3 a.m. There is a phone in the White House and it’s ringing. Who do you want answering the phone? Hillary Clinton ad (2008)
The assassination of Iran Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani is an extremely dangerous and foolish escalation. The US bears responsibility for all consequences of its rogue adventurism. Mohammad Javad Zarif (Iranian Foreign Minister)
Le président Trump vient de jeter un bâton de dynamite dans une poudrière, et il doit au peuple américain une explication. C’est une énorme escalade dans une région déjà dangereuse. Joe Biden
Iraqis — Iraqis — dancing in the street for freedom; thankful that General Soleimani is no more. Mike Pompeo
Qassem Soleimani was an arch terrorist with American blood on his hands. His demise should be applauded by all who seek peace and justice. Proud of President Trump for doing the strong and right thing. Nikki Haley
To Iran and its proxy militias: We will not accept the continued attacks against our personnel and forces in the region. Attacks against us will be met with responses in the time, manner and place of our choosing. We urge the Iranian regime to end malign activities. Mark Esper (US Defense Secretary)
At the direction of the President, the U.S. military has taken decisive defensive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad by killing Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. General Soleimani was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region. General Soleimani and his Quds Force were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition service members and the wounding of thousands more. He had orchestrated attacks on coalition bases in Iraq over the last several months – including the attack on December 27th – culminating in the death and wounding of additional American and Iraqi personnel. General Soleimani also approved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad that took place this week. This strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans. The United States will continue to take all necessary action to protect our people and our interests wherever they are around the world. US state department
In March 2007, Soleimani was included on a list of Iranian individuals targeted with sanctions in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747. On 18 May 2011, he was sanctioned again by the U.S. along with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and other senior Syrian officials due to his alleged involvement in providing material support to the Syrian government. On 24 June 2011, the Official Journal of the European Union said the three Iranian Revolutionary Guard members now subject to sanctions had been « providing equipment and support to help the Syrian government suppress protests in Syria ». The Iranians added to the EU sanctions list were two Revolutionary Guard commanders, Soleimani, Mohammad Ali Jafari, and the Guard’s deputy commander for intelligence, Hossein Taeb. Soleimani was also sanctioned by the Swiss government in September 2011 on the same grounds cited by the European Union. In 2007, the U.S. included him in a « Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism », which forbade U.S. citizens from doing business with him. The list, published in the EU’s Official Journal on 24 June 2011, also included a Syrian property firm, an investment fund and two other enterprises accused of funding the Syrian government. The list also included Mohammad Ali Jafari and Hossein Taeb. On 13 November 2018, the U.S. sanctioned an Iraqi military leader named Shibl Muhsin ‘Ubayd Al-Zaydi and others who allegedly were acting on Soleimani’s behalf in financing military actions in Syria or otherwise providing support for terrorism in the region. Wikipedia
The historic nuclear accord between a US-led group of countries and Iran was good news for a man who some consider to be the Middle East’s most effective covert operative. As a result of the deal, Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force and the general responsible for overseeing Iran’s network of proxy organizations, will be removed from European Union sanctions lists once the agreement is implemented, and taken off a UN sanctions list after eight or fewer years. Iran obtained some key concessions as a result of the nuclear agreement, including access to an estimated $150 billion in frozen assets; the lifting of a UN arms embargo, the eventual end to sanctions related to the country’s ballistic missile program; the ability to operate over 5,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges and to run stable elements through centrifuges at the once-clandestine and heavily guarded Fordow facility; nuclear assistance from the US and its partners; and the ability to stall inspections of sensitive sites for as long as 24 days. In light of these accomplishments, the de-listing of a general responsible for coordinating anti-US militia groups in Iraq — someone who may be responsible for the deaths of US soldiers — almost seems gratuitous. It’s unlikely that the entire deal hinged on a single Iranian officer’s ability to open bank accounts in EU states or travel within Europe. But it got into the deal anyway. So did a reprieve for Bank Saderat, which the US sanctioned in 2006 for facilitating money transfers to Iranian regime-supported terror groups like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. As part of the deal, Bank Saderat will leave the EU sanctions list on the same timetable as Suleimani, although it will remain under US designation. Like Suleimani’s removal, Bank Saderat’s apparent legalization in Europe suggests that for the purposes of the deal, the US and its partners lumped a broad range of restrictions under the heading of « nuclear-related » sanctions. Suleimani and Bank Saderat are still going to remain under US sanctions related to the Iranian regime’s human rights abuses and support for terrorism. US sanctions have broad extraterritorial reach, and the US Treasury Department has turned into the scourge of compliance desks at banks around the world. But that matters to a somewhat lesser degree inside of the EU, where companies have actually been exempted from complying with certain US « secondary sanctions » on Iran since the mid-1990s. (…) Some time in the next few years, Qasem Suleimani will be able to travel and do business inside the EU, while a bank that’s facilitated the funding of US-listed terror group’s will be allowed to enter the European market. As part of the nuclear deal, the US and its partners bargained away much of the international leverage against some of the more problematic sectors in the Iranian regime, including entities whose wrongdoing went well beyond the nuclear realm. The result is the almost complete reversal of the sanctions regime in Europe. Iran successfully pushed for a broad definition of « nuclear-related sanctions, » and bargained hard — and effectively — for a maximal degree of sanctions relief. And the de-listing of Bank Saderat and Qasem Suleimani, along with the late-breaking effort to classify arms trade restrictions as purely nuclear-related, demonstrates just how far the US and its partners were willing to go to close a historic nuclear deal. Armin Rosen
This was a combatant. There’s no doubt that he fit the description of ‘combatant.’ He was a uniformed member of an enemy military who was actively planning to kill Americans; American soldiers and probably, as well, American civilians. It was the right thing to do. It was legally justified, and I think we should applaud the president for his decision. We send a very powerful message to the Iranian government that we will not stand by as the American embassy is attacked — which is an act of war — and we will not stand by as plans are being made to attack and kill American soldiers. I think every president who had any degree of courage would do the same thing, and I applaud our president for doing it, and the members of the military who carried it out, risking their own lives and safety. I think this is an action that will have saved lives in the end. The president doesn’t need congressional authorization, or any legal authorization … The president, as the commander-in-chief of the army is entitled to take preventive actions to save the lives of the American military. This is very similar to what Barack Obama did with Ben Rhodes’s authorization and approval — without Congress’s authorization — in killing Osama bin Laden. In fact, that was worse, in some ways, because that was a revenge act. There was no real threat that Osama bin Laden would carry out any future terrorist acts. Moreover, he was not a member of an official armed forces in uniform, so it’s a fortiori from what Obama did and Rhodes did that President Trump has complete legal authority in a much more compelling way to have taken the military action that was taken today. Alan Dershowitz
Trump in full fascist 101 mode-,steal and lie – untill there’s nothing left and start a war – He’s so idiotic he doesn’t know he just attacked Iran And that’s not like anywhere else. John Cusak
Dear #Iran, The USA has disrespected your country, your flag, your people. 52% of us humbly apologize. We want peace with your nation. We are being held hostage by a terrorist regime. We do not know how to escape. Please do not kill us. #Soleimani. Rose McGowan
On se réveille dans un monde plus dangereux (…) et l’escalade militaire est toujours dangereuse. Amélie de Montchalin (secrétaire d’État française aux Affaires européennes)
C’est d’abord l’Iranienne qui va vous répondre et celle-là ne peut que se réjouir de ce qui s’est passé. Je parle en mon nom mais je peux vous l’assurer aussi au nom de millions d’Iraniens, probablement la majorité d’entre eux : cet homme était haï, il incarnait le mal absolu ! Je suis révoltée par les commentaires que j’ai entendus venant de certains pseudo-spécialistes de l’Iran, le présentant sur une chaîne de télévision comme un individu charismatique et populaire. Il faut ne rien connaître et ne rien comprendre à ce pays pour tenir ce genre de sottises. Pour l’Iranien lambda, Soleimani était un monstre, ce qui se fait de pire dans la République islamique. (…) Soleimani en était un élément essentiel, aussi puissant que Khameini et ce n’est pas de la propagande que d’affirmer que sa mort ne choque presque personne. (…) Je ne suis pas dans le secret des généraux iraniens mais une simple observatrice informée. Le régime est aux abois depuis des mois, totalement isolé. Ils savent qu’ils n’ont pas d’avenir, la rue et le peuple n’en veulent plus, ils ne peuvent pas vraiment compter sur l’Union européenne et pas plus sur la Chine. Ils n’ont aucun avenir et c’est ce qui rend la situation particulièrement dangereuse car ils sont dans une logique suicidaire. (…) En réalité, ils ont tout perdu et ne peuvent plus sortir du pays pour s’installer à l’étranger car des mandats ont été lancés contre la plupart d’entre eux. Les sanctions ont asséché la manne des pétrodollars et c’est essentiel car il n’y avait pas d’adhésion idéologique à ce régime. (…) Donald Trump (…) a considérablement affaibli ce régime, comme jamais auparavant, et peut-être même a-t-il signé leur arrêt de mort. Nous verrons. Lors des manifestations populaires, à Téhéran et dans d’autre villes, les noms de Khameini, de Rohani, de Soleimani étaient hués. Il n’y a jamais eu de slogans anti-Trump ou contre les Etats-Unis. (…) [Mais] hélas ils n’abandonneront pas le pouvoir tranquillement, j’en suis convaincue. Mahnaz Shirali
The whole “protest” against the United States Embassy compound in Baghdad last week was almost certainly a Suleimani-staged operation to make it look as if Iraqis wanted America out when in fact it was the other way around. The protesters were paid pro-Iranian militiamen. No one in Baghdad was fooled by this. In a way, it’s what got Suleimani killed. He so wanted to cover his failures in Iraq he decided to start provoking the Americans there by shelling their forces, hoping they would overreact, kill Iraqis and turn them against the United States. Trump, rather than taking the bait, killed Suleimani instead. I have no idea whether this was wise or what will be the long-term implications. But (…) Suleimani is part of a system called the Islamic Revolution in Iran. That revolution has managed to use oil money and violence to stay in power since 1979 — and that is Iran’s tragedy, a tragedy that the death of one Iranian general will not change. Today’s Iran is the heir to a great civilization and the home of an enormously talented people and significant culture. Wherever Iranians go in the world today, they thrive as scientists, doctors, artists, writers and filmmakers — except in the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose most famous exports are suicide bombing, cyberterrorism and proxy militia leaders. The very fact that Suleimani was probably the most famous Iranian in the region speaks to the utter emptiness of this regime, and how it has wasted the lives of two generations of Iranians by looking for dignity in all the wrong places and in all the wrong ways. (…) in the coming days there will be noisy protests in Iran, the burning of American flags and much crying for the “martyr.” The morning after the morning after? There will be a thousand quiet conversations inside Iran that won’t get reported. They will be about the travesty that is their own government and how it has squandered so much of Iran’s wealth and talent on an imperial project that has made Iran hated in the Middle East. And yes, the morning after, America’s Sunni Arab allies will quietly celebrate Suleimani’s death, but we must never forget that it is the dysfunction of many of the Sunni Arab regimes — their lack of freedom, modern education and women’s empowerment — that made them so weak that Iran was able to take them over from the inside with its proxies. (…) the Middle East, particularly Iran, is becoming an environmental disaster area — running out of water, with rising desertification and overpopulation. If governments there don’t stop fighting and come together to build resilience against climate change — rather than celebrating self-promoting military frauds who conquer failed states and make them fail even more — they’re all doomed. Thomas L. Friedman
It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action. It is more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even the death of [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi. Suleimani was the architect and operational commander of the Iranian effort to solidify control of the so-called Shia crescent, stretching from Iran to Iraq through Syria into southern Lebanon. He is responsible for providing explosives, projectiles, and arms and other munitions that killed well over 600 American soldiers and many more of our coalition and Iraqi partners just in Iraq, as well as in many other countries such as Syria. So his death is of enormous significance. The question of course is how does Iran respond in terms of direct action by its military and Revolutionary Guard Corps forces? And how does it direct its proxies—the Iranian-supported Shia militia in Iraq and Syria and southern Lebanon, and throughout the world? (…) The reasoning seems to be to show in the most significant way possible that the U.S. is just not going to allow the continued violence—the rocketing of our bases, the killing of an American contractor, the attacks on shipping, on unarmed drones—without a very significant response. Many people had rightly questioned whether American deterrence had eroded somewhat because of the relatively insignificant responses to the earlier actions. This clearly was of vastly greater importance. Of course it also, per the Defense Department statement, was a defensive action given the reported planning and contingencies that Suleimani was going to Iraq to discuss and presumably approve. This was in response to the killing of an American contractor, the wounding of American forces, and just a sense of how this could go downhill from here if the Iranians don’t realize that this cannot continue. (…) Iran is in a very precarious economic situation, it is very fragile domestically—they’ve killed many, many hundreds if not thousands of Iranian citizens who were demonstrating on the streets of Iran in response to the dismal economic situation and the mismanagement and corruption. I just don’t see the Iranians as anywhere near as supportive of the regime at this point as they were decades ago during the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly the supreme leader has to consider that as Iran considers the potential responses to what the U.S. has done. It will be interesting now to see if there is a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reach out to Iran and to say, “Okay, the next move could be strikes against your oil infrastructure and your forces in your country—where does that end?” (…) We haven’t declared war, but we have taken a very, very significant action. (…) We’ve taken numerous actions to augment our air defenses in the region, our offensive capabilities in the region, in terms of general purpose and special operations forces and air assets. The Pentagon has considered the implications, the potential consequences and has done a great deal to mitigate the risks—although you can’t fully mitigate the potential risks. (…) Again what was the alternative? Do it in Iran? Think of the implications of that. This is the most formidable adversary that we have faced for decades. He is a combination of CIA director, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] commander, and special presidential envoy for the region. This is a very significant effort to reestablish deterrence, which obviously had not been shored up by the relatively insignificant responses up until now. (…) Obviously all sides will suffer if this becomes a wider war, but Iran has to be very worried that—in the state of its economy, the significant popular unrest and demonstrations against the regime—that this is a real threat to the regime in a way that we have not seen prior to this. (…) The incentive would be to get out from under the sanctions, which are crippling. Could we get back to the Iran nuclear deal plus some additional actions that could address the shortcomings of the agreement? This is a very significant escalation, and they don’t know where this goes any more than anyone else does. Yes, they can respond and they can retaliate, and that can lead to further retaliation—and that it is clear now that the administration is willing to take very substantial action. This is a pretty clarifying moment in that regard. (…) Right now they are probably doing what anyone does in this situation: considering the menu of options. There could be actions in the gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz by proxies in the regional countries, and in other continents where the Quds Force have activities. There’s a very considerable number of potential responses by Iran, and then there’s any number of potential U.S. responses to those actions. Given the state of their economy, I think they have to be very leery, very concerned that that could actually result in the first real challenge to the regime certainly since the Iran-Iraq War. (…) The [Iraqi] prime minister has said that he would put forward legislation to [kick the U.S. military out of Iraq], although I don’t think that the majority of Iraqi leaders want to see that given that ISIS is still a significant threat. They are keenly aware that it was not the Iranian supported militias that defeated the Islamic State, it was U.S.-enabled Iraqi armed forces and special forces that really fought the decisive battles. Gen. David Petraeus
