back in,” he said. “And one lesson that I think is important to draw from what happened is that if the Iraqis themselves are not willing or capable to arrive at the political accommodations necessary to govern, if they are not willing to fight for the security of their country, we cannot do that for them.”
“In addition to our profound national-security interests, I have a personal interest in locking [the nuclear deal] down.”

I turned the conversation to Iran by quoting to him something he said in that 2012 interview (the same interview in which he publicly ruled out, for the first time, the idea of containing a nuclear Iran, rather than stopping it from crossing the nuclear threshold).

This is what he told me three years ago: “It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons” if Iran got them. I then noted various reports suggesting that, in reaction to a final deal that allows Iran to keep much of its nuclear infrastructure in place, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Turkey and Egypt as well, would consider starting their own nuclear programs. This, of course, would run completely counter to Obama’s nuclear non-proliferation goals.

I asked Obama if the Saudis had promised him not to go down the nuclear path: “What are the consequences if other countries in the region say, ‘Well you know what, they have 5,000 centrifuges? We’re going to have 5,000 centrifuges.’”

Obama responded by downplaying these media reports, and then said, “There has been no indication from the Saudis or any other [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries that they have an intention to pursue their own nuclear program. Part of the reason why they would not pursue their own nuclear program—assuming that we have been successful in preventing Iran from continuing down the path of obtaining a nuclear weapon—is that the protection that we provide as their partner is a far greater deterrent than they could ever hope to achieve by developing their own nuclear stockpile or trying to achieve breakout capacity when it comes to nuclear weapons.”

He went on to say that the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, appear satisfied that if the agreement works as advertised, it will serve to keep Iran from becoming a nuclear threat. “They understand that ultimately their own security and defense is much better served by working with us,” Obama said.

One of the reasons I worry about the Iran deal is that the Obama administration seems, on occasion, to be overly optimistic about the ways in which Iran will deploy the money it will receive when sanctions are relieved. This is a very common fear among Arabs and, of course, among Israelis. I quoted Jack Lew, the treasury secretary, who said in a recent speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that “most of the money Iran receives from sanctions relief will not be used to support” its terrorist-aiding activities. I argued to Obama that this seemed like wishful thinking.

Obama responded at length (please read his full answer below), but he began this way: “I don’t think Jack or anybody in this administration said that no money will go to the military as a consequence of sanctions relief. The question is, if Iran has $150 billion parked outside the country, does the IRGC automatically get $150 billion? Does that $150 billion then translate by orders of magnitude into their capacity to project power throughout the region? And that is what we contest, because when you look at the math, first of all they’re going to have to deliver on their obligations under any agreement, which would take a certain period of time. Then there are the mechanics of unwinding the existing restraints they have on getting that money, which takes a certain amount of time. Then [Iranian President] Rouhani and, by extension, the supreme leader have made a series of commitments to improve the Iranian economy, and the expectations are outsized. You saw the reaction of people in the streets of Tehran after the signing of the agreement. Their expectations are that [the economy is] going to improve significantly.” Obama also argued that most of Iran’s nefarious activities—in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon—are comparatively low-cost, and that they’ve been pursuing these policies regardless of sanctions.

“The protection that we provide as [the Gulf countries’] partner is a far greater deterrent than they could ever hope to achieve by developing their own nuclear stockpile.”

I also raised another concern—one that the president didn’t seem to fully share. It’s been my belief that it is difficult to negotiate with parties that are captive to a conspiratorial anti-Semitic worldview not because they hold offensive views, but because they hold ridiculous views. As Walter Russell Mead and others have explained, anti-Semites have difficulty understanding the world as it actually works, and don’t comprehend cause-and-effect in politics and economics. Though I would like to see a solid nuclear deal (it is preferable to the alternatives) I don’t believe that the regime with which Obama is negotiating can be counted on to be entirely rational.

Obama responded to this theory by saying the following: “Well the fact that you are anti-Semitic, or racist, doesn’t preclude you from being interested in survival. It doesn’t preclude you from being rational about the need to keep your economy afloat; it doesn’t preclude you from making strategic decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme leader is anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that this overrides all of his other considerations. You know, if you look at the history of anti-Semitism, Jeff, there were a whole lot of European leaders—and there were deep strains of anti-Semitism in this country—”

I interjected by suggesting that anti-Semitic European leaders made irrational decisions, to which Obama responded, “They may make irrational decisions with respect to discrimination, with respect to trying to use anti-Semitic rhetoric as an organizing tool. At the margins, where the costs are low, they may pursue policies based on hatred as opposed to self-interest. But the costs here are not low, and what we’ve been very clear [about] to the Iranian regime over the past six years is that we will continue to ratchet up the costs, not simply for their anti-Semitism, but also for whatever expansionist ambitions they may have. That’s what the sanctions represent. That’s what the military option I’ve made clear I preserve represents. And so I think it is not at all contradictory to say that there are deep strains of anti-Semitism in the core regime, but that they also are interested in maintaining power, having some semblance of legitimacy inside their own country, which requires that they get themselves out of what is a deep economic rut that we’ve put them in, and on that basis they are then willing and prepared potentially to strike an agreement on their nuclear program.”

On Israel, Obama endorsed, in moving terms, the underlying rationale for the existence of a Jewish state, making a direct connection between the battle for African American equality and the fight for Jewish national equality. “There’s a direct line between supporting the right of the Jewish people to have a homeland and to feel safe and free of discrimination and persecution, and the right of African Americans to vote and have equal protection under the law,” he said. “These things are indivisible in my mind.”

In discussing the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe, he was quite clear in his condemnation of what has become a common trope—that anti-Zionism, the belief that the Jews should not have a state of their own in at least part of their ancestral homeland, is unrelated to anti-Jewish hostility. He gave me his own parameters for judging whether a person is simply critical of certain Israeli policies or harboring more prejudicial feelings.

“Do you think that Israel has a right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, and are you aware of the particular circumstances of Jewish history that might prompt that need and desire?” he said, in defining the questions that he believes should be asked. “And if your answer is no, if your notion is somehow that that history doesn’t matter, then that’s a problem, in my mind. If, on the other hand, you acknowledge the justness of the Jewish homeland, you acknowledge the active presence of anti-Semitism—that it’s not just something in the past, but it is current—if you acknowledge that there are people and nations that, if convenient, would do the Jewish people harm because of a warped ideology. If you acknowledge those things, then you should be able to align yourself with Israel where its security is at stake, you should be able to align yourself with Israel when it comes to making sure that it is not held to a double standard in international fora, you should align yourself with Israel when it comes to making sure that it is not isolated.”

Though he tried to frame his conflict with Netanyahu in impersonal terms, he made two things clear. One is that he will not stop criticizing Israel when he believes it is not living up to its own founding values. And two—and this is my interpretation of his worldview—he holds Israel to a higher standard than he does other countries because of the respect he has for Jewish values and Jewish teachings, and for the role Jewish mentors and teachers have played in his life. After equating the creation of Israel with the American civil-rights movement, he went on to say this: “What is also true, by extension, is that I have to show that same kind of regard to other peoples. And I think it is true to Israel’s traditions and its values—its founding principles—that it has to care about … Palestinian kids. And when I was in Jerusalem and I spoke, the biggest applause that I got was when I spoke about those kids I had visited in Ramallah, and I said to a Israeli audience that it is profoundly Jewish, it is profoundly consistent with Israel’s traditions to care about them. And they agreed. So if that’s not translated into policy—if we’re not willing to take risks on behalf of those values—then those principles become empty words, and in fact, in my mind, it makes it more difficult for us to continue to promote those values when it comes to protecting Israel internationally.”
Obama, when he talks about Israel, sounds like a rabbi in the progressive Zionist tradition.

As I was listening to him speak about Israel and its values (we did not discuss the recent controversy over a now-shelved Israeli Defense Ministry plan to segregate certain West Bank bus lines, but issues like this informed the conversation), I felt as if I had participated in discussions like this dozens of times, but mainly with rabbis. I have probably had 50 different conversations with 50 different rabbis over the past couple of years—including the rabbi of my synagogue, Gil Steinlauf, who is hosting Obama on Friday—about the challenges they face in talking about current Israeli reality.

Many Reform and Conservative rabbis (and some Orthodox rabbis as well) find themselves anguishing—usually before the High Holidays—about how to present Israel’s complex and sometimes unpalatable reality to their congregants. (I refer to this sermon generically as the “How to Love a Difficult Israel” sermon.) Obama, when he talks about Israel, often sounds to me like one of these rabbis:

“My hope is that over time [the] debate gets back on a path where there’s some semblance of hope and not simply fear, because it feels to me as if … all we are talking about is based from fear,” he said. “Over the short term that may seem wise—cynicism always seems a little wise—but it may lead Israel down a path in which it’s very hard to protect itself [as] a Jewish-majority democracy. And I care deeply about preserving that Jewish democracy, because when I think about how I came to know Israel, it was based on images of … kibbutzim, and Moshe Dayan, and Golda Meir, and the sense that not only are we creating a safe Jewish homeland, but also we are remaking the world. We’re repairing it. We are going to do it the right way. We are going to make sure that the lessons we’ve learned from our hardships and our persecutions are applied to how we govern and how we treat others. And it goes back to the values questions that we talked about earlier—those are the values that helped to nurture me and my political beliefs.”

I sent these comments on Wednesday to Rabbi Steinlauf to see if he disagreed with my belief that Obama, when he talks about Israel, sounds like a rabbi in the progressive Zionist tradition. Steinlauf wrote back: “President Obama shares the same yearning for a secure peace in Israel that I and so many of my rabbinic colleagues have. While he doesn’t speak as a Jew, his progressive values flow directly out of the core messages of Torah, and so he is deeply in touch with the heart and spirit of the Jewish people.”

I have to imagine that comments like Steinlauf’s may be understood by people such as Sheldon Adelson and Benjamin Netanyahu as hopelessly naive. But this is where much of the Jewish community is today: nervous about Iran, nervous about Obama’s response to Iran, nervous about Netanyahu’s response to reality, nervous about the toxic marriage between Obama and Netanyahu, and nervous that, once again, there is no margin in the world for Jewish error.

The transcript of my conversation with President Obama, including the contentious bits, is below. I’ve edited some of my baggier questions for clarity and concision. The president’s answers are reproduced in full.

Jeffrey Goldberg: You’ve argued that ISIS has been on the defensive. But Ramadi just fell. Are we actually losing this war, or would you not go that far?

President Barack Obama: No, I don’t think we’re losing, and I just talked to our CENTCOM commanders and the folks on the ground. There’s no doubt there was a tactical setback, although Ramadi had been vulnerable for a very long time, primarily because these are not Iraqi security forces that we have trained or reinforced. They have been there essentially for a year without sufficient reinforcements, and the number of ISIL that have come into the city now are relatively small compared to what happened in [the Iraqi city of] Mosul. But it is indicative that the training of Iraqi security forces, the fortifications, the command-and-control systems are not happening fast enough in Anbar, in the Sunni parts of the country. You’ve seen actually significant progress in the north, and those areas where the Peshmerga [Kurdish forces] are participating. Baghdad is consolidated. Those predominantly Shia areas, you’re not seeing any forward momentum by ISIL, and ISIL has been significantly degraded across the country. But—

Goldberg: You’ve got to worry about the Iraqi forces—

Obama: I’m getting to that, Jeff. You asked me a question, and there’s no doubt that in the Sunni areas, we’re going to have to ramp up not just training, but also commitment, and we better get Sunni tribes more activated than they currently have been. So it is a source of concern. We’re eight months into what we’ve always anticipated to be a multi-year campaign, and I think [Iraqi] Prime Minister Abadi recognizes many of these problems, but they’re going to have to be addressed.

Goldberg: Stay on Iraq. There’s this interesting conversation going on in Republican circles right now, debating a question that you answered for yourself 13 years ago, about whether it was right or wrong to go into Iraq. What is this conversation actually about? I’m also wondering if you think this is the wrong conversation to have in the following sense: You’re under virtually no pressure—correct me if I’m wrong—but you’re under virtually no pressure domestically to get more deeply involved in the Middle East. That seems to be one of the downstream consequences of the Iraq invasion 12 years ago.

Obama: As you said, I’m very clear on the lessons of Iraq. I think it was a mistake for us to go in in the first place, despite the incredible efforts that were made by our men and women in uniform. Despite that error, those sacrifices allowed the Iraqis to take back their country. That opportunity was squandered by Prime Minister Maliki and the unwillingness to reach out effectively to the Sunni and Kurdish populations.
Reuters / The Atlantic

But today the question is not whether or not we are sending in contingents of U.S. ground troops. Today the question is: How do we find effective partners to govern in those parts of Iraq that right now are ungovernable and effectively defeat ISIL, not just in Iraq but in Syria?

It is important to have a clear idea of the past because we don’t want to repeat mistakes. I know that there are some in Republican quarters who have suggested that I’ve overlearned the mistake of Iraq, and that, in fact, just because the 2003 invasion did not go well doesn’t argue that we shouldn’t go back in. And one lesson that I think is important to draw from what happened is that if the Iraqis themselves are not willing or capable to arrive at the political accommodations necessary to govern, if they are not willing to fight for the security of their country, we cannot do that for them. We can be effective allies. I think Prime Minister Abadi is sincere and committed to an inclusive Iraqi state, and I will continue to order our military to provide the Iraqi security forces all assistance that they need in order to secure their country, and I’ll provide diplomatic and economic assistance that’s necessary for them to stabilize.

But we can’t do it for them, and one of the central flaws I think of the decision back in 2003 was the sense that if we simply went in and deposed a dictator, or simply went in and cleared out the bad guys, that somehow peace and prosperity would automatically emerge, and that lesson we should have learned a long time ago. And so the really important question moving forward is: How do we find effective partners—not just in Iraq, but in Syria, and in Yemen, and in Libya—that we can work with, and how do we create the international coalition and atmosphere in which people across sectarian lines are willing to compromise and are willing to work together in order to provide the next generation a fighting chance for a better future?
Reuters / The Atlantic
The Nuclear Deal With Iran

Goldberg: Let me do two or three on Iran, and then we’ll move to Israel and Jews. All of the fun subjects. By the way, you’re coming to my synagogue to speak on Friday.

Obama: I’m very much looking forward to it.

Goldberg: This is the biggest thing that’s happened there since the last Goldberg bar mitzvah.

Obama: [Laughs]

Goldberg: So in 2012 you told me, when we were talking about Iran, “It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons if Iran got them.” Now we’re in this kind of weird situation in which there’s talk that Saudi Arabia, maybe Turkey, maybe Egypt would go build nuclear infrastructures come the finalization of this deal to match the infrastructure that your deal is going to leave in place in Iran. So my question to you is: Have you asked the Saudis not to go down any kind of nuclear path? What have they told you about this? And what are the consequences if other countries in the region say, “Well you know what, they have 5,000 centrifuges? We’re going to have 5,000 centrifuges.”

Obama: There’s been talk in the media, unsourced—

Goldberg: Well, [Saudi Arabia’s] Prince Turki said it publicly—

Obama: Well, he’s not in the government. There has been no indication from the Saudis or any other [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries that they have an intention to pursue their own nuclear program. Part of the reason why they would not pursue their own nuclear program—assuming that we have been successful in preventing Iran from continuing down the path of obtaining a nuclear weapon—is that the protection that we provide as their partner is a far greater deterrent than they could ever hope to achieve by developing their own nuclear stockpile or trying to achieve breakout capacity when it comes to nuclear weapons, and they understand that.

What we saw at the GCC summit was, I think, legitimate skepticism and concern, not simply about the Iranian nuclear program itself but also the consequences of sanctions coming down. We walked through the four pathways that would be shut off in any agreement that I would be signing off on. Technically, we showed them how it would be accomplished—what the verification mechanisms will be, how the UN snapback provisions [for sanctions] might work. They were satisfied that if in fact the agreement meant the benchmarks that we’ve set forth, that it would prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and given that, they understand that ultimately their own security and defense is much better served by working with us. Their covert—presumably—pursuit of a nuclear program would greatly strain the relationship they’ve got with the United States.

Goldberg: Stay with Iran for one more moment. I just want you to help me square something. So you’ve argued, quite eloquently in fact, that the Iranian regime has at its highest levels been infected by a kind of anti-Semitic worldview. You talked about that with Tom [Friedman]. “Venomous anti-Semitism” I think is the term that you used. You have argued—not that it even needs arguing—but you’ve argued that people who subscribe to an anti-Semitic worldview, who explain the world through the prism of anti-Semitic ideology, are not rational, are not built for success, are not grounded in a reality that you and I might understand. And yet, you’ve also argued that the regime in Tehran—a regime you’ve described as anti-Semitic, among other problems that they have—is practical, and is responsive to incentive, and shows signs of rationality. So I don’t understand how these things fit together in your mind.

Obama: Well the fact that you are anti-Semitic, or racist, doesn’t preclude you from being interested in survival. It doesn’t preclude you from being rational about the need to keep your economy afloat; it doesn’t preclude you from making strategic decisions about how you stay in power; and so the fact that the supreme leader is anti-Semitic doesn’t mean that this overrides all of his other considerations. You know, if you look at the history of anti-Semitism, Jeff, there were a whole lot of European leaders—and there were deep strains of anti-Semitism in this country—

Goldberg: And they make irrational decisions—

Obama: They may make irrational decisions with respect to discrimination, with respect to trying to use anti-Semitic rhetoric as an organizing tool. At the margins, where the costs are low, they may pursue policies based on hatred as opposed to self-interest. But the costs here are not low, and what we’ve been very clear [about] to the Iranian regime over the past six years is that we will continue to ratchet up the costs, not simply for their anti-Semitism, but also for whatever expansionist ambitions they may have. That’s what the sanctions represent. That’s what the military option I’ve made clear I preserve represents. And so I think it is not at all contradictory to say that there are deep strains of anti-Semitism in the core regime, but that they also are interested in maintaining power, having some semblance of legitimacy inside their own country, which requires that they get themselves out of what is a deep economic rut that we’ve put them in, and on that basis they are then willing and prepared potentially to strike an agreement on their nuclear program.
Reuters / The Atlantic

Goldberg: One of the other issues that’s troubling about this is—and I’m quoting [Treasury Secretary] Jack Lew here, who said a couple of weeks ago at the Washington Institute when talking about Iran’s various nefarious activities, he said, “Most of the money Iran receives from sanctions relief will not be used to support those activities.” To me that sounds like a little bit of wishful thinking—that [Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps] is going to want to get paid, Hezbollah is going to see, among other groups, might see a little bit of a windfall from these billions of dollars that might pour in. I’m not assuming something completely in the other direction either, but I just don’t know where your confidence comes from.

Obama: Well I don’t think Jack or anybody in this administration said that no money will go to the military as a consequence of sanctions relief. The question is, if Iran has $150 billion parked outside the country, does the IRGC automatically get $150 billion? Does that $150 billion then translate by orders of magnitude into their capacity to project power throughout the region? And that is what we contest, because when you look at the math, first of all they’re going to have to deliver on their obligations under any agreement, which would take a certain period of time. Then there are the mechanics of unwinding the existing restraints they have on getting that money, which takes a certain amount of time. Then [Iranian President] Rouhani and, by extension, the supreme leader have made a series of commitments to improve the Iranian economy, and the expectations are outsized. You saw the reaction of people in the streets of Tehran after the signing of the agreement. Their expectations are that [the economy is] going to improve significantly. You have Iranian elites who are champing at the bit to start moving business and getting out from under the restraints that they’ve been under.

And what is also true is that the IRGC right now, precisely because of sanctions, in some ways are able to exploit existing restrictions to have a monopoly on what comes in and out of the country, and they’ve got their own revenue sources that they’ve been able to develop, some of which may actually lessen as a consequence of sanctions relief. So I don’t think this is a science, and this is an issue that came up with the GCC countries during the summit. The point we simply make to them is: It is not a mathematical formula whereby [Iranian leaders] get a certain amount of sanctions relief and automatically they’re causing more problems in the neighborhood. What makes that particularly important is, in the discussion with the GCC countries, we pointed out that the biggest vulnerabilities that they have to Iran, and the most effective destabilizing activities of the IRGC and [Iran’s] Quds Force are actually low-cost. They are not a threat to the region because of their hardware. Ballistic missiles are a concern. They have a missile program. We have to think about missile-defense systems and how those are integrated and coordinated. But the big problems we have are weapons going in to Hezbollah, or them sending agents into Yemen, or other low-tech asymmetric threats that they’re very effective at exploiting, which they’re already doing—they’ve been doing despite sanctions. They will continue to do [this] unless we are developing greater capacity to prevent them from doing those things, which is part of what our discussion was in terms of the security assurances with the GCC countries.

You know, if you look at a situation like Yemen, part of the problem is the chronic, endemic weakness in a state like that, and the instability that Iran then seeks to exploit. If you had GCC countries who were more capable of maritime interdiction, effective intelligence, cutting off financing sources, and are more effective in terms of working and training with allied forces in a place like Yemen, so that Houthis can’t just march into Sana’a, well, if all those things are being done, Iran having some additional dollars from sanctions relief is not going to override those improvements and capabilities, and that’s really where we have to focus. Likewise with respect to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has a certain number of fighters who are hardened and effective. If Iran has some additional resources, then perhaps they’re less strained in trying to make payroll when it comes to Hezbollah, but it’s not as if they can suddenly train up and successfully deploy 10 times the number of Hezbollah fighters that are currently in Syria. That’s not something that they have automatic capacity to do. The reason that Hezbollah is effective is because they’ve got a core group of hardened folks that they’ve developed over the last 20-30 years, and—

Goldberg: You could buy more rockets and put them in south Lebanon.

Obama: Well, and the issue though with respect to rockets in south Lebanon is not whether [Iran has] enough money to do so. They’ve shown a commitment to doing that even when their economy is in the tank. The issue there is: Are we able to interdict those shipments more effectively than we do right now? And that’s the kind of thing that we have to continue to partner with Israel and other countries to stop.

Goldberg: Let me go to these questions related to Israel and your relationship to the American Jewish community. So a number of years ago, I made the case that you’re America’s first Jewish president. And I made that assessment based on the depth of your encounters with Jews: the number of Jewish mentors you’ve had—Abner Mikva, Newton Minow, and so on—teachers, law professors, fellow community organizers, Jewish literature, Jewish thought, and of course your early political base in Chicago. There are obviously Jews in America who are immune to the charms of this argument, led by Sheldon Adelson but not only him.

Here’s a quote from Adelson which always struck me as central to the way your Jewish opponents understand you: “All the steps he’s taken”—“he” meaning you—“against the State of Israel are liable to bring about the destruction of the state.”

I have my own theories about why there’s this bifurcation in the American Jewish community, and we’ve discussed this in past interviews, but what is going on? Is this the byproduct of well-intentioned anxiety about Iran, about the explosive growth of anti-Semitism in Europe? Something else?

Obama: Let me depersonalize it a little bit. First of all, there’s not really a bifurcation with respect to the attitudes of the Jewish American community about me. I consistently received overwhelming majority support from the Jewish community, and even after all the publicity around the recent differences that I’ve had with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the majority of the Jewish American community still supports me, and supports me strongly.

Goldberg: It was 70 percent in the last election.

Obama: 70 percent is pretty good. I think that there are a lot of crosscurrents that are going on right now. There is no doubt that the environment worldwide is scary for a lot of Jewish families. You’ve mentioned some of those trends. You have a Middle East that is turbulent and chaotic, and where extremists seem to be full of enthusiasm and momentum. You have Europe, where, as you’ve very effectively chronicled, there is an emergence of a more overt and dangerous anti-Semitism. And so part of the concern in the Jewish community is that, only a generation removed from the Holocaust, it seems that anti-Semitic rhetoric and anti-Israeli rhetoric is on the rise. And that will make people fearful.

What I also think is that there has been a very concerted effort on the part of some political forces to equate being pro-Israel, and hence being supportive of the Jewish people, with a rubber stamp on a particular set of policies coming out of the Israeli government. So if you are questioning settlement policy, that indicates you’re anti-Israeli, or that indicates you’re anti-Jewish. If you express compassion or empathy towards Palestinian youth, who are dealing with checkpoints or restrictions on their ability to travel, then you are suspect in terms of your support of Israel. If you are willing to get into public disagreements with the Israeli government, then the notion is that you are being anti-Israel, and by extension, anti-Jewish. I completely reject that.

Goldberg: Is that a cynical ploy by somebody?

Obama: Well I won’t ascribe motives to them. I think that some of those folks may sincerely believe that the Jewish state is consistently embattled, that it is in a very bad neighborhood and either you’re with them or against them, and end of story. And they may sincerely believe it. My response to them is that, precisely because I care so deeply about the State of Israel, precisely because I care so much about the Jewish people, I feel obliged to speak honestly and truthfully about what I think will be most likely to lead to long-term security, and will best position us to continue to combat anti-Semitism, and I make no apologies for that precisely because I am secure and confident about how deeply I care about Israel and the Jewish people.

I said in a previous interview and I meant it: I think it would be a moral failing for me as president of the United States, and a moral failing for America, and a moral failing for the world, if we did not protect Israel and stand up for its right to exist, because that would negate not just the history of the 20th century, it would negate the history of the past millennium. And it would violate what we have learned, what humanity should have learned, over that past millennium, which is that when you show intolerance and when you are persecuting minorities and when you are objectifying them and making them the Other, you are destroying something in yourself, and the world goes into a tailspin.

And so, to me, being pro-Israel and pro-Jewish is part and parcel with the values that I’ve been fighting for since I was politically conscious and started getting involved in politics. There’s a direct line between supporting the right of the Jewish people to have a homeland and to feel safe and free of discrimination and persecution, and the right of African Americans to vote and have equal protection under the law. These things are indivisible in my mind. But what is also true, by extension, is that I have to show that same kind of regard to other peoples. And I think it is true to Israel’s traditions and its values—its founding principles—that it has to care about those Palestinian kids. And when I was in Jerusalem and I spoke, the biggest applause that I got was when I spoke about those kids I had visited in Ramallah, and I said to a Israeli audience that it is profoundly Jewish, it is profoundly consistent with Israel’s traditions to care about them. And they agreed. So if that’s not translated into policy—if we’re not willing to take risks on behalf of those values—then those principles become empty words, and in fact, in my mind, it makes it more difficult for us to continue to promote those values when it comes to protecting Israel internationally.

Goldberg: You’re not known as an overly emotive politician, but there was a period in which the relationship between you and the prime minister, and therefore the U.S. government and the Israeli government, seemed very fraught and very emotional. There was more public criticism coming out of this administration directed at Israel than any other ally, and maybe at some adversaries—

Obama: Yeah, and I have to say, Jeff, I completely disagree with that assessment, and I know you wrote that. And I objected to it. I mean, the fact of the matter is that there was a very particular circumstance in which we had a policy difference that shouldn’t be papered over because it goes to the nature of the friendship between the United States and Israel, and how we deal government to government, and how we sort through those issues.

Now, a couple of things that I’d say at the outset. In every public pronouncement I’ve made, I said that the bedrock security relationships between our two countries—these are sacrosanct. Military cooperation, intelligence cooperation—none of that has been affected. I have maintained, and I think I can show that no U.S. president has been more forceful in making sure that we help Israel protect itself, and even some of my critics in Israel have acknowledged as much. I said that none of this should impact the core strategic relationship that exists between the United States and Israel, or the people-to-people relations that are so deep that they transcend any particular president or prime minister and will continue until the end of time.

But what I did say is that when, going into an election, Prime Minister Netanyahu said a Palestinian state would not happen under his watch, or there [was] discussion in which it appeared that Arab-Israeli citizens were somehow portrayed as an invading force that might vote, and that this should be guarded against—this is contrary to the very language of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which explicitly states that all people regardless of race or religion are full participants in the democracy. When something like that happens, that has foreign-policy consequences, and precisely because we’re so close to Israel, for us to simply stand there and say nothing would have meant that this office, the Oval Office, lost credibility when it came to speaking out on these issues.

And when I am then required to come to Israel’s defense internationally, when there is anti-Semitism out there, when there is anti-Israeli policy that is based not on the particulars of the Palestinian cause but [is] based simply on hostility, I have to make sure that I am entirely credible in speaking out against those things, and that requires me then to also be honest with friends about how I view these issues. Now that makes, understandably, folks both in Israel and here in the United States uncomfortable.

But the one argument that I very much have been concerned about, and it has gotten stronger over the last 10 years … it’s less overt than the arguments that a Sheldon Adelson makes, but in some ways can be just as pernicious, is this argument that there should not be disagreements in public. So a lot of times the criticism that was leveled during this period—including from you, Jeff—was not that you disagreed with me on the assessment, but rather that it’s dangerous or unseemly for us to air these disagreements—

Goldberg: I don’t think I ever—

Obama: You didn’t make that argument—

Goldberg: I didn’t make that argument. I spend half my life airing those arguments.

Obama: Fair enough. But you understand what I’m saying, Jeff. I understand why the Jewish American community, people would get uncomfortable. I would get letters from people saying, “Listen, Mr. President, I completely support you. I agree with you on this issue, but you shouldn’t say these things publicly.” Now the truth of the matter is that what we said publicly was fairly spare and mild, and then would be built up—it seemed like an article a day, partly because when you get in arguments with friends it’s a lot more newsworthy than arguments with enemies. Well, and it’s the same problem that I’m having right now with the trade deals up on Capitol Hill. The fact that I agree with Elizabeth Warren on 90 percent of issues is not news. That we disagree on one thing is news. But my point, Jeff, is that we are at enough of an inflection point in terms of the region that trying to pretend like these important, difficult policy questions are not controversial, and that they don’t have to be sorted out, I think is a problem. And one of the great things about Israel is, these are arguments that take place in Israel every day.

Goldberg: It’s a 61/59 country right now.

Obama: If you sit down in some cafe in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, you’re hearing far more contentious arguments, and that’s healthy. That’s part of why Americans love Israel, it’s part of the reason why I love Israel—because it is a genuine democracy and you can express your opinions. But the most important thing, I think, that we can do right now in strengthening Israel’s position is to describe very clearly why I have believed that a two-state solution is the best security plan for Israel over the long term; for me to take very seriously Israel’s security concerns about what a two-state solution might look like; to try to work through systematically those issues; but also, at the end of the day, to say to any Israeli prime minister that it will require some risks in order to achieve peace. And the question you have to ask yourself then is: How do you weigh those risks against the risks of doing nothing and just perpetuating the status quo? My argument is that the risks of doing nothing are far greater, and I ultimately—it is important for the Israeli people and the Israeli government to make its own decisions about what it needs to secure the people of that nation.

But my hope is that over time that debate gets back on a path where there’s some semblance of hope and not simply fear, because it feels to me as if … all we are talking about is based from fear. Over the short term that may seem wise—cynicism always seems a little wise—but it may lead Israel down a path in which it’s very hard to protect itself—

Goldberg: As a Jewish-majority democracy.

Obama: —as a Jewish-majority democracy. And I care deeply about preserving that Jewish democracy, because when I think about how I came to know Israel, it was based on images of, you know—

Goldberg: We talked about this once. Kibbutzim, and—

Obama: Kibbutzim, and Moshe Dayan, and Golda Meir, and the sense that not only are we creating a safe Jewish homeland, but also we are remaking the world. We’re repairing it. We are going to do it the right way. We are going to make sure that the lessons we’ve learned from our hardships and our persecutions are applied to how we govern and how we treat others. And it goes back to the values questions that we talked about earlier—those are the values that helped to nurture me and my political beliefs. It’s interesting, when I spoke to some leaders of Jewish organizations a few months back, I said to them, it’s true, I have high expectations for Israel, and they’re not unrealistic expectations, they’re not stupid expectations, they’re not the expectations that Israel would risk its own security blindly in pursuit of some idealistic pie-in-the-sky notions.

Goldberg: But you want Israel to embody Jewish values.

