For over a century, social scientists have predicted declines in religious beliefs and their replacement with more scientific/naturalistic outlooks, a prediction known as the secularization hypothesis. However, skepticism surrounding this hypothesis has been expressed by some researchers in recent decades. After reviewing the pertinent evidence and arguments, we examined some aspects of the secularization hypothesis from what is termed a biologically informed perspective. Based on large samples of college students in Malaysia and the USA, religiosity, religious affiliation, and parental fertility were measured using self-reports. Three religiosity indicators were factor analyzed, resulting in an index for religiosity. Results reveal that average parental fertility varied considerably according to religious groups, with Muslims being the most religious and the most fertile and Jews and Buddhists being the least. Within most religious groupings, religiosity was positively associated with parental fertility. While cross-sectional in nature, when our results are combined with evidence that both religiosity and fertility are substantially heritable traits, findings are consistent with view that earlier trends toward secularization (due to science education surrounding advancements in science) are currently being counter-balanced by genetic and reproductive forces. We also propose that the inverse association between intelligence and religiosity, and the inverse correlation between intelligence and fertility lead to predictions of a decline in secularism in the foreseeable future. A contra-secularization hypothesis is proposed and defended in the discussion. It states that secularism is likely to undergo a decline throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century, including Europe and other industrial societies.’ Lee Ellis, Anthony W. Hoskin, Edward Dutton and Helmuth Nyborg
Secularization is not likely to replace the popularity of religions. ‘Instead, over the long term, we predict that the most religious ‘shall inherit the earth,’ so to speak’. ‘This is especially so for the most fertile religious groups – Islam’. Lee Ellis, Anthony W. Hoskin, Edward Dutton and Helmuth Nyborg
En 100 ans à peine, les pays musulmans ont reproduit la multiplication par dix que l’Europe a réalisée entre 1500 et 1900. Au cours du dernier siècle, la population musulmane a grimpé en flèche de 140 millions à 1.4 milliard. Si l’Europe était parvenue à la multiplication par quatre observée aux États-unis (de 75 millions à 300 millions entre 1900 et 2006), les 1.6 milliards d’habitants de son continent auraient fait paraître bien chétives la Chine de 1.3 milliards et l’Inde de 1.1 milliards. Cependant, la part de l’Europe dans la population mondiale des hommes en âge de combattre, qui était de 27% en 1914, est aujourd’hui, avec 9%, inférieure aux 11% de 1500. Ainsi, les nouveaux habits du « pacifisme européen » et du « soft power » sont les cache-sexe de son impuissance. Gunnar Heinsohn
Depuis plusieurs années, l’Unaf met en avant les atteintes à la politique familiale. Et ce, dans une réflexion transpartisane. « La baisse du quotient familial et la réduction du congé parental depuis le 1er janvier 2015 » sont les principales mesures dénoncées. « Les familles s’interrogent. La confiance est perdue », poursuit Marie-Andrée Blanc en brandissant un chiffre clé : d’après une enquête de 2013, le désir d’enfant des Français est de 2,37 enfants par famille. Il est donc bien plus important que le nombre effectif d’enfants. Cet écart peut s’expliquer par la situation économique des ménages en temps de crise. Avoir plusieurs enfants demande généralement une stabilité concernant le logement, l’emploi, les revenus. Le pouvoir d’achat des familles n’étant pas extensible, le choix d’une deuxième naissance serait de moins en moins évident. « C’est inquiétant car un pays avec des enfants est un pays qui consomme et finance ses retraites. » L’argument économique est également validé par le démographe. Même s’il le nuance légèrement. « On sait qu’en période de croissance du chômage, il y a moins de naissances, note Laurent Toulemon. Mais je ne crois pas que l’affaiblissement de la politique familiale puisse avoir un impact. On n’a pas encore de données précises. » Le chercheur pense notamment à la récente restriction d’allocations pour les familles aisées (+ de 6.000 euros de revenus). Il valide en revanche une autre piste liée à la baisse du nombre de mariages depuis 1970. «Les couples mariés ont plus d’enfants que les autres. Et quand les couples mariés font peu d’enfants, la fécondité baisse.» Enfin à moyen terme, le déficit de naissances peut s’expliquer par la baisse du nombre de couples en âge d’avoir des enfants. La deuxième vague du baby-boom ayant déjà eu des enfants, il faudra peut-être attendre que la troisième génération se fasse appeler papa et maman. 20 minutes
I fail to see why any economist should be surprised by this. A record number of millennials are living at home. Unless the millennials… Shed student debt Move out on their own Get a job that supports raising a family No longer have to take care of their aging parents Have a significant change in attitudes about homes, families, debt, and mobility …. economists will still be wondering “what happened” years from now. Zero edge
POPULATION La France a enregistré 19.000 naissances de moins en 2015 qu’en 2014…
Economists figured the recovery would bring about increased confidence and a rise in the birth rate.