[Qasem Soleimani] was our most significant Iranian adversary during my four years in Iraq, [and] certainly when I was the Central Command commander, and very much so when I was the director of the CIA. He is unquestionably the most significant and important — or was the most significant and important — Iranian figure in the region, the most important architect of the effort by Iran to solidify control of the Shia crescent, and the operational commander of the various initiatives that were part of that effort. (…) He sent a message to me through the president of Iraq in late March of 2008, during the battle of Basra, when we were supporting the Iraqi army forces that were battling the Shia militias in Basra that were supported, of course, by Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force. He sent a message through the president that said, « General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control the policy of Iran for Iraq, and also for Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. » And the implication of that was, « If you want to deal with Iran to resolve this situation in Basra, you should deal with me, not with the Iranian diplomats. » And his power only grew from that point in time. By the way, I did not — I actually told the president to tell Qasem Soleimani to pound sand. (…) I suspect that the leaders in Washington were seeking to reestablish deterrence, which clearly had eroded to some degree, perhaps by the relatively insignificant actions in response to these strikes on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia, shipping in the Gulf and our $130 million dollar drone that was shot down. And we had seen increased numbers of attacks against US forces in Iraq. So I’m sure that there was a lot of discussion about what could show the Iranians most significantly that we are really serious, that they should not continue to escalate. Now, obviously, there is a menu of options that they have now and not just in terms of direct Iranian action against perhaps our large bases in the various Gulf states, shipping in the Gulf, but also through proxy actions — and not just in the region, but even in places such as Latin America and Africa and Europe. (…) I am not privy to the intelligence that was the foundation for the decision, which clearly was, as was announced, this was a defensive action, that Soleimani was going into the country to presumably approve further attacks. Without really being in the inner circle on that, I think it’s very difficult to either second-guess or to even think through what the recommendation might have been. Again, it is impossible to overstate the significance of this action. This is much more substantial than the killing of Osama bin Laden. It’s even more substantial than the killing of Baghdadi. (…) my understanding is that we have significantly shored up our air defenses, our air assets, our ground defenses and so forth. There’s been the movement of a lot of forces into the region in months, not just in the past days. So there’s been a very substantial augmentation of our defensive capabilities and also our offensive capabilities. And (…) the question Iran has to ask itself is, « Where does this end? » If they now retaliate in a significant way — and considering how vulnerable their infrastructure and forces are at a time when their economy is in dismal shape because of the sanctions. So Iran is not in a position of strength, although it clearly has many, many options available to it, as I mentioned, not just with their armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, but also with these Quds Force-supported proxy elements throughout the region in the world. (…) I think one of the questions is, « What will the diplomatic ramifications of this be? » And again, there have been celebrations in some places in Iraq at the loss of Qasem Soleimani. So, again, there’s no tears being shed in certain parts of the country. And one has to ask what happens in the wake of the killing of the individual who had a veto, virtually, over the leadership of Iraq. What transpires now depends on the calculations of all these different elements. And certainly the US, I would assume, is considering diplomatic initiatives as well, reaching out and saying, « Okay. Does that send a sufficient message of our seriousness? Now, would you like to return to the table? » Or does Iran accelerate the nuclear program, which would, of course, precipitate something further from the United States? Very likely. So lots of calculations here. And I think we’re still very early in the deliberations on all the different ramifications of this very significant action. (…) I think that this particular episode has been fairly impressively handled. There’s been restraint in some of the communications methods from the White House. The Department of Defense put out, I think, a solid statement. It has taken significant actions, again, to shore up our defenses and our offensive capabilities. The question now, I think, is what is the diplomatic initiative that follows this? What will the State Department and the Secretary of State do now to try to get back to the table and reduce or end the battlefield consequences? [The flag that Donald Trump posted last night, no words] (…) I think relative to some of his tweets that was quite restrained. Gen. David Petraeus
Washington gave Israel a green light to assassinate Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida reported on Monday. Al-Jarida, which in recent years had broken exclusive stories from Israel, quoted a source in Jerusalem as saying that « there is an American-Israeli agreement » that Soleimani is a « threat to the two countries’ interests in the region. » It is generally assumed in the Arab world that the paper is used as an Israeli platform for conveying messages to other countries in the Middle East. (…) The agreement between Israel and the United States, according to the report, comes three years after Washington thwarted an Israeli attempt to kill the general. The report says Israel was « on the verge » of assassinating Soleimani three years ago, near Damascus, but the United States warned the Iranian leadership of the plan, revealing that Israel was closely tracking the Iranian general. Haaretz (2018)
Most revered military leader’ now joins ‘austere religious scholar’ and ‘mourners’ trying to storm our embassy as word choices that make normal people wonder whose side the American mainstream media is on. Buck Sexton
Make no mistake – this is bigger than taking out Osama Bin Laden. Ranj Alaaldin
The reported deaths of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani and the Iraqi commander of the militia that killed an American last week was a bold and decisive military action made possible by excellent intelligence and the courage of America’s service members. His death is a huge loss for Iran’s regime and its Iraqi proxies, and a major operational and psychological victory for the United States. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by Suleimani, was responsible for the deaths of more than 600 Americans in Iraq between 2003-2011, and countless more injured. He was a chief architect behind Iran’s continuing reign of terror in the region. This strike against one of the world’s most odious terrorists is no different than the mission which took out Osama bin Laden – it is, in fact, even more justifiable since he was in a foreign country directing terrorist attacks against Americans. Lt. Col. (Ret.) James Carafano (Heritage Foundation)
This is a major blow. I would argue that this is probably the most major decapitation strike the United States has ever carried out. … This is a man who controlled a transnational foreign legion that was controlling governments in numerous different countries. He had a hell of a lot of power and a hell of a lot of control. You have to be a strong leader in order to get these people to work with you, know how and when to play them off one another, and also know which Iranians do I need within the IRGC-QF, which Lebanese do I need, which Iraqis do I need … that’s not something you can just pick up at a local five and dime. It takes decades of experience. (…) It’s an incredible two-fer. This is another one of those old hands. These guys don’t grow on trees. It takes time. Iran has been at war with the United States since the Islamic Revolutionary regime took power in Tehran in 1979. To say that we are going to war or that this is yet another American escalation — I think we need to be a little more detailed. Over the past year, Kata’ib Hizballah, was launching rockets and mortars at Americans in Iraq and eventually killed one. Over the past couple of years we’ve had a number of issues in the Gulf, we’ve had a number of issues in different countries, we’ve had international terrorism issues, you name it, you can throw everything at the wall, and the Iranians have in some way been behind some of it. Even arm supplies to the Taliban … so this didn’t just appear in a vacuum because ‘we didn’t like the Iranians. What the administration must offer now is firm diplomacy backed by the continuing, credible threat of the use of military force. President Trump has wisely shown that he will act with the full powers of his office when American interests are threatened, and the extremist regime in Tehran would be wise to take notice. Phillip Smyth (Washington Institute)
From a military and diplomatic perspective, Soleimani was Iran’s David Petraeus and Stan McChrystal and Brett McGurk all rolled into one. And that’s now the problem Iran faces. I do not know of a single Iranian who was more indispensable to his government’s ambitions in the Middle East. From 2015 to 2017, when we were in the heat of the fighting against the Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq, I would watch Soleimani shuttle back and forth between Syria and Iraq. When the war to prop up Bashar al-Assad was going poorly, Soleimani would leave Iraq for Syria. And when Iranian-backed militias in Iraq began to struggle against the Islamic State, Soleimani would leave Syria for Iraq. That’s now a problem for Iran. Just as the United States often faces a shortage of human capital—not all general officers and diplomats are created equal, sadly, and we are not exactly blessed with a surplus of Arabic speakers in our government—Iran also doesn’t have a lot of talent to go around. One of the reasons I thought Iran erred so often in Yemen—giving strategic weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles to a bunch of undertrained Houthi yahoos, for example—was a lack of adult supervision. Qassem Soleimani was the adult supervision. He was spread thin over the past decade, but he was nonetheless a serious if nefarious adversary of the United States and its partners in the region. And Iran and its partners will now feel his loss greatly. Soleimani was at least partially, and in many cases directly, responsible for dozens if not hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq going back to the height of the Iraq War. Andrew Exum
Soleimani is responsible for the Iranian military terror reign across the Middle East. Many Arab Muslims across the region are celebrating today. Unfortunately, many US Democrats are not. Instead, they are criticizing President Trump. If the death of Soleimani leads to any escalation, it is the Islamic regime of Iran that is to blame. The same Islamic terror regime that past President Obama wanted to align as the US closest ally in the Middle East, handing them the disastrous nuclear deal, as well as billions of dollars in cash. As Iran considers the US “big satan” and Israel as “little satan”, Israel is on high alert for any Iranian attacks in retaliation. Iran has always viewed an attack on Israeli interests as an attack on the USA. Avi Abelow
The successful operation against Qassem Suleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is a stunning blow to international terrorism and a reassertion of American might. (…) President Trump has conditioned his policies on Iranian behavior. When Iran spread its malign influence, Trump acted to check it. When Iran struck, Trump hit back: never disproportionately, never definitively. He left open the possibility of negotiations. He doesn’t want to have the greater Middle East — whether Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, or Afghanistan — dominate his presidency the way it dominated those of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. America no longer needs Middle Eastern oil. Best to keep the region on the back burner and watch it so it doesn’t boil over. Do not overcommit resources to this underdeveloped, war-torn, sectarian land. The result was reciprocal antagonism. In 2018, Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated by his predecessor. He began jacking up sanctions. The Iranian economy turned to a shambles. This “maximum pressure” campaign of economic warfare deprived the Iranian war machine of revenue and drove a wedge between the Iranian public and the Iranian government. Trump offered the opportunity to negotiate a new agreement. Iran refused. And began to lash out. Last June, Iran’s fingerprints were all over two oil tankers that exploded in the Persian Gulf. Trump tightened the screws. Iran downed a U.S. drone. Trump called off a military strike at the last minute and responded indirectly, with more sanctions, cyber attacks, and additional troop deployments to the region. Last September a drone fleet launched by Iranian proxies in Yemen devastated the Aramco oil facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. Trump responded as he had to previous incidents: nonviolently. Iran slowly brought the region to a boil. First it hit boats, then drones, then the key infrastructure of a critical ally. On December 27 it went further: Members of the Kataib Hezbollah militia launched rockets at a U.S. installation near Kirkuk, Iraq. Four U.S. soldiers were wounded. An American contractor was killed. Destroying physical objects merited economic sanctions and cyber intrusions. Ending lives required a lethal response. It arrived on December 29 when F-15s pounded five Kataib Hezbollah facilities across Iraq and Syria. At least 25 militiamen were killed. Then, when Kataib Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias organized a mob to storm the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, setting fire to the grounds, America made a show of force and threatened severe reprisals. The angry crowd melted away. The risk to the U.S. embassy — and the possibility of another Benghazi — must have angered Trump. “The game has changed,” Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said hours before the assassination of Soleimani at Baghdad airport. (…) Deterrence, says Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, is credibly holding at risk something your adversary holds dear. If the reports out of Iraq are true, President Trump has put at risk the entirety of the Iranian imperial enterprise even as his maximum-pressure campaign strangles the Iranian economy and fosters domestic unrest. That will get the ayatollah’s attention. And now the United States must prepare for his answer. The bombs over Baghdad? That was Trump calling Khamenei’s bluff. The game has changed. But it isn’t over. Matthew Continetti
D’un point de vue fonctionnel, [Soleimani] était responsable de la force al-Qods des Gardiens de la Révolution, c’est-à-dire de l’ensemble des opérations menées par l’Iran dans toute la région. Cet homme avait beaucoup de secrets. Il était l’un des vecteurs, sinon le vecteur principal, du déploiement de l’influence de l’Iran. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui pensent qu’il y a une volonté expansionniste de l’Iran, mais Téhéran a développé des réseaux d’influence et c’est probablement Soleimani qui avait la haute main sur ceux-ci. Sur tous les terrains chauds de la région où l’Iran a une influence, on retrouve le général Soleimani. Il avait été localisé en Syrie ces dernières années, ce qui indique que la coordination des opérations des milices chiites dans le pays était sous sa responsabilité. Le fait qu’il ait été assassiné à Bagdad cette nuit prouve qu’il avait une importance logistique sur la coordination des milices en Irak. (…) Il ne faut pas sous-estimer l’importance de cette décision irresponsable de Donald Trump. Depuis le retrait unilatéral des Etats-Unis de l’accord sur le nucléaire, en mai 2018, les tensions avec l’Iran se sont accrues. Ce qui était très important, c’est que ces tensions étaient mesurées, sous contrôle. Elles avaient un fort impact sur la vie quotidienne des Iraniens. Pour autant, il n’y avait pas beaucoup de dérapages militaires : quelques incidents dans le golfe, le bombardement de sites pétroliers en Arabie-Saoudite. C’était un combat à fleuret moucheté. Personne ne franchissait la ligne rouge. Je crains fort qu’elle ait été franchie par cette décision, en raison de la qualité de la cible et de son importance dans le dispositif régional iranien. Les tensions s’étaient ravivées au cours des dernières heures, avec le siège de l’ambassade américaine à Bagdad, sans nul doute mené par les milices iraniennes. Il est évident que Soleimani a tenu un rôle. Cette prise d’assaut venait à la suite d’attaques ciblées des Etats-Unis. (…) Cela s’explique par le manque de sang-froid de Donald Trump. Ce matin, les démocrates s’insurgent, car cette décision a été prise sans concertation. C’est une décision à l’emporte-pièce, il a été sans doute un peu excité par les va-t-en-guerre de son camp, comme le secrétaire d’Etat Mike Pompeo, qui prône une ligne dure contre l’Iran. On y est presque. (…) Les Iraniens ne vont pas rester les deux pieds dans le même sabot. Je ne sais pas de quelles manières ils réagiront, ni où et quand. Ce ne sera sans doute pas tout de suite, mais nul doute qu’ils réagiront. Nous sommes dans une nouvelle séquence, ouverte par cet assassinat ciblé, réalisé au mépris de toutes les conventions internationales. Je ne maîtrise pas tous les paramètres, mais, à chaud, je peux imaginer qu’il y aura une recrudescence d’action militaire contre des objectifs américains, des bases militaires, des ambassades ou des intérêts sur place. Il y a également des risques pour Israël, qui sera peut-être une cible. Les milices pro-iraniennes déployées en Syrie ont une capacité de feu contre des villes israéliennes. Dans la région, il va y avoir un regain de mobilisation de toutes les forces proches de l’Iran, en Irak, au Liban et en Syrie. Je ne veux pas dire qu’il y a un risque d’embrasement général, je n’en sais rien, ce n’est pas la peine d’alimenter le fantasme. Mais la situation est infiniment préoccupante. Il y aura des conséquences, même si on ne sait pas bien les mesurer. (…) Une action sur le détroit d’Ormuz [où transitent de nombreux pétroliers] peut faire partie des mesures mises en œuvre par les Iraniens. Ils peuvent bloquer ou menacer de bloquer. Je ne pense pas qu’ils feront un blocage complet : les Iraniens font de la politique et ils savent que cela se retournerait contre eux. Mais il peut y avoir quelques arraisonnements de navires pétroliers et les cours du pétrole pourraient monter, même si cela n’avait pas été le cas après les incidents de l’été dernier dans le détroit. Didier Billion
Attention: une décision irresponsable peut en cacher une autre !
A l’heure où …
Après les attaques de pétroliers, la destruction d’installations pétrolières saoudiennes et les roquettes sur des bases américaines ayant entrainé la mort d’un citoyen américain …
Et avant sa brillante élimination par les forces américaines …
Le cerveau du dispositif terroriste des mollahs au Moyen-Orient préparait une possible deuxième attaque de l’ambassade américaine à Bagdad …
Pendant que la rue arabe comme la rue iranienne peinent à cacher leur joie …
Devinez quelle « décision irresponsable » dénoncent le parti démocrate américain, nos médias ou nos prétendus spécialistes ?
Mort du général Soleimani : « C’est une décision irresponsable de Donald Trump », estime un spécialiste de la région
Interrogé par franceinfo, Didier Billion, directeur adjoint de l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégique (Iris), spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, redoute qu’une « ligne rouge » ait été franchie.
Propos recueillis par Thomas Baïetto
France Télévisions
03/01/202
Qassem Soleimani est mort. Cet influent général iranien a été tué, vendredi 3 janvier, par une frappe américaine contre son convoi qui circulait sur l’aéroport de Bagdad (Irak). Cette élimination, ordonnée par le président américain Donald Trump, fait craindre une nouvelle escalade militaire dans la région.
Pour franceinfo, Didier Billion, directeur adjoint de l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (Iris) et spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, analyse les possibles conséquences de cette mort.
Franceinfo : Pouvez-vous nous rappeler le rôle de Qassem Soleimani dans le régime iranien ?
Didier Billion : D’un point de vue fonctionnel, il était responsable de la force al-Qods des Gardiens de la Révolution, c’est-à-dire de l’ensemble des opérations menées par l’Iran dans toute la région. Cet homme avait beaucoup de secrets. Il était l’un des vecteurs, sinon le vecteur principal, du déploiement de l’influence de l’Iran. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui pensent qu’il y a une volonté expansionniste de l’Iran, mais Téhéran a développé des réseaux d’influence et c’est probablement Soleimani qui avait la haute main sur ceux-ci.
Sur tous les terrains chauds de la région où l’Iran a une influence, on retrouve le général Soleimani.à franceinfo
Il avait été localisé en Syrie ces dernières années, ce qui indique que la coordination des opérations des milices chiites dans le pays était sous sa responsabilité. Le fait qu’il ait été assassiné à Bagdad cette nuit prouve qu’il avait une importance logistique sur la coordination des milices en Irak.
Comment analysez-vous la décision des Etats-Unis de le tuer ?
Il ne faut pas sous-estimer l’importance de cette décision irresponsable de Donald Trump. Depuis le retrait unilatéral des Etats-Unis de l’accord sur le nucléaire, en mai 2018, les tensions avec l’Iran se sont accrues. Ce qui était très important, c’est que ces tensions étaient mesurées, sous contrôle. Elles avaient un fort impact sur la vie quotidienne des Iraniens. Pour autant, il n’y avait pas beaucoup de dérapages militaires : quelques incidents dans le golfe, le bombardement de sites pétroliers en Arabie-Saoudite. C’était un combat à fleuret moucheté. Personne ne franchissait la ligne rouge.
Je crains fort qu’elle ait été franchie par cette décision, en raison de la qualité de la cible et de son importance dans le dispositif régional iranien. Les tensions s’étaient ravivées au cours des dernières heures, avec le siège de l’ambassade américaine à Bagdad, sans nul doute mené par les milices iraniennes. Il est évident que Soleimani a tenu un rôle. Cette prise d’assaut venait à la suite d’attaques ciblées des Etats-Unis.