Obama: I want Israel, in the same way that I want the United States, to embody the Judeo-Christian and, ultimately then, what I believe are human or universal values that have led to progress over a millennium. The same values that led to the end of Jim Crow and slavery. The same values that led to Nelson Mandela being freed and a multiracial democracy emerging in South Africa. The same values that led to the Berlin Wall coming down. The same values that animate our discussion on human rights and our concern that people on the other side of the world who may be tortured or jailed for speaking their mind or worshipping—the same values that lead us to speak out against anti-Semitism. I want Israel to embody these values because Israel is aligned with us in that fight for what I believe to be true. And that doesn’t mean there aren’t tough choices and there aren’t compromises. It doesn’t mean that we don’t have to ask ourselves very tough questions about, in the short term, do we have to protect ourselves, which means we may have some choices that—

Goldberg: Hard decisions.

Obama: —And hard decisions that in peace we will not make. Those are decisions that I have to make every time I deploy U.S. forces. Those are choices that we make with respect to drones, and with respect to our intelligence agencies. And so when I spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu, for example, about can we come up with a peace plan, I sent out our top military folks to go through systematically every contingency, every possible concern that Israel might have on its own terms about maintaining security in a two-state agreement, and what would it mean for the Jordan Valley, and what would it mean with respect to the West Bank, and I was the first one to acknowledge that you can’t have the risk of terrorists coming up right to the edge of Jerusalem and exposing populations. So this isn’t an issue of being naive or unrealistic, but ultimately yes, I think there are certain values that the United States, at its best, exemplifies. I think there are certain values that Israel, and the Jewish tradition, at its best exemplifies. And I am willing to fight for those values.

Goldberg: On this question, which is an American campus question, and which is a European question as well: Hollande’s government [in France]—Manuel Valls, the prime minister—David Cameron [in the U.K.] … we were talking about the line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. And I know that you’ve talked about this with Jewish organizations, with some of your Jewish friends—how you define the differences and the similarities between these two concepts.

Obama: You know, I think a good baseline is: Do you think that Israel has a right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people, and are you aware of the particular circumstances of Jewish history that might prompt that need and desire? And if your answer is no, if your notion is somehow that that history doesn’t matter, then that’s a problem, in my mind. If, on the other hand, you acknowledge the justness of the Jewish homeland, you acknowledge the active presence of anti-Semitism—that it’s not just something in the past, but it is current—if you acknowledge that there are people and nations that, if convenient, would do the Jewish people harm because of a warped ideology. If you acknowledge those things, then you should be able to align yourself with Israel where its security is at stake, you should be able to align yourself with Israel when it comes to making sure that it is not held to a double standard in international fora, you should align yourself with Israel when it comes to making sure that it is not isolated.

But you should be able to say to Israel, we disagree with you on this particular policy. We disagree with you on settlements. We think that checkpoints are a genuine problem. We disagree with you on a Jewish-nationalist law that would potentially undermine the rights of Arab citizens. And to me, that is entirely consistent with being supportive of the State of Israel and the Jewish people. Now for someone in Israel, including the prime minister, to disagree with those policy positions—that’s OK too. And we can have a debate, and we can have an argument. But you can’t equate people of good will who are concerned about those issues with somebody who is hostile towards Israel. And you know, I actually believe that most American Jews, most Jews around the world, and most Jews in Israel recognize as much. And that’s part of the reason why I do still have broad-based support among American Jews. It’s not because they dislike Israel, it’s not because they aren’t worried about Iran having a nuclear weapon or what Hezbollah is doing in Lebanon. It’s because I think they recognize, having looked at my history and having seen the actions of my administration, that I’ve got Israel’s back, but there are values that I share with them that may be at stake if we’re not able to find a better path forward than what feels like a potential dead-end right now.
U.S.
Barack Obama Is Such a Traditional Jew Sometimes

Jeffrey Goldberg
The Atlantic
Mar 11, 2012

Two weeks ago, after I finished interviewing President Obama on the subject of Iran and Israel, I handed him a copy of the New American Haggadah, the Passover user’s guide edited by Jonathan Safran Foer, which includes commentary by Goldblog. It is an all-around excellent Haggadah (except for my bits, he says fetchingly). Jonathan did a masterful job, first by recruiting Nathan Englander (whose new short story collection, What We Talk About When We Talk About Anne Frank, I just read on the flight over to Tel Aviv — by the way, I’m in Tel Aviv — is the equal, at least, of his first collection) to re-translate the Hebrew, in order to de-stultify it. Jonathan also recruited, in addition to yours truly, Nathaniel Deutsch, Rebecca Goldstein and Lemony Snicket to write commentaries, and found a genius named Oded Ezer to design the Haggadah.

It is not, as The New York Times points out, a Brooklyn-hipster Haggadah (as the Foer-Englander combination might suggest, particularly when you realize — just go click on that Times link — that they go shirt-shopping together), but an intelligent and beautiful Haggadah, very modern but also deeply respectful of everything that came before.

When I handed him the Haggadah, President Obama, who famously stages his own seders at the White House, (which is a very nice philo-Semitic thing to do, IMHO) spent a moment leafing through it and making approving noises. Then he said (as I told the Times): « Does this mean we can’t use the Maxwell House Haggadah anymore? »

George W. Bush was, in his own way, a philo-Semite, but he never would have made such an M.O.T. kind of joke (see the end of this post if you’re not sure what M.O.T. means). Once again, Barack Obama was riffing off the cosmic joke that he is somehow anti-Semitic, when in fact, as many people understand, he is the most Jewish president we’ve ever had (except for Rutherford B. Hayes). No president, not even Bill Clinton, has traveled so widely in Jewish circles, been taught by so many Jewish law professors, and had so many Jewish mentors, colleagues, and friends, and advisers as Barack Obama (though it is true that every so often he appoints a gentile to serve as White House chief of staff). And so no President, I’m guessing, would know that the Maxwell House Haggadah — the flimsy, wine-stained, rote, anti-intellectual Haggadah you get when you buy a can of coffee at Shoprite) — is the target, alternatively, of great derision and veneration among American Jews (at least, I’m told there are people who venerate it). I’ll grapple with the meaning of Obama’s Jewishness later, but the dispute between the Jewish right and the Jewish left over Obama is actually not about whether he is anti-Jewish or pro-Jewish, but over what sort of Jew he actually is.

After he cracked wise about Maxwell House, I told the president — this is the part the Times left out — that, as commander-in-chief, he could use whatever Haggadah he liked, though it seemed to me that our Haggadah might add some depth and meaning and aesthetic charm to his seder, as it would to any seder. I knew, of course, that he would stick with the Maxwell House Haggadah — tradition! — but it didn’t strike me until later exactly why he would stick with it. The reason he’s sticking with Maxwell House is the same reason he spoke at the AIPAC convention, and is once again not speaking at the upcoming convention of J Street, the left-leaning pro-Israel group.

Before I go on, here are all the usual Goldblog caveats: AIPAC is too unthinkingly rightist to me, J Street is too naively leftist, etc. etc., but both groups represent legitimate streams of Jewish pro-Israel thought in America, and both are worthy of the President’s attention. But the President only pays attention to one — and it’s the one where he’s not very popular. I wandered around the AIPAC convention last week, and it wasn’t too easy to hear a kind word about Obama. The 13,000 or so delegates to the AIPAC convention are drawn disproportionately from the 22 percent of Jewish voters who did not support Obama in 2008. J Street, on the other hand, is made up overwhelmingly of people who support Obama.

And how does this relate to Obama’s choice of Haggadahs? When it comes to Jews, Obama does the safe thing. The Jews in Glencoe and Syosset and Boca read the Maxwell House Haggadah, and that’s good enough for him. They like AIPAC in Glencoe and Syosset and Boca, and that’s good enough for him, as well. And by the way, just so I’m crystal-clear on the subject, the New American Haggadah is not the J Street equivalent of the haggadah. It is, like Judaism, larger than mere politics. And I’m also expressly not making the point that Obama necessarily shares J Street’s outlook on Middle East politics. He is well to the left of the AIPAC mainstream, of course, but I think he’s too hardheaded to buy much of J Street’s line. But J Street is a natural constituency for Obama, but one he avoids, because someone told him it would be politically unwise to be seen with too many J Streeters. An Obama address at J Street would do great things: It would signal to the American Jewish establishment that a left-Zionist viewpoint is a legitimate viewpoint; and it would allow the President to tell J Street just exactly where he thinks its members are right, and where he thinks they are wrong.

My prediction is that not until we have an actual Jewish president will the president address J Street (obviously, this isn’t true if the first Jewish president is Eric Cantor). Only a Jewish president — a Rahm Emanuel-type, if not Rahm himself — would feel secure enough to make the argument that AIPAC doesn’t speak for everyone. Also, the first Jewish president will undoubtedly use The New American Haggadah. Of that I’m sure.

Oh, and M.O.T = member of the tribe.

Voir encore:

Remarks by the President and First Lady on the End of the War in Iraq

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

11:52 A.M. EST

MRS. OBAMA:  Hello, everyone!  I get to start you all off.  I want to begin by thanking General Anderson for that introduction, but more importantly for his leadership here at Fort Bragg.  I can’t tell you what a pleasure and an honor it is to be back here.  I have so many wonderful memories of this place.

A couple of years ago, I came here on my very first official trip as First Lady.  And I spent some — a great time with some of the amazing military spouses, and I visited again this summer to help to put on the finishing touches on an amazing new home for a veteran and her family.  So when I heard that I had the opportunity to come back and to be a part of welcoming you all home, to say I was excited was an understatement.

And I have to tell you that when I look out at this crowd, I am simply overwhelmed.  I am overwhelmed and proud, because I know the level of strength and commitment that you all display every single day.  Whenever this country calls, you all are the ones who answer, no matter the circumstance, no matter the danger, no matter the sacrifice.

And I know that you do this not just as soldiers, not just as patriots, but as fathers and mothers, as brothers and sisters, as sons and daughters.  And I know that while your children and your spouses and your parents and siblings might not wear uniforms, they serve right alongside you.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!  (Applause.)

MRS. OBAMA:  I know that your sacrifice is their sacrifice, too.  So when I think of all that you do and all that your families do, I am so proud and so grateful.  But more importantly, I’m inspired.  But like so many Americans, I never feel like I can fully convey just how thankful I am, because words just don’t seem to be enough.

And that’s why I have been working so hard, along with Jill Biden, on a campaign that we call Joining Forces.  It’s a campaign that we hope goes beyond words.  It’s a campaign that is about action.  It’s about rallying all Americans to give you the honor, the appreciation and the support that you have all earned.  And I don’t have to tell you that this hasn’t been a difficult campaign.  We haven’t had to do much convincing because American have been lining up to show their appreciation for you and your families in very concrete and meaningful ways.

Businesses are hiring tens of thousands of veterans and military spouses.  Schools all across the country and PTAs are reaching out to our military children.  And individuals are serving their neighbors and their communities all over this country in your honor.

So I want you to know that this nation’s support doesn’t end as this war ends.  Not by a long shot.  We’re going to keep on doing this.  We have so much more work to do.  We’re going to keep finding new ways to serve all of you as well as you have served us.  And the man leading the way is standing right here.  (Applause.)  He is fighting for you and your families every single day.  He’s helped more than half a million veterans and military family members go to college through the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill.  (Applause.)

He’s taken unprecedented steps to improve mental health care.  He’s cut taxes for businesses that hire a veteran or a wounded warrior.  And he has kept his promise to responsibly bring you home from Iraq.

So please join me in welcoming someone who’s your strongest advocate, someone who shows his support for our military not only in words, but in deeds, my husband, our President, and your Commander-in-Chief, Barack Obama.  (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:  Hello, everybody!  (Applause.)  Hello, Fort Bragg!  All the way!

AUDIENCE:  Airborne!

THE PRESIDENT:  Now, I’m sure you realize why I don’t like following Michelle Obama.  (Laughter.)  She’s pretty good.  And it is true, I am a little biased, but let me just say it:  Michelle, you are a remarkable First Lady.  You are a great advocate for military families.  (Applause.)  And you’re cute.  (Applause.)  I’m just saying — gentlemen, that’s your goal:  to marry up.  (Laughter.)  Punch above your weight.

Fort Bragg, we’re here to mark a historic moment in the life of our country and our military.  For nearly nine years, our nation has been at war in Iraq.  And you — the incredible men and women of Fort Bragg — have been there every step of the way, serving with honor, sacrificing greatly, from the first waves of the invasion to some of the last troops to come home.  So, as your Commander-in-Chief, and on behalf of a grateful nation, I’m proud to finally say these two words, and I know your families agree:  Welcome home!  (Applause.)  Welcome home.  Welcome home.  (Applause.)  Welcome home.

It is great to be here at Fort Bragg — home of the Airborne and Special Operations Forces.  I want to thank General Anderson and all your outstanding leaders for welcoming us here today, including General Dave Rodriguez, General John Mulholland.  And I want to give a shout-out to your outstanding senior enlisted leaders, including Command Sergeant Major Roger Howard, Darrin Bohn, Parry Baer.  And give a big round of applause to the Ground Forces Band.  (Applause.)

We’ve got a lot of folks in the house today.  We’ve got the 18th Airborne Corps — the Sky Dragons.  (Applause.)  We’ve got the legendary, All-American 82nd Airborne Division.  (Applause.)  We’ve got America’s quiet professionals — our Special Operations Forces.  (Applause.)  From Pope Field, we’ve got Air Force.  (Applause.)  And I do believe we’ve got some Navy and Marine Corps here, too.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Yes!  (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT:  And though they’re not here with us today, we send our thoughts and prayers to General Helmick, Sergeant Major Rice and all the folks from the 18th Airborne and Bragg who are bringing our troops back from Iraq.  (Applause.)  We honor everyone from the 82nd Airborne and Bragg serving and succeeding in Afghanistan, and General Votel and those serving around the world.

And let me just say, one of the most humbling moments I’ve had as President was when I presented our nation’s highest military decoration, the Medal of Honor, to the parents of one of those patriots from Fort Bragg who gave his life in Afghanistan — Staff Sergeant Robert Miller.

I want to salute Ginny Rodriguez, Miriam Mulholland, Linda Anderson, Melissa Helmick, Michelle Votel and all the inspiring military families here today.  We honor your service as well.  (Applause.)

And finally, I want to acknowledge your neighbors and friends who help keep your — this outstanding operation going, all who help to keep you Army Strong, and that includes Representatives Mike McIntyre, and Dave Price, and Heath Shuler, and Governor Bev Perdue.  I know Bev is so proud to have done so much for our military families.  So give them a big round of applause.  (Applause.)

Today, I’ve come to speak to you about the end of the war in Iraq.  Over the last few months, the final work of leaving Iraq has been done.  Dozens of bases with American names that housed thousands of American troops have been closed down or turned over to the Iraqis.  Thousands of tons of equipment have been packed up and shipped out.  Tomorrow, the colors of United States Forces-Iraq — the colors you fought under — will be formally cased in a ceremony in Baghdad.  Then they’ll begin their journey across an ocean, back home.

Over the last three years, nearly 150,000 U.S. troops have left Iraq.  And over the next few days, a small group of American soldiers will begin the final march out of that country.  Some of them are on their way back to Fort Bragg.  As General Helmick said, “They know that the last tactical road march out of Iraq will be a symbol, and they’re going to be a part of history.”

As your Commander-in-Chief, I can tell you that it will indeed be a part of history.  Those last American troops will move south on desert sands, and then they will cross the border out of Iraq with their heads held high.  One of the most extraordinary chapters in the history of the American military will come to an end.  Iraq’s future will be in the hands of its people.  America’s war in Iraq will be over.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  Now, we knew this day would come.  We’ve known it for some time.  But still, there is something profound about the end of a war that has lasted so long.

Now, nine years ago, American troops were preparing to deploy to the Persian Gulf and the possibility that they would be sent to war.  Many of you were in grade school.  I was a state senator.  Many of the leaders now governing Iraq — including the Prime Minister — were living in exile.  And since then, our efforts in Iraq have taken many twists and turns.  It was a source of great controversy here at home, with patriots on both sides of the debate.  But there was one constant — there was one constant:  your patriotism, your commitment to fulfill your mission, your abiding commitment to one another.  That was constant.  That did not change.  That did not waiver.

It’s harder to end a war than begin one.  Indeed, everything that American troops have done in Iraq -– all the fighting and all the dying, the bleeding and the building, and the training and the partnering -– all of it has led to this moment of success.  Now, Iraq is not a perfect place.  It has many challenges ahead.  But we’re leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people.  We’re building a new partnership between our nations.  And we are ending a war not with a final battle, but with a final march toward home.

This is an extraordinary achievement, nearly nine years in the making.  And today, we remember everything that you did to make it possible.

We remember the early days -– the American units that streaked across the sands and skies of Iraq; the battles from Karbala to Baghdad, American troops breaking the back of a brutal dictator in less than a month.

We remember the grind of the insurgency -– the roadside bombs, the sniper fire, the suicide attacks.  From the “triangle of death” to the fight for Ramadi; from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south -– your will proved stronger than the terror of those who tried to break it.

We remember the specter of sectarian violence -– al Qaeda’s attacks on mosques and pilgrims, militias that carried out campaigns of intimidation and campaigns of assassination.  And in the face of ancient divisions, you stood firm to help those Iraqis who put their faith in the future.

We remember the surge and we remember the Awakening -– when the abyss of chaos turned toward the promise of reconciliation.  By battling and building block by block in Baghdad, by bringing tribes into the fold and partnering with the Iraqi army and police, you helped turn the tide toward peace.

And we remember the end of our combat mission and the emergence of a new dawn -– the precision of our efforts against al Qaeda in Iraq, the professionalism of the training of Iraqi security forces, and the steady drawdown of our forces.  In handing over responsibility to the Iraqis, you preserved the gains of the last four years and made this day possible.

Just last month, some of you — members of the Falcon Brigade —

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  — turned over the Anbar Operations Center to the Iraqis in the type of ceremony that has become commonplace over these last several months.  In an area that was once the heart of the insurgency, a combination of fighting and training, politics and partnership brought the promise of peace.  And here’s what the local Iraqi deputy governor said:  “This is all because of the U.S. forces’ hard work and sacrifice.”

That’s in the words of an Iraqi.  Hard work and sacrifice.  Those words only begin to describe the costs of this war and the courage of the men and women who fought it.

We know too well the heavy cost of this war.  More than 1.5 million Americans have served in Iraq — 1.5 million.  Over 30,000 Americans have been wounded, and those are only the wounds that show.  Nearly 4,500 Americans made the ultimate sacrifice — including 202 fallen heroes from here at Fort Bragg — 202.  So today, we pause to say a prayer for all those families who have lost their loved ones, for they are part of our broader American family.  We grieve with them.

We also know that these numbers don’t tell the full story of the Iraq war -– not even close.  Our civilians have represented our country with skill and bravery.  Our troops have served tour after tour of duty, with precious little dwell time in between.  Our Guard and Reserve units stepped up with unprecedented service.  You’ve endured dangerous foot patrols and you’ve endured the pain of seeing your friends and comrades fall.  You’ve had to be more than soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen –- you’ve also had to be diplomats and development workers and trainers and peacemakers.  Through all this, you have shown why the United States military is the finest fighting force in the history of the world.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!  (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:  As Michelle mentioned, we also know that the burden of war is borne by your families.  In countless base communities like Bragg, folks have come together in the absence of a loved one.  As the Mayor of Fayetteville put it, “War is not a political word here.  War is where our friends and neighbors go.”  So there have been missed birthday parties and graduations.  There are bills to pay and jobs that have to be juggled while picking up the kids.  For every soldier that goes on patrol, there are the husbands and the wives, the mothers, the fathers, the sons, the daughters praying that they come back.

So today, as we mark the end of the war, let us acknowledge, let us give a heartfelt round of applause for every military family that has carried that load over the last nine years.  You too have the thanks of a grateful nation.  (Applause.)

Part of ending a war responsibly is standing by those who fought it.  It’s not enough to honor you with words.  Words are cheap.  We must do it with deeds.  You stood up for America; America needs to stand up for you.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  That’s why, as your Commander-in Chief, I am committed to making sure that you get the care and the benefits and the opportunities that you’ve earned. For those of you who remain in uniform, we will do whatever it takes to ensure the health of our force –- including your families.  We will keep faith with you.

We will help our wounded warriors heal, and we will stand by those who’ve suffered the unseen wounds of war.  And make no mistake — as we go forward as a nation, we are going to keep America’s armed forces the strongest fighting force the world has ever seen.  That will not stop.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!  (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:  That will not stop.  But our commitment doesn’t end when you take off the uniform.  You’re the finest that our nation has to offer.  And after years of rebuilding Iraq, we want to enlist our veterans in the work of rebuilding America.  That’s why we’re committed to doing everything we can to extend more opportunities to those who have served.

That includes the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, so that you and your families can get the education that allows you to live out your dreams.  That includes a national effort to put our veterans to work.  We’ve worked with Congress to pass a tax credit so that companies have the incentive to hire vets.  And Michelle has worked with the private sector to get commitments to create 100,000 jobs for those who’ve served.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  And by the way, we’re doing this not just because it’s the right thing to do by you –- we’re doing it because it’s the right thing to do for America.  Folks like my grandfather came back from World War II to form the backbone of this country’s middle class.  For our post-9/11 veterans -– with your skill, with your discipline, with your leadership, I am confident that the story of your service to America is just beginning.

But there’s something else that we owe you.  As Americans, we have a responsibility to learn from your service.  I’m thinking of an example — Lieutenant Alvin Shell, who was based here at Fort Bragg.  A few years ago, on a supply route outside Baghdad, he and his team were engulfed by flames from an RPG attack.  Covered with gasoline, he ran into the fire to help his fellow soldiers, and then led them two miles back to Camp Victory where he finally collapsed, covered with burns.  When they told him he was a hero, Alvin disagreed.  “I’m not a hero,” he said.  “A hero is a sandwich. “  (Laughter.)  “I’m a paratrooper.”

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  We could do well to learn from Alvin.  This country needs to learn from you.  Folks in Washington need to learn from you.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  Policymakers and historians will continue to analyze the strategic lessons of Iraq — that’s important to do.  Our commanders will incorporate the hard-won lessons into future military campaigns — that’s important to do.  But the most important lesson that we can take from you is not about military strategy –- it’s a lesson about our national character.

For all of the challenges that our nation faces, you remind us that there’s nothing we Americans can’t do when we stick together.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!

THE PRESIDENT:  For all the disagreements that we face, you remind us there’s something bigger than our differences, something that makes us one nation and one people regardless of color, regardless of creed, regardless of what part of the country we come from, regardless of what backgrounds we come out of.  You remind us we’re one nation.

And that’s why the United States military is the most respected institution in our land because you never forget that.  You can’t afford to forget it.  If you forget it, somebody dies.  If you forget it, a mission fails.  So you don’t forget it.  You have each other’s backs.  That’s why you, the 9/11 Generation, has earned your place in history.

Because of you — because you sacrificed so much for a people that you had never met, Iraqis have a chance to forge their own destiny.  That’s part of what makes us special as Americans.  Unlike the old empires, we don’t make these sacrifices for territory or for resources.  We do it because it’s right.  There can be no fuller expression of America’s support for self-determination than our leaving Iraq to its people.  That says something about who we are.

Because of you, in Afghanistan we’ve broken the momentum of the Taliban.  Because of you, we’ve begun a transition to the Afghans that will allow us to bring our troops home from there.  And around the globe, as we draw down in Iraq, we have gone after al Qaeda so that terrorists who threaten America will have no safe haven, and Osama bin Laden will never again walk the face of this Earth.

AUDIENCE:  Hooah!  (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:  So here’s what I want you to know, and here’s what I want all our men and women in uniform to know:  Because of you, we are ending these wars in a way that will make America stronger and the world more secure.  Because of you.

That success was never guaranteed.  And let us never forget the source of American leadership:  our commitment to the values that are written into our founding documents, and a unique willingness among nations to pay a great price for the progress of human freedom and dignity.  This is who we are.  That’s what we do as Americans, together.

The war in Iraq will soon belong to history.  Your service belongs to the ages.  Never forget that you are part of an unbroken line of heroes spanning two centuries –- from the colonists who overthrew an empire, to your grandparents and parents who faced down fascism and communism, to you –- men and women who fought for the same principles in Fallujah and Kandahar, and delivered justice to those who attacked us on 9/11.

Looking back on the war that saved our union, a great American, Oliver Wendell Holmes, once paid tribute to those who served.  “In our youth,” he said, “our hearts were touched with fire.  It was given to us to learn at the outset that life is a profound and passionate thing.”

All of you here today have lived through the fires of war.  You will be remembered for it.  You will be honored for it — always.  You have done something profound with your lives.  When this nation went to war, you signed up to serve.  When times were tough, you kept fighting.  When there was no end in sight, you found light in the darkness.

And years from now, your legacy will endure in the names of your fallen comrades etched on headstones at Arlington, and the quiet memorials across our country; in the whispered words of admiration as you march in parades, and in the freedom of our children and our grandchildren.  And in the quiet of night, you will recall that your heart was once touched by fire.  You will know that you answered when your country called; you served a cause greater than yourselves; you helped forge a just and lasting peace with Iraq, and among all nations.

I could not be prouder of you, and America could not be prouder of you.

God bless you all, God bless your families, and God bless the United States of America.  (Applause.)

Voir par ailleurs:

National Security
Robert Gates, former defense secretary, offers harsh critique of Obama’s leadership in ‘Duty’
Bob Woodward

The Washington Post

January 7, 2014

In a new memoir, former defense secretary Robert Gates unleashes harsh judgments about President Obama’s leadership and his commitment to the Afghanistan war, writing that by early 2010 he had concluded the president “doesn’t believe in his own strategy, and doesn’t consider the war to be his. For him, it’s all about getting out.”

Leveling one of the more serious charges that a defense secretary could make against a commander in chief sending forces into combat, Gates asserts that Obama had more than doubts about the course he had charted in Afghanistan. The president was “skeptical if not outright convinced it would fail,” Gates writes in “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.”

Obama, after months of contentious discussion with Gates and other top advisers, deployed 30,000 more troops in a final push to stabilize Afghanistan before a phased withdrawal beginning in mid-2011. “I never doubted Obama’s support for the troops, only his support for their mission,” Gates writes.

As a candidate, Obama had made plain his opposition to the 2003 Iraq invasion while embracing the Afghanistan war as a necessary response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, requiring even more military resources to succeed. In Gates’s highly emotional account, Obama remains uncomfortable with the inherited wars and distrustful of the military that is providing him options. Their different worldviews produced a rift that, at least for Gates, became personally wounding and impossible to repair.

In a statement Tuesday evening, National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said Obama “deeply appreciates Bob Gates’ service as Secretary of Defense, and his lifetime of service to our country.”

“As has always been the case, the President welcomes differences of view among his national security team, which broaden his options and enhance our policies,” Hayden said in the statement. “The President wishes Secretary Gates well as he recovers from his recent injury, and discusses his book.” Gates fractured his first vertebra last week in a fall at his home in Washington state.

It is rare for a former Cabinet member, let alone a defense secretary occupying a central position in the chain of command, to publish such an antagonistic portrait of a sitting president.

Gates’s severe criticism is even more surprising — some might say contradictory — because toward the end of “Duty,” he says of Obama’s chief Afghanistan policies, “I believe Obama was right in each of these decisions.” That particular view is not a universal one; like much of the debate about the best path to take in Afghanistan, there is disagreement on how well the surge strategy worked, including among military officials.

The sometimes bitter tone in Gates’s 594-page account contrasts sharply with the even-tempered image that he cultivated during his many years of government service, including stints at the CIA and National Security Council. That image endured through his nearly five years in the Pentagon’s top job, beginning in President George W. Bush’s second term and continuing after Obama asked him to remain in the post. In “Duty,” Gates describes his outwardly calm demeanor as a facade. Underneath, he writes, he was frequently “seething” and “running out of patience on multiple fronts.”

The book, published by Knopf, is scheduled for release Jan. 14.

[PHOTOS: A look at Robert Gates’s career in government]

Gates, a Republican, writes about Obama with an ambivalence that he does not resolve, praising him as “a man of personal integrity” even as he faults his leadership. Though the book simmers with disappointment in Obama, it reflects outright contempt for Vice President Biden and many of Obama’s top aides.

Biden is accused of “poisoning the well” against the military leadership. Thomas Donilon, initially Obama’s deputy national security adviser, and then-Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, the White House coordinator for the wars, are described as regularly engaged in “aggressive, suspicious, and sometimes condescending and insulting questioning of our military leaders.”

In her statement, Hayden said Obama “disagrees with Secretary Gates’ assessment” of the vice president.

“From his leadership on the Balkans in the Senate, to his efforts to end the war in Iraq, Joe Biden has been one of the leading statesmen of his time, and has helped advance America’s leadership in the world,” Hayden said. “President Obama relies on his good counsel every day.”

Gates is 70, nearly 20 years older than Obama. He has worked for every president going back to Richard Nixon, with the exception of Bill Clinton. Throughout his government career, he was known for his bipartisan detachment, the consummate team player. “Duty” is likely to provide ammunition for those who believe it is risky for a president to fill such a key Cabinet post with a holdover from the opposition party.

He writes, “I have tried to be fair in describing actions and motivations of others.” He seems well aware that Obama and his aides will not see it that way.

While serving as defense secretary, Gates gave Obama high marks, saying privately in the summer of 2010 that the president is “very thoughtful and analytical, but he is also quite decisive.” He added, “I think we have a similar approach to dealing with national security issues.”

Obama echoed Gates’s comments in a July 10, 2010, interview for my book “Obama’s Wars.” The president said: “Bob Gates has, I think, served me extraordinarily well. And part of the reason is, you know, I’m not sure if he considers this an insult or a compliment, but he and I actually think a lot alike, in broad terms.”

During that interview, Obama said he believed he “had garnered confidence and trust in Gates.” In “Duty,” Gates complains repeatedly that confidence and trust were what he felt was lacking in his dealings with Obama and his team. “Why did I feel I was constantly at war with everybody, as I have detailed in these pages?” he writes. “Why was I so often angry? Why did I so dislike being back in government and in Washington?”

His answer is that “the broad dysfunction in Washington wore me down, especially as I tried to maintain a public posture of nonpartisan calm, reason and conciliation.”

His lament about Washington was not the only factor contributing to his unhappiness. Gates also writes of the toll taken by the difficulty of overseeing wars against terrorism and insurgencies in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Such wars do not end with a clear surrender; Gates acknowledges having ambiguous feelings about both conflicts. For example, he writes that he does not know what he would have recommended if he had been asked his opinion on Bush’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq.

Three years later, Bush recruited Gates — who had served his father for 15 months as CIA director in the early 1990s — to take on the defense job. The first half of “Duty” covers those final two years in the Bush administration. Gates reveals some disagreements from that period, but none as fundamental or as personal as those he describes with Obama and his aides in the book’s second half.

“All too early in the [Obama] administration,” he writes, “suspicion and distrust of senior military officers by senior White House officials — including the president and vice president — became a big problem for me as I tried to manage the relationship between the commander in chief and his military leaders.”

Gates offers a catalogue of various meetings, based in part on notes that he and his aides made at the time, including an exchange between Obama and then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton that he calls “remarkable.”

He writes: “Hillary told the president that her opposition to the [2007] surge in Iraq had been political because she was facing him in the Iowa primary. . . . The president conceded vaguely that opposition to the Iraq surge had been political. To hear the two of them making these admissions, and in front of me, was as surprising as it was dismaying.”

Earlier in the book, he describes Hillary Clinton in the sort of glowing terms that might be used in a political endorsement. “I found her smart, idealistic but pragmatic, tough-minded, indefatigable, funny, a very valuable colleague, and a superb representative of the United States all over the world,” he wrote.

[READ: The Fix on what Gates’s memoir could mean for a Clinton campaign]
March 3, 2011

“Duty” reflects the memoir genre, declaring that this is how the writer saw it, warts and all, including his own. That focus tends to give short shrift to the fuller, established record. For example, in recounting the difficult discussions that led to the Afghan surge strategy in 2009, Gates makes no reference to the six-page “terms sheet” that Obama drafted at the end, laying out the rationale for the surge and withdrawal timetable. Obama asked everyone involved to sign on, signaling agreement.

According to the meeting notes of another participant, Gates is quoted as telling Obama, “You sound the bugle . . . Mr. President, and Mike [Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I will be the first to charge the hill.”