Instead, the rate dropped into a tie with the lowest birth rate on record.
This is yet another surprise for economists to ponder.
Please consider the Wall Street Journal report Behind the Ongoing U.S. Baby Bust.
The newest official tally from the National Center for Health Statistics showed an unexpected drop in the number of babies born in the U.S. in 2015. The report was a surprise: Demographers had generally expected the number of births to rise in 2015, as it had in 2014. Instead, the U.S. appears to still be stuck in something of an ongoing “baby bust” that started with the recession and housing collapse and has yet to reverse.
The Wall Street Journal concludes “There’s still good reason to believe the birth rate will pick up in coming years. After slumping for nearly a decade into the 1970s, births picked up in the 1980s and 1990s (giving us the generation known as millennials.) The most common age in America is 24 or 25, meaning there’s a very large cohort of these millennials who are about to hit the years that people are most likely to become parents.”
I fail to see why any economist should be surprised by this. A record number of millennials are living at home.
- Time: Millennials Living With Parents at Record Rates
- Pew: More Millennials Living With Family Despite Improved Job Market
- Mother Jones: Why Are So Many Millennials Still Living at Home?
This is simply too obvious. So I have two questions:
- Do economists read anything or do they just believe in their models?
- If they do read, how come they cannot grasp simple, easy to understand ideas?
Economists who could not figure any of this out now place their faith in the fact “a very large cohort of these millennials who are about to hit the years that people are most likely to become parents.”
Mish’s Alternate View
Unless the millennials…
- Shed student debt
- Move out on their own
- Get a job that supports raising a family
- No longer have to take care of their aging parents
- Have a significant change in attitudes about homes, families, debt, and mobility ….
…economists will still be wondering “what happened” years from now.
Voir par ailleurs:
The share of Americans who identify as Mormons has roughly held steady even as the percentage of Christians in the U.S. has declined dramatically in recent years, according to the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study. And the study found Mormons stand out in other ways: They have higher fertility rates and are far more likely than members of most other major religious traditions to be married – especially to other Mormons.
Mormons made up 1.6% of the American adult population in 2014, little changed from 2007 (1.7%), the last time a similar survey was conducted. By contrast, the percentage of Christians in the U.S. has dropped from 78.4% to 70.6% during the same time period.
Two-thirds (66%) of U.S. Mormon adults are currently married, down slightly from 71% in 2007 – but still high compared with current rates among Christians overall (52%) and U.S. adults overall (48%). (Marriage rates are lower across the board than they were several years ago.)
Compared with many other religious groups, Mormons who are married are especially likely to have spouses who share their faith. Eight-in-ten Mormons who are married or living with a partner (82%) have a Mormon spouse or partner; among religious traditions, only Hindus have a higher rate of “in-marriage” (91%).
Mormons also tend to have more children than other groups. Mormons ages 40-59 have had an average of 3.4 children in their lifetime, well above the comparable figure for all Americans in that age range (2.1) and higher than any other religious group. Overall, Mormon adults have an average of 1.1 children currently living at home, nearly double the national average (0.6).
These findings line up with U.S. Mormons’ priorities as expressed in a 2011 Pew Research survey of the group. In that survey, 73% of U.S. Mormons said that having a successful marriage is “one of the most important things in life,” and 81% said the same about being a good parent. Among the general public, half or fewer call each of these life goals “one of the most important things in life.”
Some other findings about U.S. Mormons from the 2014 study include:
- Most adults who were raised as Mormons still identify as Mormons today (64%), a retention rate roughly on par with that of evangelical Protestants (65%) and slightly above that of Catholics (59%). Among those who were raised as Mormons but have left the church, most are now religiously unaffiliated (21% of all those who were raised Mormon).
- About as many people have joined the Mormon faith after being raised in another religious tradition (0.5% of U.S. adults) as have left the church after being raised Mormon (0.6%).
- While the U.S. population has become more racially and ethnically diverse in recent years, the racial and ethnic composition of Mormons has not changed much; Mormons remain overwhelmingly white. Mormons were 14% non-white in 2007 and 15% non-white in 2014; Christians overall were 29% non-white in 2007 and 34% non-white in 2014.
- Utah still has by far the biggest share of Mormon residents of any state (55%), a percentage that has changed little in recent years.