Tout indiquait une montée en tension, mais là, ce n’est pas seulement un mort de plus, c’est très important.à franceinfo
Cela s’explique par le manque de sang-froid de Donald Trump. Ce matin, les démocrates s’insurgent, car cette décision a été prise sans concertation. C’est une décision à l’emporte-pièce, il a été sans doute un peu excité par les va-t-en-guerre de son camp, comme le secrétaire d’Etat Mike Pompeo, qui prône une ligne dure contre l’Iran. On y est presque.
A quelles réactions peut-on s’attendre de la part de l’Iran ?
Les Iraniens ne vont pas rester les deux pieds dans le même sabot. Je ne sais pas de quelles manières ils réagiront, ni où et quand. Ce ne sera sans doute pas tout de suite, mais nul doute qu’ils réagiront. Nous sommes dans une nouvelle séquence, ouverte par cet assassinat ciblé, réalisé au mépris de toutes les conventions internationales. Je ne maîtrise pas tous les paramètres, mais, à chaud, je peux imaginer qu’il y aura une recrudescence d’action militaire contre des objectifs américains, des bases militaires, des ambassades ou des intérêts sur place.
Il y a également des risques pour Israël, qui sera peut-être une cible. Les milices pro-iraniennes déployées en Syrie ont une capacité de feu contre des villes israéliennes. Dans la région, il va y avoir un regain de mobilisation de toutes les forces proches de l’Iran, en Irak, au Liban et en Syrie. Je ne veux pas dire qu’il y a un risque d’embrasement général, je n’en sais rien, ce n’est pas la peine d’alimenter le fantasme. Mais la situation est infiniment préoccupante. Il y aura des conséquences, même si on ne sait pas bien les mesurer.
Peut-on s’attendre à des conséquences économiques ?
Une action sur le détroit d’Ormuz [où transitent de nombreux pétroliers] peut faire partie des mesures mises en œuvre par les Iraniens. Ils peuvent bloquer ou menacer de bloquer. Je ne pense pas qu’ils feront un blocage complet : les Iraniens font de la politique et ils savent que cela se retournerait contre eux. Mais il peut y avoir quelques arraisonnements de navires pétroliers et les cours du pétrole pourraient monter, même si cela n’avait pas été le cas après les incidents de l’été dernier dans le détroit.
Voir aussi:
Mort de Soleimani : l’Iran menace, la scène internationale s’inquiète
Le puissant général Qassem Soleimani a été tué à Bagdad. L’ambassade américaine à Bagdad a appelé ses ressortissants à quitter l’Irak « immédiatement ».
Le Point/AFP
03/01/2020
C’est certainement un moment clé du conflit qui oppose les États-Unis à l’Iran. Le puissant général Qassem Soleimani a été tué, jeudi 2 janvier, dans un raid américain à Bagdad, trois jours après une attaque inédite contre l’ambassade américaine. Le général Soleimani « n’a eu que ce qu’il méritait », a abondé le sénateur républicain Tom Cotton. Rapidement, des ténors républicains se sont félicités de ce raid ordonné par Trump. Une attaque dénoncée par ses adversaires démocrates, dont son potentiel rival à la présidentielle, Joe Biden.
Le Premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahou, a interrompu vendredi son voyage officiel en Grèce afin de rentrer en Israël, a indiqué son bureau à l’Agence France-Presse. Benyamin Netanyahou, arrivé à Athènes jeudi où il a signé un accord avec Chypre et la Grèce en faveur d’un projet de gazoduc, devait rester dans ce pays jusqu’à samedi, mais il a écourté son voyage après l’annonce du décès de Qassem Soleimani, chef des forces iraniennes al-Qods souvent accusées par Israël de préparer des attaques contre l’État hébreu.
La France a plaidé pour la « stabilité »
Le chef du mouvement chiite libanais Hezbollah, grand allié de l’Iran, a promis « le juste châtiment » aux « assassins criminels » responsables de la mort du général iranien Qassem Soleimani. « Apporter le juste châtiment aux assassins criminels […] sera la responsabilité et la tâche de tous les résistants et combattants à travers le monde », a promis dans un communiqué le chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, qui utilise généralement le terme de « Résistance » pour désigner son organisation et ses alliés.
De son côté, la France a plaidé pour la « stabilité » au Moyen-Orient estimant, par la voix d’Amélie de Montchalin, secrétaire d’État aux Affaires européennes, que « l’escalade militaire [était] toujours dangereuse ». « On se réveille dans un monde plus dangereux. L’escalade militaire est toujours dangereuse », a-t-elle déclaré au micro de RTL. « Quand de telles opérations ont lieu, on voit bien que l’escalade est en marche alors que nous souhaitons avant tout la stabilité et la désescalade », a-t-elle ajouté.
Le ministre britannique des Affaires étrangères, Dominic Raab, a appelé « toutes les parties à la désescalade ». « Nous avons toujours reconnu la menace agressive posée par la force iranienne Qods dirigée par Qassem Soleimani. Après sa mort, nous exhortons toutes les parties à la désescalade. Un autre conflit n’est aucunement dans notre intérêt », a déclaré le chef de la diplomatie britannique dans un communiqué.
Éviter une « escalade des tensions »
La Chine a fait part de sa « préoccupation » et a appelé au « calme ». La Chine est l’un des pays signataires de l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien, dont les États-Unis se sont retirés unilatéralement en 2018, et l’un des principaux importateurs de brut iranien. « Nous demandons instamment à toutes les parties concernées, en particulier aux États-Unis, de garder leur calme et de faire preuve de retenue afin d’éviter une nouvelle escalade des tensions », a indiqué devant la presse un porte-parole de la diplomatie chinoise, Geng Shuang.
La Russie a mis en garde contre les conséquences de l’assassinat ciblé à Bagdad du général iranien Qassem Soleimani, une frappe américaine « hasardeuse » qui va se traduire par un « accroissement des tensions dans la région ». « L’assassinat de Soleimani […] est un palier hasardeux qui va mener à l’accroissement des tensions dans la région », a déclaré le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, cité par les agences RIA Novosti et TASS. « Soleimani servait fidèlement les intérêts de l’Iran. Nous présentons nos sincères condoléances au peuple iranien », a-t-il ajouté.
Les ressortissants américains en Irak appelés à fuir
L’assassinat ciblé du général iranien Qassem Soleimani représente « une escalade dangereuse dans la violence », a déclaré, vendredi, la présidente de la Chambre des représentants, la démocrate Nancy Pelosi. « L’Amérique et le monde ne peuvent pas se permettre une escalade des tensions qui atteigne un point de non-retour », a estimé Nancy Pelosi dans un communiqué.
Le pouvoir syrien a dénoncé la « lâche agression américaine » y voyant une « grave escalade » pour le Moyen-Orient, a rapporté l’agence officielle Sana. La Syrie est certaine que cette « lâche agression américaine […] ne fera que renforcer la détermination à suivre le modèle de ces chefs de la résistance », souligne une source du ministère des Affaires étrangères à Damas citée par Sana.
L’ambassade américaine à Bagdad a appelé ses ressortissants à quitter l’Irak « immédiatement ». La chancellerie conseille vivement aux Américains en Irak de partir « par avion tant que cela est possible », alors que le raid a eu lieu dans l’enceinte même de l’aéroport de Bagdad, « sinon vers d’autres pays par voie terrestre ». Les principaux postes-frontières de l’Irak mènent vers l’Iran et la Syrie en guerre, alors que d’autres points de passage existent vers l’Arabie saoudite et la Turquie.
« Une guerre dévastatrice en Irak »
Le Premier ministre démissionnaire irakien Adel Abdel Mahdi a estimé que le raid allait « déclencher une guerre dévastatrice en Irak ». « L’assassinat d’un commandant militaire irakien occupant un poste officiel est une agression contre l’Irak, son État, son gouvernement et son peuple », affirme Adel Abdel Mahdi dans un communiqué, alors qu’Abou Mehdi al-Mouhandis est le numéro deux du Hachd al-Chaabi, une coalition de paramilitaires pro-Iran intégrée à l’État. « Régler ses comptes contre des personnalités dirigeantes irakiennes ou d’un pays ami sur le sol irakien […] constitue une violation flagrante des conditions autorisant la présence des troupes américaines », ajoute le texte.
Le guide suprême iranien, l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei, s’est engagé vendredi à « venger » la mort du puissant général iranien Qassem Soleimani, tué plus tôt dans un raid américain à Bagdad, et a décrété un deuil national de trois jours dans son pays. « Le martyre est la récompense de son inlassable travail durant toutes ces années. […] Si Dieu le veut, son œuvre et son chemin ne s’arrêteront pas là, et une vengeance implacable attend les criminels qui ont empli leurs mains de son sang et de celui des autres martyrs », a dit l’ayatollah Khamenei sur son compte Twitter en farsi.
L’Iran promet une vengeance
L’Iran et les « nations libres de la région » se vengeront des États-Unis après la mort du puissant général iranien Qassem Soleimani, a promis le président Hassan Rohani. « Il n’y a aucun doute sur le fait que la grande nation d’Iran et les autres nations libres de la région prendront leur revanche sur l’Amérique criminelle pour cet horrible meurtre », a déclaré Hassan Rohani dans un communiqué publié sur le site du gouvernement.
Qaïs al-Khazali, un commandant de la coalition pro-iranienne en Irak, a appelé « tous les combattants » à se « tenir prêts », quelques heures après l’assassinat par les Américains du général iranien Qassem Soleimani à Bagdad. « Que tous les combattants résistants se tiennent prêts, car ce qui nous attend, c’est une conquête proche et une grande victoire », a écrit Qaïs al-Khazali, chef d’Assaïb Ahl al-Haq, l’une des plus importantes factions du Hachd al-Chaabi qui regroupe les paramilitaires pro-Iran sous la tutelle de l’État irakien, dans une lettre manuscrite dont l’Agence France-Presse a pu consulter une copie.
Les républicains serrent les rangs
« J’apprécie l’action courageuse du président Donald Trump contre l’agression iranienne », a salué sur Twitter l’influent sénateur républicain Lindsey Graham, proche allié du président peu après la confirmation par le Pentagone que le locataire de la Maison-Blanche avait donné l’ordre de tuer le général iranien Qassem Soleimani, dans un raid à Bagdad. « Au gouvernement iranien : si vous en voulez plus, vous en aurez plus », a-t-il menacé, avant d’ajouter : « Si l’agression iranienne se poursuit et que je travaillais dans une raffinerie iranienne de pétrole, je songerais à une reconversion. »
Comme cet élu de Caroline du Sud, les républicains serraient les rangs jeudi soir derrière la stratégie du président américain. « Les actions défensives que les États-Unis ont prises contre l’Iran et ses mandataires sont conformes aux avertissements clairs qu’ils ont reçus. Ils ont choisi d’ignorer ces avertissements parce qu’ils croyaient que le président des États-Unis était empêché d’agir en raison de nos divisions politiques internes. Ils ont extrêmement mal évalué », a également salué le sénateur républicain Marco Rubio.
« Un bâton de dynamite »
Dans l’autre camp, les adversaires démocrates du président qui ont approuvé le mois dernier à la Chambre basse du Congrès son renvoi en procès pour destitution ont dénoncé le bombardement et les risques d’escalade avec l’Iran. « Le président Trump vient de jeter un bâton de dynamite dans une poudrière, et il doit au peuple américain une explication », a dénoncé l’ancien vice-président Joe Biden, en lice pour la primaire démocrate en vue de l’élection présidentielle de novembre. « C’est une énorme escalade dans une région déjà dangereuse », a-t-il insisté, dans un communiqué.
« La dangereuse escalade de Trump nous amène plus près d’une autre guerre désastreuse au Moyen-Orient », a dénoncé Bernie Sanders, autre favori de la primaire démocrate. « Trump a promis de terminer les guerres sans fin, mais cette action nous met sur le chemin d’une autre », a poursuivi le sénateur indépendant.
« Un affront aux pouvoirs du Congrès »
Le chef démocrate de la commission des Affaires étrangères de la Chambre des représentants a déploré que Donald Trump n’ait pas notifié le Congrès américain du raid mené en Irak. « Mener une action de cette gravité sans impliquer le Congrès soulève de graves problèmes légaux et constitue un affront aux pouvoirs du Congrès », a écrit dans un communiqué Eliot Engel.
« D’accord, il ne fait aucun doute que Soleimani a beaucoup de sang sur les mains. Mais c’est un moment vraiment effrayant. L’Iran va réagir et probablement à différents endroits. Pensée à tout le personnel américain dans la région en ce moment », a, quant à lui, estimé Ben Rhodes, ancien proche conseiller de Barack Obama. « Un président qui a juré de tenir les États-Unis à l’écart d’une autre guerre au Moyen-Orient vient dans les faits de faire une déclaration de guerre », a réagi le président de l’organisation International Crisis Group Robert Malley.
Voir également:
Frappe américaine : « Pour l’Iranien lambda, le général Soleimani était un monstre »
Propos recueillis par Alain Léauthier
Marianne
03/01/2020
Au fou ! Quelques heures après l’élimination spectaculaire, tôt dans la matinée de ce vendredi 3 janvier, du général Qassem Soleimani, le chef des opérations extérieures (la force al-Qods) des Gardiens de la Révolution iranienne et pilier du régime des mollahs, nombre de chancelleries étrangères condamnaient à demi-mot le raid aérien ciblé ordonné par Donald Trump. « On se réveille dans un monde plus dangereux (…) et l’escalade militaire est toujours dangereuse », a ainsi benoitement déclaré Amélie de Montchalin, la secrétaire d’État française aux Affaires européennes.
En Irak même, l’ex Premier ministre Adel Abdoul Mahdi, proche de Téhéran et obligé de démissionner en décembre sous la pression de la rue, a dénoncé une « atteinte aux conditions de la présence américaine en Irak et atteinte à la souveraineté du pays », allant jusqu’à qualifier d’ « assassinat » la frappe qui a également coûté la vie à Abou Mehdi al-Mouhandis, le numéro deux du Hachd al-Chaabi, une coalition de paramilitaires pro-Iran, désormais intégrés à l’Etat irakien et très actifs dans la tentative d’assaut de l’ambassade américaine à Bagdad il y a trois jours. Dans un tweet musclé, le secrétaire d’État Mike Pompéo l’avait clairement désigné comme un des responsables des évènements ainsi que Qaïs al-Khazali, fondateur de la milice chiite Assaïb Ahl al-Haq, une des factions du Hachd al-Chaabi.
Les mollahs disposent d’une grande variété de relais pour semer le chaos dans la région
Ce dernier ne se trouvait pas dans le convoi visé par la frappe létale et a lancé un appel au djihad – « Que tous les combattants résistants se tiennent prêts car ce qui nous attend, c’est une conquête proche et une grande victoire » – relayant une déclaration tonitruante de l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Dans un tweet, le guide suprême iranien a promis une « vengeance implacable » aux « criminels qui ont empli leurs mains de son sang et de celui des autres martyrs », menace sur laquelle s’est aussitôt calé le président Hassan Rohani, longtemps présenté comme le chef de file des « modérés » et réformateurs.
Les dignitaires de la République islamique ne pouvaient guère faire moins à l’issue de plusieurs mois de tensions et d’accrochages indirects qui ont culminé vendredi 27 décembre avec la mort d’un sous-traitant américain lors d’une énième attaque à la roquette contre une base militaire, située cette fois à Kirkouk, dans le nord de l’Irak, en pleine zone pétrolière.
Deux jours plus tard, les avions américains avaient répliqué en bombardant des garnisons des brigades du Hezbollah, autre faction pro-iranienne à la solde de Qassem Soleimani, et c’est autour du cortège funéraire des vingt-cinq « martyrs » tombés ce jour-là qu’avait débuté l’assaut contre l’ambassade des Etats-Unis à Bagdad. En attendant les éventuelles représailles iraniennes, les Etats-Unis ont encouragé leurs ressortissants à quitter au plus vite le sol irakien, tâche qui ne sera pas forcément des plus aisées, et les forces israéliennes ont été placées en état d’alerte maximal. Si une confrontation directe semble pour l’heure exclue, du Yemen au Liban en passant par la Syrie et bien sûr l’Irak, les mollahs disposent d’une grande variété de relais pour semer le chaos dans la région, à l’image du bombardement téléguidé d’installations pétrolières dans l’est de l’Arabie saoudite en septembre dernier.
Aux Etats-Unis, à en croire les commentaires alarmistes de Nancy Pelosi, la présidente démocrate de la Chambre des représentants, et ceux d’une presse lui reprochant déjà des vacances prolongées en Floride alors qu’il met le feu aux poudres, Donald Trump aurait montré une fois de plus l’incohérence de sa politique étrangère. Traître à la cause des Kurdes un jour mais jouant les apprentis sorciers un autre. Tel n’est pourtant pas tout à fait le sentiment de la chercheuse iranienne Mahnaz Shirali, enseignante à Science-Po, dans l’entretien qu’elle nous accorde ce vendredi.