Gates does not include such a moment in “Duty.” He picks up the story a bit later, after Gen. David H. Petraeus, then the central commander in charge of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, made remarks to the press suggesting he was not comfortable with setting a fixed date to start withdrawal.

At a March 3, 2011, National Security Council meeting, Gates writes, the president opened with a “blast.” Obama criticized the military for “popping off in the press” and said he would push back hard against any delay in beginning the withdrawal.

According to Gates, Obama concluded, “ ‘If I believe I am being gamed . . .’ and left the sentence hanging there with the clear implication the consequences would be dire.”

Gates continues: “I was pretty upset myself. I thought implicitly accusing” Petraeus, and perhaps Mullen and Gates himself, “of gaming him in front of thirty people in the Situation Room was inappropriate, not to mention highly disrespectful of Petraeus. As I sat there, I thought: the president doesn’t trust his commander, can’t stand [Afghanistan President Hamid] Karzai, doesn’t believe in his own strategy, and doesn’t consider the war to be his. For him, it’s all about getting out.”

[READ: World Views: Gates was wrong on the most important issue he ever faced]
‘Breaches of faith’

Lack of trust is a major thread in Gates’s account, along with his unsparing criticism of Obama’s aides. At times, the two threads intertwine. For example, after the devastating 2010 Haitian earthquake that had left tens of thousands dead, Gates met with Obama and Donilon, the deputy national security adviser, about disaster relief.

Donilon was “complaining about how long we were taking,” Gates writes. “Then he went too far, questioning in front of the president and a roomful of people whether General [Douglas] Fraser [head of the U.S. Southern Command] was competent to lead this effort. I’ve rarely been angrier in the Oval Office than I was at that moment. . . . My initial instinct was to storm out, telling the president on the way that he didn’t need two secretaries of defense. It took every bit of my self-discipline to stay seated on the sofa.”

Gates confirms a previously reported statement in which he told Obama’s first national security adviser, retired Marine Gen. James Jones, that he thought Donilon would be a “disaster” if he succeeded Jones (as Donilon did in late 2010). Gates writes that Obama quizzed him about this characterization; a one-on-one meeting with Donilon followed, and that “cleared the air,” according to Gates.

His second year with Obama proved as tough as the first. “For me, 2010 was a year of continued conflict and a couple of important White House breaches of faith,” he writes.

The first, he says, was Obama’s decision to seek the repeal of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy toward gays serving in the military. Though Gates says he supported the decision, there had been months and months of debate, with details still to work out. On one day’s notice, Obama informed Gates and Mullen that he would announce his request for a repeal of the law. Obama had “blindsided Admiral Mullen and me,” Gates writes.

Similarly, in a battle over defense spending, “I was extremely angry with President Obama,” Gates writes. “I felt he had breached faith with me . . . on the budget numbers.” As with “don’t ask, don’t tell,” “I felt that agreements with the Obama White House were good for only as long as they were politically convenient.”

Gates acknowledges forthrightly in “Duty” that he did not reveal his dismay. “I never confronted Obama directly over what I (as well as [Hillary] Clinton, [then-CIA Director Leon] Panetta, and others) saw as the president’s determination that the White House tightly control every aspect of national security policy and even operations. His White House was by far the most centralized and controlling in national security of any I had seen since Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger ruled the roost.”

It got so bad during internal debates over whether to intervene in Libya in 2011 that Gates says he felt compelled to deliver a “rant” because the White House staff was “talking about military options with the president without Defense being involved.”

Gates says his instructions to the Pentagon were: “Don’t give the White House staff and [national security staff] too much information on the military options. They don’t understand it, and ‘experts’ like Samantha Power will decide when we should move militarily.” Power, then on the national security staff and now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has been a strong advocate for humanitarian intervention.

Another time, after Donilon and Biden tried to pass orders to Gates, he told the two, “The last time I checked, neither of you are in the chain of command,” and said he expected to get orders directly from Obama.

Life at the top was no picnic, Gates writes. He did little or no socializing. “Every evening I could not wait to get home, get my office homework out of the way, write condolence letters to the families of the fallen, pour a stiff drink, wolf down a frozen dinner or carry out,” since his wife, Becky, often remained at their home in Washington state.

“I got up at five every morning to run two miles around the Mall in Washington, past the World War II, Korean, and Vietnam memorials, and in front of the Lincoln Memorial. And every morning before dawn, I would ritually look up at that stunning white statue of Lincoln, say good morning, and sadly ask him, How did you do it?”

The memoir’s title comes from a quote, “God help me to do my duty,” that Gates says he kept on his desk. The quote has been attributed to Abraham Lincoln’s war secretary, Edwin Stanton.

At his confirmation hearings to be Bush’s defense secretary in late 2006, Gates told the senators that he had not “come back to Washington to be a bump on a log and not say exactly what I think, and to speak candidly and, frankly, boldly to people at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue about what I believe and what I think needs to be done.”

But Gates says he did not speak his mind when the committee chairman listed the problems he would face as secretary. “I remember sitting at the witness table listening to this litany of woe and thinking, “What the hell am I doing here? I have walked right into the middle of a category-five shitstorm. It was the first of many, many times I would sit at the witness table thinking something very different from what I was saying.”

“Duty” offers the familiar criticism of Congress and its culture, describing it as “truly ugly.” Gates’s cold feelings toward the legislative branch stand in stark contrast to his warmth for the military. He repeatedly describes his affection for the troops, especially those in combat.

Gates wanted to quit at the end of 2010 but agreed to stay at Obama’s urging, finally leaving in mid-2011. He later joined a consulting firm with two of Bush’s closest foreign policy advisers — former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser during Bush’s second term. The firm is called RiceHadleyGates. In October, he became president-elect of the Boy Scouts of America.

Gates writes, “I did not enjoy being secretary of defense,” or as he e-mailed one friend while still serving, “People have no idea how much I detest this job.”

Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.

Voir enfin:

Asia Pacific
Bipartisan Critic Turns His Gaze Toward Obama
In His New Memoir, Robert M. Gates, the Former Defense Secretary, Offers a Critique of the President
Thom Shanker

Jan. 7, 2014

WASHINGTON — After ordering a troop increase in Afghanistan, President Obama eventually lost faith in the strategy, his doubts fed by White House advisers who continually brought him negative news reports suggesting it was failing, according to his former defense secretary Robert M. Gates.

In a new memoir, Mr. Gates, a Republican holdover from the Bush administration who served for two years under Mr. Obama, praises the president as a rigorous thinker who frequently made decisions “opposed by his political advisers or that would be unpopular with his fellow Democrats.” But Mr. Gates says that by 2011, Mr. Obama began criticizing — sometimes emotionally — the way his policy in Afghanistan was playing out.

At a pivotal meeting in the situation room in March 2011, called to discuss the withdrawal timetable, Mr. Obama opened with a blast of frustration — expressing doubts about Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander he had chosen, and questioning whether he could do business with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai.

“As I sat there, I thought: The president doesn’t trust his commander, can’t stand Karzai, doesn’t believe in his own strategy and doesn’t consider the war to be his,” Mr. Gates wrote. “For him, it’s all about getting out.”

“Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War” is the first book describing the Obama administration’s policy deliberations written from inside the cabinet. Mr. Gates offers 600 pages of detailed history of his personal wars with Congress, the Pentagon bureaucracy and, in particular, Mr. Obama’s White House staff. He wrote that the “controlling nature” of the staff “took micromanagement and operational meddling to a new level.”

Mr. Obama’s decision to retain Mr. Gates at the Pentagon gave his national security team a respected professional and veteran of decades at the center of American foreign policy — and offered a bipartisan aura. But it was not long before Mr. Obama’s inner circle tired of the defense secretary they initially praised as “Yoda” — a reference to the wise, aged Jedi master in the “Star Wars” films — and he of them.

Mr. Gates describes his running policy battles within Mr. Obama’s inner circle, among them Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.; Tom Donilon, who served as national security adviser; and Douglas E. Lute, the Army lieutenant general who managed Afghan policy issues at the time.

Mr. Gates calls Mr. Biden “a man of integrity,” but questions his judgment. “I think he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades,” Mr. Gates writes. He has high praise for Hillary Rodham Clinton, who served as secretary of state when he was at the Pentagon and was a frequent ally on national security issues.

But Mr. Gates does say that, in defending her support for the Afghan surge, she confided that her opposition to Mr. Bush’s Iraq surge when she was in the Senate and a presidential candidate “had been political,” since she was facing Mr. Obama, then an antiwar senator, in the Iowa primary. In the same conversation, Mr. Obama “conceded vaguely that opposition to the Iraq surge had been political,” Mr. Gates recalls. “To hear the two of them making these admissions, and in front of me, was as surprising as it was dismaying.”

Mr. Gates discloses that he almost quit in September 2009 after a dispute-filled meeting to assess the way ahead in Afghanistan, including the number of troops that were needed. “I was deeply uneasy with the Obama White House’s lack of appreciation — from the top down — of the uncertainties and unpredictability of war,” he recalls. “I came closer to resigning that day than at any other time in my tenure.”

Caitlin Hayden, the National Security Council spokeswoman, released a statement late Tuesday saying that “deliberations over our policy on Afghanistan have been widely reported on over the years, and it is well known that the president has been committed to achieving the mission of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda, while also ensuring that we have a clear plan for winding down the war, which will end this year.”

In response to Mr. Gates’s comments on Mr. Biden, she said, “President Obama relies on his good counsel every day.”

Mr. Gates is a bipartisan critic of the two presidents he served as defense secretary. He holds the George W. Bush administration responsible for misguided policy that squandered the early victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, although he credits Mr. Bush with ordering a troop surge in Iraq that averted collapse of the mission.

And he says that only he and Mr. Bush’s second secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, pressed forcefully to close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, with little result.

Mr. Gates does not spare himself from criticism. He describes how he came to feel “an overwhelming sense of personal responsibility” for the troops he ordered into combat, which left him misty-eyed when discussing their sacrifices — and perhaps clouded his judgment when coldhearted national security interests were at stake.

Mr. Gates acknowledges that he initially opposed sending Special Operations forces to attack a housing compound in Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was believed to be hiding. Mr. Gates writes that Mr. Obama’s approval for the Navy SEAL mission, despite strong doubts that Bin Laden was even there, was “one of the most courageous decisions I had ever witnessed in the White House.”

In his final chapter, Mr. Gates makes clear his verdict on the president’s overall Afghan strategy: “I believe Obama was right in each of these decisions.”

Mr. Gates reveals the depth of Mr. Obama’s concerns over leaks of classified information to news outlets, writing that within his first month in office, the new president said he wanted a criminal investigation into disclosures by The New York Times on covert action intended to sabotage Iran’s suspected effort to develop nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gates, too, ordered a campaign to stamp out unauthorized disclosures, but grew rankled when White House officials always blamed the Pentagon for leaks. “Only the president would acknowledge to me he had problems with leaks in his own shop,” Mr. Gates writes.

Mr. Gates, who began public service as an Air Force intelligence officer, tells of emotional meetings with troops in combat, with those who suffered horrific wounds and with their families.

He writes that he is to be buried in Arlington Cemetery’s Section 60, the final home for many killed in Afghanistan and Iraq. “The greatest honor possible would be to rest among my heroes for all eternity,” Mr. Gates writes in closing his memoir.

Voir encore:

Panetta: Obama, White House Responsible For Chaos In Iraq
Former Secretary of Defense breaks down history in upcoming memoir
Washington Free Beacon Staff
October 2, 2014

 Obama’s former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, has blamed the president for the chaos unfolding in Iraq.

Time previewed Panetta’s upcoming memoir, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace. In the book, Panetta said he and others in the Obama administration pushed for a residual force of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq but their efforts were stymied by White House.

“The White House was so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests,” Panetta wrote.
Through the fall of 2011, the main question facing the American military in Iraq was what our role would be now that combat operations were over. When President Obama announced the end of our combat mission in August 2010, he acknowledged that we would maintain troops for a while. Now that the deadline was upon us, however, it was clear to me–and many others–that withdrawing all our forces would endanger the fragile stability then barely holding Iraq together.

Privately, the various leadership factions in Iraq all confided that they wanted some U.S. forces to remain as a bulwark against sectarian violence. But none was willing to take that position publicly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki concluded that any Status of Forces Agreement, which would give legal protection to those forces, would have to be submitted to the Iraqi parliament for approval.

That made reaching agreement very difficult given the internal politics of Iraq, but representatives of the Defense and State departments, with scrutiny from the White House, tried to reach a deal.We had leverage. We could, for instance, have threatened to withdraw reconstruction aid to Iraq if al-Maliki would not support some sort of continued U.S. military presence. My fear, as I voiced to the President and others, was that if the country split apart or slid back into the violence that we’d seen in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion, it could become a new haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the U.S. Iraq’s stability was not only in Iraq’s interest but also in ours. I privately and publicly advocated for a residual force that could provide training and security for Iraq’s military.

To my frustration, the White House coordinated the negotiations but never really led them. Officials there seemed content to endorse an agreement if State and Defense could reach one, but without the President’s active advocacy, al-Maliki was allowed to slip away. The deal never materialized. To this day, I believe that a small U.S. troop presence in Iraq could have effectively advised the Iraqi military on how to deal with al-Qaeda’s resurgence and the sectarian violence that has engulfed the country.
Panetta is a close ally of the Clintons, and his memoir may be seen as an effort to distance Hillary Clinton from the Obama administration’s foreign policy failures. The memoir comes out on October 7.

Voir enfin:

Politics
A Closer Look at Hillary Clinton’s Emails on Benghazi
Michael S. Schmidt

May 21, 2015

Hillary Rodham Clinton last year provided the State Department with 55,000 pages of emails that she said were related to her work as secretary of state, all from the personal account she exclusively used while leading the department.

Roughly 850 pages of those emails that relate to Libya and the 2012 attacks on the United States outposts in Benghazi were handed over to a special committee appointed to investigate the attacks. In response to a request from Mrs. Clinton, the State Department plans to release those emails in the coming days. The New York Times obtained more than a third of those documents and has provided a guide to some of the key findings related to the Benghazi attacks below.

Blumenthal Memos Were Often Circulated Without Identifying Their Source

From 2011 to 2012, Sidney Blumenthal, a longtime friend and confidant who was a senior adviser to Mrs. Clinton during her 2008 presidential campaign, sent her at least 25 memos about Libya, including several about the Benghazi attacks. Mrs. Clinton forwarded most of them to Jake Sullivan, her trusted foreign policy adviser. Mr. Sullivan would then send the memos along to other senior State Department officials, asking for their feedback. There is no evidence those officials were told that the memos were from Mr. Blumenthal. In April 2012, J. Christopher Stevens, the ambassador who died in the Benghazi attacks, was asked by Mr. Sullivan to provide his thoughts on the latest information “from HRC friend.” (Pages 127-128) Brian Fallon, a spokesman for Mrs. Clinton, said that Mr. Blumenthal had not been working for the government in any official capacity at the time and that his emails to Mrs. Clinton had not been solicited.

In Memo, Blumenthal Initially Blames Demonstrators for Attacks
The day after the Sept. 11, 2012, attacks on American outposts in Benghazi that killed Mr. Stevens and three other Americans, Mr. Blumenthal sent Mrs. Clinton a memo with his intelligence about what had occurred. The memo said the attacks were by “demonstrators” who “were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America.” Mrs. Clinton forwarded the memo to Mr. Sullivan, saying “More info.” (Pages 193-195)

Second Memo Provides Detailed Account of Benghazi
The next day, Mr. Blumenthal sent Mrs. Clinton a more thorough account of what had occurred. Citing “sensitive sources” in Libya, the memo provided extensive detail about the episode, saying that the siege had been set off by members of Ansar al-Shariah, the Libyan terrorist group. Those militants had ties to Al Qaeda, had planned the attacks for a month and had used a nearby protest as cover for the siege, the memo said. “We should get this around asap” Mrs. Clinton said in an email to Mr. Sullivan. “Will do,” he responded. That information contradicted the Obama administration’s narrative at the time about what had spawned the attacks. Republicans have said the administration misled the country about the attacks because it did not want to undermine the notion that President Obama, who was up for re-election, was winning the war on terrorism. (Pages 200-203)

Blumenthal Warns of Political Attacks
In early October 2012, a month before Mr. Obama was re-elected, Mr. Blumenthal forwarded Mrs. Clinton an article on a left-leaning website. The article cautioned that the Republicans could exploit the attacks in a “Jimmy Carter Strategy” and use them to paint Mr. Obama as weak on terrorism. Mrs. Clinton forwarded the email to Mr. Sullivan. “Be sure Ben knows they need to be ready for this line of attack,” Mrs. Clinton wrote. She did not say to which Ben she was referring, but one of Mr. Obama’s senior national security advisers is Benjamin J. Rhodes, who handles communications and speechwriting. Mrs. Clinton then told Mr. Blumenthal that she was “pushing to WH” the story. “According to Politico yesterday, there was an internal argument within the Romney campaign over Libya,” Mr. Blumenthal said in response. “Obviously, the neocons and the Rove oriented faction (Ed Gillespie, Rove’s surrogate is now a Romney campaign adviser) beat Stuart Stevens.” (Pages 215-225)

Clinton’s Personal Email Account Contained Sensitive Information
Mrs. Clinton’s emails show that she had a special type of government information known as “sensitive but unclassified,” or “SBU,” in her account. That information included the whereabouts and travel plans of American officials in Libya as security there deteriorated during the uprising against the leadership of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011. Nearly a year and a half before the attacks in Benghazi, Mr. Stevens, then an American envoy to the rebels, considered leaving Benghazi citing deteriorating security, according to an email to Mrs. Clinton marked “SBU.”

Voir de plus:

Nouvelle polémique autour de la mort de Ben Laden
Emmanuelle.Rivière
Le Figaro

11/05/2015

L’enquête d’une figure du journalisme d’investigation américain remet en cause la thèse officielle sur la mort de Ben Laden. Des affirmations «sans fondement», a aussitôt rétorqué lundi la Maison-Blanche.

Publiée dans la London Review of Books, l’enquête de Seymour M. Hersh, emblème du journalisme d’investigation américain, tend à discréditer la thèse officielle de l’administration Obama sur la mort d’Oussama Ben Laden. Après avoir décrypté le déroulement des opérations qui ont conduit à l’élimination du chef d’al-Qaida, le journaliste ironise: «L’histoire de la Maison-Blanche aurait pu être écrite par Lewis Caroll».

Seymour M. Hersh affirme d’abord que la traque de Ben Laden en mai 2011 n’a pas seulement été menée par les États-Unis. D’après lui, l’opération était connue d’une poignée d’officiels pakistanais, qui pourraient même y avoir contribué. Citant une «source anonyme», il va même jusqu’à évoquer un chantage de l’administration américaine sur le Pakistan. «Nous étions très réticents, mais cela devait être fait parce que tous les programmes d’aides américains auraient été coupés», aurait déclaré la fameuse source d’Hersh. Cette même source ajoutant: «Ils ont dit qu’ils allaient nous affamer si nous ne l’autorisions pas [le raid] et l’accord a été donné alors que Ahmed Shuja Pasha [le directeur général des services secrets pakistanais] était à Washington».

Ben Laden était-il emprisonné par le Pakistan?
D’après le journaliste, le cerveau des attentats de 2001 ne se cachait pas à Abottabad (le lieu où il a été tué) mais y était, en réalité, emprisonné par le Pakistan. Toujours selon le journaliste, c’est une source pakistanaise, rémunérée 25 millions de dollars, qui aurait ensuite rapporté la localisation précise ainsi que des échantillons ADN du terroriste afin de prouver ses affirmations.

Mais Seymour Hersh ne s’arrête pas là. Il soutient que la mise à mort du chef terroriste n’a pu être actionnée qu’après de longues négociations avec le Pakistan: «En août 2010, un ancien officier des services secrets pakistanais a approché Jonathan Bank, alors chef du bureau de la CIA à l’ambassade américaine d’Islamabad», raconte le journaliste, et «il a proposé de dire à la CIA où trouver Ben Laden en échange de la récompense que Washington avait offerte en 2001». Les dires selon lesquels le corps de la dépouille aurait été jeté en mer seraient également erronés. Réduite en morceaux par les balles, elle aurait été éparpillée dans l’ Hindou Koush, entre le Pakistan et l’Afghanistan, avance le journaliste.

Les démentis de la Maison-Blanche
Spécialiste de la politique et des services secrets américains, Seymour Hersh n’en est pas à son premier coup d’éclat. On lui doit notamment les révélations sur le massacre de My Lai en avril 1968 (pour lequel il obtint le Pullitzer en 1970), au cours duquel 400 Vietnamiens ont été exterminés par une unité de l’armée américaine. Il est également à l’origine du rapport sur les tortures des prisonniers d’Abou Ghraib en 2004. C’est peu dire, donc, que le personnage hante les présidents américains depuis plus de 50 ans…

La Maison-Blanche a rejeté en bloc le travail de ce «vieux brisquard» du journalisme. «Il y a trop d’inexactitudes et d’affirmations sans fondement dans cet article pour y répondre point par point», a affirmé Ned Price, porte-parole du Conseil de sécurité nationale (NSC).

La thèse de Seymour Hersh pâtit de reposer en grande partie sur les déclarations d’une source unique, anonyme qui plus est. Au lendemain de l’assaut de mai 2011, Islamabad avait fortement critiqué l’opération américaine, estimant que de telles «actions unilatérales non autorisées» ne devraient pas se reproduire. Quant à la CIA, elle avait affirmé que les États-Unis n’avaient en aucun cas informé le Pakistan, de crainte que le pays n’«alerte» Oussama Ben Laden.

Voir de même:

Mort de Ben Laden : « C’est un énorme mensonge »

Thomas Liabot

le JDD

11 mai 2015

Selon le journaliste Seymour Hersh, la mort d’Oussama Ben Laden n’est pas intervenue selon le scénario révélé par Washington. Un agent pakistanais aurait renseigné la CIA, contre une forte récompense.
Et si Washington avait menti sur la version officielle de la mort d’Oussama Ben Laden? Selon le journaliste Seymour Hersh (prix Pulitzer en 1970), cela ne fait aucun doute. Dans un rapport publié dans la London Review of Books, il affirme en effet que l' »histoire de la Maison-Blanche aurait pu être écrite par Lewis Caroll », le père des Aventures d’Alice au pays des merveilles. « C’est un énorme mensonge, il n’y a pas un seul mot de vrai », poursuit l’ancien journaliste du New York Times.

« La Maison Blanche maintient que la mission était une affaire 100% américaine, et que les généraux de l’armée pakistanaise et ses services secrets n’ont pas été mis au courant de l’assaut à l’avance. C’est faux. » Selon lui, les Pakistanais avaient établi depuis 2006 que le chef d’al-Qaïda était à Abbottabad, et étaient en relation avec la CIA pour planifier son élimination.

Aidé par un agent pakistanais
Seymour Hersh s’explique : « En août 2010, un ancien officier des services secrets pakistanais a approché Jonathan Bank, alors chef du bureau de la CIA à l’ambassade américaine d’Islamabad. Il a proposé de dire à la CIA où trouver Ben Laden en échange de la récompense que Washington avait offerte en 2001 », soit 25 millions de dollars. Récompensé, l’homme serait aujourd’hui consultant à Washington pour la CIA.

Dans son article, Seymour Hersh écrit qu’il n’y pas eu d’affrontements dans la villa d’Abbotabad, mais que les forces spéciales américaines ont abattu « un homme faible et sans armes ». Le journaliste ajoute que le corps d’Oussama Ben Laden n’aurait pas été jeté en mer, mais enterré au Pakistan.

Voir enfin:

The Killing of Osama bin Laden
Seymour M. Hersh
London Review of Books
21 May 2015

Seymour M. Hersh is writing an alternative history of the war on terror.

It’s been four years since a group of US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in a night raid on a high-walled compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The killing was the high point of Obama’s first term, and a major factor in his re-election. The White House still maintains that the mission was an all-American affair, and that the senior generals of Pakistan’s army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were not told of the raid in advance. This is false, as are many other elements of the Obama administration’s account. The White House’s story might have been written by Lewis Carroll: would bin Laden, target of a massive international manhunt, really decide that a resort town forty miles from Islamabad would be the safest place to live and command al-Qaida’s operations? He was hiding in the open. So America said.

The most blatant lie was that Pakistan’s two most senior military leaders – General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the army staff, and General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, director general of the ISI – were never informed of the US mission. This remains the White House position despite an array of reports that have raised questions, including one by Carlotta Gall in the New York Times Magazine of 19 March 2014. Gall, who spent 12 years as the Times correspondent in Afghanistan, wrote that she’d been told by a ‘Pakistani official’ that Pasha had known before the raid that bin Laden was in Abbottabad. The story was denied by US and Pakistani officials, and went no further. In his book Pakistan: Before and after Osama (2012), Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, a think tank in Islamabad, wrote that he’d spoken to four undercover intelligence officers who – reflecting a widely held local view – asserted that the Pakistani military must have had knowledge of the operation. The issue was raised again in February, when a retired general, Asad Durrani, who was head of the ISI in the early 1990s, told an al-Jazeera interviewer that it was ‘quite possible’ that the senior officers of the ISI did not know where bin Laden had been hiding, ‘but it was more probable that they did [know]. And the idea was that, at the right time, his location would be revealed. And the right time would have been when you can get the necessary quid pro quo – if you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.’

This spring I contacted Durrani and told him in detail what I had learned about the bin Laden assault from American sources: that bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Kayani and Pasha knew of the raid in advance and had made sure that the two helicopters delivering the Seals to Abbottabad could cross Pakistani airspace without triggering any alarms; that the CIA did not learn of bin Laden’s whereabouts by tracking his couriers, as the White House has claimed since May 2011, but from a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer who betrayed the secret in return for much of the $25 million reward offered by the US, and that, while Obama did order the raid and the Seal team did carry it out, many other aspects of the administration’s account were false.

‘When your version comes out – if you do it – people in Pakistan will be tremendously grateful,’ Durrani told me. ‘For a long time people have stopped trusting what comes out about bin Laden from the official mouths. There will be some negative political comment and some anger, but people like to be told the truth, and what you’ve told me is essentially what I have heard from former colleagues who have been on a fact-finding mission since this episode.’ As a former ISI head, he said, he had been told shortly after the raid by ‘people in the “strategic community” who would know’ that there had been an informant who had alerted the US to bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, and that after his killing the US’s betrayed promises left Kayani and Pasha exposed.

The major US source for the account that follows is a retired senior intelligence official who was knowledgeable about the initial intelligence about bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. He also was privy to many aspects of the Seals’ training for the raid, and to the various after-action reports. Two other US sources, who had access to corroborating information, have been longtime consultants to the Special Operations Command. I also received information from inside Pakistan about widespread dismay among the senior ISI and military leadership – echoed later by Durrani – over Obama’s decision to go public immediately with news of bin Laden’s death. The White House did not respond to requests for comment.

*

It began with a walk-in. In August 2010 a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer approached Jonathan Bank, then the CIA’s station chief at the US embassy in Islamabad. He offered to tell the CIA where to find bin Laden in return for the reward that Washington had offered in 2001. Walk-ins are assumed by the CIA to be unreliable, and the response from the agency’s headquarters was to fly in a polygraph team. The walk-in passed the test. ‘So now we’ve got a lead on bin Laden living in a compound in Abbottabad, but how do we really know who it is?’ was the CIA’s worry at the time, the retired senior US intelligence official told me.

The US initially kept what it knew from the Pakistanis. ‘The fear was that if the existence of the source was made known, the Pakistanis themselves would move bin Laden to another location. So only a very small number of people were read into the source and his story,’ the retired official said. ‘The CIA’s first goal was to check out the quality of the informant’s information.’ The compound was put under satellite surveillance. The CIA rented a house in Abbottabad to use as a forward observation base and staffed it with Pakistani employees and foreign nationals. Later on, the base would serve as a contact point with the ISI; it attracted little attention because Abbottabad is a holiday spot full of houses rented on short leases. A psychological profile of the informant was prepared. (The informant and his family were smuggled out of Pakistan and relocated in the Washington area. He is now a consultant for the CIA.)

‘By October the military and intelligence community were discussing the possible military options. Do we drop a bunker buster on the compound or take him out with a drone strike? Perhaps send someone to kill him, single assassin style? But then we’d have no proof of who he was,’ the retired official said. ‘We could see some guy is walking around at night, but we have no intercepts because there’s no commo coming from the compound.’

In October, Obama was briefed on the intelligence. His response was cautious, the retired official said. ‘It just made no sense that bin Laden was living in Abbottabad. It was just too crazy. The president’s position was emphatic: “Don’t talk to me about this any more unless you have proof that it really is bin Laden.”’ The immediate goal of the CIA leadership and the Joint Special Operations Command was to get Obama’s support. They believed they would get this if they got DNA evidence, and if they could assure him that a night assault of the compound would carry no risk. The only way to accomplish both things, the retired official said, ‘was to get the Pakistanis on board’.

During the late autumn of 2010, the US continued to keep quiet about the walk-in, and Kayani and Pasha continued to insist to their American counterparts that they had no information about bin Laden’s whereabouts. ‘The next step was to figure out how to ease Kayani and Pasha into it – to tell them that we’ve got intelligence showing that there is a high-value target in the compound, and to ask them what they know about the target,’ the retired official said. ‘The compound was not an armed enclave – no machine guns around, because it was under ISI control.’ The walk-in had told the US that bin Laden had lived undetected from 2001 to 2006 with some of his wives and children in the Hindu Kush mountains, and that ‘the ISI got to him by paying some of the local tribal people to betray him.’ (Reports after the raid placed him elsewhere in Pakistan during this period.) Bank was also told by the walk-in that bin Laden was very ill, and that early on in his confinement at Abbottabad, the ISI had ordered Amir Aziz, a doctor and a major in the Pakistani army, to move nearby to provide treatment. ‘The truth is that bin Laden was an invalid, but we cannot say that,’ the retired official said. ‘“You mean you guys shot a cripple? Who was about to grab his AK-47?”’
British Academy – Screen Translation film screening

‘It didn’t take long to get the co-operation we needed, because the Pakistanis wanted to ensure the continued release of American military aid, a good percentage of which was anti-terrorism funding that finances personal security, such as bullet-proof limousines and security guards and housing for the ISI leadership,’ the retired official said. He added that there were also under-the-table personal ‘incentives’ that were financed by off-the-books Pentagon contingency funds. ‘The intelligence community knew what the Pakistanis needed to agree – there was the carrot. And they chose the carrot. It was a win-win. We also did a little blackmail. We told them we would leak the fact that you’ve got bin Laden in your backyard. We knew their friends and enemies’ – the Taliban and jihadist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan – ‘would not like it.’

A worrying factor at this early point, according to the retired official, was Saudi Arabia, which had been financing bin Laden’s upkeep since his seizure by the Pakistanis. ‘The Saudis didn’t want bin Laden’s presence revealed to us because he was a Saudi, and so they told the Pakistanis to keep him out of the picture. The Saudis feared if we knew we would pressure the Pakistanis to let bin Laden start talking to us about what the Saudis had been doing with al-Qaida. And they were dropping money – lots of it. The Pakistanis, in turn, were concerned that the Saudis might spill the beans about their control of bin Laden. The fear was that if the US found out about bin Laden from Riyadh, all hell would break out. The Americans learning about bin Laden’s imprisonment from a walk-in was not the worst thing.’

Despite their constant public feuding, American and Pakistani military and intelligence services have worked together closely for decades on counterterrorism in South Asia. Both services often find it useful to engage in public feuds ‘to cover their asses’, as the retired official put it, but they continually share intelligence used for drone attacks, and co-operate on covert operations. At the same time, it’s understood in Washington that elements of the ISI believe that maintaining a relationship with the Taliban leadership inside Afghanistan is essential to national security. The ISI’s strategic aim is to balance Indian influence in Kabul; the Taliban is also seen in Pakistan as a source of jihadist shock troops who would back Pakistan against India in a confrontation over Kashmir.

