Baisse de la natalité: Pourquoi il faut voter Fillon (After France, America faces unexpected baby bust)

 
millennials living at home4Fertility Rate

The western world is going out of business because it’s given up having babies. The 20th century welfare state, with its hitherto unknown concepts such as spending a third of your adult lifetime in « retirement », is premised on the basis that there will be enough new citizens to support the old. But there won’t be. Lazy critics of my thesis thought that I was making a « prediction », and that my predictions were no more reliable than Al Gore’s or Michael Mann’s on the looming eco-apocalypse. I tried to explain that it’s not really a prediction at all: When it comes to forecasting the future, the birthrate is the nearest thing to hard numbers. If only a million babies are born in 2006, it’s hard to have two million adults enter the workforce in 2026 (or 2033, or 2037, or whenever they get around to finishing their Anger Management and Queer Studies degrees). And the hard data on babies around the Western world is that they’re running out a lot faster than the oil is. « Replacement » fertility rate–i.e., the number you need for merely a stable population, not getting any bigger, not getting any smaller–is 2.1 babies per woman. Some countries are well above that: the global fertility leader, Somalia, is 6.91, Niger 6.83, Afghanistan 6.78, Yemen 6.75. Notice what those nations have in common? Scroll way down to the bottom of the Hot One Hundred top breeders and you’ll eventually find the United States, hovering just at replacement rate with 2.07 births per woman. Ireland is 1.87, New Zealand 1.79, Australia 1.76. But Canada’s fertility rate is down to 1.5, well below replacement rate; Germany and Austria are at 1.3, the brink of the death spiral; Russia and Italy are at 1.2; Spain 1.1, about half replacement rate. That’s to say, Spain’s population is halving every generation. By 2050, Italy’s population will have fallen by 22%. (…) Enter Islam, which sportingly volunteered to be the children we couldn’t be bothered having ourselves, and which kind offer was somewhat carelessly taken up by the post-Christian west. As I wrote a decade ago: The design flaw of the secular social-democratic state is that it requires a religious-society birthrate to sustain it. Post-Christian hyperrationalism is, in the objective sense, a lot less rational than Catholicism or Mormonism. Indeed, in its reliance on immigration to ensure its future, the European Union has adopted a 21st-century variation on the strategy of the Shakers, who were forbidden from reproducing and thus could increase their numbers only by conversion. That didn’t work out too great for the Shakers, but the Europeans figured it would be a piece of cake for them: « westernization » is so seductive, so appealing that, notwithstanding the occasional frothing imam and burka-bagged crone, their young Muslims would fall for the siren song of secular progressivism just like they themselves had. So, as long as you kept the immigrants coming, there would be no problem – as long as you oomphed up the scale of the solution. As I put it: To avoid collapse, European nations will need to take in immigrants at a rate no stable society has ever attempted. Last year, Angela Merkel decided to attempt it. The German Chancellor cut to the chase and imported in twelve months 1.1 million Muslim « refugees ». That doesn’t sound an awful lot out of 80 million Germans, but, in fact, the 1.1 million Muslim are overwhelmingly (80 per cent plus) fit, virile, young men. Germany has fewer than ten million people in the same population cohort, among whom Muslims are already over-represented: the median age of Germans as a whole is 46, the median age of German Muslims is 34. But let’s keep the numbers simple, and assume that of those ten million young Germans half of them are ethnic German males. Frau Merkel is still planning to bring in another million « refugees » this year. So by the end of 2016 she will have imported a population equivalent to 40 per cent of Germany’s existing young male cohort. The future is here now: It’s not about « predictions ». On standard patterns of « family reunification », these two million « refugees » will eventually bring another four or five persons each from their native lands – or another eight-to-ten million. In the meantime, they have the needs of all young lads, and no one around to gratify them except the local womenfolk. Hence, New Year’s Eve in Cologne, and across the southern border the Vienna police chief warning women not to go out unaccompanied, and across the northern border: Danish nightclubs demand guests have to speak Danish, English or German to be allowed in after ‘foreign men in groups’ attack female revellers But don’t worry, it won’t be a problem for long: On the German and Swedish « migrant » numbers, there won’t be a lot of « female revelry » in Europe’s future. The formerly firebreathing feminists at The Guardian and the BBC are already falling as mute as battered wives – saying nothing, looking away, making excuses, clutching at rationalizations… (…)  A few weeks before The Wall Street Journal published my piece, I discussed its themes at an event in New York whose speakers included Douglas Murray. Douglas was more optimistic: He suggested that Muslim populations in Europe were still small, and immigration policy could be changed: Easier said than done. My essay and book were so influential that in the decade since, the rate of Islamization in the west has increased – via all three principal methods: Muslim immigration, Muslim birthrates of those already here, Muslim conversion of the infidels. David Goldman thinks aging, childless Germany has embraced civilizational suicide as redemption for their blood-soaked sins. Maybe. But it is less clear why the Continent’s less tainted polities – impeccably « neutral » Sweden, for example – are so eager to join them. (…) Somewhere, deep down, the European political class understands that the Great Migrations have accelerated the future I outlined way back when (…) It’s the biggest story of our time, and, ten years on, Europe’s leaders still can’t talk about it, not to their own peoples, not honestly. For all the « human rights » complaints, and death threats from halfwits, and subtler rejections from old friends who feel I’m no longer quite respectable, I’m glad I brought it up. And it’s well past time for others to speak out. Mark Steyn