Marianne : Quelle est votre première réaction après la mort de Qassem Soleimani ?
Mahnaz Shirali : C’est d’abord l’Iranienne qui va vous répondre et celle-là ne peut que se réjouir de ce qui s’est passé. Je parle en mon nom mais je peux vous l’assurer aussi au nom de millions d’Iraniens, probablement la majorité d’entre eux : cet homme était haï, il incarnait le mal absolu ! Je suis révoltée par les commentaires que j’ai entendus venant de certains pseudo-spécialistes de l’Iran, le présentant sur une chaîne de télévision comme un individu charismatique et populaire. Il faut ne rien connaître et ne rien comprendre à ce pays pour tenir ce genre de sottises. Pour l’Iranien lambda, Soleimani était un monstre, ce qui se fait de pire dans la République islamique.
C’est un coup dur pour le régime ?
Évidemment, Soleimani en était un élément essentiel, aussi puissant que Khameini et ce n’est pas de la propagande que d’affirmer que sa mort ne choque presque personne.
A quoi peut-on s’attendre ?
Je ne suis pas dans le secret des généraux iraniens mais une simple observatrice informée. Le régime est aux abois depuis des mois, totalement isolé. Ils savent qu’ils n’ont pas d’avenir, la rue et le peuple n’en veulent plus, ils ne peuvent pas vraiment compter sur l’Union européenne et pas plus sur la Chine. Ils n’ont aucun avenir et c’est ce qui rend la situation particulièrement dangereuse car ils sont dans une logique suicidaire.
Les mollahs ont accumulé des fortunes à l’étranger. Ne voudront-ils pas préserver leurs acquis financiers ?
En réalité, ils ont tout perdu et ne peuvent plus sortir du pays pour s’installer à l’étranger car des mandats ont été lancés contre la plupart d’entre eux. Les sanctions ont asséché la manne des pétrodollars et c’est essentiel car il n’y avait pas d’adhésion idéologique à ce régime.
Est-ce à dire que ligne suivi par Trump sur la question iranienne et durement critiquée par de nombreux experts, peut se révéler positive ?
Je ne suis pas compétente pour juger de la politique de Donald Trump. Je peux juste faire quelques observations. Il a considérablement affaibli ce régime, comme jamais auparavant, et peut-être même a-t-il signé leur arrêt de mort. Nous verrons. Lors des manifestations populaires, à Téhéran et dans d’autre villes, les noms de Khameini, de Rohani, de Soleimani étaient hués. Il n’y a jamais eu de slogans anti-Trump ou contre les Etats-Unis.
Mais la situation désormais est explosive…
Probablement oui, hélas, ils n’abandonneront pas le pouvoir tranquillement, j’en suis convaincue.
Voir de même:
Soleimani : La rue iranienne félicite Trump
Iran Resist
03.01.2020
Trump dit avoir mis à mort le Vador immortel des mollahs, Qassem Soleimani. Les adversaires de Trump le blâment. La France s’est jointe à eux par l’intermédiaire de Malbrunot. Mais les Iraniens sont heureux et se félicitent de cette mort et félicitent Trump comme le montre ce slogan écrit dans un quartier chic de Téhéran : Trump Damet garm ! Trump ! Reste en forme !
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
Par ailleurs, à Kermanshâh (Kurdistan iranien), les gens ont fait un gâteau pour une fête en honneur de l’élimination de Hadj Ghassem Soleimani. Dans une vidéo faisant part de cette initiative, un homme qui partage le gâteau fait référence à Soleimani en utilisant son sobriquet de Shash Ghassem (pisseux Ghassem) !
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST. ORG
Il y a d’autres vidéos ou images du même genre.
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST. RG
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
D’autres opposants en exil appellent aussi les ambassades du régime pour faire part de leur joie et leurs interlocuteurs ne prennent pas la peine de protester !
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST. ORG
Il y a aussi des scènes de joie en Irak et en Syrie !
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
© IRAN-RESIST.ORG
Contrairement aux prédictions des Malbrunot & co (voix du Quai d’Orsay), le Moyen-Orient ne va pas basculer dans le chaos pro-mollahs ! Les Français feraient mieux de changer de discours et suivre les peuples de la région au lieu de suivre leurs ennemis par aversion pour Trump ou par jalousie pour ses succès.
Trump Damet garm !
Voir de plus:
Petraeus Says Trump May Have Helped ‘Reestablish Deterrence’ by Killing Suleimani
The former U.S. commander and CIA director says Iran’s “very fragile” situation may limit its response.
Lara Seligman
Foreign policy
January 3, 2020
As a former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former CIA director, retired Gen. David Petraeus is keenly familiar with Qassem Suleimani, the powerful chief of Iran’s Quds Force, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad Friday morning.
After months of a muted U.S. response to Tehran’s repeated lashing out—the downing of a U.S. military drone, a devastating attack on Saudi oil infrastructure, and more—Suleimani’s killing was designed to send a pointed message to the regime that the United States will not tolerate continued provocation, he said.
Petraeus spoke to Foreign Policy on Friday about the implications of an action he called “more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden.” This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
Foreign Policy: What impact will the killing of Gen. Suleimani have on regional tensions?
David Petraeus: It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action. It is more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even the death of [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi. Suleimani was the architect and operational commander of the Iranian effort to solidify control of the so-called Shia crescent, stretching from Iran to Iraq through Syria into southern Lebanon. He is responsible for providing explosives, projectiles, and arms and other munitions that killed well over 600 American soldiers and many more of our coalition and Iraqi partners just in Iraq, as well as in many other countries such as Syria. So his death is of enormous significance.
The question of course is how does Iran respond in terms of direct action by its military and Revolutionary Guard Corps forces? And how does it direct its proxies—the Iranian-supported Shia militia in Iraq and Syria and southern Lebanon, and throughout the world?
FP: Two previous administrations have reportedly considered this course of action and dismissed it. Why did Trump act now?
DP: The reasoning seems to be to show in the most significant way possible that the U.S. is just not going to allow the continued violence—the rocketing of our bases, the killing of an American contractor, the attacks on shipping, on unarmed drones—without a very significant response.
Many people had rightly questioned whether American deterrence had eroded somewhat because of the relatively insignificant responses to the earlier actions. This clearly was of vastly greater importance. Of course it also, per the Defense Department statement, was a defensive action given the reported planning and contingencies that Suleimani was going to Iraq to discuss and presumably approve.
This was in response to the killing of an American contractor, the wounding of American forces, and just a sense of how this could go downhill from here if the Iranians don’t realize that this cannot continue.
FP: Do you think this response was proportionate?
DP: It was a defensive response and this is, again, of enormous consequence and significance. But now the question is: How does Iran respond with its own forces and its proxies, and then what does that lead the U.S. to do?
Iran is in a very precarious economic situation, it is very fragile domestically—they’ve killed many, many hundreds if not thousands of Iranian citizens who were demonstrating on the streets of Iran in response to the dismal economic situation and the mismanagement and corruption. I just don’t see the Iranians as anywhere near as supportive of the regime at this point as they were decades ago during the Iran-Iraq War. Clearly the supreme leader has to consider that as Iran considers the potential responses to what the U.S. has done.
It will be interesting now to see if there is a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reach out to Iran and to say, “Okay, the next move could be strikes against your oil infrastructure and your forces in your country—where does that end?”
FP: Will Iran consider this an act of war?
DP: I don’t know what that means, to be truthful. They clearly recognize how very significant it was. But as to the definition—is a cyberattack an act of war? No one can ever answer that. We haven’t declared war, but we have taken a very, very significant action.
FP: How prepared is the U.S. to protect its forces in the region?
DP: We’ve taken numerous actions to augment our air defenses in the region, our offensive capabilities in the region, in terms of general purpose and special operations forces and air assets. The Pentagon has considered the implications the potential consequences and has done a great deal to mitigate the risks—although you can’t fully mitigate the potential risks.
FP: Do you think the decision to conduct this attack on Iraqi soil was overly provocative?
DP: Again what was the alternative? Do it in Iran? Think of the implications of that. This is the most formidable adversary that we have faced for decades. He is a combination of CIA director, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] commander, and special presidential envoy for the region. This is a very significant effort to reestablish deterrence, which obviously had not been shored up by the relatively insignificant responses up until now.
FP: What is the likelihood that there will be an all-out war?
DP: Obviously all sides will suffer if this becomes a wider war, but Iran has to be very worried that—in the state of its economy, the significant popular unrest and demonstrations against the regime—that this is a real threat to the regime in a way that we have not seen prior to this.
FP: Given the maximum pressure campaign that has crippled its economy, the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, and now this assassination, what incentive does Iran have to negotiate now?
DP: The incentive would be to get out from under the sanctions, which are crippling. Could we get back to the Iran nuclear deal plus some additional actions that could address the shortcomings of the agreement?
This is a very significant escalation, and they don’t know where this goes any more than anyone else does. Yes, they can respond and they can retaliate, and that can lead to further retaliation—and that it is clear now that the administration is willing to take very substantial action. This is a pretty clarifying moment in that regard.
FP: What will Iran do to retaliate?
DP: Right now they are probably doing what anyone does in this situation: considering the menu of options. There could be actions in the gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz by proxies in the regional countries, and in other continents where the Quds Force have activities. There’s a very considerable number of potential responses by Iran, and then there’s any number of potential U.S. responses to those actions
Given the state of their economy, I think they have to be very leery, very concerned that that could actually result in the first real challenge to the regime certainly since the Iran-Iraq War.
FP: Will the Iraqi government kick the U.S. military out of Iraq?
DP: The prime minister has said that he would put forward legislation to do that, although I don’t think that the majority of Iraqi leaders want to see that given that ISIS is still a significant threat. They are keenly aware that it was not the Iranian supported militias that defeated the Islamic State, it was U.S.-enabled Iraqi armed forces and special forces that really fought the decisive battles.
Lara Seligman is a staff writer at Foreign Policy.
Voir encore:
Gen. Petraeus on Qasem Soleimani’s killing: ‘It’s impossible to overstate the significance’
The World
January 03, 2020
The United States is sending nearly 3,000 additional troops to the Middle East from the 82nd Airborne Division as a precaution amid rising threats to American forces in the region, the Pentagon said on Friday.
Iran promised vengeance after a US airstrike in Baghdad on Friday killed Qasem Soleimani, Tehran’s most prominent military commander and the architect of its growing influence in the Middle East.
The overnight attack, authorized by US President Donald Trump, was a dramatic escalation in the « shadow war » in the Middle East between Iran and the United States and its allies, principally Israel and Saudi Arabia.
As former commander of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former CIA director, retired Gen. David Petraeus is very familiar with Soleimani. He spoke to The World’s host Marco Werman about what could happen next.
Marco Werman: How did you know Qasem Soleimani?
Gen. David Petraeus: Well, he was our most significant Iranian adversary during my four years in Iraq, [and] certainly when I was the Central Command commander, and very much so when I was the director of the CIA. He is unquestionably the most significant and important — or was the most significant and important — Iranian figure in the region, the most important architect of the effort by Iran to solidify control of the Shia crescent, and the operational commander of the various initiatives that were part of that effort.
General Petraeus, did you ever interact directly or indirectly with him?
Indirectly. He sent a message to me through the president of Iraq in late March of 2008, during the battle of Basra, when we were supporting the Iraqi army forces that were battling the Shia militias in Basra that were supported, of course, by Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force. He sent a message through the president that said, « General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qasem Soleimani, control the policy of Iran for Iraq, and also for Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. »
And the implication of that was, « If you want to deal with Iran to resolve this situation in Basra, you should deal with me, not with the Iranian diplomats. » And his power only grew from that point in time. By the way, I did not — I actually told the president to tell Qasem Soleimani to pound sand.
So why do you suppose this happened now, though?
Well, I suspect that the leaders in Washington were seeking to reestablish deterrence, which clearly had eroded to some degree, perhaps by the relatively insignificant actions in response to these strikes on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia, shipping in the Gulf and our $130 million dollar drone that was shot down. And we had seen increased numbers of attacks against US forces in Iraq. So I’m sure that there was a lot of discussion about what could show the Iranians most significantly that we are really serious, that they should not continue to escalate.
Now, obviously, there is a menu of options that they have now and not just in terms of direct Iranian action against perhaps our large bases in the various Gulf states, shipping in the Gulf, but also through proxy actions — and not just in the region, but even in places such as Latin America and Africa and Europe.
Would you have recommended this course of action right now?
I’d hesitate to answer that just because I am not privy to the intelligence that was the foundation for the decision, which clearly was, as was announced, this was a defensive action, that Soleimani was going into the country to presumably approve further attacks. Without really being in the inner circle on that, I think it’s very difficult to either second-guess or to even think through what the recommendation might have been.
Again, it is impossible to overstate the significance of this action. This is much more substantial than the killing of Osama bin Laden. It’s even more substantial than the killing of Baghdadi.
Final question, General Petraeus, how vulnerable are US military and civilian personnel in the Middle East right now as a result of what happened last night?
Well, my understanding is that we have significantly shored up our air defenses, our air assets, our ground defenses and so forth. There’s been the movement of a lot of forces into the region in months, not just in the past days. So there’s been a very substantial augmentation of our defensive capabilities and also our offensive capabilities.
And, you know, the question Iran has to ask itself is, « Where does this end? » If they now retaliate in a significant way — and considering how vulnerable their infrastructure and forces are at a time when their economy is in dismal shape because of the sanctions. So Iran is not in a position of strength, although it clearly has many, many options available to it, as I mentioned, not just with their armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, but also with these Quds Force-supported proxy elements throughout the region in the world.
Two short questions for what’s next, Gen. Petraeus — US remaining in Iraq, and war with Iran. What’s your best guess?
Well, I think one of the questions is, « What will the diplomatic ramifications of this be? » And again, there have been celebrations in some places in Iraq at the loss of Qasem Soleimani. So, again, there’s no tears being shed in certain parts of the country. And one has to ask what happens in the wake of the killing of the individual who had a veto, virtually, over the leadership of Iraq. What transpires now depends on the calculations of all these different elements. And certainly the US, I would assume, is considering diplomatic initiatives as well, reaching out and saying, « Okay. Does that send a sufficient message of our seriousness? Now, would you like to return to the table? » Or does Iran accelerate the nuclear program, which would, of course, precipitate something further from the United States? Very likely. So lots of calculations here. And I think we’re still very early in the deliberations on all the different ramifications of this very significant action.
Do you have confidence in this administration to kind of navigate all those calculations?
Well, I think that this particular episode has been fairly impressively handled. There’s been restraint in some of the communications methods from the White House. The Department of Defense put out, I think, a solid statement. It has taken significant actions, again, to shore up our defenses and our offensive capabilities. The question now, I think, is what is the diplomatic initiative that follows this? What will the State Department and the Secretary of State do now to try to get back to the table and reduce or end the battlefield consequences?
The flag that Donald Trump posted last night, no words. Was that restraint, do you think?
I think it was. Certainly all things are relative. And I think relative to some of his tweets that was quite restrained.
Voir enfin:
Iran’s strategic mastermind got a huge boost from the nuclear deal
The historic nuclear accord between a US-led group of countries and Iran was good news for a man who some consider to be the Middle East’s most effective covert operative.As a result of the deal, Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force and the general responsible for overseeing Iran’s network of proxy organizations, will be removed from European Union sanctions lists once the agreement is implemented, and taken off a UN sanctions list after eight or fewer years.
Iran obtained some key concessions as a result of the nuclear agreement, including access to an estimated $150 billion in frozen assets; the lifting of a UN arms embargo, the eventual end to sanctions related to the country’s ballistic missile program; the ability to operate over 5,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges and to run stable elements through centrifuges at the once-clandestine and heavily guarded Fordow facility; nuclear assistance from the US and its partners; and the ability to stall inspections of sensitive sites for as long as 24 days. In light of these accomplishments, the de-listing of a general responsible for coordinating anti-US militia groups in Iraq — someone who may be responsible for the deaths of US soldiers — almost seems gratuitous.
It’s unlikely that the entire deal hinged on a single Iranian officer’s ability to open bank accounts in EU states or travel within Europe. But it got into the deal anyway. So did a reprieve for Bank Saderat, which the US sanctioned in 2006 for facilitating money transfers to Iranian regime-supported terror groups like Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. As part of the deal, Bank Saderat will leave the EU sanctions list on the same timetable as Suleimani, although it will remain under US designation.
Like Suleimani’s removal, Bank Saderat’s apparent legalization in Europe suggests that for the purposes of the deal, the US and its partners lumped a broad range of restrictions under the heading of « nuclear-related » sanctions.
Suleimani and Bank Saderat are still going to remain under US sanctions related to the Iranian regime’s human rights abuses and support for terrorism. US sanctions have broad extraterritorial reach, and the US Treasury Department has turned into the scourge of compliance desks at banks around the world. But that matters to a somewhat lesser degree inside of the EU, where companies have actually been exempted from complying with certain US « secondary sanctions » on Iran since the mid-1990s.