Adding to the tension was the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, often depicted in the Western press as an ‘Islamic bomb’ that might be transferred by Pakistan to an embattled nation in the Middle East in the event of a crisis with Israel. The US looked the other way when Pakistan began building its weapons system in the 1970s and it’s widely believed it now has more than a hundred nuclear warheads. It’s understood in Washington that US security depends on the maintenance of strong military and intelligence ties to Pakistan. The belief is mirrored in Pakistan.

‘The Pakistani army sees itself as family,’ the retired official said. ‘Officers call soldiers their sons and all officers are “brothers”. The attitude is different in the American military. The senior Pakistani officers believe they are the elite and have got to look out for all of the people, as keepers of the flame against Muslim fundamentalism. The Pakistanis also know that their trump card against aggression from India is a strong relationship with the United States. They will never cut their person-to-person ties with us.’

Like all CIA station chiefs, Bank was working undercover, but that ended in early December 2010 when he was publicly accused of murder in a criminal complaint filed in Islamabad by Karim Khan, a Pakistani journalist whose son and brother, according to local news reports, had been killed by a US drone strike. Allowing Bank to be named was a violation of diplomatic protocol on the part of the Pakistani authorities, and it brought a wave of unwanted publicity. Bank was ordered to leave Pakistan by the CIA, whose officials subsequently told the Associated Press he was transferred because of concerns for his safety. The New York Times reported that there was ‘strong suspicion’ the ISI had played a role in leaking Bank’s name to Khan. There was speculation that he was outed as payback for the publication in a New York lawsuit a month earlier of the names of ISI chiefs in connection with the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008. But there was a collateral reason, the retired official said, for the CIA’s willingness to send Bank back to America. The Pakistanis needed cover in case their co-operation with the Americans in getting rid of bin Laden became known. The Pakistanis could say: “You’re talking about me? We just kicked out your station chief.”’

*

The bin Laden compound was less than two miles from the Pakistan Military Academy, and a Pakistani army combat battalion headquarters was another mile or so away. Abbottabad is less than 15 minutes by helicopter from Tarbela Ghazi, an important base for ISI covert operations and the facility where those who guard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal are trained. ‘Ghazi is why the ISI put bin Laden in Abbottabad in the first place,’ the retired official said, ‘to keep him under constant supervision.’

The risks for Obama were high at this early stage, especially because there was a troubling precedent: the failed 1980 attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran. That failure was a factor in Jimmy Carter’s loss to Ronald Reagan. Obama’s worries were realistic, the retired official said. ‘Was bin Laden ever there? Was the whole story a product of Pakistani deception? What about political blowback in case of failure?’ After all, as the retired official said, ‘If the mission fails, Obama’s just a black Jimmy Carter and it’s all over for re-election.’

Obama was anxious for reassurance that the US was going to get the right man. The proof was to come in the form of bin Laden’s DNA. The planners turned for help to Kayani and Pasha, who asked Aziz to obtain the specimens. Soon after the raid the press found out that Aziz had been living in a house near the bin Laden compound: local reporters discovered his name in Urdu on a plate on the door. Pakistani officials denied that Aziz had any connection to bin Laden, but the retired official told me that Aziz had been rewarded with a share of the $25 million reward the US had put up because the DNA sample had showed conclusively that it was bin Laden in Abbottabad. (In his subsequent testimony to a Pakistani commission investigating the bin Laden raid, Aziz said that he had witnessed the attack on Abbottabad, but had no knowledge of who was living in the compound and had been ordered by a superior officer to stay away from the scene.)

Bargaining continued over the way the mission would be executed. ‘Kayani eventually tells us yes, but he says you can’t have a big strike force. You have to come in lean and mean. And you have to kill him, or there is no deal,’ the retired official said. The agreement was struck by the end of January 2011, and Joint Special Operations Command prepared a list of questions to be answered by the Pakistanis: ‘How can we be assured of no outside intervention? What are the defences inside the compound and its exact dimensions? Where are bin Laden’s rooms and exactly how big are they? How many steps in the stairway? Where are the doors to his rooms, and are they reinforced with steel? How thick?’ The Pakistanis agreed to permit a four-man American cell – a Navy Seal, a CIA case officer and two communications specialists – to set up a liaison office at Tarbela Ghazi for the coming assault. By then, the military had constructed a mock-up of the compound in Abbottabad at a secret former nuclear test site in Utah, and an elite Seal team had begun rehearsing for the attack.

The US had begun to cut back on aid to Pakistan – to ‘turn off the spigot’, in the retired official’s words. The provision of 18 new F-16 fighter aircraft was delayed, and under-the-table cash payments to the senior leaders were suspended. In April 2011 Pasha met the CIA director, Leon Panetta, at agency headquarters. ‘Pasha got a commitment that the United States would turn the money back on, and we got a guarantee that there would be no Pakistani opposition during the mission,’ the retired official said. ‘Pasha also insisted that Washington stop complaining about Pakistan’s lack of co-operation with the American war on terrorism.’ At one point that spring, Pasha offered the Americans a blunt explanation of the reason Pakistan kept bin Laden’s capture a secret, and why it was imperative for the ISI role to remain secret: ‘We needed a hostage to keep tabs on al-Qaida and the Taliban,’ Pasha said, according to the retired official. ‘The ISI was using bin Laden as leverage against Taliban and al-Qaida activities inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. They let the Taliban and al-Qaida leadership know that if they ran operations that clashed with the interests of the ISI, they would turn bin Laden over to us. So if it became known that the Pakistanis had worked with us to get bin Laden at Abbottabad, there would be hell to pay.’

At one of his meetings with Panetta, according to the retired official and a source within the CIA, Pasha was asked by a senior CIA official whether he saw himself as acting in essence as an agent for al-Qaida and the Taliban. ‘He answered no, but said the ISI needed to have some control.’ The message, as the CIA saw it, according to the retired official, was that Kayani and Pasha viewed bin Laden ‘as a resource, and they were more interested in their [own] survival than they were in the United States’.

A Pakistani with close ties to the senior leadership of the ISI told me that ‘there was a deal with your top guys. We were very reluctant, but it had to be done – not because of personal enrichment, but because all of the American aid programmes would be cut off. Your guys said we will starve you out if you don’t do it, and the okay was given while Pasha was in Washington. The deal was not only to keep the taps open, but Pasha was told there would be more goodies for us.’ The Pakistani said that Pasha’s visit also resulted in a commitment from the US to give Pakistan ‘a freer hand’ in Afghanistan as it began its military draw-down there. ‘And so our top dogs justified the deal by saying this is for our country.’

*

Pasha and Kayani were responsible for ensuring that Pakistan’s army and air defence command would not track or engage with the US helicopters used on the mission. The American cell at Tarbela Ghazi was charged with co-ordinating communications between the ISI, the senior US officers at their command post in Afghanistan, and the two Black Hawk helicopters; the goal was to ensure that no stray Pakistani fighter plane on border patrol spotted the intruders and took action to stop them. The initial plan said that news of the raid shouldn’t be announced straightaway. All units in the Joint Special Operations Command operate under stringent secrecy and the JSOC leadership believed, as did Kayani and Pasha, that the killing of bin Laden would not be made public for as long as seven days, maybe longer. Then a carefully constructed cover story would be issued: Obama would announce that DNA analysis confirmed that bin Laden had been killed in a drone raid in the Hindu Kush, on Afghanistan’s side of the border. The Americans who planned the mission assured Kayani and Pasha that their co-operation would never be made public. It was understood by all that if the Pakistani role became known, there would be violent protests – bin Laden was considered a hero by many Pakistanis – and Pasha and Kayani and their families would be in danger, and the Pakistani army publicly disgraced.
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It was clear to all by this point, the retired official said, that bin Laden would not survive: ‘Pasha told us at a meeting in April that he could not risk leaving bin Laden in the compound now that we know he’s there. Too many people in the Pakistani chain of command know about the mission. He and Kayani had to tell the whole story to the directors of the air defence command and to a few local commanders.

‘Of course the guys knew the target was bin Laden and he was there under Pakistani control,’ the retired official said. ‘Otherwise, they would not have done the mission without air cover. It was clearly and absolutely a premeditated murder.’ A former Seal commander, who has led and participated in dozens of similar missions over the past decade, assured me that ‘we were not going to keep bin Laden alive – to allow the terrorist to live. By law, we know what we’re doing inside Pakistan is a homicide. We’ve come to grips with that. Each one of us, when we do these missions, say to ourselves, “Let’s face it. We’re going to commit a murder.”’ The White House’s initial account claimed that bin Laden had been brandishing a weapon; the story was aimed at deflecting those who questioned the legality of the US administration’s targeted assassination programme. The US has consistently maintained, despite widely reported remarks by people involved with the mission, that bin Laden would have been taken alive if he had immediately surrendered.

*

At the Abbottabad compound ISI guards were posted around the clock to keep watch over bin Laden and his wives and children. They were under orders to leave as soon as they heard the rotors of the US helicopters. The town was dark: the electricity supply had been cut off on the orders of the ISI hours before the raid began. One of the Black Hawks crashed inside the walls of the compound, injuring many on board. ‘The guys knew the TOT [time on target] had to be tight because they would wake up the whole town going in,’ the retired official said. The cockpit of the crashed Black Hawk, with its communication and navigational gear, had to be destroyed by concussion grenades, and this would create a series of explosions and a fire visible for miles. Two Chinook helicopters had flown from Afghanistan to a nearby Pakistani intelligence base to provide logistical support, and one of them was immediately dispatched to Abbottabad. But because the helicopter had been equipped with a bladder loaded with extra fuel for the two Black Hawks, it first had to be reconfigured as a troop carrier. The crash of the Black Hawk and the need to fly in a replacement were nerve-wracking and time-consuming setbacks, but the Seals continued with their mission. There was no firefight as they moved into the compound; the ISI guards had gone. ‘Everyone in Pakistan has a gun and high-profile, wealthy folks like those who live in Abbottabad have armed bodyguards, and yet there were no weapons in the compound,’ the retired official pointed out. Had there been any opposition, the team would have been highly vulnerable. Instead, the retired official said, an ISI liaison officer flying with the Seals guided them into the darkened house and up a staircase to bin Laden’s quarters. The Seals had been warned by the Pakistanis that heavy steel doors blocked the stairwell on the first and second-floor landings; bin Laden’s rooms were on the third floor. The Seal squad used explosives to blow the doors open, without injuring anyone. One of bin Laden’s wives was screaming hysterically and a bullet – perhaps a stray round – struck her knee. Aside from those that hit bin Laden, no other shots were fired. (The Obama administration’s account would hold otherwise.)

‘They knew where the target was – third floor, second door on the right,’ the retired official said. ‘Go straight there. Osama was cowering and retreated into the bedroom. Two shooters followed him and opened up. Very simple, very straightforward, very professional hit.’ Some of the Seals were appalled later at the White House’s initial insistence that they had shot bin Laden in self-defence, the retired official said. ‘Six of the Seals’ finest, most experienced NCOs, faced with an unarmed elderly civilian, had to kill him in self-defence? The house was shabby and bin Laden was living in a cell with bars on the window and barbed wire on the roof. The rules of engagement were that if bin Laden put up any opposition they were authorised to take lethal action. But if they suspected he might have some means of opposition, like an explosive vest under his robe, they could also kill him. So here’s this guy in a mystery robe and they shot him. It’s not because he was reaching for a weapon. The rules gave them absolute authority to kill the guy.’ The later White House claim that only one or two bullets were fired into his head was ‘bullshit’, the retired official said. ‘The squad came through the door and obliterated him. As the Seals say, “We kicked his ass and took his gas.”’

After they killed bin Laden, ‘the Seals were just there, some with physical injuries from the crash, waiting for the relief chopper,’ the retired official said. ‘Twenty tense minutes. The Black Hawk is still burning. There are no city lights. No electricity. No police. No fire trucks. They have no prisoners.’ Bin Laden’s wives and children were left for the ISI to interrogate and relocate. ‘Despite all the talk,’ the retired official continued, there were ‘no garbage bags full of computers and storage devices. The guys just stuffed some books and papers they found in his room in their backpacks. The Seals weren’t there because they thought bin Laden was running a command centre for al-Qaida operations, as the White House would later tell the media. And they were not intelligence experts gathering information inside that house.’

On a normal assault mission, the retired official said, there would be no waiting around if a chopper went down. ‘The Seals would have finished the mission, thrown off their guns and gear, and jammed into the remaining Black Hawk and di-di-maued’ – Vietnamese slang for leaving in a rush – ‘out of there, with guys hanging out of the doors. They would not have blown the chopper – no commo gear is worth a dozen lives – unless they knew they were safe. Instead they stood around outside the compound, waiting for the bus to arrive.’ Pasha and Kayani had delivered on all their promises.

*

The backroom argument inside the White House began as soon as it was clear that the mission had succeeded. Bin Laden’s body was presumed to be on its way to Afghanistan. Should Obama stand by the agreement with Kayani and Pasha and pretend a week or so later that bin Laden had been killed in a drone attack in the mountains, or should he go public immediately? The downed helicopter made it easy for Obama’s political advisers to urge the latter plan. The explosion and fireball would be impossible to hide, and word of what had happened was bound to leak. Obama had to ‘get out in front of the story’ before someone in the Pentagon did: waiting would diminish the political impact.

Not everyone agreed. Robert Gates, the secretary of defence, was the most outspoken of those who insisted that the agreements with Pakistan had to be honoured. In his memoir, Duty, Gates did not mask his anger:

Before we broke up and the president headed upstairs to tell the American people what had just happened, I reminded everyone that the techniques, tactics and procedures the Seals had used in the bin Laden operation were used every night in Afghanistan … it was therefore essential that we agree not to release any operational details of the raid. That we killed him, I said, is all we needed to say. Everybody in that room agreed to keep mum on details. That commitment lasted about five hours. The initial leaks came from the White House and CIA. They just couldn’t wait to brag and to claim credit. The facts were often wrong … Nonetheless the information just kept pouring out. I was outraged and at one point, told [the national security adviser, Tom] Donilon, ‘Why doesn’t everybody just shut the fuck up?’ To no avail.

Obama’s speech was put together in a rush, the retired official said, and was viewed by his advisers as a political document, not a message that needed to be submitted for clearance to the national security bureaucracy. This series of self-serving and inaccurate statements would create chaos in the weeks following. Obama said that his administration had discovered that bin Laden was in Pakistan through ‘a possible lead’ the previous August; to many in the CIA the statement suggested a specific event, such as a walk-in. The remark led to a new cover story claiming that the CIA’s brilliant analysts had unmasked a courier network handling bin Laden’s continuing flow of operational orders to al-Qaida. Obama also praised ‘a small team of Americans’ for their care in avoiding civilian deaths and said: ‘After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.’ Two more details now had to be supplied for the cover story: a description of the firefight that never happened, and a story about what happened to the corpse. Obama went on to praise the Pakistanis: ‘It’s important to note that our counterterrorism co-operation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding.’ That statement risked exposing Kayani and Pasha. The White House’s solution was to ignore what Obama had said and order anyone talking to the press to insist that the Pakistanis had played no role in killing bin Laden. Obama left the clear impression that he and his advisers hadn’t known for sure that bin Laden was in Abbottabad, but only had information ‘about the possibility’. This led first to the story that the Seals had determined they’d killed the right man by having a six-foot-tall Seal lie next to the corpse for comparison (bin Laden was known to be six foot four); and then to the claim that a DNA test had been performed on the corpse and demonstrated conclusively that the Seals had killed bin Laden. But, according to the retired official, it wasn’t clear from the Seals’ early reports whether all of bin Laden’s body, or any of it, made it back to Afghanistan.

Gates wasn’t the only official who was distressed by Obama’s decision to speak without clearing his remarks in advance, the retired official said, ‘but he was the only one protesting. Obama didn’t just double-cross Gates, he double-crossed everyone. This was not the fog of war. The fact that there was an agreement with the Pakistanis and no contingency analysis of what was to be disclosed if something went wrong – that wasn’t even discussed. And once it went wrong, they had to make up a new cover story on the fly.’ There was a legitimate reason for some deception: the role of the Pakistani walk-in had to be protected.

The White House press corps was told in a briefing shortly after Obama’s announcement that the death of bin Laden was ‘the culmination of years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work’ that focused on tracking a group of couriers, including one who was known to be close to bin Laden. Reporters were told that a team of specially assembled CIA and National Security Agency analysts had traced the courier to a highly secure million-dollar compound in Abbottabad. After months of observation, the American intelligence community had ‘high confidence’ that a high-value target was living in the compound, and it was ‘assessed that there was a strong probability that [it] was Osama bin Laden’. The US assault team ran into a firefight on entering the compound and three adult males – two of them believed to be the couriers – were slain, along with bin Laden. Asked if bin Laden had defended himself, one of the briefers said yes: ‘He did resist the assault force. And he was killed in a firefight.’

The next day John Brennan, then Obama’s senior adviser for counterterrorism, had the task of talking up Obama’s valour while trying to smooth over the misstatements in his speech. He provided a more detailed but equally misleading account of the raid and its planning. Speaking on the record, which he rarely does, Brennan said that the mission was carried out by a group of Navy Seals who had been instructed to take bin Laden alive, if possible. He said the US had no information suggesting that anyone in the Pakistani government or military knew bin Laden’s whereabouts: ‘We didn’t contact the Pakistanis until after all of our people, all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace.’ He emphasised the courage of Obama’s decision to order the strike, and said that the White House had no information ‘that confirmed that bin Laden was at the compound’ before the raid began. Obama, he said, ‘made what I believe was one of the gutsiest calls of any president in recent memory’. Brennan increased the number killed by the Seals inside the compound to five: bin Laden, a courier, his brother, a bin Laden son, and one of the women said to be shielding bin Laden.

Asked whether bin Laden had fired on the Seals, as some reporters had been told, Brennan repeated what would become a White House mantra: ‘He was engaged in a firefight with those that entered the area of the house he was in. And whether or not he got off any rounds, I quite frankly don’t know … Here is bin Laden, who has been calling for these attacks … living in an area that is far removed from the front, hiding behind women who were put in front of him as a shield … [It] just speaks to I think the nature of the individual he was.’

Gates also objected to the idea, pushed by Brennan and Leon Panetta, that US intelligence had learned of bin Laden’s whereabouts from information acquired by waterboarding and other forms of torture. ‘All of this is going on as the Seals are flying home from their mission. The agency guys know the whole story,’ the retired official said. ‘It was a group of annuitants who did it.’ (Annuitants are retired CIA officers who remain active on contract.) ‘They had been called in by some of the mission planners in the agency to help with the cover story. So the old-timers come in and say why not admit that we got some of the information about bin Laden from enhanced interrogation?’ At the time, there was still talk in Washington about the possible prosecution of CIA agents who had conducted torture.

‘Gates told them this was not going to work,’ the retired official said. ‘He was never on the team. He knew at the eleventh hour of his career not to be a party to this nonsense. But State, the agency and the Pentagon had bought in on the cover story. None of the Seals thought that Obama was going to get on national TV and announce the raid. The Special Forces command was apoplectic. They prided themselves on keeping operational security.’ There was fear in Special Operations, the retired official said, that ‘if the true story of the missions leaked out, the White House bureaucracy was going to blame it on the Seals.’

The White House’s solution was to silence the Seals. On 5 May, every member of the Seal hit team – they had returned to their base in southern Virginia – and some members of the Joint Special Operations Command leadership were presented with a nondisclosure form drafted by the White House’s legal office; it promised civil penalties and a lawsuit for anyone who discussed the mission, in public or private. ‘The Seals were not happy,’ the retired official said. But most of them kept quiet, as did Admiral William McRaven, who was then in charge of JSOC. ‘McRaven was apoplectic. He knew he was fucked by the White House, but he’s a dyed-in-the-wool Seal, and not then a political operator, and he knew there’s no glory in blowing the whistle on the president. When Obama went public with bin Laden’s death, everyone had to scramble around for a new story that made sense, and the planners were stuck holding the bag.’

Within days, some of the early exaggerations and distortions had become obvious and the Pentagon issued a series of clarifying statements. No, bin Laden was not armed when he was shot and killed. And no, bin Laden did not use one of his wives as a shield. The press by and large accepted the explanation that the errors were the inevitable by-product of the White House’s desire to accommodate reporters frantic for details of the mission.

One lie that has endured is that the Seals had to fight their way to their target. Only two Seals have made any public statement: No Easy Day, a first-hand account of the raid by Matt Bissonnette, was published in September 2012; and two years later Rob O’Neill was interviewed by Fox News. Both men had resigned from the navy; both had fired at bin Laden. Their accounts contradicted each other on many details, but their stories generally supported the White House version, especially when it came to the need to kill or be killed as the Seals fought their way to bin Laden. O’Neill even told Fox News that he and his fellow Seals thought ‘We were going to die.’ ‘The more we trained on it, the more we realised … this is going to be a one-way mission.’

But the retired official told me that in their initial debriefings the Seals made no mention of a firefight, or indeed of any opposition. The drama and danger portrayed by Bissonnette and O’Neill met a deep-seated need, the retired official said: ‘Seals cannot live with the fact that they killed bin Laden totally unopposed, and so there has to be an account of their courage in the face of danger. The guys are going to sit around the bar and say it was an easy day? That’s not going to happen.’

There was another reason to claim there had been a firefight inside the compound, the retired official said: to avoid the inevitable question that would arise from an uncontested assault. Where were bin Laden’s guards? Surely, the most sought-after terrorist in the world would have around-the-clock protection. ‘And one of those killed had to be the courier, because he didn’t exist and we couldn’t produce him. The Pakistanis had no choice but to play along with it.’ (Two days after the raid, Reuters published photographs of three dead men that it said it had purchased from an ISI official. Two of the men were later identified by an ISI spokesman as being the alleged courier and his brother.)

*

Five days after the raid the Pentagon press corps was provided with a series of videotapes that were said by US officials to have been taken from a large collection the Seals had removed from the compound, along with as many as 15 computers. Snippets from one of the videos showed a solitary bin Laden looking wan and wrapped in a blanket, watching what appeared to be a video of himself on television. An unnamed official told reporters that the raid produced a ‘treasure trove … the single largest collection of senior terrorist materials ever’, which would provide vital insights into al-Qaida’s plans. The official said the material showed that bin Laden ‘remained an active leader in al-Qaida, providing strategic, operational and tactical instructions to the group … He was far from a figurehead [and] continued to direct even tactical details of the group’s management and to encourage plotting’ from what was described as a command-and-control centre in Abbottabad. ‘He was an active player, making the recent operation even more essential for our nation’s security,’ the official said. The information was so vital, he added, that the administration was setting up an inter-agency task force to process it: ‘He was not simply someone who was penning al-Qaida strategy. He was throwing operational ideas out there and he was also specifically directing other al-Qaida members.’

These claims were fabrications: there wasn’t much activity for bin Laden to exercise command and control over. The retired intelligence official said that the CIA’s internal reporting shows that since bin Laden moved to Abbottabad in 2006 only a handful of terrorist attacks could be linked to the remnants of bin Laden’s al-Qaida. ‘We were told at first,’ the retired official said, ‘that the Seals produced garbage bags of stuff and that the community is generating daily intelligence reports out of this stuff. And then we were told that the community is gathering everything together and needs to translate it. But nothing has come of it. Every single thing they have created turns out not to be true. It’s a great hoax – like the Piltdown man.’ The retired official said that most of the materials from Abbottabad were turned over to the US by the Pakistanis, who later razed the building. The ISI took responsibility for the wives and children of bin Laden, none of whom was made available to the US for questioning.

‘Why create the treasure trove story?’ the retired official said. ‘The White House had to give the impression that bin Laden was still operationally important. Otherwise, why kill him? A cover story was created – that there was a network of couriers coming and going with memory sticks and instructions. All to show that bin Laden remained important.’

In July 2011, the Washington Post published what purported to be a summary of some of these materials. The story’s contradictions were glaring. It said the documents had resulted in more than four hundred intelligence reports within six weeks; it warned of unspecified al-Qaida plots; and it mentioned arrests of suspects ‘who are named or described in emails that bin Laden received’. The Post didn’t identify the suspects or reconcile that detail with the administration’s previous assertions that the Abbottabad compound had no internet connection. Despite their claims that the documents had produced hundreds of reports, the Post also quoted officials saying that their main value wasn’t the actionable intelligence they contained, but that they enabled ‘analysts to construct a more comprehensive portrait of al-Qaida’.

In May 2012, the Combating Terrrorism Centre at West Point, a private research group, released translations it had made under a federal government contract of 175 pages of bin Laden documents. Reporters found none of the drama that had been touted in the days after the raid. Patrick Cockburn wrote about the contrast between the administration’s initial claims that bin Laden was the ‘spider at the centre of a conspiratorial web’ and what the translations actually showed: that bin Laden was ‘delusional’ and had ‘limited contact with the outside world outside his compound’.

The retired official disputed the authencity of the West Point materials: ‘There is no linkage between these documents and the counterterrorism centre at the agency. No intelligence community analysis. When was the last time the CIA: 1) announced it had a significant intelligence find; 2) revealed the source; 3) described the method for processing the materials; 4) revealed the time-line for production; 5) described by whom and where the analysis was taking place, and 6) published the sensitive results before the information had been acted on? No agency professional would support this fairy tale.’

*

In June 2011, it was reported in the New York Times, the Washington Post and all over the Pakistani press that Amir Aziz had been held for questioning in Pakistan; he was, it was said, a CIA informant who had been spying on the comings and goings at the bin Laden compound. Aziz was released, but the retired official said that US intelligence was unable to learn who leaked the highly classified information about his involvement with the mission. Officials in Washington decided they ‘could not take a chance that Aziz’s role in obtaining bin Laden’s DNA also would become known’. A sacrificial lamb was needed, and the one chosen was Shakil Afridi, a 48-year-old Pakistani doctor and sometime CIA asset, who had been arrested by the Pakistanis in late May and accused of assisting the agency. ‘We went to the Pakistanis and said go after Afridi,’ the retired official said. ‘We had to cover the whole issue of how we got the DNA.’ It was soon reported that the CIA had organised a fake vaccination programme in Abbottabad with Afridi’s help in a failed attempt to obtain bin Laden’s DNA. Afridi’s legitimate medical operation was run independently of local health authorities, was well financed and offered free vaccinations against hepatitis B. Posters advertising the programme were displayed throughout the area. Afridi was later accused of treason and sentenced to 33 years in prison because of his ties to an extremist. News of the CIA-sponsored programme created widespread anger in Pakistan, and led to the cancellation of other international vaccination programmes that were now seen as cover for American spying.

The retired official said that Afridi had been recruited long before the bin Laden mission as part of a separate intelligence effort to get information about suspected terrorists in Abbottabad and the surrounding area. ‘The plan was to use vaccinations as a way to get the blood of terrorism suspects in the villages.’ Afridi made no attempt to obtain DNA from the residents of the bin Laden compound. The report that he did so was a hurriedly put together ‘CIA cover story creating “facts”’ in a clumsy attempt to protect Aziz and his real mission. ‘Now we have the consequences,’ the retired official said. ‘A great humanitarian project to do something meaningful for the peasants has been compromised as a cynical hoax.’ Afridi’s conviction was overturned, but he remains in prison on a murder charge.

*

In his address announcing the raid, Obama said that after killing bin Laden the Seals ‘took custody of his body’. The statement created a problem. In the initial plan it was to be announced a week or so after the fact that bin Laden was killed in a drone strike somewhere in the mountains on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that his remains had been identified by DNA testing. But with Obama’s announcement of his killing by the Seals everyone now expected a body to be produced. Instead, reporters were told that bin Laden’s body had been flown by the Seals to an American military airfield in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and then straight to the USS Carl Vinson, a supercarrier on routine patrol in the North Arabian Sea. Bin Laden had then been buried at sea, just hours after his death. The press corps’s only sceptical moments at John Brennan’s briefing on 2 May were to do with the burial. The questions were short, to the point, and rarely answered. ‘When was the decision made that he would be buried at sea if killed?’ ‘Was this part of the plan all along?’ ‘Can you just tell us why that was a good idea?’ ‘John, did you consult a Muslim expert on that?’ ‘Is there a visual recording of this burial?’ When this last question was asked, Jay Carney, Obama’s press secretary, came to Brennan’s rescue: ‘We’ve got to give other people a chance here.’

‘We thought the best way to ensure that his body was given an appropriate Islamic burial,’ Brennan said, ‘was to take those actions that would allow us to do that burial at sea.’ He said ‘appropriate specialists and experts’ were consulted, and that the US military was fully capable of carrying out the burial ‘consistent with Islamic law’. Brennan didn’t mention that Muslim law calls for the burial service to be conducted in the presence of an imam, and there was no suggestion that one happened to be on board the Carl Vinson.

In a reconstruction of the bin Laden operation for Vanity Fair, Mark Bowden, who spoke to many senior administration officials, wrote that bin Laden’s body was cleaned and photographed at Jalalabad. Further procedures necessary for a Muslim burial were performed on the carrier, he wrote, ‘with bin Laden’s body being washed again and wrapped in a white shroud. A navy photographer recorded the burial in full sunlight, Monday morning, May 2.’ Bowden described the photos:

One frame shows the body wrapped in a weighted shroud. The next shows it lying diagonally on a chute, feet overboard. In the next frame the body is hitting the water. In the next it is visible just below the surface, ripples spreading outward. In the last frame there are only circular ripples on the surface. The mortal remains of Osama bin Laden were gone for good.

Bowden was careful not to claim that he had actually seen the photographs he described, and he recently told me he hadn’t seen them: ‘I’m always disappointed when I can’t look at something myself, but I spoke with someone I trusted who said he had seen them himself and described them in detail.’ Bowden’s statement adds to the questions about the alleged burial at sea, which has provoked a flood of Freedom of Information Act requests, most of which produced no information. One of them sought access to the photographs. The Pentagon responded that a search of all available records had found no evidence that any photographs had been taken of the burial. Requests on other issues related to the raid were equally unproductive. The reason for the lack of response became clear after the Pentagon held an inquiry into allegations that the Obama administration had provided access to classified materials to the makers of the film Zero Dark Thirty. The Pentagon report, which was put online in June 2013, noted that Admiral McRaven had ordered the files on the raid to be deleted from all military computers and moved to the CIA, where they would be shielded from FOIA requests by the agency’s ‘operational exemption’.

McRaven’s action meant that outsiders could not get access to the Carl Vinson’s unclassified logs. Logs are sacrosanct in the navy, and separate ones are kept for air operations, the deck, the engineering department, the medical office, and for command information and control. They show the sequence of events day by day aboard the ship; if there has been a burial at sea aboard the Carl Vinson, it would have been recorded.

There wasn’t any gossip about a burial among the Carl Vinson’s sailors. The carrier concluded its six-month deployment in June 2011. When the ship docked at its home base in Coronado, California, Rear Admiral Samuel Perez, commander of the Carl Vinson carrier strike group, told reporters that the crew had been ordered not to talk about the burial. Captain Bruce Lindsey, skipper of the Carl Vinson, told reporters he was unable to discuss it. Cameron Short, one of the crew of the Carl Vinson, told the Commercial-News of Danville, Illinois, that the crew had not been told anything about the burial. ‘All he knows is what he’s seen on the news,’ the newspaper reported.

The Pentagon did release a series of emails to the Associated Press. In one of them, Rear Admiral Charles Gaouette reported that the service followed ‘traditional procedures for Islamic burial’, and said none of the sailors on board had been permitted to observe the proceedings. But there was no indication of who washed and wrapped the body, or of which Arabic speaker conducted the service.

Within weeks of the raid, I had been told by two longtime consultants to Special Operations Command, who have access to current intelligence, that the funeral aboard the Carl Vinson didn’t take place. One consultant told me that bin Laden’s remains were photographed and identified after being flown back to Afghanistan. The consultant added: ‘At that point, the CIA took control of the body. The cover story was that it had been flown to the Carl Vinson.’ The second consultant agreed that there had been ‘no burial at sea’. He added that ‘the killing of bin Laden was political theatre designed to burnish Obama’s military credentials … The Seals should have expected the political grandstanding. It’s irresistible to a politician. Bin Laden became a working asset.’ Early this year, speaking again to the second consultant, I returned to the burial at sea. The consultant laughed and said: ‘You mean, he didn’t make it to the water?’