For over a century, social scientists have predicted declines in religious beliefs and their replacement with more scientific/naturalistic outlooks, a prediction known as the secularization hypothesis. However, skepticism surrounding this hypothesis has been expressed by some researchers in recent decades. After reviewing the pertinent evidence and arguments, we examined some aspects of the secularization hypothesis from what is termed a biologically informed perspective. Based on large samples of college students in Malaysia and the USA, religiosity, religious affiliation, and parental fertility were measured using self-reports. Three religiosity indicators were factor analyzed, resulting in an index for religiosity. Results reveal that average parental fertility varied considerably according to religious groups, with Muslims being the most religious and the most fertile and Jews and Buddhists being the least. Within most religious groupings, religiosity was positively associated with parental fertility. While cross-sectional in nature, when our results are combined with evidence that both religiosity and fertility are substantially heritable traits, findings are consistent with view that earlier trends toward secularization (due to science education surrounding advancements in science) are currently being counter-balanced by genetic and reproductive forces. We also propose that the inverse association between intelligence and religiosity, and the inverse correlation between intelligence and fertility lead to predictions of a decline in secularism in the foreseeable future. A contra-secularization hypothesis is proposed and defended in the discussion. It states that secularism is likely to undergo a decline throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century, including Europe and other industrial societies.’ Lee Ellis, Anthony W. Hoskin, Edward Dutton and Helmuth Nyborg
Secularization is not likely to replace the popularity of religions. ‘Instead, over the long term, we predict that the most religious ‘shall inherit the earth,’ so to speak’. ‘This is especially so for the most fertile religious groups – Islam’. Lee Ellis, Anthony W. Hoskin, Edward Dutton and Helmuth Nyborg
En 100 ans à peine, les pays musulmans ont reproduit la multiplication par dix que l’Europe a réalisée entre 1500 et 1900. Au cours du dernier siècle, la population musulmane a grimpé en flèche de 140 millions à 1.4 milliard. Si l’Europe était parvenue à la multiplication par quatre observée aux États-unis (de 75 millions à 300 millions entre 1900 et 2006), les 1.6 milliards d’habitants de son continent auraient fait paraître bien chétives la Chine de 1.3 milliards et l’Inde de 1.1 milliards. Cependant, la part de l’Europe dans la population mondiale des hommes en âge de combattre, qui était de 27% en 1914, est aujourd’hui, avec 9%, inférieure aux 11% de 1500. Ainsi, les nouveaux habits du « pacifisme européen » et du « soft power » sont les cache-sexe de son impuissance. Gunnar Heinsohn
Depuis plusieurs années, l’Unaf met en avant les atteintes à la politique familiale. Et ce, dans une réflexion transpartisane. « La baisse du quotient familial et la réduction du congé parental depuis le 1er janvier 2015 » sont les principales mesures dénoncées. « Les familles s’interrogent. La confiance est perdue », poursuit Marie-Andrée Blanc en brandissant un chiffre clé : d’après une enquête de 2013, le désir d’enfant des Français est de 2,37 enfants par famille. Il est donc bien plus important que le nombre effectif d’enfants. Cet écart peut s’expliquer par la situation économique des ménages en temps de crise. Avoir plusieurs enfants demande généralement une stabilité concernant le logement, l’emploi, les revenus. Le pouvoir d’achat des familles n’étant pas extensible, le choix d’une deuxième naissance serait de moins en moins évident. « C’est inquiétant car un pays avec des enfants est un pays qui consomme et finance ses retraites. » L’argument économique est également validé par le démographe. Même s’il le nuance légèrement. « On sait qu’en période de croissance du chômage, il y a moins de naissances, note Laurent Toulemon. Mais je ne crois pas que l’affaiblissement de la politique familiale puisse avoir un impact. On n’a pas encore de données précises. » Le chercheur pense notamment à la récente restriction d’allocations pour les familles aisées (+ de 6.000 euros de revenus). Il valide en revanche une autre piste liée à la baisse du nombre de mariages depuis 1970. «Les couples mariés ont plus d’enfants que les autres. Et quand les couples mariés font peu d’enfants, la fécondité baisse.» Enfin à moyen terme, le déficit de naissances peut s’expliquer par la baisse du nombre de couples en âge d’avoir des enfants. La deuxième vague du baby-boom ayant déjà eu des enfants, il faudra peut-être attendre que la troisième génération se fasse appeler papa et maman. 20 minutes
I fail to see why any economist should be surprised by this. A record number of millennials are living at home. Unless the millennials… Shed student debt Move out on their own Get a job that supports raising a family No longer have to take care of their aging parents Have a significant change in attitudes about homes, families, debt, and mobility …. economists will still be wondering “what happened” years from now. Zero edge
Attention: une chute peut en cacher une autre !
Crise économique, explosion des déficits publics et de la dette privée, multiplication des Tanguy, banalisation du divorce, de l’avortement et du mariage homosexuel, dévalorisation des mâles et de la religion …
Et après, les mêmes causes produisant les mêmes effets, celle de la France il y a un an …
Chute record et inattendue de la natalité aux Etats-Unis six mois après !