Any company that transacts with a US-designated individual takes on a certain degree of US legal exposure. That actually creates problem for US allies whose companies operate under less restrictive legal regimes. It’s perfectly legal under domestic law for companies in many EU countries — among the US’s closest allies — to perform transactions for certain US-listed individuals and entities. This has been the cause of some trans-Atlantic tensions in the past, with an upshot that’s of immediate relevance to the nuclear deal reached Tuesday.In 1996, the US Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, targeting entities in two longstanding opponents of the US. But these were countries where European companies had routinely invested. The law didn’t just sanction two unfriendly regimes — it effectively sanctioned US allies where business with both countries was legally tolerated.
The law triggered consultations between the US and the EU under the World Trade Organization’s various dispute mechanisms. Diplomatic protests forced the US and and its European allies to figure out a compromise that wouldn’t expose their companies to additional legal scrutiny or lead to an unnecessary escalation in trans-Atlantic trade barriers.
The result is that the US kept the law on the books, but scaled back their implementation in Europe. Then-President Bill Clinton « negotiated an agreement under which the United States would not impose any ISLA sanctions
on European firms – much to Congress’ dismay. »
And in November 1996, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution protecting European companies from the reach of US law. The resolution authorized « blocking recognition or enforcement of decisions or judgments giving effect to the covered laws, » effectively canceling the extraterritoriality of certain US sanctions on European soil (although legal exposure continued for European companies with enough of a US presence to put them under American jurisdiction). In past disputes, companies inside of Europe have had an EU-authorized waiver for complying with US secondary sanctions.
In a post-deal environment in which European companies are eager investors in a far less diplomatically isolated Iran, the 1996 spat could be a sign of things to come, as well as a guideline for smoothing out disputes over US sanctions enforcement in Europe.
Some time in the next few years, Qasem Suleimani will be able to travel and do business inside the EU, while a bank that’s facilitated the funding of US-listed terror group’s will be allowed to enter the European market. As part of the nuclear deal, the US and its partners bargained away much of the international leverage against some of the more problematic sectors in the Iranian regime, including entities whose wrongdoing went well beyond the nuclear realm.The result is the almost complete reversal of the sanctions regime in Europe. « If you look at the competing annexes, the European list is much more comprehensive and there are going to be significant differences between the designation lists that are maintained, » Jonathan Schanzer, vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Business Insider. « The Europeans look as if they’re about to just open up entirely to Iran. »
Iran successfully pushed for a broad definition of « nuclear-related sanctions, » and bargained hard — and effectively — for a maximal degree of sanctions relief.
And the de-listing of Bank Saderat and Qasem Suleimani, along with the late-breaking effort to classify arms trade restrictions as purely nuclear-related, demonstrates just how far the US and its partners were willing to go to close a historic nuclear deal.
Voir par ailleurs:
Iran: le général Soleimani raconte sa guerre israélo-libanaise de 2006
Le Point/AFP
01/10/2019
La télévision d’Etat iranienne a diffusé mardi soir un entretien exclusif avec le général de division Ghassem Soleimani, un haut commandant des Gardiens de la Révolution, consacré à sa présence au Liban lors du conflit israélo-libanais de l’été 2006.
L’entretien est présenté comme la première interview du général Soleimani, homme de l’ombre à la tête de la force Qods, chargée des opérations extérieures –notamment en Irak et en Syrie— des Gardiens, l’armée idéologique de la République islamique.
Au cours des quelque 90 minutes d’entretien diffusées sur la première chaîne de la télévision d’Etat, le général Soleimani explique avoir passé au Liban, avec le Hezbollah chiite libanais, l’essentiel de ce conflit ayant duré 34 jours.
Le général dit être entré au pays du Cèdre au tout début de la guerre à partir de la Syrie avec Imad Moughnieh, haut commandant militaire du Hezbollah (tué en 2008) considéré par le mouvement chiite comme l’artisan de la « victoire » contre Israël lors de ce conflit ayant fait 1.200 morts côté libanais et 160 côté israélien.
Il revient sur l’élément déclencheur de la guerre: l’attaque, le 12 juillet, d’un commando du Hezbollah parvenu « à entrer en Palestine occupée (Israël, NDLR), attaquer un (blindé) sioniste et capturer deux soldats blessés ».
Mis à part une courte mission au bout « d’une semaine » pour rendre compte de la situation au guide suprême iranien, l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei, et revenir au Liban le jour-même avec un message de sa part pour Hassan Nasrallah, le chef du Hezbollah, le général dit être resté au Liban pour aider ses compagnons d’armes chiites.
Dans l’entretien, l’officier ne mentionne pas la présence d’autres Iraniens. Il livre le récit d’une expérience avant tout personnelle, au contact de Moughnieh et de M. Nasrallah.
Il raconte comment, pris sous des bombardements israéliens sur la banlieue sud de Beyrouth, bastion du Hezbollah, il évacue avec Moughniyeh le cheikh Nasrallah de la « chambre d’opérations » où il se trouve.
Selon son récit, lui et Moughniyeh font passer le chef du Hezbollah cette nuit-là d’abri en cachette avant de revenir tous deux à leur centre de commandement.
La publication de l’interview, réalisée par le bureau de l’ayatollah Khamenei, survient quelques jours après la publication, par ce même bureau, d’une photo inédite montrant Hassan Nasrallah « au-côté » de M. Khamenei et du général Soleimani et accréditant l’idée d’une rencontre récente entre les trois hommes à Téhéran.
Voir aussi:
Trump Calls the Ayatollah’s Bluff
And scores a victory against terrorism
Matthew Continetti
National review
January 3, 2020
The successful operation against Qassem Suleimani, head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is a stunning blow to international terrorism and a reassertion of American might. It will also test President Trump’s Iran strategy. It is now Trump, not Ayatollah Khamenei, who has ascended a rung on the ladder of escalation by killing the military architect of Iran’s Shiite empire. For years, Iran has set the rules. It was Iran that picked the time and place of confrontation. No more.
Reciprocity has been the key to understanding Donald Trump. Whether you are a media figure or a mullah, a prime minister or a pope, he will be good to you if you are good to him. Say something mean, though, or work against his interests, and he will respond in force. It won’t be pretty. It won’t be polite. There will be fallout. But you may think twice before crossing him again.
That has been the case with Iran. President Trump has conditioned his policies on Iranian behavior. When Iran spread its malign influence, Trump acted to check it. When Iran struck, Trump hit back: never disproportionately, never definitively. He left open the possibility of negotiations. He doesn’t want to have the greater Middle East — whether Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, or Afghanistan — dominate his presidency the way it dominated those of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. America no longer needs Middle Eastern oil. Best to keep the region on the back burner and watch it so it doesn’t boil over. Do not overcommit resources to this underdeveloped, war-torn, sectarian land.
The result was reciprocal antagonism. In 2018, Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated by his predecessor. He began jacking up sanctions. The Iranian economy turned to a shambles. This “maximum pressure” campaign of economic warfare deprived the Iranian war machine of revenue and drove a wedge between the Iranian public and the Iranian government. Trump offered the opportunity to negotiate a new agreement. Iran refused.
And began to lash out. Last June, Iran’s fingerprints were all over two oil tankers that exploded in the Persian Gulf. Trump tightened the screws. Iran downed a U.S. drone. Trump called off a military strike at the last minute and responded indirectly, with more sanctions, cyber attacks, and additional troop deployments to the region. Last September a drone fleet launched by Iranian proxies in Yemen devastated the Aramco oil facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. Trump responded as he had to previous incidents: nonviolently.
Iran slowly brought the region to a boil. First it hit boats, then drones, then the key infrastructure of a critical ally. On December 27 it went further: Members of the Kataib Hezbollah militia launched rockets at a U.S. installation near Kirkuk, Iraq. Four U.S. soldiers were wounded. An American contractor was killed.
Destroying physical objects merited economic sanctions and cyber intrusions. Ending lives required a lethal response. It arrived on December 29 when F-15s pounded five Kataib Hezbollah facilities across Iraq and Syria. At least 25 militiamen were killed. Then, when Kataib Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias organized a mob to storm the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, setting fire to the grounds, America made a show of force and threatened severe reprisals. The angry crowd melted away.
The risk to the U.S. embassy — and the possibility of another Benghazi — must have angered Trump. “The game has changed,” Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said hours before the assassination of Soleimani at Baghdad airport. Indeed it has. The decades-long gray-zone conflict between Iran and the United States manifested itself in subterfuge, terrorism, technological combat, financial chicanery, and proxy forces. Throughout it all, the two sides confronted each other directly only once: in the second half of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. That is about to change.
Deterrence, says Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, is credibly holding at risk something your adversary holds dear. If the reports out of Iraq are true, President Trump has put at risk the entirety of the Iranian imperial enterprise even as his maximum-pressure campaign strangles the Iranian economy and fosters domestic unrest. That will get the ayatollah’s attention. And now the United States must prepare for his answer.
The bombs over Baghdad? That was Trump calling Khamenei’s bluff. The game has changed. But it isn’t over.
Voir également:
The Shadow Commander
Qassem Suleimani is the Iranian operative who has been reshaping the Middle East. Now he’s directing Assad’s war in Syria.
The New Yorker
September 23, 2013
Last February, some of Iran’s most influential leaders gathered at the Amir al-Momenin Mosque, in northeast Tehran, inside a gated community reserved for officers of the Revolutionary Guard. They had come to pay their last respects to a fallen comrade. Hassan Shateri, a veteran of Iran’s covert wars throughout the Middle East and South Asia, was a senior commander in a powerful, élite branch of the Revolutionary Guard called the Quds Force. The force is the sharp instrument of Iranian foreign policy, roughly analogous to a combined C.I.A. and Special Forces; its name comes from the Persian word for Jerusalem, which its fighters have promised to liberate. Since 1979, its goal has been to subvert Iran’s enemies and extend the country’s influence across the Middle East. Shateri had spent much of his career abroad, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, where the Quds Force helped Shiite militias kill American soldiers.
Shateri had been killed two days before, on the road that runs between Damascus and Beirut. He had gone to Syria, along with thousands of other members of the Quds Force, to rescue the country’s besieged President, Bashar al-Assad, a crucial ally of Iran. In the past few years, Shateri had worked under an alias as the Quds Force’s chief in Lebanon; there he had helped sustain the armed group Hezbollah, which at the time of the funeral had begun to pour men into Syria to fight for the regime. The circumstances of his death were unclear: one Iranian official said that Shateri had been “directly targeted” by “the Zionist regime,” as Iranians habitually refer to Israel.
At the funeral, the mourners sobbed, and some beat their chests in the Shiite way. Shateri’s casket was wrapped in an Iranian flag, and gathered around it were the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, dressed in green fatigues; a member of the plot to murder four exiled opposition leaders in a Berlin restaurant in 1992; and the father of Imad Mughniyeh, the Hezbollah commander believed to be responsible for the bombings that killed more than two hundred and fifty Americans in Beirut in 1983. Mughniyeh was assassinated in 2008, purportedly by Israeli agents. In the ethos of the Iranian revolution, to die was to serve. Before Shateri’s funeral, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, released a note of praise: “In the end, he drank the sweet syrup of martyrdom.”
Kneeling in the second row on the mosque’s carpeted floor was Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force’s leader: a small man of fifty-six, with silver hair, a close-cropped beard, and a look of intense self-containment. It was Suleimani who had sent Shateri, an old and trusted friend, to his death. As Revolutionary Guard commanders, he and Shateri belonged to a small fraternity formed during the Sacred Defense, the name given to the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988 and left as many as a million people dead. It was a catastrophic fight, but for Iran it was the beginning of a three-decade project to build a Shiite sphere of influence, stretching across Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean. Along with its allies in Syria and Lebanon, Iran forms an Axis of Resistance, arrayed against the region’s dominant Sunni powers and the West. In Syria, the project hung in the balance, and Suleimani was mounting a desperate fight, even if the price of victory was a sectarian conflict that engulfed the region for years.
Suleimani took command of the Quds Force fifteen years ago, and in that time he has sought to reshape the Middle East in Iran’s favor, working as a power broker and as a military force: assassinating rivals, arming allies, and, for most of a decade, directing a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Suleimani for his role in supporting the Assad regime, and for abetting terrorism. And yet he has remained mostly invisible to the outside world, even as he runs agents and directs operations. “Suleimani is the single most powerful operative in the Middle East today,” John Maguire, a former C.I.A. officer in Iraq, told me, “and no one’s ever heard of him.”
When Suleimani appears in public—often to speak at veterans’ events or to meet with Khamenei—he carries himself inconspicuously and rarely raises his voice, exhibiting a trait that Arabs call khilib, or understated charisma. “He is so short, but he has this presence,” a former senior Iraqi official told me. “There will be ten people in a room, and when Suleimani walks in he doesn’t come and sit with you. He sits over there on the other side of room, by himself, in a very quiet way. Doesn’t speak, doesn’t comment, just sits and listens. And so of course everyone is thinking only about him.”
At the funeral, Suleimani was dressed in a black jacket and a black shirt with no tie, in the Iranian style; his long, angular face and his arched eyebrows were twisted with pain. The Quds Force had never lost such a high-ranking officer abroad. The day before the funeral, Suleimani had travelled to Shateri’s home to offer condolences to his family. He has a fierce attachment to martyred soldiers, and often visits their families; in a recent interview with Iranian media, he said, “When I see the children of the martyrs, I want to smell their scent, and I lose myself.” As the funeral continued, he and the other mourners bent forward to pray, pressing their foreheads to the carpet. “One of the rarest people, who brought the revolution and the whole world to you, is gone,” Alireza Panahian, the imam, told the mourners. Suleimani cradled his head in his palm and began to weep.
The early months of 2013, around the time of Shateri’s death, marked a low point for the Iranian intervention in Syria. Assad was steadily losing ground to the rebels, who are dominated by Sunnis, Iran’s rivals. If Assad fell, the Iranian regime would lose its link to Hezbollah, its forward base against Israel. In a speech, one Iranian cleric said, “If we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.”
Although the Iranians were severely strained by American sanctions, imposed to stop the regime from developing a nuclear weapon, they were unstinting in their efforts to save Assad. Among other things, they extended a seven-billion-dollar loan to shore up the Syrian economy. “I don’t think the Iranians are calculating this in terms of dollars,” a Middle Eastern security official told me. “They regard the loss of Assad as an existential threat.” For Suleimani, saving Assad seemed a matter of pride, especially if it meant distinguishing himself from the Americans. “Suleimani told us the Iranians would do whatever was necessary,” a former Iraqi leader told me. “He said, ‘We’re not like the Americans. We don’t abandon our friends.’ ”
Last year, Suleimani asked Kurdish leaders in Iraq to allow him to open a supply route across northern Iraq and into Syria. For years, he had bullied and bribed the Kurds into coöperating with his plans, but this time they rebuffed him. Worse, Assad’s soldiers wouldn’t fight—or, when they did, they mostly butchered civilians, driving the populace to the rebels. “The Syrian Army is useless!” Suleimani told an Iraqi politician. He longed for the Basij, the Iranian militia whose fighters crushed the popular uprisings against the regime in 2009. “Give me one brigade of the Basij, and I could conquer the whole country,” he said. In August, 2012, anti-Assad rebels captured forty-eight Iranians inside Syria. Iranian leaders protested that they were pilgrims, come to pray at a holy Shiite shrine, but the rebels, as well as Western intelligence agencies, said that they were members of the Quds Force. In any case, they were valuable enough so that Assad agreed to release more than two thousand captured rebels to have them freed. And then Shateri was killed.
Finally, Suleimani began flying into Damascus frequently so that he could assume personal control of the Iranian intervention. “He’s running the war himself,” an American defense official told me. In Damascus, he is said to work out of a heavily fortified command post in a nondescript building, where he has installed a multinational array of officers: the heads of the Syrian military, a Hezbollah commander, and a coördinator of Iraqi Shiite militias, which Suleimani mobilized and brought to the fight. If Suleimani couldn’t have the Basij, he settled for the next best thing: Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani, the Basij’s former deputy commander. Hamedani, another comrade from the Iran-Iraq War, was experienced in running the kind of irregular militias that the Iranians were assembling, in order to keep on fighting if Assad fell.
Late last year, Western officials began to notice a sharp increase in Iranian supply flights into the Damascus airport. Instead of a handful a week, planes were coming every day, carrying weapons and ammunition—“tons of it,” the Middle Eastern security official told me—along with officers from the Quds Force. According to American officials, the officers coördinated attacks, trained militias, and set up an elaborate system to monitor rebel communications. They also forced the various branches of Assad’s security services—designed to spy on one another—to work together. The Middle Eastern security official said that the number of Quds Force operatives, along with the Iraqi Shiite militiamen they brought with them, reached into the thousands. “They’re spread out across the entire country,” he told me.