The retired official said there had been another complication: some members of the Seal team had bragged to colleagues and others that they had torn bin Laden’s body to pieces with rifle fire. The remains, including his head, which had only a few bullet holes in it, were thrown into a body bag and, during the helicopter flight back to Jalalabad, some body parts were tossed out over the Hindu Kush mountains – or so the Seals claimed. At the time, the retired official said, the Seals did not think their mission would be made public by Obama within a few hours: ‘If the president had gone ahead with the cover story, there would have been no need to have a funeral within hours of the killing. Once the cover story was blown, and the death was made public, the White House had a serious “Where’s the body?” problem. The world knew US forces had killed bin Laden in Abbottabad. Panic city. What to do? We need a “functional body” because we have to be able to say we identified bin Laden via a DNA analysis. It would be navy officers who came up with the “burial at sea” idea. Perfect. No body. Honourable burial following sharia law. Burial is made public in great detail, but Freedom of Information documents confirming the burial are denied for reasons of “national security”. It’s the classic unravelling of a poorly constructed cover story – it solves an immediate problem but, given the slighest inspection, there is no back-up support. There never was a plan, initially, to take the body to sea, and no burial of bin Laden at sea took place.’ The retired official said that if the Seals’ first accounts are to be believed, there wouldn’t have been much left of bin Laden to put into the sea in any case.

*

It was inevitable that the Obama administration’s lies, misstatements and betrayals would create a backlash. ‘We’ve had a four-year lapse in co-operation,’ the retired official said. ‘It’s taken that long for the Pakistanis to trust us again in the military-to-military counterterrorism relationship – while terrorism was rising all over the world … They felt Obama sold them down the river. They’re just now coming back because the threat from Isis, which is now showing up there, is a lot greater and the bin Laden event is far enough away to enable someone like General Durrani to come out and talk about it.’ Generals Pasha and Kayani have retired and both are reported to be under investigation for corruption during their time in office.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s long-delayed report on CIA torture, released last December, documented repeated instances of official lying, and suggested that the CIA’s knowledge of bin Laden’s courier was sketchy at best and predated its use of waterboarding and other forms of torture. The report led to international headlines about brutality and waterboarding, along with gruesome details about rectal feeding tubes, ice baths and threats to rape or murder family members of detainees who were believed to be withholding information. Despite the bad publicity, the report was a victory for the CIA. Its major finding – that the use of torture didn’t lead to discovering the truth – had already been the subject of public debate for more than a decade. Another key finding – that the torture conducted was more brutal than Congress had been told – was risible, given the extent of public reporting and published exposés by former interrogators and retired CIA officers. The report depicted tortures that were obviously contrary to international law as violations of rules or ‘inappropriate activities’ or, in some cases, ‘management failures’. Whether the actions described constitute war crimes was not discussed, and the report did not suggest that any of the CIA interrogators or their superiors should be investigated for criminal activity. The agency faced no meaningful consequences as a result of the report.

The retired official told me that the CIA leadership had become experts in derailing serious threats from Congress: ‘They create something that is horrible but not that bad. Give them something that sounds terrible. “Oh my God, we were shoving food up a prisoner’s ass!” Meanwhile, they’re not telling the committee about murders, other war crimes, and secret prisons like we still have in Diego Garcia. The goal also was to stall it as long as possible, which they did.’

The main theme of the committee’s 499-page executive summary is that the CIA lied systematically about the effectiveness of its torture programme in gaining intelligence that would stop future terrorist attacks in the US. The lies included some vital details about the uncovering of an al-Qaida operative called Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who was said to be the key al-Qaida courier, and the subsequent tracking of him to Abbottabad in early 2011. The agency’s alleged intelligence, patience and skill in finding al-Kuwaiti became legend after it was dramatised in Zero Dark Thirty.

The Senate report repeatedly raised questions about the quality and reliability of the CIA’s intelligence about al-Kuwaiti. In 2005 an internal CIA report on the hunt for bin Laden noted that ‘detainees provide few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are creating fictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves of direct knowledge about bin Ladin [sic].’ A CIA cable a year later stated that ‘we have had no success in eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Laden’s location from any detainees.’ The report also highlighted several instances of CIA officers, including Panetta, making false statements to Congress and the public about the value of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in the search for bin Laden’s couriers.

Obama today is not facing re-election as he was in the spring of 2011. His principled stand on behalf of the proposed nuclear agreement with Iran says much, as does his decision to operate without the support of the conservative Republicans in Congress. High-level lying nevertheless remains the modus operandi of US policy, along with secret prisons, drone attacks, Special Forces night raids, bypassing the chain of command, and cutting out those who might say no.

Voir par ailleurs:

Et pourquoi pas des vacances en Irak ?
Gérald Papy

La Libre Belgique

10 septembre 2008

International C’est une première, pour le monde francophone en tout cas : une agence de voyages propose des séjours en Irak, un pèlerinage à la Noël 2008 et des voyages culturels en 2009. Dans un pays qui a connu une guerre il y a un peu plus de cinq ans et qui, depuis, n’a presque jamais cessé de sombrer dans un peu plus de chaos, « Terre entière » lance un fameux pari : « Démontrer que l’Irak n’est pas seulement la terre de violences dont l’image s’impose à travers les médias mais aussi une terre de tolérance, riche de sa diversité confessionnelle », explique Pierre Simon, le chargé de communication de l’agence.

Pour réaliser cette ambition, « Terre entière » a tout de même pris quelques précautions. Ainsi, c’est au Kurdistan irakien que les voyages sont organisés, dans ce territoire relativement épargné par le conflit, sous le contrôle de la communauté kurde et qui bénéficie de facto d’une autonomie depuis la guerre de 1991 lorsque la gestion de cette zone au nord-est de l’Irak fut soustraite au pouvoir de Saddam Hussein. Il n’empêche, les tensions nationales ont eu, à certains moments, des répercussions au Kurdistan, entre Kurdes et Arabes ou entre la Turquie et « ses » rebelles kurdes retranchés dans les montagnes irakiennes.

Cependant, un calme relativement durable prévaut aujourd’hui, surtout dans les villes que projettent de visiter les groupes de « Terre entière » : Erbil, où l’aéroport international accueillera les visiteurs transportés par Austrian Airways via Vienne, Dohouk, Suleimanieh… De surcroît, le tour-opérateur se garde d’arrêter d’ores et déjà le programme de ses séjours pour, le cas échéant, adapter les itinéraires en fonction d’une actualité.

A l’heure actuelle, trois séjours sont prévus : un pèlerinage « Noël en Irak », du 22 au 29 décembre 2008, et deux voyages culturels, du 24 avril au 1er mai et du 18 au 25 septembre 2009. La modeste campagne publicitaire lancée par l’organisateur depuis août laisse cependant apparaître un intérêt de la part du public qui pourrait nécessiter d’autres offres. Pour des raisons pratiques, les groupes sont limités à une vingtaine de personnes par séjour. Et à voyage tout de même un peu exceptionnel, dispositions exceptionnelles : vu la pauvreté actuelle de l’industrie touristique, c’est au Grand Séminaire du Patriarcat chaldéen de Babylone, à Ankawa près d’Erbil, que séjourneront notamment les visiteurs.

L’Irak est une mosaïque ethnique et confessionnelle. L’initiative de l’agence de voyages française l’illustre. Comme les séjours en Irak des nombreux pèlerins chiites d’Iran ou d’ailleurs qui chaque année, viennent visiter les mausolées sacrés de cette branche de l’islam. Face à cette autre forme de tourisme, renaît donc un début de tourisme venu d’Occident. Le dialogue ne peut qu’en profiter.

Voir enfin:

«Ça va devenir normal d’aller faire du tourisme en Irak»

Le Figaro

18/09/2008

L’agence de voyages Terre Entière propose des pèlerinages et des séjours culturels au Kurdistan irakien. Une première en France depuis le début du conflit.

Avec ses soldats de la coalition, ses tensions intercommunautaires et ses attentats quasi-quotidiens, l’Irak ne figure pas a priori parmi les destinations touristiques les plus courues.
Pourtant, l’agence de voyages Terre Entière a fait le pari de «montrer que ce n’est pas une destination maudite, mais bien un des berceaux de la civilisation mondiale», comme l’explique son PDG, Hubert Debbasch. Une première de la part d’un voyagiste francophone. De quoi changer des traditionnels séjours au ski…
Le principe ? Vingt personnes, 8 jours, à partir de 2.150 euros. Mais Terre Entière ne s’aventure pas dans la totalité du pays : son tout premier voyage, un pèlerinage baptisé «Noël en Irak», ainsi que les deux séjours culturels organisés au printemps et en septembre 2009, se dérouleront exclusivement au Kurdistan irakien. Une région extrêmement riche au niveau confessionnel mais aussi plus calme que le reste du pays.
Depuis juin, le Quai d’Orsay la classe en orange, alors que le reste du pays est rouge. Pour autant, cette zone frontalière de l’Iran et de la Turquie reste «déconseillée sauf raisons professionnelles impératives». (Voir les conseils aux voyageurs du Quai d’Orsay)
«Nous ne demandons pas de caution ou d’autorisation auau ministère des Affaires étrangères», répond le PDG de l’agence, créée il y a 30 ans. «Si nous décidons d’organiser un voyage au Kurdistan irakien, c’est en ayant tous les éléments qui nous permettent dire que tous les endroits dans lesquels nous nous rendrons sont des endroits sûrs, dans lesquels nous pouvons assurer totalement la sécurité des voyageurs», assure Hubert Debbasch qui a pris la décision après s’y être lui-même rendu cet été.

Doctrine Obama: Attention, un Münich peut en cacher un autre ! (Former British adviser to US troops: How Obama lost Iraq)

16 avril, 2015
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Notre contrat devient pire, à chaque instant. Lando Carlissian (murmurant entre ses dents)
If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal. President Clinton (February 1998)
[La mission des forces armées américaines et britanniques est d’]attaquer les programmes d’armement nucléaires, chimiques et biologiques de l’Irak et sa capacité militaire à menacer ses voisins (…) On ne peut laisser Saddam Hussein menacer ses voisins ou le monde avec des armements nucléaires, des gaz toxiques, ou des armes biologiques. » (…) Il y a six semaines, Saddam Hussein avait annoncé qu’il ne coopérerait plus avec l’Unscom [la commission chargée du désarmement en Irak (…). D’autres pays [que l’Irak possèdent des armements de destruction massive et des missiles balistiques. Avec Saddam, il y a une différence majeure : il les a utilisés. Pas une fois, mais de manière répétée (…). Confronté au dernier acte de défiance de Saddam, fin octobre, nous avons mené une intense campagne diplomatique contre l’Irak, appuyée par une imposante force militaire dans la région (…). J’avais alors décidé d’annuler l’attaque de nos avions (…) parce que Saddam avait accepté nos exigences. J’avais conclu que la meilleure chose à faire était de donner à Saddam une dernière chance (…).  Les inspecteurs en désarmement de l’ONU ont testé la volonté de coopération irakienne (…). Hier soir, le chef de l’Unscom, Richard Butler, a rendu son rapport au secrétaire général de l’ONU [Kofi Annan. Les conclusions sont brutales, claires et profondément inquiétantes. Dans quatre domaines sur cinq, l’Irak n’a pas coopéré. En fait, il a même imposé de nouvelles restrictions au travail des inspecteurs (…). Nous devions agir et agir immédiatement (…).  J’espère que Saddam va maintenant finalement coopérer avec les inspecteurs et respecter les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Mais nous devons nous préparer à ce qu’il ne le fasse pas et nous devons faire face au danger très réel qu’il représente. Nous allons donc poursuivre une stratégie à long terme pour contenir l’Irak et ses armes de destruction massive et travailler jusqu’au jour où l’Irak aura un gouvernement digne de sa population (…). La dure réalité est qu’aussi longtemps que Saddam reste au pouvoir il menace le bien-être de sa population, la paix de la région et la sécurité du monde. La meilleure façon de mettre un terme définitif à cette menace est la constitution d’un nouveau gouvernement, un gouvernement prêt à vivre en paix avec ses voisins, un gouvernement qui respecte les droits de sa population. Bill Clinton (16.12.98)
 Iraq would serve as the base of a new Islamic caliphate to extend throughout the Middle East, and which would threaten legitimate governments in Europe, Africa and Asia. Don Rumsfeld (2005)
They will try to re-establish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslim world. Just as we had the opportunity to learn what the Nazis were going to do, from Hitler’s world in ‘Mein Kampf,’, we need to learn what these people intend to do from their own words. General Abizaid (2005)
The word getting the workout from the nation’s top guns these days is « caliphate » – the term for the seventh-century Islamic empire that spanned the Middle East, spread to Southwest Asia, North Africa and Spain, then ended with the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258. The term can also refer to other caliphates, including the one declared by the Ottoman Turks that ended in 1924. (…) A number of scholars and former government officials take strong issue with the administration’s warning about a new caliphate, and compare it to the fear of communism spread during the Cold War. They say that although Al Qaeda’s statements do indeed describe a caliphate as a goal, the administration is exaggerating the magnitude of the threat as it seeks to gain support for its policies in Iraq. In the view of John L. Esposito, an Islamic studies professor at Georgetown University, there is a difference between the ability of small bands of terrorists to commit attacks across the world and achieving global conquest. « It is certainly correct to say that these people have a global design, but the administration ought to frame it realistically, » said Mr. Esposito, the founding director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown. « Otherwise they can actually be playing into the hands of the Osama bin Ladens of the world because they raise this to a threat that is exponentially beyond anything that Osama bin Laden can deliver. » Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland, said Al Qaeda was not leading a movement that threatened to mobilize the vast majority of Muslims. A recent poll Mr. Telhami conducted with Zogby International of 3,900 people in six countries – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon – found that only 6 percent sympathized with Al Qaeda’s goal of seeking an Islamic state. The notion that Al Qaeda could create a new caliphate, he said, is simply wrong. « There’s no chance in the world that they’ll succeed, » he said. « It’s a silly threat. » (On the other hand, more than 30 percent in Mr. Telhami’s poll said they sympathized with Al Qaeda, because the group stood up to America.) The term « caliphate » has been used internally by policy hawks in the Pentagon since the planning stages for the war in Iraq, but the administration’s public use of the word has increased this summer and fall, around the time that American forces obtained a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 leader in Al Qaeda, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, called for the establishment of a militant Islamic caliphate across Iraq before Al Qaeda’s moving on to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and then a battle against Israel. In recent weeks, the administration’s use of « caliphate » has only intensified, as Mr. Bush has begun a campaign of speeches to try to regain support for the war. He himself has never publicly used the term, although he has repeatedly described the caliphate, as he did in a speech last week when he said that the terrorists want to try to establish « a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain. » Six days earlier, Mr. Edelman, the under secretary of defense, made it clear. « Iraq’s future will either embolden terrorists and expand their reach and ability to re-establish a caliphate, or it will deal them a crippling blow, » he said. « For us, failure in Iraq is just not an option. » NYT (2005)
They demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate of all Muslim nations. Tony Blair (2005)
I remember having a conversation with one of the colonels out in the field, and although he did not believe that a rapid unilateral withdrawal would actually be helpful, there was no doubt that the US occupation in Iraq was becoming an increasing source of irritation. And that one of the things that we’re going to need to do – and to do sooner rather than later – is to transition our troops out of the day-to-day operations in Iraq and to have a much lower profile and a smaller footprint in the country over the coming year. On the other hand, I did also ask some people who were not particularly sympathetic to the initial war, but were now trying to make things work in Iraq – what they thought would be the result of a total withdrawal and I think the general view was that we were in such a delicate situation right now and that there was so little institutional capacity on the part of the Iraqi government, that a full military withdrawal at this point would probably result in significant civil war and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths. This by the way was a message that was delivered also by the Foreign Minister of Jordan, who I’ve been meeting with while here in Amman, Jordan. The sense, I think, throughout the entire region among those who opposed the US invasion, that now that we’re there it’s important that we don’t act equally precipitously in our approach to withdrawal, but that we actually stabilize the situation and allow time for the new Iraqi government to develop some sort of capacity. Barack Obama (January 9, 2006)
Having visited Iraq, I’m also acutely aware that a precipitous withdrawal of our troops, driven by Congressional edict rather than the realities on the ground, will not undo the mistakes made by this Administration. It could compound them. It could compound them by plunging Iraq into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis. We must exit Iraq, but not in a way that leaves behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide that could engulf large swaths of the Middle East and endanger America. We have both moral and national security reasons to manage our exit in a responsible way. Barack Obama (June 21, 2006)
To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we are ready … would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaeda. It would mean that we’d be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we’d allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan. It would mean increasing the probability that American troops would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous. George Bush (2007)
Sénateur Obama, je ne suis pas le président Bush. Si vous vouliez vous présenter contre le président Bush, il aurait fallu faire campagne il y a quatre ans. John McCain (2008)
The next president of the United States is not going to have to address the issue as to whether we went into Iraq or not. The next president of the United States is going to have to decide how we leave, when we leave, and what we leave behind. That’s the decision of the next president of the United States. Senator Obama said the surge could not work, said it would increase sectarian violence, said it was doomed to failure. Recently on a television program, he said it exceed our wildest expectations. But yet, after conceding that, he still says that he would oppose the surge if he had to decide that again today. Incredibly, incredibly Senator Obama didn’t go to Iraq for 900 days and never asked for a meeting with General Petraeus.(…) I’m afraid Senator Obama doesn’t understand the difference between a tactic and a strategy. (…) And this strategy, and this general, they are winning. Senator Obama refuses to acknowledge that we are winning in Iraq. (…) They just passed an electoral (…) law just in the last few days. There is social, economic progress, and a strategy, a strategy of going into an area, clearing and holding, and the people of the country then become allied with you. They inform on the bad guys. And peace comes to the country, and prosperity. (…) And that same strategy will be employed in Afghanistan by this great general. And Senator Obama, who after promising not to vote to cut off funds for the troops, did the incredible thing of voting to cut off the funds for the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. (…) Now General Petraeus has praised the successes, but he said those successes are fragile and if we set a specific date for withdrawal — and by the way, Senator Obama’s original plan, they would have been out last spring before the surge ever had a chance to succeed.(…) But if we snatch defeat from the jaws of victory and adopt Senator Obama’s plan, then we will have a wider war and it will make things more complicated throughout the region, including in Afghanistan. (…) I won’t repeat the mistake that I regret enormously, and that is, after we were able to help the Afghan freedom fighters and drive the Russians out of Afghanistan, we basically washed our hands of the region. And the result over time was the Taliban, Al Qaida, and a lot of the difficulties we are facing today. So we can’t ignore those lessons of history. (…) My reading of the threat from Iran is that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is an existential threat to the State of Israel and to other countries in the region because the other countries in the region will feel compelling requirement to acquire nuclear weapons as well. (…) What I’d also like to point out the Iranians are putting the most lethal IEDs into Iraq which are killing young Americans, there are special groups in Iran coming into Iraq and are being trained in Iran. There is the Republican Guard in Iran, which Senator Kyl had an amendment in order to declare them a sponsor of terror. Senator Obama said that would be provocative. John McCain (26.09.08)
Well, let me just correct something very quickly. I believe the Republican Guard of Iran is a terrorist organization. I’ve consistently said so. What Senator McCain refers to is a measure in the Senate that would try to broaden the mandate inside of Iraq. To deal with Iran. And ironically, the single thing that has strengthened Iran over the last several years has been the war in Iraq. Iraq was Iran’s mortal enemy. That was cleared away. And what we’ve seen over the last several years is Iran’s influence grow. They have funded Hezbollah, they have funded Hamas, they have gone from zero centrifuges to 4,000 centrifuges to develop a nuclear weapon. So obviously, our policy over the last eight years has not worked. Senator McCain is absolutely right, we cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran. It would be a game changer. Not only would it threaten Israel, a country that is our stalwart ally, but it would also create an environment in which you could set off an arms race in this Middle East. (…) We do need tougher sanctions. I do not agree with Senator McCain that we’re going to be able to execute the kind of sanctions we need without some cooperation with some countries like Russia and China that are, I think Senator McCain would agree, not democracies, but have extensive trade with Iran but potentially have an interest in making sure Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon. But we are also going to have to, I believe, engage in tough direct diplomacy with Iran and this is a major difference I have with Senator McCain, this notion by not talking to people we are punishing them has not worked. It has not worked in Iran, it has not worked in North Korea. In each instance, our efforts of isolation have actually accelerated their efforts to get nuclear weapons. That will change when I’m president of the United States. Barack Obama (26.09.08)
Senator Obama twice said in debates he would sit down with Ahmadinejad, Chavez and Raul Castro without precondition. Without precondition. Here is Ahmadinenene (…) who is now in New York, talking about the extermination of the State of Israel, of wiping Israel off the map, and we’re going to sit down, without precondition, across the table, to legitimize and give a propaganda platform to a person that is espousing the extermination of the state of Israel, and therefore then giving them more credence in the world arena and therefore saying, they’ve probably been doing the right thing, because you will sit down across the table from them and that will legitimize their illegal behavior. (…)  Look, I’ll sit down with anybody, but there’s got to be pre-conditions. Those pre-conditions would apply that we wouldn’t legitimize with a face to face meeting, a person like Ahmadinejad. Now, Senator Obama said, without preconditions. John McCain (26.09.08)
J’espère que j’ai tort et que le président a raison, mais j’ai bien peur que cette décision provoque des situations qui vont revenir hanter notre pays. Lindsey Graham
L’Irak (…) pourrait être l’un des grands succès de cette administration. Joe Biden (10.02.10)
Nous laissons derrière nous un État souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec un gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille finale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour (…) C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris neuf ans (…)
Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus de 1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30 000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles (…) les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak». «Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir (…) Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays», car «malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires.
Obama (14.12.11)
We think a successful, democratic Iraq can be a model for the entire region. Obama (12.12.11)
Nous laissons derrière nous un Etat souverain, stable, autosuffisant, avec une gouvernement représentatif qui a été élu par son peuple. Nous bâtissons un nouveau partenariat entre nos pays. Et nous terminons une guerre non avec une bataille filnale, mais avec une dernière marche du retour. C’est une réussite extraordinaire, qui a pris presque neuf ans. Et aujourd’hui nous nous souvenons de tout ce que vous avez fait pour le rendre possible. (…) Dur travail et sacrifice. Ces mots décrivent à peine le prix de cette guerre, et le courage des hommes et des femmes qui l’ont menée. Nous ne connaissons que trop bien le prix élevé de cette guerre. Plus d’1,5 million d’Américains ont servi en Irak. Plus de 30.000 Américains ont été blessés, et ce sont seulement les blessés dont les blessures sont visibles. Près de 4.500 Américains ont perdu la vie, dont 202 héros tombés au champ d’honneur venus d’ici, Fort Bragg. (…) Les dirigeants et les historiens continueront à analyser les leçons stratégiques de l’Irak. Et nos commandants prendront en compte des leçons durement apprises lors de campagnes militaires à l’avenir. Mais la leçon la plus importante que vous nous apprenez n’est pas une leçon en stratégie militaire, c’est une leçon sur le caractère de notre pays, car malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles notre pays fait face, vous nous rappelez que rien n’est impossible pour les Américains lorsqu’ils sont solidaires. Obama (14.12.11)
Vous devez vous montrer clair, à la fois pour nos alliés et nos ennemis. Vous avez fait un discours il y a quelques semaines au cours duquel vous avez déclaré que vous pensiez que nous devrions avoir encore des soldats en Irak. Ce n’est pas vraiment la bonne façon d’affronter les enjeux de la région. Il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter tous les enjeux de façon militaire. Et ce que j’ai fait pendant ma présidence et continuerai à faire, c’est d’abord m’assurer que ces pays soutiennent nos efforts contre le terrorisme ; qu’ils veillent à notre intérêt pour la sécurité d’Israël, car c’est notre plus fidèle allié dans la région ; qu’ils protègent les minorités religieuses et les femmes, car ces pays ne peuvent se développer si seulement une moitié de la population y contribue ; que nous développions leurs économies. Mais nous devons reconnaître que nous ne pouvons plus faire de construction nationale dans ces régions. Une partie du leadership américain est de veiller à ce que nous construisions d’abord notre pays. Cela nous aidera à garder le type de leadership dont nous avons besoin. Obama (23.10.2012)
What I just find interesting is the degree to which this issue keeps on coming up, as if this was my decision. Barack Hussein Obama (09.08.14)
If only Obama had paid attention to Iraq … But his only interest in Iraq was in ending the war. (…) Iran’s goal was to ensure that Iraq was not integrated into the Arab world, instead becoming a close ally of Iran. Emma Sky
The surge did really work.  It was a complicated series of events that led to the surge’s ultimate success, but one of the empirical metrics we can look to is that violence was reduced by 90% from pre-surge highs. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus had a theory, which proved absolutely correct, that by reducing the sectarian violence what you would get is more room for politicians in Baghdad to have more flexibility to reach compromises, and that would in turn build upon itself in the form of political cooperation that would lead to further reduction of violence; and that’s what happened. From 2007 through 2010, we really saw the violence coming down as Sunni Arabs were reintegrating into Iraqi politics after being purged in a wholesale manner following the invasion of 2003. The Sunnis came back into the political process and fought al-Qaeda and formed the Iraqiya coalition that eventually won in the 2010 elections. It became the primary driver for the reduction in violence from the Sunni side and that was reciprocated by a reduction of violence by Shia Islamist militias that had been backed by Iran in coordination with Hezbollah and to some extent Assad. Unfortunately, what happened later, for reasons that I cannot even begin to understand, Washington betrayed the promises that the U.S. government had made to the Sunni tribal leaders, the same leaders that had fought al-Qaeda throughout the “Awakening.” With Nouri al Maliki’s sectarian rule, Iraq’s path toward civil war was really inevitable. There was a direct line from Maliki when he returned to power in December 2010 to consolidate his personal control over the organs of the state and steer it toward a very pro-Iranian and sectarian agenda, which inevitably disillusioned and disenfranchised Sunni Arabs for a second time. Then given Maliki’s misrule in Iraq and Assad’s misrule in Syria and their cooperation along with the Iranians and Hezbollah to wage a campaign of genocide, led to a region-wide sectarian war while the United States under President Obama stood back and watched and did nothing as the violence spiraled further and further out of control. (…) Iraq’s unraveling was essentially cemented on March 20th 2003 when the first bombs were dropped on Dora farms and on April 9th when Baghdad fell. Essentially, when Saddam’s regime was blown away, Iraq was blown away too. Saddam had hollowed out the state, similar to Qaddafi in Libya, Saleh in Yemen, and Assad in Syria – the state had become a cult of personality built around one man with no real capacity and no real institutions. When we bombed Saddam’s palaces, the military and intelligence services, and when we watched the Iraqi population rise up to burn and loot the ministries, there was nothing left of the country and nothing left of the state. Therefore, Bremer’s decision to disband the army and create the DeBaathification Commission ensured that the chaos that followed was inevitable.  These decisions displaced hundreds of thousands of members of the Iraqi security services, who were trained and disciplined and knew how to use weapons and where weapons caches were.  When they were told that they had no future in the New Iraq, a violent insurgency was born. So one bad decision was followed by another bad decision, and we ended up with an absolute perfect storm, which led to the chaos that we’ve seen since 2003. Ali Khedery
Dans l’immédiat, notre attention doit se porter en priorité sur les domaines biologique et chimique. C’est là que nos présomptions vis-à-vis de l’Iraq sont les plus significatives : sur le chimique, nous avons des indices d’une capacité de production de VX et d’ypérite ; sur le biologique, nos indices portent sur la détention possible de stocks significatifs de bacille du charbon et de toxine botulique, et une éventuelle capacité de production.  Dominique De Villepin
Even when viewed through a post-war lens, documentary evidence of messages are consistent with the Iraqi Survey Group’s conclusion that Saddam was at least keeping a WMD program primed for a quick re-start the moment the UN Security Council lifted sanctions. Iraqi Perpectives Project (March 2006)
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist operatives monitored closely. Because Saddam’s security organizations and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a de facto link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.  Iraqi Perspectives Project (Saddam and Terrorism, Nov. 2007, released Mar. 2008)
Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 « good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm » in the first year. Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting « Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, ‘the Gulf,’ and Syria. » It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were « sacrificing for the cause » went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of 2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training. But these camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the volunteers participated in a special training event called the « Heroes Attack. » This training event was designed in part to prepare regional Fedayeen Saddam commands to « obstruct the enemy from achieving his goal and to support keeping peace and stability in the province.  » Study (Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia)
There is no question that the United States was divided going into that war. But I think the United States is united coming out of that war. We all recognize the tremendous price that has been paid in lives, in blood. And yet I think we also recognize that those lives were not lost in vain. (…) As difficult as [the Iraq war] was, and the cost in both American and Iraqi lives, I think the price has been worth it, to establish a stable government in a very important region of the world. Leon Panetta  (secrétaire américain à la Défense)
Who Lost Iraq? You know who. (…) The military recommended nearly 20,000 troops, considerably fewer than our 28,500 in Korea, 40,000 in Japan, and 54,000 in Germany. The president rejected those proposals, choosing instead a level of 3,000 to 5,000 troops. A deployment so risibly small would have to expend all its energies simply protecting itself — the fate of our tragic, missionless 1982 Lebanon deployment — with no real capability to train the Iraqis, build their U.S.-equipped air force, mediate ethnic disputes (as we have successfully done, for example, between local Arabs and Kurds), operate surveillance and special-ops bases, and establish the kind of close military-to-military relations that undergird our strongest alliances. The Obama proposal was an unmistakable signal of unseriousness. It became clear that he simply wanted out, leaving any Iraqi foolish enough to maintain a pro-American orientation exposed to Iranian influence, now unopposed and potentially lethal. (…) The excuse is Iraqi refusal to grant legal immunity to U.S. forces. But the Bush administration encountered the same problem, and overcame it. Obama had little desire to. Indeed, he portrays the evacuation as a success, the fulfillment of a campaign promise. Charles Krauthammer
En dernière analyse, ce que nous laisserons et comment nous partirons sera plus important que la manière dont nous sommes venus. Ryan Crocker (ex-ambassadeur américain en Irak)
Nous devons également reconnaître que le choix auquel nous sommes confrontés en Irak n’est pas entre le gouvernement irakien actuel et un gouvernement irakien parfait. Il s’agit plutôt d’un choix entre une démocratie jeune, imparfaite et à la peine que nous avons laborieusement amenée à l’existence, et les kamikazés fanatiques d’Al Qaeda et les terroristes commandités par l’Iran qui essayent de la détruire. Si les politiciens de Washington réussissent à imposer un retrait prématuré de nos troupes en Irak, le résultat sera un monde plus dangereux et l’encouragement de nos ennemis. Comme le président iranien s’en est récemment vanté,  » bientôt, nous verrons apparaître un grand vide de pouvoir dans la région. . . [ et ] nous sommes prêts à combler ce vide. » Quelque soient les imperfections de nos amis irakiens, elles ne sont aucunement une excuse pour que nous battions en retraite devant nos ennemis comme Al Qaeda et l’Iran, qui constituent une menace mortelle pour nos intérêts nationaux essentiels. Nous devons comprendre qu’aujourd’hui en Irak nous combattons et sommes en train de vaincre le même réseau terroriste qui nous a attaqués le 11/9. John McCain et Joe Lieberman
La vérité est que c’est les Sunnites qui ont lancé cette guerre il y a quatre ans et qu’ils l’ont perdue. Les tribus ne gagnent jamais les guerres, elles ne font que rejoindre le camp des vainqueurs. Un Irakien
A number of scholars and former government officials take strong issue with the administration’s warning about a new caliphate, and compare it to the fear of communism spread during the Cold War. They say that although Al Qaeda’s statements do indeed describe a caliphate as a goal, the administration is exaggerating the magnitude of the threat as it seeks to gain support for its policies in Iraq. NYT (2005)
To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we are ready … would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaeda. It would mean that we’d be risking mass killings on a horrific scale. It would mean we’d allow the terrorists to establish a safe haven in Iraq to replace the one they lost in Afghanistan. It would mean increasing the probability that American troops would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous. George Bush (2007)
More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) imposed on Iraq and its nation. The children of Iraq are our children. You, the USA, together with the Saudi regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these innocent children.  (…) The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet (ALLAH’S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places -the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka’ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims- by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.   (…) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. Osama Bin Laden (1996)
Le peuple comprend maintenant les discours des oulémas dans les mosquées, selon lesquels notre pays est devenu une colonie de l’empire américain. Il agit avec détermination pour chasser les Américains d’Arabie saoudite. […] La solution à cette crise est le retrait des troupes américaines. Leur présence militaire est une insulte au peuple saoudien. Ben Laden
27 août 1992 : les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et la France mettent en place une autre zone d’exclusion aérienne, au sud du 32eme parallèle, avec l’objectif d’observer les violations de droits de l’homme à l’encontre de la population chiite.
3 septembre 1996 : en représailles à un déploiement de troupes irakiennes dans la zone nord, les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ripostent militairement dans le sud et étendent la zone d’exclusion aérienne sud, qui passe du 32eme au 33eme parallèle. La France refuse cette extension, mais continue à effectuer des missions de surveillance aérienne au sud du 32ème parallèle..
27 décembre 1996 : Jacques Chirac décide de retirer la France du contrôle de la zone d’exclusion aérienne nord. Il justifie cette décision par le fait que le dispositif a changé de nature avec les bombardements de septembre, et que le volet humanitaire initialement prévu n’y est plus inclus. La France proteste par ailleurs contre la décision unilatérale des Etats-Unis et de la Turquie (avec l’acceptation de la Grande-Bretagne) d’augmenter la zone d’exclusion aérienne sud.
Michel Wéry
Les Etats-Unis n’ont pas envahi l’Irak mais sont intervenus dans un conflit déjà en cours.  Kiron Skinner (conseillère à la sécurité du président Bush)
Since a wounded Saddam could not be left unattended and an oil-rich Saudi Arabia could not be left unprotected, U.S. troops took up long-term residence in the Saudi kingdom, a fateful decision that started the clock ticking toward 9/11. As bin Laden himself explained in his oft-quoted 1996 fatwa, his central aim was “to expel the occupying enemy from the country of the two Holy places.”… Put another way, bin Laden’s casus belli was an unintended and unforeseen byproduct of what Saddam Hussein had done in 1990. The presence of U.S. troops in the land of Mecca and Medina had galvanized al-Qaeda, which carried out the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which triggered America’s global war on terror, which inevitably led back to Iraq, which is where America finds itself today. In a sense, occupation was inevitable after Desert Storm; perhaps the United States ended up occupying the wrong country. … If the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia sparked bin Laden’s global guerrilla war, America’s low threshold for casualties would serve as the fuel to keep it raging. … From bin Laden’s vantage point, America’s retreats from Beirut in the 1980s, Mogadishu in the 1990s and Yemen in 2000 were evidence of weakness. “When tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you,” he recalled. “The extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the heart of every Muslim and a remedy to the chests of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut, Aden and Mogadishu.” … Hence, quitting Iraq could have dramatic and disastrous consequences – something like the fall of Saigon, Desert One, and the Beirut and Mogadishu pullouts all rolled into one giant propaganda victory for the enemy. Not only would it leave a nascent democracy unprotected from bin Laden’s henchmen, it would serve to confirm their perception that America is a paper tiger lacking the will to fight or to stand with those who are willing to fight. Who would count on America the next time? For that matter, on whom would America be able to count as the wars of 9/11 continue? … Finally, retreat also would re-energize the enemy and pave the way toward his ultimate goal. Imagine Iraq spawning a Balkan-style ethno-religious war while serving as a Taliban-style springboard for terror. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s top terrorist in Iraq, already has said, “We fight today in Iraq, and tomorrow in the land of the two Holy Places, and after there the West.” Alan W. Dowd
De même que les progressistes européens et américains doutaient des menaces de Hitler et de Staline, les Occidentaux éclairés sont aujourd’hui en danger de manquer l’urgence des idéologies violentes issues du monde musulman. Les socialistes français des années 30 (…) ont voulu éviter un retour de la première guerre mondiale; ils ont refusé de croire que les millions de personnes en Allemagne avaient perdu la tête et avaient soutenu le mouvement nazi. Ils n’ont pas voulu croire qu’un mouvement pathologique de masse avait pris le pouvoir en Allemagne, ils ont voulu rester ouverts à ce que les Allemands disaient et aux revendiquations allemandes de la première guerre mondiale. Et les socialistes français, dans leur effort pour être ouverts et chaleureux afin d’éviter à tout prix le retour d’une guerre comme la première guerre mondiale, ont fait tout leur possible pour essayer de trouver ce qui était raisonnable et plausible dans les arguments d’Hitler. Ils ont vraiment fini par croire que le plus grand danger pour la paix du monde n’était pas posé par Hitler mais par les faucons de leur propre société, en France. Ces gesn-là étaient les socialistes pacifistes de la France, c’était des gens biens. Pourtant, de fil en aiguille, ils se sont opposés à l’armée française contre Hitler, et bon nombre d’entre eux ont fini par soutenir le régime de Vichy et elles ont fini comme fascistes! Ils ont même dérapé vers l’anti-sémitisme pur, et personne ne peut douter qu’une partie de cela s’est reproduit récemment dans le mouvement pacifiste aux Etats-Unis et surtout en Europe. Un des scandales est que nous avons eu des millions de personnes dans la rue protestant contre la guerre en Irak, mais pas pour réclamer la liberté en Irak. Personne n’a marché dans les rues au nom des libertés kurdes. Les intérêts des dissidents libéraux de l’Irak et les démocrates kurdes sont en fait également nos intérêts. Plus ces personnes prospèrent, plus grande sera notre sécurité. C’est un moment où ce qui devrait être nos idéaux — les idéaux de la démocratie libérale et de la solidarité sociale — sont également objectivement notre intérêt. Bush n’a pas réussi à l’expliquer clairement, et une grande partie de la gauche ne l’a même pas perçu. Paul Berman
Avec Assad, on voit justement ce qui arrive quand on laisse un dictateur en place. Les problèmes ne disparaissent pas tout seuls. Tony Blair
L’un des arguments des adversaires de l’intervention de 2003 est de dire que, puisque Saddam Hussein ne possédait aucune arme de destruction massive, l’invasion de l’Irak était injustifiée. D’après les rapports des inspecteurs internationaux, nous savons que, même si Saddam s’était débarrassé de ses armes chimiques, il avait conservé l’expertise et les capacités d’en produire. En 2011, si nous avions laissé Saddam au pouvoir, l’Irak aurait été lui aussi emporté par la vague des révolutions arabes. En tant que sunnite, Saddam aurait tout fait pour préserver son régime face à la révolte de la majorité chiite du pays. Pendant ce temps, de l’autre côté de la frontière, en Syrie, une minorité bénéficiant de l’appui des chiites s’accrocherait au pouvoir et tenterait de résister à la révolte de la majorité sunnite. Le risque aurait donc été grand de voir la région sombrer dans une conflagration confessionnelle généralisée dans laquelle les Etats ne se seraient pas affrontés par procuration, mais directement, avec leurs armées nationales. Tout le Moyen-Orient est en réalité engagé dans une longue et douloureuse transition. Nous devons nous débarrasser de l’idée que  » nous  » avons provoqué cette situation. Ce n’est pas vrai. (…) Nous avons aujourd’hui trois exemples de politique occidentale en matière de changement de régime dans la région. En Irak, nous avons appelé à un changement de régime, renversé la dictature et déployé des troupes pour aider à la reconstruction du pays. Mais l’intervention s’est révélée extrêmement ardue, et aujourd’hui le pays est à nouveau en danger. En Libye, nous avons appelé au changement de régime, chassé Kadhafi grâce à des frappes aériennes mais refusé d’envoyer des troupes au sol. Aujourd’hui, la Libye, ravagée par la violence, a exporté le désordre et de vastes quantités d’armes à travers l’Afrique du Nord et jusqu’en Afrique subsaharienne. En Syrie, nous avons appelé au changement de régime mais n’avons rien fait, et c’est le pays qui se trouve dans la situation la pire. (…) Il n’est pas raisonnable pour l’Occident d’adopter une politique d’indifférence. Car il s’agit, que nous le voulions ou pas, d’un problème qui nous concerne. Les agences de sécurité européennes estiment que la principale menace pour l’avenir proviendra des combattants revenant de Syrie. Le danger est réel de voir le pays devenir pour les terroristes un sanctuaire plus redoutable encore que ne l’était l’Afghanistan dans les années 1990. Mais n’oublions pas non plus les risques que fait peser la guerre civile syrienne sur le Liban et la Jordanie. Il était impossible que cet embrasement reste confiné à l’intérieur des frontières syriennes .Je comprends les raisons pour lesquelles, après l’Afghanistan et l’Irak, l’opinion publique est si hostile à une intervention militaire. Mais une intervention en Syrie n’était pas et n’est pas nécessairement obligée de prendre les formes qu’elle a prises dans ces deux pays. Et, chaque fois que nous renonçons à agir, les mesures que nous serons fatalement amenés à prendre par la suite devront être plus violente. (…) Nous devons prendre conscience que le défi s’étend bien au-delà du Moyen-Orient. L’Afrique, comme le montrent les tragiques événements au Nigeria, y est elle aussi confrontée. L’Extrême-Orient et l’Asie centrale également.L’Irak n’est qu’une facette d’une situation plus générale. Tous les choix qui s’offrent à nous sont inquiétants. Mais, depuis trois ans, nous regardons la Syrie s’enfoncer dans l’abîme et, pendant qu’elle sombre, elle nous enserre lentement et sûrement dans ses rets et nous entraîne avec elle. C’est pourquoi nous devons oublier les différends du passé et agir maintenant pour préserver l’avenir. Tony Blair
Ce n’est pas parce qu’une équipe de juniors porte le maillot des Lakers que cela en fait des Kobe Bryant. Je pense qu’il y a une différence entre les moyens et la portée d’un Ben Laden, d’un réseau qui planifie activement des attaques terroristes de grande envergure contre notre territoire, et ceux de jihadistes impliqués dans des luttes de pouvoir locales, souvent de nature ethnique. Barack Obama (janvier 2014)
The prospect of Iraq’s disintegration is already being spun by the Administration and its media friends as the fault of George W. Bush and Mr. Maliki. So it’s worth understanding how we got here. Iraq was largely at peace when Mr. Obama came to office in 2009. Reporters who had known Baghdad during the worst days of the insurgency in 2006 marveled at how peaceful the city had become thanks to the U.S. military surge and counterinsurgency. In 2012 Anthony Blinken, then Mr. Biden’s top security adviser, boasted that, « What’s beyond debate » is that « Iraq today is less violent, more democratic, and more prosperous. And the United States is more deeply engaged there than at any time in recent history. » Mr. Obama employed the same breezy confidence in a speech last year at the National Defense University, saying that « the core of al Qaeda » was on a « path to defeat, » and that the « future of terrorism » came from « less capable » terrorist groups that mainly threatened « diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. » Mr. Obama concluded his remarks by calling on Congress to repeal its 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force against al Qaeda. If the war on terror was over, ISIS didn’t get the message. The group, known as Tawhid al-Jihad when it was led a decade ago by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was all but defeated by 2009 but revived as U.S. troops withdrew and especially after the uprising in Syria spiraled into chaos. It now controls territory from the outskirts of Aleppo in northwestern Syria to Fallujah in central Iraq. The possibility that a long civil war in Syria would become an incubator for terrorism and destabilize the region was predictable, and we predicted it. « Now the jihadists have descended by the thousands on Syria, » we noted last May. « They are also moving men and weapons to and from Iraq, which is increasingly sinking back into Sunni-Shiite civil war. . . . If Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels threatened by al Qaeda and a Sunni rebellion, he will increasingly look to Iran to help him stay in power. » We don’t quote ourselves to boast of prescience but to wonder why the Administration did nothing to avert the clearly looming disaster. Contrary to what Mr. Blinken claimed in 2012, the « diplomatic surge » the Administration promised for Iraq never arrived, nor did U.S. weapons. « The Americans have really deeply disappointed us by not supplying the Iraqi army with the weapons and support it needs to fight terrorism, » the Journal quoted one Iraqi general based in Kirkuk. That might strike some readers as rich coming from the commander of a collapsing army, but it’s a reminder of the price Iraqis and Americans are now paying for Mr. Obama’s failure to successfully negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement with Baghdad that would have maintained a meaningful U.S. military presence. A squadron of Apache attack helicopters, Predator drones and A-10 attack planes based in Iraq might be able to turn back ISIS’s march on Baghdad. WSJ
The president is in fact implementing the policy he promised. It was retrenchment by one word, retreat by another.[Obama’s policy is also what the American public showed in polls that it wants right now] ”It wants it, at least until it gets queasy by looking at the pictures they’ve been seeing tonight. George Will
 Affirmer, au bout de onze ans, que ce à quoi on assiste actuellement est le résultat de ce qui s’est produit à l’époque est aussi simpliste qu’insultant. Dans ce qui s’assimile à une perspective néocolonialiste postmoderne, ceci revient à suggérer que les Irakiens ne sont toujours pas en mesure d’assumer la responsabilité de leur propre pays. Abstraction faite de toutes les autres conséquences, l’invasion de 2003 n’en a pas moins donné aux Irakiens une possibilité d’autodétermination démocratique qu’ils n’auraient jamais eue sous Saddam Hussein. C’est cette démocratie imparfaite qui est menacée ; il faut à présent la conserver et l’améliorer. The Observer
Mosul’s fall matters for what it reveals about a terrorism whose threat Mr. Obama claims he has minimized. For starters, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) isn’t a bunch of bug-eyed « Mad Max » guys running around firing Kalashnikovs. ISIS is now a trained and organized army. The seizures of Mosul and Tikrit this week revealed high-level operational skills. ISIS is using vehicles and equipment seized from Iraqi military bases. Normally an army on the move would slow down to establish protective garrisons in towns it takes, but ISIS is doing the opposite, by replenishing itself with fighters from liberated prisons. An astonishing read about this group is on the website of the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War. It is an analysis of a 400-page report, « al-Naba, » published by ISIS in March. This is literally a terrorist organization’s annual report for 2013. It even includes « metrics, » detailed graphs of its operations in Iraq as well as in Syria. One might ask: Didn’t U.S. intelligence know something like Mosul could happen? They did. The February 2014 « Threat Assessment » by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency virtually predicted it: « AQI/ISIL [aka ISIS] probably will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria . . . as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah. » AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq), the report says, is exploiting the weak security environment « since the departure of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. » But to have suggested any mitigating steps to this White House would have been pointless. It won’t listen. In March, Gen. James Mattis, then head of the U.S. Central Command, told Congress he recommended the U.S. keep 13,600 support troops in Afghanistan; he was known not to want an announced final withdrawal date. On May 27, President Obama said it would be 9,800 troops—for just one year. Which guarantees that the taking of Mosul will be replayed in Afghanistan. Let us repeat the most quoted passage in former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s memoir, « Duty. » It describes the March 2011 meeting with Mr. Obama about Afghanistan in the situation room. « As I sat there, I thought: The president doesn’t trust his commander, can’t stand Karzai, doesn’t believe in his own strategy and doesn’t consider the war to be his, » Mr. Gates wrote. « For him, it’s all about getting out. » Daniel Henninger
My greatest fear is that we stabilize Iraq, then hand it over to the Iranians in our rush to the exit. I’ve invested too much here to simply walk away and let that happen. General Raymond Odierno (commanding general of U.S. forces in Iraq, 2010)
Where is the U.S.? Does the U.S. have no interest in protecting the democratic process? Does the U.S. not care what sort of government is put together? Qasim Suleimani is very active putting together the Shia coalition. Does the U.S. not understand what impact this will have on the region—and on internal stability in Iraq? Is the U.S. not worried about Iranian influence in Iraq? Rafi Issawi (Iraqi, deputy prime minister)
 I had arrived ready to apologise to every Iraqi for the war. Instead I had listened to a litany of suffering and pain under Saddam for which I was quite unprepared. The mass graves, the details of torture, the bureaucratisation of abuse. The pure banality of evil. But the Iraqis also had huge expectations of the US. After every war Saddam rebuilt the country in six months, so their attitude was, ‘imagine what the US can do after six months. America can put a man on the moon … you wait’. Emma Sky
Nothing that happened in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was pre-ordained; different futures than the one unfolding today were possible. Recall that violence declined drastically during the 2007 U.S. troop surge, and that for the next couple of years both Iraq and the West felt that the country was going in the right direction. But the seeds of Iraq’s unravelling were sown in 2010, when the United States did not uphold the election results and failed to broker the formation of a new Iraqi government. As an adviser to the top U.S. general in Iraq, I was a witness. (…)The national elections took place on March 7, 2010, and went more smoothly than we had dared hope. After a month of competitive campaigning across the country and wide media coverage of the different candidates and parties, 62 percent of eligible Iraqis turned out to vote. (…) We had not expected Iraqiya—a coalition headed by the secular Shia Ayad Allawi and leaders of the Sunni community, and running on a non-sectarian platform—to do so well. The coalition had won 91 seats—two more than the incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. (…) Even though there was no evidence of fraud to justify a recount, the Iraqi electoral commission and the international community agreed to one, fearful of a repeat of the election fiasco in 2009 in Afghanistan, which had tarnished the credibility of elections there. In the meantime, Maliki’s advisers told us he needed two extra seats, either from the recount or through arbitrary de-Ba’athification that could disqualify Iraqiya candidates. Otherwise, he would be blamed for losing Iraq for the Shia, who make up some two-thirds of the population. (…)  General O and I did not think that the Iraqiya candidate, Allawi, would be able to put a government together with himself as prime minister. But we thought he had the right as the winner of the election to have first go—and that this could lead to a political compromise among the leaders, with either Allawi and Maliki agreeing to share power between them or a third person chosen to be prime minister. But … Hill, General O strode down the embassy corridor looking visibly upset. “He told me that Iraq is not ready for democracy, that Iraq needs a Shia strongman,” the general said, “and Maliki is our man.” Odierno had objected that that was not what the Iraqis wanted. They were rid of one dictator, Hussein, and did not want to create another. (…) Sami al-Askari, a Shia politician close to Maliki who believed that an agreement between State of Law and Iraqiya was the best way forward (…) also told me that everyone except the Americans realized that the formation of the government was perceived as a battle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq. The Iranians were active, while the U.S. embassy did nothing. Qasim Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s al-Quds Force, continued to summon Iraqis to Iran in order to put together a pan-Shia coalition. The Iranians, al-Askari said, intended to drag out government formation until after August 31, when all U.S. combat forces were due to leave, in order to score a “victory” over the United States. (…) In the Arabic media, there was confusion as to why the United States and Iran should both choose Maliki as prime minister, and this fuelled conspiracy theories about a secret deal between those two countries. (…) The Obama administration wanted to see an Iraqi government in place before the U.S. mid-term elections in November. Biden believed the quickest way to form a government was to keep Maliki as prime minister, and to cajole other Iraqis into accepting this. (…) I tried to explain the struggle between secularists and Islamists, and how many Iraqis wanted to move beyond sectarianism. But Biden could not fathom this. For him, Iraq was simply about Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.(…) If only President Obama had paid attention to Iraq. He, more than anyone, would understand the complexity of identities, I thought—and that people can change. But his only interest in Iraq, it appeared, was in ending the war. (…) In July 2014, I visited Erbil, Iraq, shortly after the Islamic State had taken control of a third of the country and the Iraqi Army had disintegrated. I met up with Rafi Issawi. (…) Rafi listed for me the Sunni grievances that had steadily simmered since I’d left—until they had finally boiled over. Maliki had detained thousands of Sunnis without trial, pushed leading Sunnis, including Rafi, out of the political process by accusing them of terrorism and reneged on payments and pledges to the Iraqi tribes who had bravely fought Al Qaeda in Iraq. Year-long Sunni protests demanding an end to discrimination were met by violence, with dozens of unarmed protesters killed by Iraqi security forces. Maliki had completely subverted the judiciary to his will, so that Sunnis felt unable to achieve justice. The Islamic State, Rafi explained to me, was able to take advantage of this situation, publicly claiming to be the defenders of the Sunnis against the Iranian-backed Maliki government. The downward spiral, Rafi told me not surprisingly, had begun in 2010—when Iraqiya was not given the first chance to try to form the government. “We might not have succeeded,” he admitted, “but the process itself would have been important in building trust in Iraq’s young institutions.” Emma Sky