Baisse de la natalité: Pourquoi les Français font moins d’enfants

POPULATION La France a enregistré 19.000 naissances de moins en 2015 qu’en 2014…

20 minutes

21.01.2016

Moins de biberons ou de tétées en pleine nuit, moins de couches, mais aussi moins de premiers sourires et de dents qui poussent. C’est d’une certaine manière le bilan comptable des familles françaises l’année dernière puisque celles-ci ont fait 19.000 enfants de moins qu’en 2014. Les derniers chiffres publiés par l’Insee révèlent une baisse de la natalité de 2,3 %, ce qui porte le nombre de naissances à son plus bas niveau depuis 10 ans.

La chute est conséquente, mais n’a rien d’alarmant selon Laurent Toulemon, démographe spécialiste de la fécondité. « On revient autour de 800.000 naissances par an. Ce sont des niveaux moyens sur 40 ans. En fait, il y a eu une fécondité très élevée entre 2006 et 2014. Ça relativise un peu la baisse. » Par ailleurs, avec un taux de 1,96 enfants par femme, la France fait toujours figure de bonne élève face à ses voisins européens qui tournent autour d’1,5.

Baisse du quotient familial et réduction du congé parental

Pas de quoi s’affoler, donc, mais il ne faudrait pas que la chute se poursuive dans les années à venir. « On doit garder ce taux de fécondité, c’est indicateur du bien-être des familles » prévient Marie-Andrée Blanc, la présidente de l’Union nationale des Associations Familiales (Unaf), associations apolitique et aconfessionnel représentant les 18 millions de familles sur le territoire français.

Pour elle, ce tassement de la natalité n’est pas surprenant. Depuis plusieurs années, l’Unaf met en avant les atteintes à la politique familiale. Et ce, dans une réflexion transpartisane. « La baisse du quotient familial et la réduction du congé parental depuis le 1er janvier 2015 » sont les principales mesures dénoncées. « Les familles s’interrogent. La confiance est perdue », poursuit Marie-Andrée Blanc en brandissant un chiffre clé : d’après une enquête de 2013, le désir d’enfant des Français est de 2,37 enfants par famille. Il est donc bien plus important que le nombre effectif d’enfants.

Le chômage responsable ?

Cet écart peut s’expliquer par la situation économique des ménages en temps de crise. Avoir plusieurs enfants demande généralement une stabilité concernant le logement, l’emploi, les revenus. Le pouvoir d’achat des familles n’étant pas extensible, le choix d’une deuxième naissance serait de moins en moins évident. « C’est inquiétant car un pays avec des enfants est un pays qui consomme et finance ses retraites. »

L’argument économique est également validé par le démographe. Même s’il le nuance légèrement. « On sait qu’en période de croissance du chômage, il y a moins de naissances, note Laurent Toulemon. Mais je ne crois pas que l’affaiblissement de la politique familiale puisse avoir un impact. On n’a pas encore de données précises. » Le chercheur pense notamment à la récente restriction d’allocations pour les familles aisées (+ de 6.000 euros de revenus).

En attente de la 3e vague du baby-boom

Il valide en revanche une autre piste liée à la baisse du nombre de mariages depuis 1970. «Les couples mariés ont plus d’enfants que les autres. Et quand les couples mariés font peu d’enfants, la fécondité baisse.» Enfin à moyen terme, le déficit de naissances peut s’expliquer par la baisse du nombre de couples en âge d’avoir des enfants. La deuxième vague du baby-boom ayant déjà eu des enfants, il faudra peut-être attendre que la troisième génération se fasse appeler papa et maman.