A turning point came in April, after rebels captured the Syrian town of Qusayr, near the Lebanese border. To retake the town, Suleimani called on Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, to send in more than two thousand fighters. It wasn’t a difficult sell. Qusayr sits at the entrance to the Bekaa Valley, the main conduit for missiles and other matériel to Hezbollah; if it was closed, Hezbollah would find it difficult to survive. Suleimani and Nasrallah are old friends, having coöperated for years in Lebanon and in the many places around the world where Hezbollah operatives have performed terrorist missions at the Iranians’ behest. According to Will Fulton, an Iran expert at the American Enterprise Institute, Hezbollah fighters encircled Qusayr, cutting off the roads, then moved in. Dozens of them were killed, as were at least eight Iranian officers. On June 5th, the town fell. “The whole operation was orchestrated by Suleimani,” Maguire, who is still active in the region, said. “It was a great victory for him.”
Despite all of Suleimani’s rough work, his image among Iran’s faithful is that of an irreproachable war hero—a decorated veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, in which he became a division commander while still in his twenties. In public, he is almost theatrically modest. During a recent appearance, he described himself as “the smallest soldier,” and, according to the Iranian press, rebuffed members of the audience who tried to kiss his hand. His power comes mostly from his close relationship with Khamenei, who provides the guiding vision for Iranian society. The Supreme Leader, who usually reserves his highest praise for fallen soldiers, has referred to Suleimani as “a living martyr of the revolution.” Suleimani is a hard-line supporter of Iran’s authoritarian system. In July, 1999, at the height of student protests, he signed, with other Revolutionary Guard commanders, a letter warning the reformist President Mohammad Khatami that if he didn’t put down the revolt the military would—perhaps deposing Khatami in the process. “Our patience has run out,” the generals wrote. The police crushed the demonstrators, as they did again, a decade later.
Iran’s government is intensely fractious, and there are many figures around Khamenei who help shape foreign policy, including Revolutionary Guard commanders, senior clerics, and Foreign Ministry officials. But Suleimani has been given a remarkably free hand in implementing Khamenei’s vision. “He has ties to every corner of the system,” Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad, told me. “He is what I call politically clever. He has a relationship with everyone.” Officials describe him as a believer in Islam and in the revolution; while many senior figures in the Revolutionary Guard have grown wealthy through the Guard’s control over key Iranian industries, Suleimani has been endowed with a personal fortune by the Supreme Leader. “He’s well taken care of,” Maguire said.
Suleimani lives in Tehran, and appears to lead the home life of a bureaucrat in middle age. “He gets up at four every morning, and he’s in bed by nine-thirty every night,” the Iraqi politician, who has known him for many years, told me, shaking his head in disbelief. Suleimani has a bad prostate and recurring back pain. He’s “respectful of his wife,” the Middle Eastern security official told me, sometimes taking her along on trips. He has three sons and two daughters, and is evidently a strict but loving father. He is said to be especially worried about his daughter Nargis, who lives in Malaysia. “She is deviating from the ways of Islam,” the Middle Eastern official said.
Maguire told me, “Suleimani is a far more polished guy than most. He can move in political circles, but he’s also got the substance to be intimidating.” Although he is widely read, his aesthetic tastes appear to be strictly traditional. “I don’t think he’d listen to classical music,” the Middle Eastern official told me. “The European thing—I don’t think that’s his vibe, basically.” Suleimani has little formal education, but, the former senior Iraqi official told me, “he is a very shrewd, frighteningly intelligent strategist.” His tools include payoffs for politicians across the Middle East, intimidation when it is needed, and murder as a last resort. Over the years, the Quds Force has built an international network of assets, some of them drawn from the Iranian diaspora, who can be called on to support missions. “They’re everywhere,” a second Middle Eastern security official said. In 2010, according to Western officials, the Quds Force and Hezbollah launched a new campaign against American and Israeli targets—in apparent retaliation for the covert effort to slow down the Iranian nuclear program, which has included cyber attacks and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
Since then, Suleimani has orchestrated attacks in places as far flung as Thailand, New Delhi, Lagos, and Nairobi—at least thirty attempts in the past two years alone. The most notorious was a scheme, in 2011, to hire a Mexican drug cartel to blow up the Saudi Ambassador to the United States as he sat down to eat at a restaurant a few miles from the White House. The cartel member approached by Suleimani’s agent turned out to be an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. (The Quds Force appears to be more effective close to home, and a number of the remote plans have gone awry.) Still, after the plot collapsed, two former American officials told a congressional committee that Suleimani should be assassinated. “Suleimani travels a lot,” one said. “He is all over the place. Go get him. Either try to capture him or kill him.” In Iran, more than two hundred dignitaries signed an outraged letter in his defense; a social-media campaign proclaimed, “We are all Qassem Suleimani.”
Several Middle Eastern officials, some of whom I have known for a decade, stopped talking the moment I brought up Suleimani. “We don’t want to have any part of this,” a Kurdish official in Iraq said. Among spies in the West, he appears to exist in a special category, an enemy both hated and admired: a Middle Eastern equivalent of Karla, the elusive Soviet master spy in John le Carré’s novels. When I called Dagan, the former Mossad chief, and mentioned Suleimani’s name, there was a long pause on the line. “Ah,” he said, in a tone of weary irony, “a very good friend.”
In March, 2009, on the eve of the Iranian New Year, Suleimani led a group of Iran-Iraq War veterans to the Paa-Alam Heights, a barren, rocky promontory on the Iraqi border. In 1986, Paa-Alam was the scene of one of the terrible battles over the Faw Peninsula, where tens of thousands of men died while hardly advancing a step. A video recording from the visit shows Suleimani standing on a mountaintop, recounting the battle to his old comrades. In a gentle voice, he speaks over a soundtrack of music and prayers.
“This is the Dasht-e-Abbas Road,” Suleimani says, pointing into the valley below. “This area stood between us and the enemy.” Later, Suleimani and the group stand on the banks of a creek, where he reads aloud the names of fallen Iranian soldiers, his voice trembling with emotion. During a break, he speaks with an interviewer, and describes the fighting in near-mystical terms. “The battlefield is mankind’s lost paradise—the paradise in which morality and human conduct are at their highest,” he says. “One type of paradise that men imagine is about streams, beautiful maidens, and lush landscape. But there is another kind of paradise—the battlefield.”
Suleimani was born in Rabor, an impoverished mountain village in eastern Iran. When he was a boy, his father, like many other farmers, took out an agricultural loan from the government of the Shah. He owed nine hundred toman—about a hundred dollars at the time—and couldn’t pay it back. In a brief memoir, Suleimani wrote of leaving home with a young relative named Ahmad Suleimani, who was in a similar situation. “At night, we couldn’t fall asleep with the sadness of thinking that government agents were coming to arrest our fathers,” he wrote. Together, they travelled to Kerman, the nearest city, to try to clear their family’s debt. The place was unwelcoming. “We were only thirteen, and our bodies were so tiny, wherever we went, they wouldn’t hire us,” he wrote. “Until one day, when we were hired as laborers at a school construction site on Khajoo Street, which was where the city ended. They paid us two toman per day.” After eight months, they had saved enough money to bring home, but the winter snow was too deep. They were told to seek out a local driver named Pahlavan—“Champion”—who was a “strong man who could lift up a cow or a donkey with his teeth.” During the drive, whenever the car got stuck, “he would lift up the Jeep and put it aside!” In Suleimani’s telling, Pahlavan is an ardent detractor of the Shah. He says of the two boys, “This is the time for them to rest and play, not work as a laborer in a strange city. I spit on the life they have made for us!” They arrived home, Suleimani writes, “just as the lights were coming on in the village homes. When the news travelled in our village, there was pandemonium.”
As a young man, Suleimani gave few signs of greater ambition. According to Ali Alfoneh, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, he had only a high-school education, and worked for Kerman’s municipal water department. But it was a revolutionary time, and the country’s gathering unrest was making itself felt. Away from work, Suleimani spent hours lifting weights in local gyms, which, like many in the Middle East, offered physical training and inspiration for the warrior spirit. During Ramadan, he attended sermons by a travelling preacher named Hojjat Kamyab—a protégé of Khamenei’s—and it was there that he became inspired by the possibility of Islamic revolution.
In 1979, when Suleimani was twenty-two, the Shah fell to a popular uprising led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the name of Islam. Swept up in the fervor, Suleimani joined the Revolutionary Guard, a force established by Iran’s new clerical leadership to prevent the military from mounting a coup. Though he received little training—perhaps only a forty-five-day course—he advanced rapidly. As a young guardsman, Suleimani was dispatched to northwestern Iran, where he helped crush an uprising by ethnic Kurds.
When the revolution was eighteen months old, Saddam Hussein sent the Iraqi Army sweeping across the border, hoping to take advantage of the internal chaos. Instead, the invasion solidified Khomeini’s leadership and unified the country in resistance, starting a brutal, entrenched war. Suleimani was sent to the front with a simple task, to supply water to the soldiers there, and he never left. “I entered the war on a fifteen-day mission, and ended up staying until the end,” he has said. A photograph from that time shows the young Suleimani dressed in green fatigues, with no insignia of rank, his black eyes focussed on a far horizon. “We were all young and wanted to serve the revolution,” he told an interviewer in 2005.
Suleimani earned a reputation for bravery and élan, especially as a result of reconnaissance missions he undertook behind Iraqi lines. He returned from several missions bearing a goat, which his soldiers slaughtered and grilled. “Even the Iraqis, our enemy, admired him for this,” a former Revolutionary Guard officer who defected to the United States told me. On Iraqi radio, Suleimani became known as “the goat thief.” In recognition of his effectiveness, Alfoneh said, he was put in charge of a brigade from Kerman, with men from the gyms where he lifted weights.
The Iranian Army was badly overmatched, and its commanders resorted to crude and costly tactics. In “human wave” assaults, they sent thousands of young men directly into the Iraqi lines, often to clear minefields, and soldiers died at a precipitous rate. Suleimani seemed distressed by the loss of life. Before sending his men into battle, he would embrace each one and bid him goodbye; in speeches, he praised martyred soldiers and begged their forgiveness for not being martyred himself. When Suleimani’s superiors announced plans to attack the Faw Peninsula, he dismissed them as wasteful and foolhardy. The former Revolutionary Guard officer recalled seeing Suleimani in 1985, after a battle in which his brigade had suffered many dead and wounded. He was sitting alone in a corner of a tent. “He was very silent, thinking about the people he’d lost,” the officer said.
Ahmad, the young relative who travelled with Suleimani to Kerman, was killed in 1984. On at least one occasion, Suleimani himself was wounded. Still, he didn’t lose enthusiasm for his work. In the nineteen-eighties, Reuel Marc Gerecht was a young C.I.A. officer posted to Istanbul, where he recruited from the thousands of Iranian soldiers who went there to recuperate. “You’d get a whole variety of guardsmen,” Gerecht, who has written extensively on Iran, told me. “You’d get clerics, you’d get people who came to breathe and whore and drink.” Gerecht divided the veterans into two groups. “There were the broken and the burned out, the hollow-eyed—the guys who had been destroyed,” he said. “And then there were the bright-eyed guys who just couldn’t wait to get back to the front. I’d put Suleimani in the latter category.”
Ryan Crocker, the American Ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, got a similar feeling. During the Iraq War, Crocker sometimes dealt with Suleimani indirectly, through Iraqi leaders who shuttled in and out of Tehran. Once, he asked one of the Iraqis if Suleimani was especially religious. The answer was “Not really,” Crocker told me. “He attends mosque periodically. Religion doesn’t drive him. Nationalism drives him, and the love of the fight.”
Iran’s leaders took two lessons from the Iran-Iraq War. The first was that Iran was surrounded by enemies, near and far. To the regime, the invasion was not so much an Iraqi plot as a Western one. American officials were aware of Saddam’s preparations to invade Iran in 1980, and they later provided him with targeting information used in chemical-weapons attacks; the weapons themselves were built with the help of Western European firms. The memory of these attacks is an especially bitter one. “Do you know how many people are still suffering from the effects of chemical weapons?” Mehdi Khalaji, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said. “Thousands of former soldiers. They believe these were Western weapons given to Saddam.” In 1987, during a battle with the Iraqi Army, a division under Suleimani’s command was attacked by artillery shells containing chemical weapons. More than a hundred of his men suffered the effects.
The other lesson drawn from the Iran-Iraq War was the futility of fighting a head-to-head confrontation. In 1982, after the Iranians expelled the Iraqi forces, Khomeini ordered his men to keep going, to “liberate” Iraq and push on to Jerusalem. Six years and hundreds of thousands of lives later, he agreed to a ceasefire. According to Alfoneh, many of the generals of Suleimani’s generation believe they could have succeeded had the clerics not flinched. “Many of them feel like they were stabbed in the back,” he said. “They have nurtured this myth for nearly thirty years.” But Iran’s leaders did not want another bloodbath. Instead, they had to build the capacity to wage asymmetrical warfare—attacking stronger powers indirectly, outside of Iran.
The Quds Force was an ideal tool. Khomeini had created the prototype for the force in 1979, with the goal of protecting Iran and exporting the Islamic Revolution. The first big opportunity came in Lebanon, where Revolutionary Guard officers were dispatched in 1982 to help organize Shiite militias in the many-sided Lebanese civil war. Those efforts resulted in the creation of Hezbollah, which developed under Iranian guidance. Hezbollah’s military commander, the brilliant and murderous Imad Mughniyeh, helped form what became known as the Special Security Apparatus, a wing of Hezbollah that works closely with the Quds Force. With assistance from Iran, Hezbollah helped orchestrate attacks on the American Embassy and on French and American military barracks. “In the early days, when Hezbollah was totally dependent on Iranian help, Mughniyeh and others were basically willing Iranian assets,” David Crist, a historian for the U.S. military and the author of “The Twilight War,” says.
For all of the Iranian regime’s aggressiveness, some of its religious zeal seemed to burn out. In 1989, Khomeini stopped urging Iranians to spread the revolution, and called instead for expediency to preserve its gains. Persian self-interest was the order of the day, even if it was indistinguishable from revolutionary fervor. In those years, Suleimani worked along Iran’s eastern frontier, aiding Afghan rebels who were holding out against the Taliban. The Iranian regime regarded the Taliban with intense hostility, in large part because of their persecution of Afghanistan’s minority Shiite population. (At one point, the two countries nearly went to war; Iran mobilized a quarter of a million troops, and its leaders denounced the Taliban as an affront to Islam.) In an area that breeds corruption, Suleimani made a name for himself battling opium smugglers along the Afghan border.
In 1998, Suleimani was named the head of the Quds Force, taking over an agency that had already built a lethal résumé: American and Argentine officials believe that the Iranian regime helped Hezbollah orchestrate the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, which killed twenty-nine people, and the attack on the Jewish center in the same city two years later, which killed eighty-five. Suleimani has built the Quds Force into an organization with extraordinary reach, with branches focussed on intelligence, finance, politics, sabotage, and special operations. With a base in the former U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, the force has between ten thousand and twenty thousand members, divided between combatants and those who train and oversee foreign assets. Its members are picked for their skill and their allegiance to the doctrine of the Islamic Revolution (as well as, in some cases, their family connections). According to the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom, fighters are recruited throughout the region, trained in Shiraz and Tehran, indoctrinated at the Jerusalem Operation College, in Qom, and then “sent on months-long missions to Afghanistan and Iraq to gain experience in field operational work. They usually travel under the guise of Iranian construction workers.”
After taking command, Suleimani strengthened relationships in Lebanon, with Mughniyeh and with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s chief. By then, the Israeli military had occupied southern Lebanon for sixteen years, and Hezbollah was eager to take control of the country, so Suleimani sent in Quds Force operatives to help. “They had a huge presence—training, advising, planning,” Crocker said. In 2000, the Israelis withdrew, exhausted by relentless Hezbollah attacks. It was a signal victory for the Shiites, and, Crocker said, “another example of how countries like Syria and Iran can play a long game, knowing that we can’t.”
Since then, the regime has given aid to a variety of militant Islamist groups opposed to America’s allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The help has gone not only to Shiites but also to Sunni groups like Hamas—helping to form an archipelago of alliances that stretches from Baghdad to Beirut. “No one in Tehran started out with a master plan to build the Axis of Resistance, but opportunities presented themselves,” a Western diplomat in Baghdad told me. “In each case, Suleimani was smarter, faster, and better resourced than anyone else in the region. By grasping at opportunities as they came, he built the thing, slowly but surely.”
In the chaotic days after the attacks of September 11th, Ryan Crocker, then a senior State Department official, flew discreetly to Geneva to meet a group of Iranian diplomats. “I’d fly out on a Friday and then back on Sunday, so nobody in the office knew where I’d been,” Crocker told me. “We’d stay up all night in those meetings.” It seemed clear to Crocker that the Iranians were answering to Suleimani, whom they referred to as “Haji Qassem,” and that they were eager to help the United States destroy their mutual enemy, the Taliban. Although the United States and Iran broke off diplomatic relations in 1980, after American diplomats in Tehran were taken hostage, Crocker wasn’t surprised to find that Suleimani was flexible. “You don’t live through eight years of brutal war without being pretty pragmatic,” he said. Sometimes Suleimani passed messages to Crocker, but he avoided putting anything in writing. “Haji Qassem’s way too smart for that,” Crocker said. “He’s not going to leave paper trails for the Americans.”