Attention: un Munich peut en cacher un autre !

A l’heure où, dénoncé presque immédiatement par les intéressés, le prétendu accord « historique » avec Téhéran tourne à la bérézina diplomatique …

Et où la poignée prétendument « historique » avec un Cuba tout aussi inflexible est bien prête de retomber comme le soufflé qu’elle n’a jamais cessé d’être …

Pendant qu’ayant fait main basse sur quatre capitales arabes …

Et se voyant légitimés dans leur quête d’une arme nucléaire …

Les mollahs sont en train de faire basculer, de l’Arabie saoudite à la Turquie l’ensemble de la région dans une course aux armements nucléaires …

Et que, du Moyen-Orient à l’Afrique, se réalisent sous nos propres yeux les pires prédictions, tant moquées, de la bande à Bush sur les intentions caliphatiques des djiahdistes …

Qui se souvient du précédent Munich …

Déjà dénoncé prophétiquement dès 2007 par l’ancien président Bush comme un an plus tard par le sénateur McCain ?

Qui se rappelle …

Comme le confirme, nouvelle Gertrude Bell de l’Irak, l’ancienne conseillère britannique des troupes américaines dans un nouveau livre …

La véritable trahison, par l’Administration Obama, des sunnites qui avaient permis l’élimination d’Al Qaeda en Irak …

Comme l’abandon militaire du pays en refusant d’y laisser assez de troupes …

Pour le plus grand profit non seulement des islamistes que l’on doit combattre à nouveau …

Mais surtout des Iraniens que l’on courtise aujourd’hui ?

How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq
Bush’s mistake was invading the country. His successor’s was leaving it to a strongman.
Emma Sky
Politico
April 07, 2015

When trying to explain the current unrest in the Middle East, from Iraq to Syria to Yemen, American officials often resort to platitudes about Sunni and Shia Muslims fighting each other for “centuries” due to “ancient hatreds.” Not only is this claim historically inaccurate, but it also ignores the unintended consequences that the Iraq War more recently leashed on the region. That war—and the manner in which the United States left it behind in 2011—shifted the balance of power in the region in Iran’s favor. Regional competition, of which Iran’s tension with Saudi Arabia is the main but not only dimension, exacerbated existing fault-lines, with support for extreme sectarian actors, including the Islamic State, turning local grievances over poor governance into proxy wars.

Nothing that happened in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 was pre-ordained; different futures than the one unfolding today were possible. Recall that violence declined drastically during the 2007 U.S. troop surge, and that for the next couple of years both Iraq and the West felt that the country was going in the right direction. But the seeds of Iraq’s unravelling were sown in 2010, when the United States did not uphold the election results and failed to broker the formation of a new Iraqi government. As an adviser to the top U.S. general in Iraq, I was a witness.

***

“My greatest fear,” General Raymond Odierno, the then commanding general of U.S. forces in Iraq, told me in early 2010, “is that we stabilize Iraq, then hand it over to the Iranians in our rush to the exit.”

General O (as he is known), had recently watched the 2007 movie Charlie Wilson’s War, which recounts how U.S. interest in Afghanistan ceased once the mujahedeen defeated the Soviet Army in 1989 and drove them out. Now, he had a premonition that the same could happen in Iraq. “I’ve invested too much here,” he said, “to simply walk away and let that happen.”

I had first met Odierno in 2003, when he was the commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division responsible for the provinces of Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk in the early days of the Iraq War; I had been the representative in Kirkuk of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the American-led transitional government that controlled Iraq after Hussein’s fall. Now, as his political adviser, I was helping General O ensure that the United States kept its focus on the mission in Iraq while drawing down U.S. forces.

Odierno wanted U.S. engagement with Iraq to continue for years to come, but led by U.S. civilians, not the military. He believed that, in order to train Iraqi security forces and provide the psychological support needed to maintain a level of stability, 20,000 or so U.S. troops needed to stay in Iraq beyond 2011, when all American troops were scheduled to be withdrawn. But the real engagement, General O believed, should be from the other instruments of national power, led by the U.S. embassy.

Every time a congressional delegation visited us in Baghdad, General O put up a slide showing why the United States should continue to invest in Iraq through the Strategic Framework Agreement that the two countries had signed in 2008. General O knew that for the mission to succeed, there needed to be a political agreement between Iraqi leaders. Otherwise, all the security gains that the American troops had fought so hard for would not be sustainable. He took every opportunity to educate and communicate these complexities to the new Obama administration.

For six months, General O had tried hard to support the leadership of Chris Hill, the new American ambassador who had taken up his post in April 2009. But Odierno had begun to despair. It was clear that Hill, though a career diplomat, lacked regional experience and was miscast in the role in Baghdad. In fact, he had not wanted the job, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had persuaded him to take it; she admitted as much to General O, he told me, when he met her in early 2010 in Washington to discuss the dysfunction at the embassy. General O complained that Hill did not engage with Iraqis or with others in the diplomatic community—his only focus appeared to be monitoring the activities of the U.S. military.

It was frightening how a person could so poison a place. Hill brought with him a small cabal who were new to Iraq and marginalized all those with experience in the country. The highly knowledgeable and well-regarded Arabist Robert Ford had cut short his tour as ambassador to Algeria to return to Iraq for a third tour and turned down another ambassadorship to stay on in Iraq and serve as Hill’s deputy. But Hill appeared not to want Ford’s advice on political issues and pressured him to depart the post early in 2010. In his staff meetings, Hill made clear how much he disliked Iraq and Iraqis. Instead, he was focused on making the embassy “normal” like other U.S. embassies. That apparently meant having grass within the embassy compound. The initial attempts to plant seed had failed when birds ate it all, but eventually, great rolls of lawn turf were brought in—I had no idea from where—and took root. By the end of his tenure, there was grass on which the ambassador could play lacrosse.

***

The national elections took place on March 7, 2010, and went more smoothly than we had dared hope. After a month of competitive campaigning across the country and wide media coverage of the different candidates and parties, 62 percent of eligible Iraqis turned out to vote.

The author and Gen. Raymond Odiero in Iraq. | Courtesy of Emma Sky

The European Union and others had fielded hundreds of international poll-watchers alongside thousands of trained Iraqi election observers, while the United Nations provided the Iraqis with advice on technical matters related to elections. All this helped to sustain the credibility of the process. Insurgents sought to create a climate of fear by planting bombs in water bottles and blowing up a house, but the Iraqi security forces stood up to the test.

“We won the elections!” Rafi Issawi, the deputy prime minister, shouted excitedly to me on the phone. I could hear celebratory gunfire in the background. We had not expected Iraqiya—a coalition headed by the secular Shia Ayad Allawi and leaders of the Sunni community, and running on a non-sectarian platform—to do so well. The coalition had won 91 seats—two more than the incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition.

I accompanied General O and Hill to a meeting with Maliki the next day. Maliki, a Shia, had been prime minister since 2006. Americans and Iraqis alike initially viewed him as weak, but his reputation grew after he ordered military operations against Shia militias. Since then, Iraqi politicians had become increasingly fearful of his authoritarian tendencies. He had insisted on running separately in the election—as State of Law rather than joining a united Shia coalition as had happened in 2005—in large part because the Shia parties would not agree on him to lead the list. Nobody wanted a second Maliki premiership.

When Hill asked Maliki that day about his retirement plans, it was immediately apparent that he was not contemplating stepping down. Instead, he claimed there had been massive election fraud and that the Mujahideen al-Khalq, an Iranian opposition group locked away in eastern Iraq’s Diyala province, had used satellites to tamper with the computers used to tally the voting results—even though the computers were not connected to the Internet and thousands of election observers had monitored the voting. But Maliki’s advisers had told him he would win big with more than a hundred seats, so he demanded a recount. Maliki was becoming scary.

Even though there was no evidence of fraud to justify a recount, the Iraqi electoral commission and the international community agreed to one, fearful of a repeat of the election fiasco in 2009 in Afghanistan, which had tarnished the credibility of elections there. In the meantime, Maliki’s advisers told us he needed two extra seats, either from the recount or through arbitrary de-Ba’athification that could disqualify Iraqiya candidates. Otherwise, he would be blamed for losing Iraq for the Shia, who make up some two-thirds of the population.

In parliamentary systems, the winning bloc is, by definition, the one that wins the most seats in the election and thus gets to have the first go at trying to form a government. This was certainly the intent of those who had drafted the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. But Maliki sought to challenge this basic notion, pressing Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud, Iraq’s chief justice, for his interpretation of the “winning bloc.” Medhat, continually under pressure from Maliki, returned an ambiguous ruling, saying it could mean either the bloc that receives the most seats in the election or the largest coalition formed after the election, within parliament. This would be Maliki’s escape clause.

General O urged that we should protect the process. He said the United States should not pick winners. It never worked out well. General O and I did not think that the Iraqiya candidate, Allawi, would be able to put a government together with himself as prime minister. But we thought he had the right as the winner of the election to have first go—and that this could lead to a political compromise among the leaders, with either Allawi and Maliki agreeing to share power between them or a third person chosen to be prime minister.

But after one meeting with Hill, General O strode down the embassy corridor looking visibly upset. “He told me that Iraq is not ready for democracy, that Iraq needs a Shia strongman,” the general said, “and Maliki is our man.” Odierno had objected that that was not what the Iraqis wanted. They were rid of one dictator, Hussein, and did not want to create another.

As the embassy did not want to do anything to help the Iraqis form a new government, General O instructed me to try to broker a meeting between Iraqiya and State of Law. They were the two largest blocs, and we saw an agreement between them as the most stable solution—and the one that would also best serve U.S. interests.

***

Finally, in June 2010, three months after the elections, State of Law and Iraqiya, the two largest blocs, headed into negotiations. But there was little trust between the two. State of Law continued to insist on Maliki as prime minister, and Iraqiya on Allawi.

I met up with Sami al-Askari, a Shia politician close to Maliki who believed that an agreement between State of Law and Iraqiya was the best way forward. But he also told me that everyone except the Americans realized that the formation of the government was perceived as a battle between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq. The Iranians were active, while the U.S. embassy did nothing. Qasim Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s al-Quds Force, continued to summon Iraqis to Iran in order to put together a pan-Shia coalition. The Iranians, al-Askari said, intended to drag out government formation until after August 31, when all U.S. combat forces were due to leave, in order to score a “victory” over the United States.

The Iranians had indeed not been idle. They were pressuring Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to drop his support for Allawi and agree to another Maliki term. For years, the Baathist regime in Syria had allowed jihadi foreign fighters to use their country as a launching pad for horrific attacks in Iraq. In August 2009, coordinated attacks targeted the foreign ministry and the finance ministry in Baghdad, killing around a hundred Iraqis. Maliki had blamed Assad himself for the murders.

The Iranians also were putting huge pressure on the Supreme Council, a Shia party headed by Amar Hakim, to agree a second Maliki premiership. And Iran was seeking to persuade the Sadrists, a Shia party led by Muqtada al-Sadr, through intermediaries from Lebanese Hezbollah, that Maliki would ensure there was no U.S. military presence of any sort in Iraq after 2011, and that the Sadrists would get key posts in the new government. Iran’s goal was to ensure that Iraq was not integrated into the Arab world, instead becoming a close ally of Iran. Maliki would be able to achieve this because all the neighboring Sunni countries hated him. As for Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s Kurdish president, Suleimani was determined to keep him in the role. Their relationship went back decades.

I went to see Rafi, the deputy prime minister. “Where is the U.S.?” he asked. He described how previous U.S. ambassadors had helped to bring Iraqis together. “Does the U.S. have no interest in protecting the democratic process? Does the U.S. not care what sort of government is put together? Qasim Suleimani is very active putting together the Shia coalition. Does the U.S. not understand what impact this will have on the region—and on internal stability in Iraq? Is the U.S. not worried about Iranian influence in Iraq?”