Natalité/fécondité: La natalité est l’étude du nombre de naissances au sein d’une population. Il ne faut pas la confondre avec la fécondité qui est l’étude du nombre des naissances par femme en âge de procréer.

Voir aussi:

Baby Bust: US Fertility Rate Unexpectedly Drops To Lowest On Record

Submitted by Michael Shedlock via MishTalk.com,

Economists figured the recovery would bring about increased confidence and a rise in the birth rate.

Instead, the rate dropped into a tie with the lowest birth rate on record.

This is yet another surprise for economists to ponder.

Please consider the Wall Street Journal report Behind the Ongoing U.S. Baby Bust.

The newest official tally  from the National Center for Health Statistics showed an unexpected drop in the number of babies born in the U.S. in 2015. The report was a surprise: Demographers had generally expected the number of births to rise in 2015, as it had in 2014. Instead, the U.S. appears to still be stuck in something of an ongoing “baby bust” that started with the recession and housing collapse and has yet to reverse.

The Wall Street Journal concludes “There’s still good reason to believe the birth rate will pick up in coming years. After slumping for nearly a decade into the 1970s, births picked up in the 1980s and 1990s (giving us the generation known as millennials.) The most common age in America is 24 or 25, meaning there’s a very large cohort of these millennials who are about to hit the years that people are most likely to become parents.”

No Mystery

I fail to see why any economist should be surprised by this. A record number of millennials are living at home.

This is simply too obvious. So I have two questions:

  1. Do economists read anything or do they just believe in their models?
  2. If they do read, how come they cannot grasp simple, easy to understand ideas?

Economists who could not figure any of this out now place their faith in the fact “a very large cohort of these millennials who are about to hit the years that people are most likely to become parents.

Mish’s Alternate View

Unless the millennials…

  1. Shed student debt
  2. Move out on their own
  3. Get a job that supports raising a family
  4. No longer have to take care of their aging parents
  5. Have a significant change in attitudes about homes, families, debt, and mobility ….

…economists will still be wondering “what happened” years from now.

Voir également:

Voir par ailleurs:

Mormons more likely to marry, have more children than other U.S. religious groups

The share of Americans who identify as Mormons has roughly held steady even as the percentage of Christians in the U.S. has declined dramatically in recent years, according to the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study. And the study found Mormons stand out in other ways: They have higher fertility rates and are far more likely than members of most other major religious traditions to be married – especially to other Mormons.

Mormons made up 1.6% of the American adult population in 2014, little changed from 2007 (1.7%), the last time a similar survey was conducted. By contrast, the percentage of Christians in the U.S. has dropped from 78.4% to 70.6% during the same time period.

Two-thirds (66%) of U.S. Mormon adults are currently married, down slightly from 71% in 2007 – but still high compared with current rates among Christians overall (52%) and U.S. adults overall (48%). (Marriage rates are lower across the board than they were several years ago.) 

Compared with many other religious groups, Mormons who are married are especially likely to have spouses who share their faith. Eight-in-ten Mormons who are married or living with a partner (82%) have a Mormon spouse or partner; among religious traditions, only Hindus have a higher rate of “in-marriage” (91%).

Mormons also tend to have more children than other groups. Mormons ages 40-59 have had an average of 3.4 children in their lifetime, well above the comparable figure for all Americans in that age range (2.1) and higher than any other religious group. Overall, Mormon adults have an average of 1.1 children currently living at home, nearly double the national average (0.6).

These findings line up with U.S. Mormons’ priorities as expressed in a 2011 Pew Research survey of the group. In that survey, 73% of U.S. Mormons said that having a successful marriage is “one of the most important things in life,” and 81% said the same about being a good parent. Among the general public, half or fewer call each of these life goals “one of the most important things in life.”

Some other findings about U.S. Mormons from the 2014 study include:

  • Most adults who were raised as Mormons still identify as Mormons today (64%), a retention rate roughly on par with that of evangelical Protestants (65%) and slightly above that of Catholics (59%). Among those who were raised as Mormons but have left the church, most are now religiously unaffiliated (21% of all those who were raised Mormon).
  • About as many people have joined the Mormon faith after being raised in another religious tradition (0.5% of U.S. adults) as have left the church after being raised Mormon (0.6%).
  • While the U.S. population has become more racially and ethnically diverse in recent years, the racial and ethnic composition of Mormons has not changed much; Mormons remain overwhelmingly white. Mormons were 14% non-white in 2007 and 15% non-white in 2014; Christians overall were 29% non-white in 2007 and 34% non-white in 2014.
  • Utah still has by far the biggest share of Mormon residents of any state (55%), a percentage that has changed little in recent years.
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