Before the bombing began, Crocker sensed that the Iranians were growing impatient with the Bush Administration, thinking that it was taking too long to attack the Taliban. At a meeting in early October, 2001, the lead Iranian negotiator stood up and slammed a sheaf of papers on the table. “If you guys don’t stop building these fairy-tale governments in the sky, and actually start doing some shooting on the ground, none of this is ever going to happen!” he shouted. “When you’re ready to talk about serious fighting, you know where to find me.” He stomped out of the room. “It was a great moment,” Crocker said.
The coöperation between the two countries lasted through the initial phase of the war. At one point, the lead negotiator handed Crocker a map detailing the disposition of Taliban forces. “Here’s our advice: hit them here first, and then hit them over here. And here’s the logic.” Stunned, Crocker asked, “Can I take notes?” The negotiator replied, “You can keep the map.” The flow of information went both ways. On one occasion, Crocker said, he gave his counterparts the location of an Al Qaeda facilitator living in the eastern city of Mashhad. The Iranians detained him and brought him to Afghanistan’s new leaders, who, Crocker believes, turned him over to the U.S. The negotiator told Crocker, “Haji Qassem is very pleased with our coöperation.”
The good will didn’t last. In January, 2002, Crocker, who was by then the deputy chief of the American Embassy in Kabul, was awakened one night by aides, who told him that President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union Address, had named Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil.” Like many senior diplomats, Crocker was caught off guard. He saw the negotiator the next day at the U.N. compound in Kabul, and he was furious. “You completely damaged me,” Crocker recalled him saying. “Suleimani is in a tearing rage. He feels compromised.” The negotiator told Crocker that, at great political risk, Suleimani had been contemplating a complete reëvaluation of the United States, saying, “Maybe it’s time to rethink our relationship with the Americans.” The Axis of Evil speech brought the meetings to an end. Reformers inside the government, who had advocated a rapprochement with the United States, were put on the defensive. Recalling that time, Crocker shook his head. “We were just that close,” he said. “One word in one speech changed history.”
Before the meetings fell apart, Crocker talked with the lead negotiator about the possibility of war in Iraq. “Look,” Crocker said, “I don’t know what’s going to happen, but I do have some responsibility for Iraq—it’s my portfolio—and I can read the signs, and I think we’re going to go in.” He saw an enormous opportunity. The Iranians despised Saddam, and Crocker figured that they would be willing to work with the U.S. “I was not a fan of the invasion,” he told me. “But I was thinking, If we’re going to do it, let’s see if we can flip an enemy into a friend—at least tactically for this, and then let’s see where we can take it.” The negotiator indicated that the Iranians were willing to talk, and that Iraq, like Afghanistan, was part of Suleimani’s brief: “It’s one guy running both shows.”
After the invasion began, in March, 2003, Iranian officials were frantic to let the Americans know that they wanted peace. Many of them watched the regimes topple in Afghanistan and Iraq and were convinced that they were next. “They were scared shitless,” Maguire, the former C.I.A. officer in Baghdad, told me. “They were sending runners across the border to our élite elements saying, ‘Look, we don’t want any trouble with you.’ We had an enormous upper hand.” That same year, American officials determined that Iran had reconfigured its plans to develop a nuclear weapon to proceed more slowly and covertly, lest it invite a Western attack.
After Saddam’s regime collapsed, Crocker was dispatched to Baghdad to organize a fledgling government, called the Iraqi Governing Council. He realized that many Iraqi politicians were flying to Tehran for consultations, and he jumped at the chance to negotiate indirectly with Suleimani. In the course of the summer, Crocker passed him the names of prospective Shiite candidates, and the two men vetted each one. Crocker did not offer veto power, but he abandoned candidates whom Suleimani found especially objectionable. “The formation of the governing council was in its essence a negotiation between Tehran and Washington,” he said.
Voir de même:
Gen. Soleimani: A new brand of Iranian hero for nationalist times
Not a Shiite religious figure and not a martyr, Qassem Soleimani, the living commander of Iran’s elite Qods Force, has been elevated to hero status.
Scott Peterson
The Christian Science Monitor
February 15, 2016
Tehran, Iran
For years the commander of Iran’s elite Qods Force worked from the shadows, conducting the nation’s battles from Afghanistan to Lebanon.
But today Qassem Soleimani is Iran’s celebrity general, a man elevated to hero status by a social media machine that has at least 10 Instagram accounts and spreads photographs and selfies of him at the front lines in Syria and Iraq.
The Islamic Republic long ago turned hero worship into an art form, with its devotion to Shiite religious figures and war martyrs. But the growing personality cult that halos Maj. Gen. Soleimani is different: The gray-haired servant of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very much alive, and his ascent to stardom coincides with a growing nationalist trend in Iran.
“Propaganda in Iran is changing, and every nation needs a live hero,” says a conservative analyst in Qom, who asked not to be named.
“The dead heroes now are not useful; we need a live hero now. Iranian people like great commanders, military heroes in history,” he says, ticking off a string of names. “I think Qassem Soleimani is the right person for our new propaganda policy – the right person at the right time.”
Soleimani’s face surged into public view after the self-described Islamic State (IS) swept from Syria into Iraq in June 2014. Frontline photographs of the general mingling with Iranian fighters went viral.
Iranians cite many reasons for his rise, from “saving” Baghdad from IS jihadists and reactivating Shiite militias in Iraq to preserving the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during nearly six years of war.
Never mind that some analysts suggest that earlier failures to prevent internal upheaval in Iraq and Syria – for years those countries were part of Soleimani’s responsibility – are the reason for Iran’s deep involvement today.
For his part, Soleimani attributes the “collapse of American power in the region” to Iran’s “spiritual influence” in bolstering resistance against the United States, Israel, and their allies.
“It is very extraordinary. Who else can come close?” says a veteran observer in Tehran, Iran, who asked not to be named. “I don’t know how intentional this is; you see people in all walks of life respect him. It shows we can have a very popular hero who is not a cleric.”
“There is no stain on his image,” says the observer.
Indeed, Soleimani has become a source of pride and a symbol for Iranians of all stripes of their nation’s power abroad. At a pro-regime rally, even young Westernized women in makeup pledge to be “soldiers” of Soleimani. At a bodybuilding championship held in his honor, bare-chested men flaunted their muscles beside a huge portrait of him.
Among the Islamic Revolution’s true believers, Soleimani’s exploits are sung by religious storytellers and posted online. His writings about the Iran-Iraq War are steeped in religious language.
In a video from the Syrian front line broadcast on state TV last month, he addressed fighters, saying, of an Iranian volunteer who was killed, “God loves the person who makes holy war his path.”
When erroneous reports of Soleimani’s death recently emerged (Iran has lost dozens of senior IRGC commanders in Syria and Iraq and hundreds of “advisers”), he laughed and said, “This [martyrdom] is something that I have climbed mountains and crossed plains to find.
Some say the hero worship has gone too far; months ago the IRGC ordered Iranian media not to publish frontline selfies. When a young director wanted to make a film inspired by his hero, the general said he was against it and was embarrassed.
Yet Soleimani appears to have relented for Ebrahim Hatamikia, a renowned director of war films.
“Bodyguard” is now premièring at a festival in Tehran. “I made this film for the love of Haj Qassem Soleimani,” the director told an Iranian website, adding that he is “the earth beneath Soleimani’s feet.”
Voir de plus:
The war on ISIS is getting weird in Iraq
Michael B Kelley
Business insider
Mar 25, 2015
The US has started providing « air strikes, airborne intelligence, and Advise & Assist support to Iraqi security forces headquarters » as Baghdad struggles to drive ISIS militants out of Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit.
The Iraqi assault has heretofore been spearheaded by Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, the foreign arm of the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and most of the Iraqi forces are members of Shiite militias beholden to Tehran.
The British magazine The Week features Suleimani in bed with Uncle Sam, which is quite striking given that Suleimani directed « a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq, » as detailed by Dexter Filkins in The New Yorker.The notion of the US working on the same side Suleimani is confounding to those who consider him a formidable adversary.
« There’s just no way that the US military can actively support an offensive led by Suleimani, » Christopher Harmer, a former aviator in the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf who is now an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, told Helene Cooper of The New York Times recently. « He’s a more stately version of Osama bin Laden. »
Suleimani’s Iraqi allies — such as the powerful Badr militia — are known for allegedly burning down Sunni villages and using power drills on enemies.
« It’s a little hard for us to be allied on the battlefield with groups of individuals who are unrepentantly covered in American blood, » Ryan Crocker, a career diplomat who served as the US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, told US News.
Nevertheless, American warplanes have provided support for the so-called special groups over the past few months.
Badr commander Hadi al-Ameri recently told Eli Lake of Bloomberg that the US ambassador to Iraq offered airstrikes to support the Iraqi army and the Badr ground forces. Ameri added that Suleimani « advises us. He offers us information, we respect him very much. »
The Wall Street Journal noted that « U.S. officials want to ensure that Iran doesn’t play a central role in the fight ahead. U.S. officials want to be certain that the Iraqi military provides strong oversight of the Shiite militias. »
The question is who tells Suleimani to get out of the way but leave his militias behind.
Voir de plus:
Trump Kills Iran’s Most Overrated Warrior
Suleimani pushed his country to build an empire, but drove it into the ground instead.
Thomas L. Friedman
NYT
Jan. 3, 2020
One day they may name a street after President Trump in Tehran. Why? Because Trump just ordered the assassination of possibly the dumbest man in Iran and the most overrated strategist in the Middle East: Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani.
Think of the miscalculations this guy made. In 2015, the United States and the major European powers agreed to lift virtually all their sanctions on Iran, many dating back to 1979, in return for Iran halting its nuclear weapons program for a mere 15 years, but still maintaining the right to have a peaceful nuclear program. It was a great deal for Iran. Its economy grew by over 12 percent the next year. And what did Suleimani do with that windfall?
He and Iran’s supreme leader launched an aggressive regional imperial project that made Iran and its proxies the de facto controlling power in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sana. This freaked out U.S. allies in the Sunni Arab world and Israel — and they pressed the Trump administration to respond. Trump himself was eager to tear up any treaty forged by President Obama, so he exited the nuclear deal and imposed oil sanctions on Iran that have now shrunk the Iranian economy by almost 10 percent and sent unemployment over 16 percent.
All that for the pleasure of saying that Tehran can call the shots in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sana. What exactly was second prize?
With the Tehran regime severely deprived of funds, the ayatollahs had to raise gasoline prices at home, triggering massive domestic protests. That required a harsh crackdown by Iran’s clerics against their own people that left thousands jailed and killed, further weakening the legitimacy of the regime.
Then Mr. “Military Genius” Suleimani decided that, having propped up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and helping to kill 500,000 Syrians in the process, he would overreach again and try to put direct pressure on Israel. He would do this by trying to transfer precision-guided rockets from Iran to Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon and Syria.
Alas, Suleimani discovered that fighting Israel — specifically, its combined air force, special forces, intelligence and cyber — is not like fighting the Nusra front or the Islamic State. The Israelis hit back hard, sending a whole bunch of Iranians home from Syria in caskets and hammering their proxies as far away as Western Iraq.
Indeed, Israeli intelligence had so penetrated Suleimani’s Quds Force and its proxies that Suleimani would land a plane with precision munitions in Syria at 5 p.m., and the Israeli air force would blow it up by 5:30 p.m. Suleimani’s men were like fish in a barrel. If Iran had a free press and a real parliament, he would have been fired for colossal mismanagement.
But it gets better, or actually worse, for Suleimani. Many of his obituaries say that he led the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq, in tacit alliance with America. Well, that’s true. But what they omit is that Suleimani’s, and Iran’s, overreaching in Iraq helped to produce the Islamic State in the first place.
It was Suleimani and his Quds Force pals who pushed Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, to push Sunnis out of the Iraqi government and army, stop paying salaries to Sunni soldiers, kill and arrest large numbers of peaceful Sunni protesters and generally turn Iraq into a Shiite-dominated sectarian state. The Islamic State was the counterreaction.
Finally, it was Suleimani’s project of making Iran the imperial power in the Middle East that turned Iran into the most hated power in the Middle East for many of the young, rising pro-democracy forces — both Sunnis and Shiites — in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
As the Iranian-American scholar Ray Takeyh pointed out in a wise essay in Politico, in recent years “Soleimani began expanding Iran’s imperial frontiers. For the first time in its history, Iran became a true regional power, stretching its influence from the banks of the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Soleimani understood that Persians would not be willing to die in distant battlefields for the sake of Arabs, so he focused on recruiting Arabs and Afghans as an auxiliary force. He often boasted that he could create a militia in little time and deploy it against Iran’s various enemies.”
It was precisely those Suleimani proxies — Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen — that created pro-Iranian Shiite states-within-states in all of these countries. And it was precisely these states-within-states that helped to prevent any of these countries from cohering, fostered massive corruption and kept these countries from developing infrastructure — schools, roads, electricity.
And therefore it was Suleimani and his proxies — his “kingmakers” in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq — who increasingly came to be seen, and hated, as imperial powers in the region, even more so than Trump’s America. This triggered popular, authentic, bottom-up democracy movements in Lebanon and Iraq that involved Sunnis and Shiites locking arms together to demand noncorrupt, nonsectarian democratic governance.
On Nov. 27, Iraqi Shiites — yes, Iraqi Shiites — burned down the Iranian consulate in Najaf, Iraq, removing the Iranian flag from the building and putting an Iraqi flag in its place. That was after Iraqi Shiites, in September 2018, set the Iranian consulate in Basra ablaze, shouting condemnations of Iran’s interference in Iraqi politics.
The whole “protest” against the United States Embassy compound in Baghdad last week was almost certainly a Suleimani-staged operation to make it look as if Iraqis wanted America out when in fact it was the other way around. The protesters were paid pro-Iranian militiamen. No one in Baghdad was fooled by this.
In a way, it’s what got Suleimani killed. He so wanted to cover his failures in Iraq he decided to start provoking the Americans there by shelling their forces, hoping they would overreact, kill Iraqis and turn them against the United States. Trump, rather than taking the bait, killed Suleimani instead.
I have no idea whether this was wise or what will be the long-term implications. But here are two things I do know about the Middle East.
First, often in the Middle East the opposite of “bad” is not “good.” The opposite of bad often turns out to be “disorder.” Just because you take out a really bad actor like Suleimani doesn’t mean a good actor, or a good change in policy, comes in his wake. Suleimani is part of a system called the Islamic Revolution in Iran. That revolution has managed to use oil money and violence to stay in power since 1979 — and that is Iran’s tragedy, a tragedy that the death of one Iranian general will not change.
Today’s Iran is the heir to a great civilization and the home of an enormously talented people and significant culture. Wherever Iranians go in the world today, they thrive as scientists, doctors, artists, writers and filmmakers — except in the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose most famous exports are suicide bombing, cyberterrorism and proxy militia leaders. The very fact that Suleimani was probably the most famous Iranian in the region speaks to the utter emptiness of this regime, and how it has wasted the lives of two generations of Iranians by looking for dignity in all the wrong places and in all the wrong ways.
The other thing I know is that in the Middle East all important politics happens the morning after the morning after.
Yes, in the coming days there will be noisy protests in Iran, the burning of American flags and much crying for the “martyr.” The morning after the morning after? There will be a thousand quiet conversations inside Iran that won’t get reported. They will be about the travesty that is their own government and how it has squandered so much of Iran’s wealth and talent on an imperial project that has made Iran hated in the Middle East.
And yes, the morning after, America’s Sunni Arab allies will quietly celebrate Suleimani’s death, but we must never forget that it is the dysfunction of many of the Sunni Arab regimes — their lack of freedom, modern education and women’s empowerment — that made them so weak that Iran was able to take them over from the inside with its proxies.
I write these lines while flying over New Zealand, where the smoke from forest fires 2,500 miles away over eastern Australia can be seen and felt. Mother Nature doesn’t know Suleimani’s name, but everyone in the Arab world is going to know her name. Because the Middle East, particularly Iran, is becoming an environmental disaster area — running out of water, with rising desertification and overpopulation. If governments there don’t stop fighting and come together to build resilience against climate change — rather than celebrating self-promoting military frauds who conquer failed states and make them fail even more — they’re all doomed.
Voir encore:
Love is a Battlefield
Jon Stewart takes the U.S.-Iran ‘strange bedfellows’ line literally, imagines Iraq as a love triangle
Peter Weber
The Week
June 17, 2014
Yes, Jon Stewart is a comedian, and no, The Daily Show isn’t a hard news-and-analysis show. But on Monday night’s show, Stewart gave a remarkably cogent and creative explanation of the geopolitical situation in Iraq. The U.S. and Iran are discussing coordinating their efforts in Iraq to defeat a common enemy, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militia. Meanwhile, ISIS is getting financial support from one of America’s biggest Arab allies, and Iran’s biggest Muslim enemy, Saudi Arabia.