In July, Maliki’s fortunes appeared to take a decisive turn for the worse: The Shia coalition sent him a letter requesting that he withdraw his candidature for prime minister; Iraqiya made it clear that they would offer him the speakership of the parliament or the presidency, but not the premiership, and the Kurds explained that they really did not want to see him as prime minister for another four years.

General O and Hill met Maliki and told him frankly that he had little support from other groups, so it would be very hard for him to remain as prime minister. Maliki continued to insist that only he could do the job, only he could save Iraq. “I dream I am on a boat,” he said. “I keep trying to pull Iraqis out of the water to save them.”

The embassy informed the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Allawi and other Iraqi leaders that Maliki had no chance of being prime minister.

***

General O went back to Washington in mid-July for more meetings. He phoned to tell me that Vice President Joe Biden had agreed to give Maliki and Allawi a deadline. If they could not reach an agreement within two weeks on how to form the government, they should both step aside and let others have a shot at it.

However, when Biden phoned up the two leaders that week, he did not stick to the agreed line. Instead, he told Maliki that the United States would support him remaining as prime minister, and he told Allawi that he should accept Maliki as PM. In the Arabic media, there was confusion as to why the United States and Iran should both choose Maliki as prime minister, and this fuelled conspiracy theories about a secret deal between those two countries.

When I met Rafi, he was incredulous: “How come one week the U.S. was telling everyone that Maliki should step down and the next week telling Maliki he should be PM?” He went on: “Why is the U.S. picking the prime minister? This is Iraq. This is our country. We have to live here. And we care passionately about building a future for our children.” He was deeply upset.

Biden visited Iraq at the end of August 2010. By then, Hill had been replaced as ambassador by Jim Jeffrey. In internal meetings, one U.S. adviser argued that Maliki was “our man”: He would give us a follow-on Status of Forces Agreement to keep a small contingent of U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011; he was a nationalist; and he would fight the Sadrists. Furthermore, the official claimed that Maliki had promised him that he would not seek a third term. “Maliki is not our friend,” replied another official, Jeff Feltman, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, exasperated at the delusional nature of the discussion. But Biden had been persuaded by the arguments that there was no one but Maliki who could be prime minister and that he would sign a new security agreement with the United States. The Obama administration wanted to see an Iraqi government in place before the U.S. mid-term elections in November. Biden believed the quickest way to form a government was to keep Maliki as prime minister, and to cajole other Iraqis into accepting this.

“Iraqiya genuinely fear Maliki,” General O explained. They were scared that he would accuse them of being terrorists or bring charges of corruption against them, and would arrest them. Maliki had accused Rafi of being the leader of a terrorist group, for instance—allegations that were totally unfounded. General O described how Maliki had changed so much over the past six months. He had become more sectarian and authoritarian. Iraqis had reason to fear him.

I tried to explain the struggle between secularists and Islamists, and how many Iraqis wanted to move beyond sectarianism. But Biden could not fathom this. For him, Iraq was simply about Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.

I tried another tack: “It is important to build belief in the democratic process by showing people that change can come about through elections—rather than violence. The peaceful transfer of power is key—it has never happened in the Arab World.” At the very least, either Maliki or Talabani needed to give up his seat; otherwise, they would both think they owned the seats. Biden did not agree. He responded that there were often elections in the United States that did not bring about any change.

Biden’s easy smile had evaporated. He was clearly irritated by me. “Look, I know these people,” he went on. “My grandfather was Irish and hated the British. It’s like in the Balkans. They all grow up hating each other.”

The conversation ended, as we had to head over to the meeting with Iraqiya members. Some were in suits, others were wearing their finest traditional robes. There were Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Turkmen Shia, Kurds and a Christian. The full tapestry of Iraqi society was sitting facing us—distinguishable only by their dress, clearly showing us the sort of Iraq they wanted to live in.

Biden started off smiling: “I know you people. My grandfather was Irish and hated the British.” Everyone turned toward me, the Brit. The Iraqis were grinning, expecting there was going to be a good spat between Brits and Americans. How could I stop Biden making a totally inappropriate comment about them all being Sunnis and hating Shia? Thinking on my feet, I said, “Don’t look at me, Mr. Vice President, I am not the only Brit in the room.” One of the Iraqis piped up: “I have a British passport.”

Biden lost his train of thought and moved on. He said that one of his predecessors, Al Gore, had technically won more votes in the 2000 presidential election, but for the good of America had stepped back rather than keep the country in limbo while fighting over the disputed vote-count.

Allawi pretended not to understand that Biden was suggesting he give up his claim to have first go at trying to form the government, letting Maliki remain as prime minister. The meeting finished. After we left, I was sure the Iraqis would be wondering why on earth Biden had mentioned his Irish grandfather and Al Gore. If only President Obama had paid attention to Iraq. He, more than anyone, would understand the complexity of identities, I thought—and that people can change. But his only interest in Iraq, it appeared, was in ending the war.

***

In July 2014, I visited Erbil, Iraq, shortly after the Islamic State had taken control of a third of the country and the Iraqi Army had disintegrated. I met up with Rafi Issawi. So much had happened since General O and I had left Iraq at the end of August 2010. Iran had succeeded in pressuring Muqtada al-Sadr to accept a second Maliki term as prime minister and hence ensured that there would be no follow-on security agreement for a post-2011 U.S. troop presence. The United States had helped to hammer out a power-sharing agreement of sorts in Erbil, but it had never been implemented.

Rafi listed for me the Sunni grievances that had steadily simmered since I’d left—until they had finally boiled over. Maliki had detained thousands of Sunnis without trial, pushed leading Sunnis, including Rafi, out of the political process by accusing them of terrorism and reneged on payments and pledges to the Iraqi tribes who had bravely fought Al Qaeda in Iraq. Year-long Sunni protests demanding an end to discrimination were met by violence, with dozens of unarmed protesters killed by Iraqi security forces. Maliki had completely subverted the judiciary to his will, so that Sunnis felt unable to achieve justice. The Islamic State, Rafi explained to me, was able to take advantage of this situation, publicly claiming to be the defenders of the Sunnis against the Iranian-backed Maliki government.

The downward spiral, Rafi told me not surprisingly, had begun in 2010—when Iraqiya was not given the first chance to try to form the government. “We might not have succeeded,” he admitted, “but the process itself would have been important in building trust in Iraq’s young institutions.”

Emma Sky, senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute, is author of The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, from which this article is adapted.

Voir aussi:

Ex-British diplomat accuses Hillary Clinton of role in meltdown of Iraq
New book by former adviser to the US in Iraq Emma Sky says Clinton appointed ambassador to Baghdad who had no Middle East experience
Colin Freeman, Chief foreign correspondent
The Guardian
14 Apr 2015

A former British diplomat has accused Hillary Clinton of contributing to Iraq’s disastrous meltdown during her four years as Barack Obama’s foreign policy chief.
Emma Sky, who served as an adviser to one of the top US commanders in Iraq, claims in a new book that Mrs Clinton operated a “dysfunctional” diplomatic mission to Baghdad that allowed a lapse back into sectarian warfare after elections in 2010.
At that time Mrs Clinton was mid-way through her four-year stint as Mr Obama’s Secretary of State, the equivalent position to Foreign Secretary in Britain.
The criticisms, which come as Mrs Clinton announces her presidential bid, are contained in a book that Ms Sky, an Oxford-educated Middle East expert, is to publish next month about the seven years she spent in Iraq.
Entitled The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, it paints an unflattering picture of the Obama administration as it tried to extricate itself from the country as hastily as possible.

While the demand for a speedy drawdown from Iraq was driven primarily by Mr Obama himself, Mrs Clinton is accused of appointing an incompetent US ambassador to Baghdad, Chris Hill, who had little experience of the region and held its people in contempt.

That then paved the way for Washington to be outmanoeuvred by Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who was able to grab a second term in office despite fears that he was a sectarian dictator in the making.

The book also claims that the US-vice president, Joe Biden, showed little interest in Iraq’s political complexities, making oafish comparisons between its sectarian civil war and Britain’s historic tensions with Ireland.

Thanks to Mr Obama’s hasty pull-out at the end of 2011, Ms Sky says, hard-won opportunities for a lasting peace in Iraq after the war to remove Saddam Hussein in 2003 were squandered.

“That war – and the manner in which the United States left it behind in 2011 – shifted the balance of power in the region in Iran’s favour,” she writes. “Regional competition… exacerbated existing fault-lines, with support for extreme sectarian actors, including the Islamic State, turning local grievances over poor governance into proxy wars.”

Ms Sky, who is now an academic at Yale University, first went to work in Iraq in 2003 after a spell as a development expert for the British Council in the Palestinian territories. Although a self-described “tree hugger”, her expertise in Arab affairs saw her appointed as coalition governor of the northern city of Kirkuk, where she then impressed General Ray Odierno, whom she advised during the US troop “surge” that curbed Iraq’s 2006-7 Sunni-Shia civil war.

However, by 2010, Gen Odierno was becoming increasingly concerned that Washington was likely to destabilise Iraq in the “rush to the exit”. He had already “begun to despair”, Ms Sky says, of Mr Hill, who was appointed the year before despite concerns about his lack of Middle East experience.

Lifting the lid on behind the scenes intrigues in Baghdad’s heavily guarded “Green Zone”, Ms Sky writes: “It was clear that Hill, though a career diplomat, lacked regional experience and was miscast in the role in Baghdad. In fact, he had not wanted the job, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had persuaded him to take it; she admitted as much to General Odierno, he told me, when he met her in early 2010 in Washington to discuss the dysfunction at the embassy.”

She adds that “in his staff meetings, Hill made clear how much he disliked Iraq and Iraqis”. His main priority, she said, was getting the embassy to look like a “normal” US mission, which included importing rolls of turf “on which the ambassador could play lacrosse”.

Worse was to come when Mr Biden visited Baghdad. He made clear his impatience when Ms Sky tried to explain about Iraq’s myriad political landscape of secularists, Islamists, and moderates who wanted to move beyond sectarianism. Mr Biden “could not fathom this”, she said, telling her: “My grandfather was Irish and hated the British. It’s like in the Balkans. They all grow up hating each other.”

He repeated the simplistic observation at a meeting with the Iraqiya bloc, a religiously mixed, secular movement, only to be embarrassed when one of the Iraqi politicians told him that he had a British passport.

Ms Sky makes her accusations in an article adapted from her book in Politico magazine, titled “How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq”.

She says the lack of foreign policy focus from Washington ultimately allowed the White House to back Mr Maliki for a second term when he tied in 2010’s elections with Ayad Allawi, the secular, pro-Western leader of the Iraqiya bloc. Mr Hill, she says, told a distraught Gen Odierno “that Iraq is not ready for democracy, that Iraq needs a Shia strongman, and Maliki is our man”.

Her revelations come as Haider al-Abadi, Iraq’s prime minister, met Mr Obama on Tuesday to ask for more arms to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil). Recent gains against the group in Tikrit have been undermined by Isil counter-attacks in the western province of Anbar.

Voir également:

Bookshelf
Iraq’s Unlikely Eulogist
There was no more improbable duo than Odierno, the hulking general with a shaved head, and his petite English adviser.
Max Boot
The Wall Street journal

April 13, 2015

The British Empire, which at one time dominated the lands stretching from Egypt to Persia, produced a long line of distinguished if often eccentric Arabists —Richard Francis Burton, Gertrude Bell, St. John Philby, T.E. Lawrence, Freya Stark, Wilfred Thesiger and more.

The deepening American involvement in the Middle East over the past decade has inspired its own crop of ardent experts. Some have been Foreign Service officers, such as Robert Ford and Ryan Crocker. Others military officers like Rick Welch, Derek Harvey and Joel Rayburn. Still others—perhaps the largest share—have been temporary recruits, helping the U.S. government understand the “human terrain” and filling gaps left by insufficient State Department resources. This group includes Ali Khedery, a young Arab-American who served as an aide to U.S. ambassadors in Baghdad; Matt Sherman, currently serving as political adviser to the U.S. commander in Kabul after previous stints in both Iraq and Afghanistan; and Carter Malkasian, who advised Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The new generation of American Arabists, busy in the field trying to help win two wars, has not yet produced the outpouring of writing that characterized their British predecessors, but they are starting to catch up. Mr. Malkasian penned a first-rate account of his experiences in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, “War Comes to Garmser” (2013), and, last year, Col. Rayburn published a wise book on “Iraq After America.” And now Emma Sky, dubbed “Our Miss Bell” by Iraqi interlocutors, has produced a radiant and beautifully written account, at turns funny and sad, of her service in Iraq.

There could have been few more unlikely candidates to advise U.S. military commanders. British-born and Oxford-educated, Ms. Sky is the kind of “progressive” who imagines that Texas is “a State of cowboys, electric chairs and right-wing zealots who spend their weekends down by the border shooting Mexicans who tried to cross illegally.” She welcomed Barack Obama’s victory in 2008, writing, “After the crazy era of the neoconservatives, the US was now led by a man whose worldview I believed I shared.”

The Unraveling

By Emma Sky
PublicAffairs, 382 pages, $28.99

She had come to assist the American war effort in Iraq by chance in 2003 after having spent a decade as a humanitarian worker in the Middle East. Employed by the British Council, a cultural organization sponsored by the Foreign Office, she received an email asking for volunteers to help the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Single and 30-something, she raised her hand and wound up in Kirkuk, where she became political adviser to Col. William Mayville, commander of the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade.

Ms. Sky had no experience of the military and was “wary” of her new colleagues. Upon first meeting Col. Mayville, she threatened to haul him to The Hague if he did anything that violated the Geneva Convention: “I took my brown Filofax with me everywhere,” she writes, “and began documenting everything Colonel Mayville said and did.” Before long, however, she realized that behind his “bravado was a deep intellect—and a wicked sense of humor.” She developed such admiration and affection for the soldiers of the brigade that when they rotated home in early 2004 she “sobbed inconsolably all afternoon.”

She returned home herself in June 2004 but “could not settle back” into her humdrum job. She spent nine months in Jerusalem advising the U.S. military mission monitoring Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and then did a tour in Afghanistan for Britain’s Department for International Development. In 2006, Gen. Raymond Odierno, who had been Col. Mayville’s division commander, invited her to become his political adviser when he was appointed the deputy American commander in Iraq.

There was no more unlikely duo than the hulking, 6-foot-5 former football player with the shaved head and his petite English adviser. To add to the incongruity, Ms. Sky needled Gen. Odierno relentlessly in a way that no one else would have dared—and he returned the favor. On a helicopter ride after “General O” comments that Saddam Hussein was a mass murderer, she replies, “We still don’t know who killed more Iraqis: you or Saddam, sir.” This was greeted by total silence among the general’s aides, but he jocularly shouted, “Open the door, pilots. Throw her out!”

It is part of Gen. Odierno’s greatness as a commander that he realized he needed the independent viewpoint that Ms. Sky could provide to avoid the groupthink that so often characterizes military command. He made her his indispensable aide, and she stayed by his side not only during his tour as the deputy commander in Iraq in 2006-08 but also when he was the top commander, from 2008 to 2010.

Along the way, she helped the U.S. military drag Iraq back from the brink of the abyss—only to see all of their achievements squandered. In Ms. Sky’s telling, the turning point was the failure to allow the secular Shiite Ayad Allawi a chance to form a government after his party had emerged as the top vote-getter in the 2010 election. Ambassador Christopher Hill and Vice President Joe Biden, the architects of the Obama administration’s Iraq policy in spite of their invincible ignorance of the country, threw U.S. influence behind the sitting prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who had refused to accept his electoral defeat. In his second term, he pursued the sectarian agenda that drove many Sunnis into the arms of Islamic State.

Ms. Sky ended up disenchanted with the administration she had once supported: “Biden was a nice man, but he simply had the wrong instincts on Iraq. If only Obama had paid attention to Iraq. . . . But his only interest in Iraq was in ending the war.” By contrast, her respect for the whole U.S. military and in particular for Gen. Odierno—who warned the administration of Mr. Maliki’s authoritarian tendencies—was never higher. He told her, “I gave my best military advice.” She laments: “But he had been ignored.” That is as good an epitaph as any for the American misadventure in Mesopotamia.

Mr. Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign

‘Iraq Is Finished’
Tribal leaders reflect on the enemy destroying their country from within.
Emma Sky

The Atlantic

Apr 8 2015

One afternoon this March, during a visit to Jordan, I sat on the banks of the Dead Sea with my Iraqi friend, Azzam Alwash. As we stared across the salt lake and watched the sun disappear behind the rocky crags of Israel, I recounted a trip I had taken to Jordan 20 years earlier to conduct field research on Palestinian refugees, as part of a Middle East peace effort designed to ensure that within a decade nobody in the region considered himself a refugee.

No one had an inkling back then that the numbers of refugees in the region would increase exponentially, with millions of Iraqis and Syrians displaced from their homes by international intervention and civil war. Nor had I imagined at the time that I would find myself in Iraq after the invasion of 2003, initially as a British representative of the Coalition Provisional Authority—the international transitional government that ran the country for about a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein—and then as the political advisor to U.S. Army General Raymond Odierno when he commanded U.S. forces in the country.

A number of the Iraqis I had gotten to know over the last decade had relocated to Jordan. I had gone there to see them and better understand events in the region—and the conditions that had led to the rise of the Islamic State.

* * *

The evening following our Dead Sea visit, Azzam and I went out for Italian food in Amman with a diverse group of our Iraqi friends, Sunni and Shiite, Kurd and Arab. It was a reunion of sorts; some of us had gone white-water rafting down the Little Zaab river in northern Iraq a few years ago. Azzam was an experienced rafter, but even the danger of the rapids had not pressured the group to trust his leadership and work together. There was a lot of shouting and we all got soaked, but somehow we had survived the trip. This, to me, represented Iraq writ large.

The conversation soon turned to Daesh (known as ISIS in the West), and how the group had formed. A common view I’ve heard in the region, propagated by Sunni and Shiite alike, is that Daesh is the creation of the United States. There was no al-Qaeda in Iraq or Islamic State before the U.S. invasion in 2003. Therefore, so the twisted reasoning goes, the United States must have deliberately created the group in order to make Sunnis and Shiites fight each other, thereby allowing the U.S to continue dominating the region. Local media had reported on alleged U.S. airdrops to Daesh. Some outlets even referred to Daesh’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as an Israeli-trained Mossad agent.

One of my dining companions asked me where I thought the group came from. I responded that Daesh was a symptom of a much larger problem. Regional sectarian conflict was an unintended consequence of the Iraq War and the manner in which the United States had left the country, both of which had empowered Iran and changed the balance of power in the Middle East. In my view, regional competition—of which Iran versus Saudi Arabia is the main but not only dimension—exacerbated existing fault lines. Those countries’ support for extreme sectarian actors in different countries had now turned local grievances over poor governance into proxy wars. Iran was funding and training Shiite militias, as well as advising regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. Gulf financing had flowed to Sunni fighters, including the ones that ultimately became Daesh. At the same time, there was a symbiotic relationship between corrupt elites in Iraq and terrorists—they justified each other’s existence, each claiming to provide protection from the other.

Azzam offered another perspective. Daesh, he said, were Muslims, and fundamentalist Salafi Islam was to blame for their existence. The problem, he said, was the literal interpretation of the Quran, which, for example, spelled out harsh criminal punishments reflective of seventh-century practices. Other religions had moved forward and reformed because adherents were willing to interpret texts for their own time. A heated argument broke out as others at the table defended Islam and accused Azzam of being brainwashed by the West. « If we Muslim intellectuals are not self-critical, if we refuse to take responsibility to address the issues, » he responded, « what hope is there for the Middle East? »

* * *

Azzam’s was only one of numerous explanations of Daesh’s origins and power that I heard from Iraqis during my visit to Jordan. All of these explanations contained some truth: There was no one simple reason, but rather a complex set of factors, that had enabled the group to take control of so much of Iraq.

Another explanation came from Sheikh Abdullah al-Yawar, the paramount sheikh of the Shammar tribe, which has around 5 million members in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Last summer, in the wake of the Daesh takeover of Mosul, his mother and brother managed to escape just hours before their palatial 27-room house near Rabiah—northwest of Mosul on the Syrian border—was blown up, his photos and carpets destroyed, his horses scattered to the wilds. It was a house that I knew well and had visited many times. From 2003 onward, Abdullah had decided that he and his family would cooperate with international coalition forces to secure their area, rather than fight against them.

Daesh did not suddenly take control of Mosul last summer, Abdullah told me over dinner with his family at his house in Amman. For years, there had been so much corruption in local government that Daesh had been able to buy influence and supporters. Government in Iraq, he said, was a business—a family business in which politicians in Baghdad and Mosul had stolen millions of dollars worth of the country’s wealth. Daesh had then been able to exploit this situation to take control, presenting itself as a better alternative to corrupt local government.

In Iraq, corrupt elites and terrorists justified each other’s existence, each claiming to provide protection from the other.
But I had a more basic question: « Who are Daesh? » Many, he told me, had come out of the town of Tal Afar, where there had been bitter fighting between the Sunni and Shiite populations during the civil war. They were former Baathists, members of Saddam Hussein’s party who had been purged from Iraq’s government following the international intervention to oust Hussein. Then, after 2003, some became al-Qaeda, and now they were Daesh. They felt excluded and marginalized. Daesh gave them a sense of empowerment and let them present themselves as the defenders of the Sunnis against Shiites, Iran, and the United States.

In northern Iraq last summer, I had met men with large mustaches—the Baathists’ signature facial hair—who claimed to be spokesmen for insurgent groups and said they were leading a Sunni uprising against then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. I asked Abdullah what had happened to them. He responded that they had been all talk. Some had grown the beards mandated by fundamentalists and joined Daesh. Others had done nothing.

Abdullah and his wife provided me quotation after quotation from the Quran to prove that Daesh violated the tenets of Islam. Personally, I told them, I judge people by how they behave. « When I think of a Muslim, I think of the hospitality shown to me, a foreigner, whenever I travel in the Arab world. » I went on, « Sadly, when I now tell people in the U.S. that I am off on holiday to the Middle East, they worry that I will be kidnapped and have my head chopped off. » I had finished the vine leaves and tabbouleh salad we had been eating, and kebab and chicken were now heaped on my plate. I told them I thought I faced a greater risk of death from overeating.

Abdullah turned serious. « We need more help from America, » he said. « Look at what Iran is doing. Iran is now in Tikrit.” (Iranian military officers were highly visible as advisors to Shiite militias seeking to retake the city.) He went on: « This is a huge humiliation for the Sunnis. This is not the way to destroy Daesh. It will cause a worse reaction in the future. »

* * *

A few days later, Sheikh Ghassan al-Assi of the Obeidi tribe, which has around 700,000 members in Iraq, both Sunni and Shiite, took me to a restaurant in Amman that he said was owned by Christians from Baghdad. When the waiter came to take our order, Ghassan said, with an acerbic wit that I was by now long familiar with: « The Americans and British destroyed our country—but we still invite them to lunch! » He would later pick out the best parts of the barbecued fish and put them on my plate.

I had first met Ghassan in 2003, when he had been highly critical of coalition forces in Iraq. Even so, we had remained friends. He had fled to Amman last summer in the wake of the Daesh blitzkrieg. According to Ghassan, the group had blown up the grave of his father, the paramount sheikh of the Obeidis, and had destroyed the houses of his uncles because they collaborated with Maliki. He had hoped that his house would be left alone, since he had not worked with the United States or the Iraqi government. But the week prior to my visit, Daesh had turned up with C4 explosives and blown the home up. He did not know why. He took out his iPhone. « Bastards, bastards, bastards,” he muttered as he flicked through the photos.

« There is no state left. It is a state of militias. »
Over a cup of tea, Ghassan showed me photos of one of his sons, who was wearing a red-and-white checked scarf, with a goatee, and was posing for the camera like a male model. I was surprised; I had never expected a boy born and bred in Hawija—a rough provincial town—to turn out looking like this. Even in Hawija, it seemed, there were people who just wanted to lead normal lives, to wear the latest fashion. It was Dubai, not Daesh, that represented the sort of society they wanted to live in.

Sheikh Ghassan laughed at my astonishment. « Miss Emma,” he asked me somewhat cryptically, “what is life without love? »

* * *

On my last day in Jordan, Jaber al-Jaberi, another tribal leader who had served Iraq as a member of parliament and had once been a candidate for minister of defense, drove me to Jerash, an ancient city outside Amman. With Daesh destroying Iraq’s archaeological sites, we both wanted to go and see Jordan’s. Jaber, too, had been forced to leave his home in Anbar amid the Daesh advance.

« The Sunnis of Iraq are like the Palestinians, » Jaber said. « We’ve been displaced from our land. » Sunnis had been cleansed from Diyala and areas surrounding Baghdad by Shiite militias, and many more had fled from the provinces of Anbar, Nineva, and Salah al-Din because of Daesh. Jaber himself had given up politics and was now spending his days trying to get food and assistance to tribesmen living in terrible conditions in makeshift accommodation in the desert. The Sunnis, he said, had no real leaders, and the Shiite militias were more powerful than the Iraqi security forces.

« Iraq is finished, » he lamented to me. « There is no state left. It is a state of militias.”

The state of Iraq has indeed failed. It no longer has the legitimacy or the power to extend control over its whole territory, and the power vacuum is being filled by a multitude of non-state actors, increasingly extreme and sectarian, who will likely continue to fight each other for years to come, supported by regional powers. Whether a new kind of order will finally emerge, with more local legitimacy, remains to be seen. And for now those who are displaced are left wondering how long it will be until they are able to return home—and to what.

Still, I refused to believe that terrorists could erase Iraq’s past, and I told Jaber so. The past would survive in archives, in exhibits in the British Museum, on the walls of art galleries in Amman, in poems recited around the world. We were in the land where humans had first experimented with settled agriculture, where the Babylonian king Hammurabi gave some of the first written laws, where Jews had written the Talmud. Jaber, I saw, had tears in his eyes. « Nothing can take this away, Jaber,” I told him. “Nothing. Not these terrible terrorists, not these militias, not these awful politicians. A new generation will come one day that can build on this. The hope is the youth who just want to live their lives. »

POSTSCRIPT
Who Lost Iraq?
And How to Get It Back

Emma Sky

Foreign Affairs

June 24, 2014

EMMA SKY is a senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. From 2007 to 2010, she was the political adviser to Ray Odierno (then the commanding general of U.S. Forces in Iraq).Republicans and Democrats each share some of the blame for the situation in Iraq — the former for the way in which the United States entered the country and the latter for the way in which it left. It was only between 2007 and 2009 that the United States had a coherent strategy in Iraq, matched with the right leadership and the necessary resources. The current turmoil dates back to just after that period, to 2010, after Iraq’s second post-Saddam national election.

Republicans and Democrats each share some of the blame for the situation in Iraq — the former for the way in which the United States entered the country and the latter for the way in which it left. It was only between 2007 and 2009 that the United States had a coherent strategy in Iraq, matched with the right leadership and the necessary resources. The current turmoil dates back to just after that period, to 2010, after Iraq’s second post-Saddam national election.

At that time, some senior officials argued that the United States should uphold the constitutionally mandated right of the winning bloc, Iraqiya, headed by Ayad Allawi, to have the first go at trying to form a government. They maintained that the United States should actively help broker an agreement among Iraqi elites to form the new government and warned of the already apparent autocratic tendencies of Nouri al-Maliki, the incumbent prime minister.

Other officials argued that Maliki, despite his narrow electoral defeat, was the only conceivable Shia leader who could hold the position. He was also, they said, a friend of the United States who would agree to allow the United States to maintain a small contingent of forces in Iraq after 2011, when the existing agreement between the two countries expired. In the end, it was Iran that stepped in and, by pressuring the Sadrists to support Maliki, secured him a second premiership. The price Iran extracted from Maliki was his support for the removal of all U.S. forces.

Since 2010, Maliki has consolidated his power by targeting his political rivals, subverting the judiciary and independent government commissions, reneging on his promises to the Sunni tribal leaders who had helped him fight al Qaeda, and politicizing the security forces that the United States invested so much in training. He also mishandled the yearlong protests against his government that erupted in Sunni areas at the end of 2012, following the souring of relations between him and Rafi al-Issawi, the highly respected minister of finance. His forces attacked protesters in Hawija, killing 50. Then, in December 2013, he sent troops into western Anbar to attack the desert camps of a Sunni radical group, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Following the death of the Iraqi general leading the operation, Maliki ordered his troops into the cities of Anbar province to close down all protest sites.

Maliki’s moves seemed to be tactical successes in that they strengthened his regime. But they have been revealed to be strategic disasters, since they provoked a backlash that weakened the state. With the ISIS takeover of cities in the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din, that reality has been made clear. Iraqi security forces, which outnumber ISIS by around a hundred to one, deserted and fled their positions as ISIS advanced; soldiers’ morale was low and a number of senior officers owed their positions to bribes and political affiliation rather than to competence. Sunni tribes, which previously had turned against the forerunner of ISIS, al Qaeda in Iraq, have this time either fled, remained neutral, or backed the militants. Given their sense of disenfranchisement, they do not trust Maliki’s government to provide for them or to protect them. Some have concluded that ISIS is the lesser of two evils. Sunni clerics in Iraq, along with regional media, are now referring to the Sunni « revolt » against Maliki’s government.

ISIS’ victories are a result of internal divides, rising sectarianism, state failure, and geopolitical competition in two neighboring countries. In one of his recent speeches, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, called on Sunni Muslims to join his organization to fight the Shia and establish a caliphate, which would remove the borders between Muslim lands that were demarcated by colonial powers. “Give up corrupt nationalism,” he urged, “and join the nation of Islam.”

But it is not the borders that are the root of the problems of these countries. It is the political leadership, which has failed to develop inclusive and robust states. Grievances against the governments of Maliki and Bashar al-Assad in Syria have created the environment in which ISIS can prosper. And, ironically, although the ISIS has railed against national divisions, the tensions between its international jihadist agenda and the nationalist agendas of most Sunni groups will inevitably create friction and infighting. For now, though, ISIS will find plenty of Sunnis willing to join the fray.

Meanwhile, facing the shock caused by the collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul, Shia have turned to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani for guidance. Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to join the security forces in the fight against ISIS. Despite Sistani’s statement that the fatwa was intended for Sunni and Shia civilians alike, Shia militias are using it as an occasion for sectarian mobilization.

In the ongoing turmoil, the Kurds have taken the contested city of Kirkuk and see independence in their sights. U.S. forces invested considerable time and resources in mediating between the different parties in these disputed territories. Without such a neutral third party, the likelihood of Arab-Kurdish conflict is increasing, with ISIS gaining the opportunity to present itself as the protector of the Sunnis against Iranian-backed Shia but also against what they perceive as Kurdish expansionism.

So what can and should the United States do? It is positive that the United States no longer views the violence in Iraq as separate from the bloodshed in Syria and Lebanon. The region has become one battlefield — and U.S. policy must reflect that. It was the 1979 Iranian Revolution that set off the modern-day struggle between Iran and the Sunni powers. And it was the 2003 war in Iraq that led to sectarianization of regional politics. Then it was the 2011 U.S. departure from Iraq that left the impression in the region that Iran had defeated the United States. The United States needs to pursue policies that lessen sectarian tensions and support moderates. The majority of those living in Iraq and Syria yearn to live in peace with just, effective, and transparent governments. The choice before them cannot simply be Iranian-backed exclusionary regimes or al Qaeda­–linked affiliates.

Although the United States and Iran face a common threat in ISIS, the United States should cooperate with Iran only if it leads to major reform of Iraq’s political system so as to overcome sectarian divisions. If not, the specter of a perceived alignment between the United States and Iran could worsen sectarianism and push more Sunnis toward ISIS.

The main political tensions in Iraq today are between Maliki’s drive to centralize power, the Kurds’ desire to maximize their autonomy, and the increasing Sunni awareness of themselves as a distinct community. The fall of Mosul and events that followed are indications that these tensions have come to a head and that it is time for Maliki to admit his failures and open the way for a more competent Shia leader to start a new approach. Although Maliki did head the winning bloc in the most recent elections, those opposed to him have enough votes to replace him if they can agree on an alternative. Iraq’s political elites, in particular the Shia parties, need to select a new prime minister who is acceptable to them and to other communities, and is supported by Iran and Turkey as well as the United States.