Forget « strange bedfellows » — this is a romantic Gordian knot. But it makes a lot of sense when Stewart presents the situation as a love triangle. « Sure, you say ‘Death to America’ and burn our flags, but you do it to our face, » Stewart tells Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has been funding America’s enemies behind our backs — but what about its sweet, sweet crude oil? Like all good love triangles, this one has a soundtrack — Stewart draws on the hits of the 1980s to great effect. In fact, the only ’80s song Stewart left out that would have tied this all together: « Love Bites. » –Peter Weber
State Department urges U.S. citizens to ‘depart Iraq immediately’ due to ‘heightened tensions’
Notes
- [1]
Notre traduction.
- [2]
L’ayatollah Khomeini qualifie la guerre de Jihad défensif et l’appelle « Défense Sacrée » (Def¯a’e moghaddas) ; au sujet des offensives iraniennes il parle de « Kerbala » en référence à la bataille qui, dans cette ville irakienne, marque en 680 le début de la rupture entre les Chiites et les Sunnites ; la guerre en Irak est appelée « Qadisiyya de Sadam » par référence, ici encore religieuse, à la bataille al-Qadisiyya de Sa’d qui eut lieu en Mésopotamie en 636 entre Musulmans et Perses sassanides, dans le cadre de la conquête musulmane de la Perse (voir à ce sujet Sinan Antoon, « Monumental Disrespect », Middle East Report, no 228, automne 2003, p. 28-30).
- [3]
L’auteur remercie Sandrine Lefranc pour sa lecture attentive et ses commentaires.
- [4]
Voir notamment Ervand Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions. Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999 ; Amnesty International (AI), « Iran : Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990 », décembre 1990 ; AI, « Iran : Political Executions », décembre 1988 ; anonyme, « Man shahede ghatle ame zendanyane siyasi boodam » (« J’ai été témoin du massacre des prisonniers politiques »), Cheshmandaz, no 14, hiver 1995 ; Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Khaterat (Mémoires), hhhhttp:// wwww. amontazeri. com(consulté le 7 avril 2008).
- [5]
Voir E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 215 ; AI, « Iran : Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990 » ; Kaveh Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor : A Preliminary Report on The 1988 Massacre of Iran’s Political Prisoners », Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 20, 2007, p. 227-261, p. 228.
- [6]
Farhad Khosrokhavar, « L’Iran, la démocratie et la nouvelle citoyenneté », Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, no 111, 2001/2, p. 291-317.
- [7]
Ibid., p. 309 et Nouchine Yavari d’Hellencourt, « Islam et démocratie : de la nécessité d’une contextualisation », Cemoti, no spécial, La question démocratique et les sociétés musulmanes. Le militaire, l’entrepreneur et le paysan, no 27, hhhhttp:// cemoti. revues. org/ document656. html(consulté le 20 avril 2008).
- [8]
Ibid.
- [9]
Ibid.
- [10]
Stanley Cohen, States of Denial, Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.
- [11]
E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 209-229 ; Afshin Matin-Asgari, « Twentieth Century Iran’s Political Prisoners », Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 42, no 5, 2006, p. 689-707.
- [12]
Maziar Behrooz, « Reflections on Iran’s Prison System During the Montazeri Years (19851988) », Iran Analysis Quarterly, vol. 2, no 3, 2005, p. 11-24.
- [13]
Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran : The Abuse of Cultural Relativism, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001 ; K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 243-257 ; Raluca Mihaila, « Political Considerations in Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity : An Iranian Case Study », Hemispheres : The Tufts University Journal of International Affairs, no spécial, State-Building : Risks and Consequences, 2002, hhhhttp:// ase. tufts. edu/ hemispheres/ (consulté le 7 avril 2008).
- [14]
Conseil Économique et Social des Nations Unies (ECOSOC), Commission sur les droits humains, « On the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran », Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27, U.N. Doc. A/44/620 (2 novembre 1989) ; Final Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/67 of 4 March 1992, E/CN.4/1993/41 ; Human Rights Watch, « Pour-Mohammadi and the 1988 Prison Massacres », Ministers of Murder : Iran’s New Security Cabinet, hhhhttp:// wwww. hrw. org/ backgrounder/ mena/ iran1205/ 2. htm#_Toc121896787(consulté le 7 avril 2008).
- [15]
Un impressionnant travail a été accompli sur ce point par E. Abrahambian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 209-229, qui reste la principale référence à ce jour.
- [16]
Notamment Nima Parvaresh, Nabardi nabarabar : gozareshi az haft sal zendan 136168 (Une bataille inégale : rapport de sept ans en prison 19821989), Andeesheh va Peykar Publications, 1995 ; Reza Ghaffari, Khaterate yek zendani az zendanhaye jomhuriyeh islami (Les mémoires d’un prisonnier dans les prisons de la République Islamique), Stockholm, Arash Forlag, 1998 ; anonyme, « Man shahede ghatle ame zendanyane siyasi boodam », op. cit.
- [17]
Nous reprenons, parmi les différentes transcriptions possibles, l’orthographe adoptée par l’organisation aujourd’hui [[[[http:// wwww. maryam-rajavi. com/ fr/ content/ view/ 300/ 66/ (consulté le 7 avril 2008). « Moudjahidines » est le pluriel de « moudjahed ».
- [18]
Mohammad Mossadeq a été Premier ministre de 1951 à 1953. Ayant nationalisé l’industrie pétrolière iranienne en 1951, il est renversé en 1953 suite à l’opération « TP-Ajax » (menée par la CIA), condamné à trois ans d’emprisonnement, puis assigné à résidence jusqu’à sa mort en 1967. Hosein Fatemi est le fondateur du Front de Libération exécuté en 1955.
- [19]
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedins, New Haven/Londres, Yale University Press, 1992, p. 115-125.
- [20]
Ibid., p. 100-102.
- [21]
Ibid., p. 229 ; voir également A. Matin-Asgari, « Twentieth Century Iran’s Political Prisoners », art. cité, p. 690.
- [22]
E. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedins, op. cit., p. 229 (notre traduction).
- [23]
Appliqué dans la Constitution iranienne de 1979, ce principe théologique confère aux religieux la primauté sur le pouvoir politique et assure une gestion réelle du pouvoir par le Guide de la Révolution (Vali-e Faghih) qui détermine la direction politique générale du pays, arbitre les conflits entre pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire et est chef des armées (régulières et paramilitaires).
- [24]
Haleh Afshar (dir.), Iran : A Revolution in Turmoil, Albany, SUNY Press, 1985 ; Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the ayatollahs : Iran and the Islamic Revolution, New York, Basic Books, 1984.
- [25]
Connie Bruck, « Exiles : How Iran’s Expatriates Are Gaming the Nuclear Threat », The New Yorker, 6 Mars 2006, p. 48.
- [26]
E. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedins, op. cit., p. 260-261.
- [27]
C. Bruck, « Exiles… », art. cité ; Human Rights Watch, No exit : human rights abuses inside the MKO camps, 2005, [[[http:// hrw. org/ backgrounder/ mena/ iran0505/ ?iran0505.pdf, consulté le 7 avril 2008] ; Human Rights Watch, Statement on Responses to Human Rights Watch Report on Abuses by the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), 15 février 2006, [[[[http:// hrw. org/ mideast/ pdf/ iran021506. pdf(consulté le 7 avril 2008).
- [28]
Elizabeth Rubin, « The Cult of Rajavi », New York Times Magazine, 13 juillet 2003, p. 26.
- [29]
E. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedins, op. cit., p. 3 (notre traduction).
- [30]
Ibid.
- [31]
Le mouvement était le seul à présenter des candidats partout en Iran.
- [32]
Le manuscrit dit : « une société Tohidie », d’après le Tohid qui est le premier principe d’Islam (« Je dis qu’il y a un seul Dieu ») : une société islamique selon la perspective d’Ali Chariati.
- [33]
E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confession, op. cit., p. 210.
- [34]
Nader Vahabi, « L’obstacle structurel à l’abolition de la peine de mort en Iran », Panagea, « Diritti umani », mars 2007, hhhttp:// wwww. panagea. eu/ web/ index. php? ?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=99999999 (consulté le 28 avril 2008).
- [35]
H.-A. Montazeri, Khaterat, op. cit.
- [36]
Hossein Mokhtar, Testimony at the September 1st Conference, Mission for Establishment of Human Rights in Iran (MEHR), 1998, en ligne, hhhhttp:// wwww. mehr. org/ massacre_1988. htm(consulté le 7 avril 2008). Notre traduction.
- [37]
E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 209 et suiv.
- [38]
Ibid.
- [39]
Témoignage cité dans E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 214 ; K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 238.
- [40]
E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 209.
- [41]
K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 227 ; R. Mihaila, « Political Considerations in Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity… », art. cité. Ces travaux prolongent une recherche initiale d’Amnesty International qui a produit plusieurs rapports quasi contemporains aux événements (« Iran : Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990 », art. cité ; « Iran : Political Executions », art. cité) et adopte aujourd’hui la définition de crime contre l’humanité : « Aux termes du droit international en vigueur en 1988, on entend par crimes contre l’humanité des attaques généralisées ou systématiques dirigées contre des civils et fondées sur des motifs discriminatoires, y compris d’ordre politique. » (AI, Action Urgente, « Iran : Craintes de mauvais traitements/ Prisonniers d’opinion présumés », 2 novembre 2007, [en ligne hhhhttp:// asiapacific. amnesty. org/ library/ Index/ FRAMDE131282007,consulté le 7 avril 2008]).
- [42]
Les pasdaran-e Sepah, gardiens de la Révolution, sont la milice paramilitaire de la République islamique.
- [43]
Expression désignant l’attentat terroriste de juin 1981 où 72 cadres du Parti républicain islamique sont morts : le terme renvoie aux « compagnons l’Imam de Hussein » dans la tradition chiite ; l’« Imam » désigne ici Khomeini.
- [44]
K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 240-241.
- [45]
Du français « comité » : désigne les cellules informelles d’ordre public mises en place par le Hezbollah au début de la Révolution, et qui se solidifient peu à peu en para-forces de l’ordre, surveillant notamment les m urs islamiques.
- [46]
AI, « Mass Executions of Political Prisoners », Amnesty International’s Newsletter, février 1989 ; K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 239.
- [47]
Ibid.
- [48]
UN document A/44/153, ZB février 1989, cité dans AI, Iran : Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990. Notre traduction.
- [49]
Final Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights.
- [50]
M. Behrooz, « Reflections on Iran’s Prison System… », art. cité.
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E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 221 (notre traduction).
- [52]
Ibid., p. 221-222 ; Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, « La révolution iranienne à l’heure des réformes », Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 1998 : hhhhttp:// wwww. monde-diplomatique. fr/ 1998/ 01/ KIAN_THIEBAUT/ 9782. html#nh1(consulté le 20 avril 2008).
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H. Mokhtar, Testimony at the September 1 Conference, op. cit (notre traduction) ; Kanoon-e Khavaran hhhhttp:// wwww. khavaran. com/ HTMLs/ Fraxan-Zendanian-Jan3008. htm(consulté le 7 avril 2008) ; Bidaran, hhhhttp:// wwww. bidaran. net/ (consulté le 7 avril 2008) ; OMID, A Memorial in Defense of Human Rights in Iran, [en llllignehttp:// wwww. abfiran. org/ english/ memorial. php,consulté le 7 avril 2008].
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Christina Lamb, The Telegraph, « Khomeini fatwa “led to killing of 30,000 in Iran” », 19 juin 2001 ; Conseil National de la Résistance Iranienne, site des moudjahidines du Peuple en exil, hhhhttp:// wwww. ncr-iran. org/ fr/ content/ view/ 3966/ 89/ ,(consulté le 7 avril 2008).
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Nasser Mohajer, « The Mass Killings in Iran », Aresh, no 57, août 1996, p. 7, cité in E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 212.
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K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 257 ; R. Mihaila, « Political Considerations in Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity… », art. cité.
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K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 243-257 ; R. Mihaila, « Political Considerations in Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity… », art. cité.
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Voir par exemple N. Yavari d’Hellencourt, « Islam et démocratie… », art. cité.
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Voir par exemple Ahmed Vahdat, « The Spectre of Montazeri », Rouzegar-e-Now, no 8, janvier-février 2003, p. 48.
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Cité dans K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 241.
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E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit., p. 210 ; R. Ghaffari, Khaterate yek zendani az zendanhaye jomhuriyeh islami, op. cit., note 23, p. 248 ; HRW, « Pour-Mohammadi and the 1988 Prison Massacres », op. cit. ; H.-A. Montazeri, Khaterat, op. cit.
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E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions…, op. cit. ; R. Afshari, Human Rights in Iran, op. cit. ; H.-A. Montazeri, Khaterat , op. cit.
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Paul Vieille, « L’institution shi’ite, la religiosité populaire, le martyre et la révolution », Peuples Méditerranéens, no 16, 1981, p. 77-92.
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Voir par exemple E. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedins, op. cit., p. 206 et 243.
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F. Khosrokhavar, L’islamisme et la mort : le martyre révolutionnaire en Iran, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1995 ; F. Khosrokhavar, Anthropologie de la révolution iranienne. Le rêve impossible, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1997.
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Ulrich Marzolph, « The Martyr’s Way to Paradise. Shiite Mural Art in the Urban Context », Ethnologia Europaea, vol. 33, no 2, 2003, p. 87-98.
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Ali Reza Sheikholeslami, « The Transformation of Iran’s Political Culture », Critique : Critical Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 17, no 9, 2000, p.105-133.
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F. Khosrokhavar, L’islamisme et la mort…, op. cit.
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Témoignage paru dans le journal islamiste Keyhan en 1984, cité par F. Khosrokhavar, L’islamisme et la mort…, op. cit., p. 92.
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BBC Persia, « Le cimetière de Khavaran : des sépultures sans nom, et la mise au jour des exécutés », 1er septembre 2005, hhhhttp:// wwww. bbc. co. uk/ persian/ iran/ story/ 2005/ 09/ 050902_mf_cemetery. shtml(notre traduction, consulté le 7 avril 2007).
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AI, Iran : Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990, p. 3. Notre traduction.
- [72]
Entretien filmé reproduit sur le site internet de l’ONG de défense des droits humains : hhhhttp:// wwww. bidaran. net/ (consulté le 7 avril 2008).
- [73]
Entretien télévisé disponible sur internet : Mosahebe-ye Televisione Internasional ba Babake Yazdi Dar Morede Koshtare Tabestane 67 (interview de la chaîne télévisée Internationale avec Babak Yazdi, concernant les massacres de l’été 88), hhhhttp:// khavaran. com/ Ghatleam(consulté le 7 avril 2007).
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Mohammad Reza Mohini, « Khavaran est un nom qui signifie “ne pas oublier” », Bidaran, hhhhttp:// wwww. bidaran. net/ spip. php? article48(consulté le 7 avril 2008).
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E. Abrahamian, Tortured Confession…, op. cit., p. 218 ; K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 282 ; AI, « Mass Executions of Political Prisoners », art. cité.
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Communauté religieuse persécutée.
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BBC Persia, « Le cimetière de Khavaran… », art. cité ; voir aussi M. R Mohini, « Khavaran est un nom qui signifie “ne pas oublier” », art. cité.
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Nouvelles radiophonique du 19 novembre 2005, Radio Farda, Afrade Nashenas Ghabrhaye Edamyane Siyasiye Daheye 60 ra dar Goorestane Khavaran Takhreeb Kardand (« Des individus non identifiés ont détruit les tombes des prisonniers politiques exécutés dans les années 1980 dans le cimetière de Khavaran »).
- [79]
AI, Action Urgente, « Iran : Craintes de mauvais traitements/ Prisonniers d’opinion présumés », op. cit.
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Human Rights Watch, Minister of murders, op. cit. Notre traduction.
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Kanoon-e Khavaran, op. cit. (site internet).
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M. R. Mohini, « Khavaran est un nom qui signifie “ne pas oublier” », art. cité.
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F. Khosrokhavar, « L’Iran, la démocratie et la nouvelle citoyenneté », art. cité.
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John R. Gillis (dir.), Commemorations : The Politics of National Identity, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 3 (notre traduction).
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K. Shahrooz, « With Revolutionary Rage and Rancor… », art. cité, p. 259 ; voir aussi R. Mihaila, « Political Considerations in Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity… », art. cité, en ligne.
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Nicole Loraux, La cité divisée. L’oubli dans la mémoire d’Athène, Paris, Payot-Rivages, 2005, p. 164.
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Nathalie Nougayrède, « Une chercheuse franco-iranienne empêchée de quitter Téhéran », Le Monde, 6 septembre 2007.
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Nader Khoshdel, « Marasem-e bozorgdasht-e zendanian-e siasi : goft-o-gou ba Mihan Rousta » (« La cérémonie de bozorgdasht des prisonniers politiques : entretien avec Mihan Rousta »), Sedaye-ma, 13 octobre 2004, hhhhttp:// wwww. sedaye-ma. org/ web/ show_article. php? file= src/ didgah/ mihanrousta_10132006_1. htm(consulté le 7 avril 2008).