In his June 19 statement, U.S. President Barack Obama said, « Iraqi leaders must rise above their differences and come together around a political plan for Iraq’s future. Shia, Sunni, Kurds — all Iraqis — must have confidence that they can advance their interests and aspirations through the political process rather than through violence.” Obama is right to pressure Iraqi politicians to form a new government, rather than insisting that they support Maliki. He correctly recognized that any military options would be effective only if they were in support of an overall political strategy that a new broad-based government agreed to. The United States has a key role to play in helping broker a new deal among the elites that creates a better balance among Iraq’s communities. A new broad-based Iraqi government will need to win back the support of Sunnis against ISIS — and the Obama administration should be prepared to respond positively to requests for assistance to do so.

Iraqi Sunnistan?
Why Separatism Could Rip the Country Apart—Again
Emma Sky and Harith al-Qarawee
Foreign Affairs

January 23, 2013

EMMA SKY is a senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. From 2007 to 2010, she was the political adviser to Ray Odierno (then the commanding general of U.S. Forces in Iraq). HARITH AL-QARAWEE is an Iraqi political scientist and the author of Imagining the Nation: Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-political Conflict in Iraq.

It’s not easy being a prominent Sunni in Iraq these days. This past December, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered the arrest of several bodyguards of Rafi al-Issawi, the minister of finance and one of the most influential and respected Sunni leaders in Iraq. In response, tens of thousands of Sunnis took to the streets of Anbar, Mosul, and other predominantly Sunni cities, demanding the end of what they consider government persecution. Issawi has accused Maliki of targeting him as part of a systematic campaign against Sunni leaders, which includes the 2011 indictment of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, on terrorism charges. This is not the first time that Maliki has gone after Issawi, either. In 2010, during tense negotiations over the makeup of the government, Maliki accused Issawi of leading a terrorist group — a claim that the U.S. military investigated and found baseless. Not coincidentally, this most recent incident occurred days after President Jalal Talabani, always a dependable moderator in Iraqi politics, was incapacitated by a stroke.

The scale of the ongoing demonstrations reveals the widespread sense of alienation that Sunnis feel in the new Iraq. Prior to 2003, Sunnis rarely identified as members of a religious sect and instead called themselves Iraqi or Arab nationalists. It was the country’s Shia population that claimed to be victims, on account of their persecution by Saddam Hussein.
Today, the roles are reversed. Shia Islamists consolidated power in Baghdad after the toppling of Saddam’s regime, and some — particularly those who were exiled during Baathist rule — now view all Sunnis with suspicion. In turn, many Sunnis take issue with the new political system, which was largely shaped by Shia and Kurdish parties. Today, the Sunni population is mobilizing against the status quo and making sect-specific demands, such as the release of Sunni detainees, an end to the torture of Sunni suspects, and humane treatment of Sunni women in jails. Moreover, demonstrators are calling for the overthrow of the regime, using slogans made popular during the Arab Spring.

Meanwhile, Kurdish leaders identify Maliki as the main problem facing Iraq, and some delegations of Kurds and Shia have travelled to Issawi’s native province of Anbar to express their own distrust of the regime. The top Iraqi Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, has voiced disappointment with Maliki’s government and has called for it to respond to the concerns of the protestors. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Iraq’s most authentic grassroots Shia movement, the Sadrist Trend, has accused Maliki of provoking the current discontent. Although fear of Maliki’s creeping authoritarianism is pushing his rivals together, growing sectarian tensions may yet rip Iraq apart.
As with other protests in the Arab world, which were initially driven by legitimate local grievances, there is a risk that the current movement will become increasingly sectarian. At political events, some Iraqi Sunni clerics use conciliatory language and emphasize Iraqi fraternity. Others, however, speak passionately about the suffering of the Sunni community at the hands of Maliki’s Shia administration and condemn his ties with Iran.

Since 2008, when Maliki led a harsh crackdown on the Mahdi Army, a Shia militia, the prime minister has tried to present himself as a nationalist leader seeking to unify his country and evenly enforce the rule of law. The rise of Maliki and the popularity he gained with Shia, however, reveal the flaws of Iraq’s new political system, which made state institutions fiefdoms of patronage for sectarian political parties rather than channels for delivering public services. Maliki tried to earn legitimacy beyond just the Shia community, in particular seeking the support of Sunni voters. His confrontation with Massoud Barzani, the president of the semi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan region, over security issues along the disputed border was primarily a move to win the support of the Sunni population there, which is resentful of Kurdish encroachment.
But Maliki has squandered his ability to appeal to the country’s other sects and communities because of his paranoia and ideological bias as a leader of Dawa, the Shia Islamist party. He blames external interference for the current tensions, exploiting images of divisive symbols such as flags of the Saddam era, the Free Syrian Army, and Kurdistan, as well as photos of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And Maliki’s record — his targeting of Sunni politicians, his selective use of law, his influence over the judiciary to ensure rulings in his favor, and his close ties with Iran — confirms that he is prepared to use all means necessary to consolidate power.

Maliki could cling to power by presenting himself as the defender of the Shia in an increasingly tumultuous environment, turning his fear of a regional sectarian conflict into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq are on the rise, provoked by discontent with Maliki and inspired by the Syrian civil war next door. So far this month, al-Qaeda has killed Shia pilgrims in Karbala, a Sunni lawmaker in Anbar, and Kurds in Kirkuk. Meanwhile, other leaders are struggling to remain relevant. The credibility of Sunni government officials is declining, due to their inability to prevent discrimination against their constituents while participating in a system that brings them personal benefits. In the Shia camp, Sadr is moving to the center, positioning himself as a nationalist leader. If Sadr is able to create an alliance with anti-Maliki Sunnis and Kurds — presenting a credible and unifying alternative government — sectarianism could be curbed. However, Maliki might be provoked by such a challenge and clamp down on his rivals even more aggressively.
Politics in Iraq and the surrounding region are increasingly sectarian. Inspired by the rebellion in Syria and supported by the Sunni leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Iraq’s Sunnis may seek greater autonomy from the Shia-dominated central government in years to come. This need not be the case: in the 2010 national elections, most Sunnis voted for the Iraqiya electoral list, a coalition that defined itself as nonsectarian and was led by a secular Shia politician. But, given the sectarian turn of Iraqi politics, Sunni leaders seem likely to run on one list with a platform built around Sunni grievances in the 2014 national elections. In addition, more hardline Sunni leaders may emerge if the current politicians prove unable to achieve meaningful gains for their communities. Sunni leaders may also, if they manage to overcome their internal divisions, propose an independent Sunni region, similar to the one enjoyed by the Kurds. This would mark the end of Iraqi nationalism and put the survival of the state in question.
Maliki’s efforts to destroy his rivals have drawn him closer to Shia Iran, which has in turn affected regional power dynamics. To counter Iran’s influence, Turkey is now posing as the defender not only of Iraq’s Sunnis but also of its Kurds, even though Turkey has long feared Kurdish nationalism within its own borders. Saudi Arabia, despite its usual counterrevolutionary attitude, is supporting the rebels in Syria in hopes of replacing the Shia-Alawite regime with a Sunni government and undoing the pro-Shia axis that now runs through Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

It is up to Iraq’s politicians, then, to overcome their differences and construct a national platform that addresses the country’s challenges. Any such settlement will require making concessions regarding regional autonomy, internal border disputes, the management and distribution of oil profits, and Baghdad’s foreign policy orientation. Unfortunately, given mutual distrust, the personalization of disputes, and the upcoming electoral season, such compromises do not seem likely — particularly if Maliki insists on remaining in power indefinitely.
The American public is no doubt fatigued by the recent decades of involvement in the country and the region. But to avoid disaster, the United States urgently needs to review its Iraq policy. Washington needs to show the Iraqi people that its intent is not to divide Iraq and keep it weak — even if that appears to have been a main outcome of the U.S. intervention. U.S. President Barack Obama succeeded in keeping his campaign promise of withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq. In its second term, the Obama administration should stop supporting a status quo that is driving Iraq toward both authoritarianism and fragmentation. The United States should make clear that it neither condones nor supports the prime minister’s consolidation of power and blatant use of the Iraqi Security Forces — which the United States helped train and equip — to crack down on political opposition. Washington should make its aid to Maliki — or any other Iraqi leader — conditional on his behaving within democratic norms.
In addition, Washington should support Iraqi Shia’s attempts to select a new prime minister and should help facilitate a pact among the country’s elites in order to turn Iraq into a buffer rather than a battlefield state in the volatile region. U.S. engagement in the Middle East should seek to restrain external actors from interfering in Iraq and waging a proxy war there. Washington needs to contain Iran, but should make clear that it is not aligned with Sunnis in a regional sectarian war against Shia. This will require pushing back on Iranian influence in Iraq and simultaneously putting greater pressure on Sunni allies in the region to respect and protect their Shia populations. The United States has invested too much in Iraq to simply ignore these warning signs. Washington should use its diplomatic clout to help prevent further bloodshed.

UPDATE 1-Saudi Arabia, South Korea sign MOU on nuclear power
(Reuters) – Saudi Arabia and South Korea have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cooperate on the development of nuclear energy, Saudi state news agency SPA said, building on a deal signed in 2011.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye met with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman on Tuesday in Riyadh during an official visit, SPA said.

The MOU calls for South Korean firms to help build at least two small-to-medium sized nuclear reactors in Saudi Arabia, the South Korean presidential office said in a statement.

« If the two units go ahead, the cost of the contract will be (near) $2 billion, » the statement said.

Saudi Arabia aims to build 17 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear power by 2032 as well as around 41 GW of solar capacity. The oil exporter currently has no nuclear power.

Those plans are likely to take until 2040, the head of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), in charge of overseeing such projects, said in January.

On Tuesday, K.A.Care said in a statement: « The two sides will discuss the current mutual activities and ways and means of future collaboration, building on the bilateral agreement already signed between the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of South Korea in 2011 with a view to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful uses. »

That agreement called for cooperation in research and development, as well as in construction and training.

Separately, Saudi Electricity signed four energy-related agreements on Tuesday with U.S. company General Electric as well as South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO) , Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction and Eximbank.

The KEPCO agreement calls for cooperation in development of nuclear and renewable energy.

Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker Co. also signed a non-binding MOU with South Korea’s LG Electronics on cooperation in cooling systems for nuclear reactors.

The United Arab Emirates was the first Gulf Arab state to start building a nuclear power plant. In December 2009, the UAE awarded a group led by KEPCO a contract to build four 1,400 MW nuclear reactors to meet surging demand for electricity.

(Reporting by Reem Shamseddine and Brian Kim; editing by Rania El Gamal and Jason Neely)

Voir encore:

Turkey Launches Nuclear Plant Construction, Sparking Protest
ABC

ANKARA, Turkey — Apr 14, 2015

Turkey held a ground-breaking ceremony for the construction of parts of its first nuclear reactor, sparking an angry protest by activists.

Activists say Tuesday’s ceremony came despite ongoing court cases against the nuclear plant being built by Russia in Akkuyu, in the Mediterranean coastal province of Mersin.

Protesters blocked a gate leading to the ceremony area, briefly preventing officials from leaving the site. Security forces pushed the activists back with water cannons.

Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said the plant was designed to withstand powerful earthquakes, adding: « There cannot be a developed Turkey without nuclear energy. »

Turkey has chosen a French-Japanese consortium to build the country’s second nuclear plant on the Black Sea coast and also has plans to build a third to reduce the nation’s energy dependence.

Voir encore:

Briton who advised US in Iraq tells how tactics changed after bloody insurgency
Emma Sky, who spent four years in Iraq, says US military started reaching out to groups it had been fighting to stem violence

Nick Hopkins

16 July 2012

The British woman who became adviser to America’s most senior general in Iraq has given an insider’s account of the way the US radically changed tactics to try to stem the violence from 2007 and why military commanders started dealing with insurgents who « had blood on their hands ».

Emma Sky, 44, said she feared Iraq was in danger of becoming « the biggest strategic failure in the history of the US ». She also worried the « surge » strategy, which involved another 20,000 US troops being sent to Baghdad, might make the situation worse.

« There was so much violence that it was almost too big to comprehend. Everything had just escalated and escalated. There were occasions when I doubted whether we were ever going to break the back of it, and whether we should call it quits, » she said.

Speaking in detail for the first time about this most turbulent of periods, Sky also describes how:

• Barack Obama’s first trip to Iraq in 2009 almost turned into a diplomatic fiasco.

• She went on secret night trips into some of Baghdad’s most dangerous areas to try to gather information about the strength of the insurgency.

• She became a hostage negotiator to stop a spate of kidnaps escalating into an international crisis involving the Kurds.
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Sky was political adviser to General Ray Odierno, who was commander of all US forces in Iraq, and was also in charge of implementing the overarching « surge » strategy devised by General David Petraeus.

A British liberal who had been against the war in Iraq, she was taken on by the Americans because they respected her judgment and advice, even when it ran directly counter to their own.

Sky spent more than four years in Iraq, and was recruited by Odierno to help him implement the « surge » in 2007. She said the military realised it could not win with might alone, and had to start reaching out to groups that had been waging violence against it.

« I had confidence in our analysis. But I was not sure the strategy would work. Not because I thought it was wrong, but because I worried the situation in Iraq was so out of control our extra forces might only exacerbate the violence, not lessen it, » she said.

« There was so much violence that it was almost too big to comprehend. The military has a language that is not accidental, it is used to quarantine emotion. Every day we would hear reports that another 60 or 70 bodies had turned up, heads chopped off or drilled through. It was absolutely horrific. We could tell which groups had been behind the attacks by the way the victims had been killed. »

In the face of this, Sky said, Odierno challenged his soldiers to « understand the causes of instability, to understand the ‘why’ not just describe the ‘what’.

« It meant we would have to start dealing with people we had been fighting and for any commander that is a very difficult thing to do. We couldn’t afford to say: ‘We’ll only deal with people as long as they haven’t got blood on their hands.’ We’ve all got blood on our hands. »

Six months into the campaign, Sky said, things began to change.

« By July we started to feel things were changing. We heard it first from the battalions who described how more and more Iraqis were coming forward to give information about ‘bad guys’, and how insurgents were reaching out to do deals. There were ceasefires everywhere, local agreements, because more and more Iraqis were coming forward wanting to work with us. The intelligence we were getting improved, and the number of Iraqi casualties started to go down. »

When Obama made his first visit to Iraq, a scheduled meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, had to be abandoned because White House security staff refused to let the president fly from the American base outside Baghdad to the Green Zone because of bad weather.

Senior Iraqi politicians had always avoided the US base, called Camp Victory, because it was regarded as the seat of the occupation.

With a diplomatic standoff looming, Sky was sent to the Green Zone to see if Maliki could be persuaded to travel by car to meet Obama at the US headquarters.

Maliki was asleep when she arrived.

« So I go over to see the prime minister, who is having his afternoon siesta. I had to wake him up. I said: ‘I am terribly sorry but President Obama cannot come to Green Zone because of the weather and I hate, hate to ask of you, is there any chance you can come to Camp Victory?’ Obama was new. Everyone was excited about him, and Maliki agreed. And if Maliki agreed, then the others would probably come too. »

Inside Iraq: the British peacenik who became key to the US military
Exclusive: How Emma Sky went from anti-war academic to governor of Kirkuk, one of Iraq’s most volatile regions

Nick Hopkins, defence and security correspondent

The Guardian

15 July 2012

On the face of it, Emma Sky was not an obvious candidate to send to Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the war. She had never been to the country before, and had opposed the coalition’s invasion. She had only been to the US once and was instinctively suspicious of the military, perhaps especially the US military.

Yet on Friday, 20 June 2003 , two months after the war began, Sky boarded a flight from RAF Brize Norton, the only woman among 200 soldiers, and headed into the 50C heat and post-conflict chaos of Basra, the city in the south where the British were based.

Two weeks earlier she had been working as an international development adviser for the British Council in Manchester; now she found herself in charge of one of the most volatile regions in Iraq. The journey from north-west England to north-east Iraq owed a lot to fortune, her determination, and some barely scriptable coincidences. But Sky is the first to concede the random nature of her appointment reflected much broader failures in planning and strategy that would ultimately draw the country into a civil war.
Into the breach

Nobody’s ingenue, Sky was certainly used to operating in difficult environments; an Arabist, she had spent 10 years working in Gaza and the West Bank before returning to the UK with the British Council to advise countries in Africa, Asia and south America, on issues such as human rights and governance. When the Foreign Office asked for volunteers to go to Iraq to help with the reconstruction effort, a friend in the civil service prompted Sky to apply.

« I was against the war and I had this idea that I was going to go out to Iraq and apologise to the Iraqis for the invasion, and everything they had experienced, and I would do whatever I could to help them get back on their feet. » A few days and one short phone call later, Sky was told to report to the military air base in Oxfordshire. The Foreign Office did not give her a formal interview or briefing before she left, and she was given no detailed instructions about what to do when she landed. « I had a phone call from someone in the Foreign Office. It wasn’t a long conversation. They said ‘you’ve spent a lot of time in the Middle East, you’ll be fine’. I was told that there would be someone at the airport waiting for me, carrying a card with my name. When I got to Basra, there was nobody there, and nobody seemed to know I was coming. »

After a sleepless night on the floor in a corridor at Basra airport, Sky hitched a lift on a US Hercules transport plane to Baghdad, and then a military bus into the Republican Palace in the Green Zone. This had become the headquarters of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was supposed to be restoring order to the country.

She tracked down and introduced herself to Sir John Sawers, who was the UK’s special envoy to Iraq, (and is now head of MI6) and spent a week helping out until a proper role was found for her. Life inside the palace was bizarre. « Stately rooms had become dormitories reminiscent of wartime hospitals. At times we showered in mineral water and some days even the floors were washed with mineral water. »

Their dirty laundry was flown to Kuwait for cleaning, and engineers spent days trying to decapitate the four giant heads of Saddam Hussein, which leered from the palace ceilings. Sky says she adapted more easily than most, thanks to her « years at an all boys’ English boarding school that had honed a wide range of survival instincts which proved most useful in the jungle ».

A few days after arriving, she decided to escape into downtown Baghdad on her own – the kind of trip that was already strictly forbidden. She found herself chatting to a man selling cigarettes from a trolley. « I talked to him, he was in his 50s. He said to me ‘it’s a Hobbesian world’. And I was thinking, how does he know about Hobbes? He was referring to all the looting. Iraqis were taking revenge on the state that had controlled their lives for so long. » From the start nothing was quite as it seemed.

Under the leadership of the US diplomat Paul Bremer, the CPA was tasked with reforming and reconstructing the country; but it was always going to struggle, especially in the regions away from Baghdad, where it had fewer people.

Sky was told to fly to northern Iraq because the CPA was short of staff in Erbil, but when she arrived, the posts were already filled, and she was directed to Kirkuk. « They said, ‘we’ve nobody in Kirkuk, so go there’. »

On the border of the autonomous Kurdish area, and 150 miles north of Baghdad, Kirkuk is an ancient, oil-rich city, with tribal rivalries that date back to the Ottoman Empire.

And so this 35-year-old Oxford graduate who had almost fallen out of the Black Hawk helicopter that took her to the city for the first time (« I couldn’t get my harness on and I couldn’t understand why they’d left the door open ») became the governate co-ordinator of this restive area. She reported directly to ambassador Bremer.

In the days before she took up her new post, he invited her to join him on a short tour of the north, which included dinner with the Kurdish leader, Masoud Barzani, in the town of Sari Rash. During the meal, Bremer spoke about America’s 4 July Independence Day, which was the next day, and then he turned to Sky for a comment. « I managed to say something about wishing all our former colonies the same success as America. I wondered, how on Earth have I got here? How on Earth had someone like me, a British liberal, become part of a US-led invasion that I had opposed? »

Welcome to Kirkuk

From the airport in Kirkuk, Sky was taken to modern villa near the centre of the city, a base she was supposed to share with a group of American contractors and engineers. But within days, this idea looked a trifle optimistic, as did any notion that a new Iraq would emerge easily from the shadow of the old.

« We received intelligence that the house might be targeted, » said Sky. « We had to turn the lights out at dusk and we slept fully clothed away from the windows. On my fifth night, five mortars were fired at the house. The noise was deafening and seemed to be coming from all sides. We were under attack. I struggled into my body armour and ran down to the safest part of the building where the others were already huddled. We sat in the darkness for what seemed like hours. »

Most of the staff abandoned the villa the following day, but Sky decided to stay. Two nights later, the house was attacked again by gunmen who appeared determined to storm the building. « I woke to the sound of automatic gunfire followed by massive explosions. Dust poured in through the sandbags. I curled up in a ball in bed with my hands over my ears, paralysed by the sound. The attack lasted half an hour … it was only when it was over that I discovered that four rocket propelled grenades had been fired at the house, and one had entered a couple of metres from my bed. »

The private security guards who tried to defend the house believed it was too vulnerable, so Sky accepted the offer of a bunk on the airfield in a US airforce tent, which she shared with seven men. This required her to become expert in the military’s « three-minute showers (30 seconds to soap, two and a half minutes to rinse).

Narrowly avoiding death within her first week was an inauspicious start to her governorship, and the task ahead remained unclear. This was underlined to her a few days later when Sawers arrived in Kirkuk on his farewell tour of the country. He invited Sky to join his entourage, and during the trip, she sought his advice. « His parting advice to me was to become a trusted partner to all groups and to get to know the Turkmen, » she said. « And that, in essence, was as far as guidance from CPA went in the early months. »

With few staff of her own, no orders from Baghdad, and reliant on the US military for protection, Sky concluded there was only one way to get anything done. She would have to work with the 3,500 soldiers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade who were based on the outskirts of the city.

« I was a British civilian volunteer who had arrived accidentally in Kirkuk. I looked around and decided to work closely with the military. They were the ones with the power, with the resources, with the bureaucracy. I could spend all my time watching what they do and reporting back on all their mistakes, or I could look at how to work with them. So I rolled up my sleeves, knuckled down. I learned the rank structure, the handshakes, the jokes, the code. »

Sky did this with some trepidation – she had never worked with the military before – and some of those she spoke to at first did their best to confirm her fears. One American officer told her working in Iraq was « like being on Planet of the Apes ». And she heard soldiers referring to Iraqis as « haji », which is an honorific in Arabic, but was being used in a derogatory way, as a racial slur. Some mocked the Iraqi people for living in mud huts, wearing « man dresses » and giving « man kisses ».

« They had come into contact with an ancient civilisation with people who knew their lineage back through centuries, who had survived under the harshest of dictatorships. They did not understand the people they were dealing with. » Sometimes offence was caused unwittingly. In one effort to foster relations with community leaders, the US air force invited a group of dignitaries to a military entertainment show. The « tops and stripes » evening included a mildly racy dance involving women flipping up their skirts. The guests walked out, quickly followed by Sky, who assured them that no offence had been intended.
Abu Ghraib
Iraqi inmates line up for a body search in Abu Ghraib prison: the detention of young men and evidence of torture at Abu Ghraib radicalised many Iraqis. Photograph: John Moore/AP

Sky set about learning the history of Kirkuk and ventured out into the city, in her soft-topped car, to speak to people about their problems. The military seemed genuinely perplexed that Iraqis seemed so hostile. « The brigade viewed themselves as liberators and were angry that Iraqis were not more grateful. One of the questions put to me was, ‘what do we need to do to be loved?’ I told them that people who invaded other peoples’ countries, and killed people who were no threat to them, would never be loved. I said that after the first Gulf war which killed 100,000 Iraqis, a decade of sanctions with the devastating effects on health, education and economy, and the humiliating defeat of the second Gulf war, I could well understand why Iraqis were shooting at us. »

Sky found an unlikely kindred spirit in Colonel William Mayville, the brigade commander with a cowboy swagger. They shared the same goal – to help Kirkuk get on its feet so the military could withdraw. And he also believed – wrongly – her presence heralded the arrival of an army of civilians that would enable his brigade to go home. One of the US military’s rising stars, Mayville loved listening to opera and had a team of highly educated officers – all of which came as a surprise to Sky. As did their willingness to listen to this opinionated Englishwoman who had appeared in their midst.
The restless natives

Sky was included in all classified « battle update briefs » about security operations, and discussions about what the military should be doing next. When she arrived in Kirkuk, the military was running everything in the city. But that was part of the problem. Sky said success should be defined as Kirkukis running their own affairs: the job of the coalition was not to do it for them, but to help them do it themselves.

She and Mayville formed « team government » – a military and civilian partnership, developing ideas that were later reflected in America’s new counter-insurgency strategy. They established the Kirkuk Development Commission to kickstart the local economy. And they also encouraged Iraqis to register any complaints they had about the coalition, including damage done to property during raids.

The two shared an office on the first floor of an old government building in the city centre. « Every day, there were long queues outside our door, with Kirkukis wanting to tell us about weapons of mass destruction or sightings of Saddam. Others were asking for jobs or complaining about services. It was madness, » said Sky.

Among the myriad issues were two that were intertwined; the property claims of 250,000 Kurds who had been expelled from their homes in the city during the 1970s – when Saddam Hussein set out to « arabise » Kirkuk by moving hundreds of families there from the south. The second issue was whether Kirkuk should secede from Iraq and become part of the Kurdish enclave in the north.

Sky urged the CPA to give Kirkuk special status because of its unique make-up; she met the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the US deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, when they made flying visits to the city. She argued Kirkuk needed to be exempted from the rush to Iraqi governance the CPA was demanding in other areas. On 19 September 2003, Sky was summoned to a meeting in Baghdad with Bremer and his deputy, the British diplomat Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

Her idea, she says, « was torpedoed » because of concerns that a precedent might be set. Bremer promised Sky that Kirkuk would be treated as a priority – but it wasn’t, because there were so many other priorities.

Sky didn’t find any mourning for Saddam, but she sensed growing anger about decisions taken in Baghdad that had dire consequences on the ground. « I had arrived ready to apologise to every Iraqi for the war. Instead I had listened to a litany of suffering and pain under Saddam for which I was quite unprepared. The mass graves, the details of torture, the bureaucratisation of abuse. The pure banality of evil. But the Iraqis also had huge expectations of the US. After every war Saddam rebuilt the country in six months, so their attitude was, ‘imagine what the US can do after six months. America can put a man on the moon … you wait’. »

Sky admits the CPA simply could not meet these expectations and no amount of hard work from many experienced British and American volunteers could make up for the lack of planning before the invasion. It left the CPA – which was assembled in haste and from scratch – attempting to restore public services, disband the security forces and build new ones, as well as introduce a free market and democracy. « No organisation would have been able to implement such an agenda, particularly without the consent of the population. Those in Baghdad struggled to cope with the daily crises, whilst those in the provinces were often left to their own devices. Some Americans believed Iraq could become a democracy that would serve as a model for the region. Most Iraqis had not consented to this experiment, or to being occupied by foreign forces. »

Driven on by « zealous Iraqi exiles who had no proper constituency », Sky says some senior members of the CPA and the US government seemed to see Iraq as « an experiment, an incubator for bringing in democracy ».

One of the most contentious CPA orders involved the « de-Ba’athification » of society. This demanded that any member of Saddam’s Ba’ath party at grade four level and above should be dismissed, regardless of whether there was any evidence of actual complicity in crimes. Thousands of professional people in Kirkuk lost their jobs at a stroke – including teachers and doctors.

« Demonising the Ba’ath party to this degree was dangerous, » said Sky. « The whole process hit us very, very hard. It did not affect all communities evenly. Some Sunni areas ended up with no doctors in their hospitals and no teachers in their schools. What did the coalition really know about Iraq? Nothing. De-Ba’athification was based on de-Nazification. It didn’t bring catharsis, or justice. It became highly politicised and brought more and more anger. Everybody who had stayed in Iraq had, in order to survive, become complicit to some way with the regime. But instead of saying we have all suffered, and let’s talk about how we deal with the past, this pitted people against each other. De-Ba’athification became a witch-hunt. I don’t think any society could have withstood what we did to it in terms of disbanding the security forces and sacking its civil servants. »

Sky said the brigade started to become « contemptuous of the CPA and its lack of clear policies and obstruction of their work. Their experiences of Iraq led the military to regard most civilians and their agencies as largely incompetent and impotent ».

A fresh insurgency

Sky realised many local Sunni Arabs were joining an emerging insurgency because they felt excluded from the Shia-led Iraq. « Iraqis felt humiliated by the presence of foreign troops on their soil. Right from the outset, there was resistance from former regime members as well as foreign fighters who entered the country to fight jihad. But it was the de-Ba’athication and dissolving of the military that led many Sunnis to believe that there was no future for them and to oppose the coalition as well as the Iraqi leaders they had put in power. »

The US commander in overall charge of the Kirkuk region, Major General Ray Odierno, issued an amnesty to teachers and doctors caught up in de-Ba’athification in an attempt to defuse the issue. But Baghdad controlled the payroll and cut them off.

A mix of resentments and fears fuelled violence to a level nobody had foreseen. « The US military was not trained or prepared to deal with such a situation and they met violence with violence. There were continuous raids and mass round-ups of military-aged males. There were no suitable facilities to hold the detainees, nor systems to process them, and many became radicalised in detention. » Worst of all, she says, was the evidence that US soldiers were abusing detainees in Abu Ghraib prison.

Kirkuk did not escape the bloodshed, and its victims included community leaders Sky had encouraged to help her shape the city’s new landscape. « I had worked in places overseas for a long time, but I had not worked with people who had been killed, or had been killed because of their relationship with me. I spent a lot of time with the provincial council and about a quarter of the people on council were killed. There was always that sense that we had come into their lives and said, ‘who is going to stand up and serve their province?’, and they had come forward, and some of them had been killed. If we had never come into their lives that would never have happened. Some were killed because they stood forward to join the council, some were killed because they were seen as close to the coalition. I can still see their faces, I remember going to their funerals, speaking to their kids. »

By February 2004, Sky had returned to work at the CPA’s headquarters in Baghdad, where life had become even more stressful for its staff. The number of attacks on the Green Zone had reached such a level that people had stopped running to the shelters when the siren sounded – and the siren didn’t always sound.

Beyond the wire and thick bomb-resistant walls, fliers were appearing all over the capital denouncing the occupation. « Everyone was working incredibly hard but I wasn’t convinced we knew who we were fighting, or why they were fighting. » One man who knew that Sky brought a different perspective on Iraq was Odierno, who had a fearsome reputation as an « old school » soldier.

He had watched Sky reaching out to people in Kirkuk and liked the way she worked with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. In almost all respects, Sky and Odierno were different; she is diminutive, precise and controlled. Shaven-headed and muscular, Odierno is a giant, whose military call sign was Iron Horse. He and Sky developed a rapport that became as important as it was unlikely. « Odierno never questioned why one of his commanders had brought in a British civilian woman into an American brigade. I found him honest, straightforward and direct. Whenever he arrived in Kirkuk, we felt a huge sense of relief. He always gave us support and asked how he could help. And he always asked my opinion about why the violence was happening. I think he recognised the solutions were not simply military ones. »

When Odierno returned to Iraq two and a half years later to lead US forces during « the surge », the general decided he needed more than military might to stop Iraq’s vicious civil war. He asked Sky to join his team.

Voir encore:

Inside Iraq: ‘We had to deal with people who had blood on their hands’
Exclusive: Emma Sky – a British civilian who advised US commanders in Iraq – explains how the surge changed military tactics, and why Obama’s Baghdad trip almost ended in disaster

Part one of our exclusive interview with Emma Sky

Nick Hopkins

The Guardian

16 July 2012

Emma Sky was at her home in Wandsworth, south-west London in September 2006, when she received an email from a friend in the US. At first she tried to ignore it. But Sky knew she wouldn’t refuse him his unusual request.

The author was General Raymond T Odierno, one of the US army’s most senior officers. He was about to return to Iraq to head « Phantom Corps » in a last ditch attempt to stop violence tearing the country apart.

And he wanted Sky to go with him as his political adviser.

« I hadn’t been in Iraq for two years and had just done a six-month tour in Afghanistan, so the email came as something of a surprise. When he asked me to return I was flattered. I also felt that if anyone could make a difference in Iraq it was Odierno. The general is a good listener, he doesn’t think he knows the whole truth, he is intell