Présidentielle américaine: Vous avez dit effet Bradley ? (Revenge of the clingers and deplorables: a win so big even Nate Silver missed it)

La prédiction est un art bien difficile, surtout en ce qui concerne l’avenir. Niels Bohr

Soudain, Norman se sentit fier. Tout s’imposait à lui, avec force. Il était fier. Dans ce monde imparfait, les citoyens souverains de la première et de la plus grande Démocratie Electronique avaient, par l’intermédiaire de Norman Muller (par lui), exercé une fois de plus leur libre et inaliénable droit de vote. Le Votant (Isaac Asimov, 1955)

Vous allez dans certaines petites villes de Pennsylvanie où, comme ans beaucoup de petites villes du Middle West, les emplois ont disparu depuis maintenant 25 ans et n’ont été remplacés par rien d’autre (…) Et il n’est pas surprenant qu’ils deviennent pleins d’amertume, qu’ils s’accrochent aux armes à feu ou à la religion, ou à leur antipathie pour ceux qui ne sont pas comme eux, ou encore à un sentiment d’hostilité envers les immigrants. Barack Obama (2008)

Pour généraliser, en gros, vous pouvez placer la moitié des partisans de Trump dans ce que j’appelle le panier des pitoyables. Les racistes, sexistes, homophobes, xénophobes, islamophobes. A vous de choisir. Hillary Clinton

I continue to believe Mr. Trump will not be president. And the reason is that I have a lot of faith in the American people. Being president is a serious job. It’s not hosting a talk show, or a reality show. The American people are pretty sensible, and I think they’ll make a sensible choice in the end. It’s not promotion, it’s not marketing. It’s hard. And a lot of people count on us getting it right. Barack Hussein Obama (Feb. 2016)

Comme je l’ai dit depuis le début, notre campagne n’en était pas simplement une, mais plutôt un grand mouvement incroyable, composé de millions d’hommes et de femmes qui travaillent dur, qui aiment leur pays, et qui veulent un avenir plus prospère et plus radieux pour eux-mêmes et leur famille. C’est un mouvement composé d’Américains de toutes races, de toutes religions, de toutes origines, qui veulent et attendent que le gouvernement serve le peuple. Ce gouvernement servira le peuple. J’ai passé toute ma vie dans le monde des affaires et j’ai observé le potentiel des projets et des personnes partout dans le monde. Aujourd’hui, c’est ce que je veux faire pour notre pays. Il y a un potentiel énorme, je connais bien notre pays, il y a potentiel incroyable, ce sera magnifique. Chaque Américain aura l’opportunité de vivre pleinement son potentiel. Ces hommes et ces femmes oubliés de notre pays, ces personnes ne seront plus oubliées. Donald Trump

Je suis désolé d’être le porteur de mauvaises nouvelles, mais je crois avoir été assez clair l’été dernier lorsque j’ai affirmé que Donald Trump serait le candidat républicain à la présidence des États-Unis. Cette fois, j’ai des nouvelles encore pires à vous annoncer: Donald J. Trump va remporter l’élection du mois de novembre. Ce clown à temps partiel et sociopathe à temps plein va devenir notre prochain président. (…) Jamais de toute ma vie n’ai-je autant voulu me tromper. (…) Voici 5 raisons pour lesquelles Trump va gagner : 1. Le poids électoral du Midwest, ou le Brexit de la Ceinture de rouille 2. Le dernier tour de piste des Hommes blancs en colère 3. Hillary est un problème en elle-même 4. Les partisans désabusés de Bernie Sanders 5. L’effet Jesse Ventura. Michael Moore

The phenomenon of voters telling pollsters what they think they want to hear, however, actually has a name: the Bradley Effect, a well-studied political phenomenon. In 1982, poll after poll showed Tom Bradley, Los Angeles’ first black mayor and a Democrat, with a solid lead over George Deukmejian, a white Republican, in the California gubernatorial race. Instead, Bradley narrowly lost to Deukmejian, a stunning upset that led experts to wonder how the polls got it wrong. Pollsters, and some political scientists, later concluded that voters didn’t want to say they were voting against Bradley, who would have been the nation’s first popularly-elected African-American governor, because they didn’t want to appear to be racist. (…) In December, a Morning Consult poll examined whether Trump supporters were more likely to say they supported him in online polls than in polls conducted by live questioners. Their finding was surprising: « Trump performs about six percentage points better online than via live telephone interviewing, » according to the study. At the same time, « his advantage online is driven by adults with higher levels of education, » the study says, countering data showing Trump’s bedrock support comes from voters without college degrees. « Importantly, the differences between online and live telephone [surveys] persist even when examining only highly engaged, likely voters. » But Galston says while the study examines « a legitimate question, » the methodology is unclear, and « it’s really important to compare apples to apples. You need to be sure that the online community has the same demographic profile » as phone polling. « It may also be the case that people who are online and willing to participate in that study are already, in effect, a self-selected sample » of pro-Trump voters, Galston says. (…) Ultimately, Trump’s claim « is more of a way to try to explain poor polling numbers. Trump is losing at the moment and he’s trying to explain it off, » Skelley says. « This doesn’t really hold up under scrutiny. » US News & world report (July 2016)

Ever since the ascendency of their “war room,” the Clinton-inspired Left has attacked the integrity and morality of all Republican presidential candidates: McCain was rendered a near-senile coot, confused about the extent of his wife’s wealth and the number of their estates. No finer man ran for president than Mitt Romney. And by November 2012 when he lost, he had been reduced to a bullying hazer in his teen-age years, a vulture capitalist, a heartless plutocrat who was rude to his garbage man, tortured dogs, had an elevator in his house, and provided horses and stables to his aristocratic wife. All were either lies or exaggerations or irrelevant and all insidiously cemented the picture of the gentlemanly Romney as a preppie, out-of-touch, old white-guy snob, and gratuitously cruel to the less fortunate. Trump was certainly more vulgar than either McCain or Romney, but what voters he lost owing to his crass candor he may well have gained back through his slash-and-burn, take-no-prisoners willingness to fight back against the liberal smear machine. We can envision what Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, or Ted Cruz would look like after six months of “going high” from the Clinton-campaign treatment. It is a mistake to believe that any other candidate would have better dealt with the Clinton-Podesta hit teams; all we can assume is that most would have suffered far more nobly than Trump. It would be wonderful if a Republican candidate ran with Romney’s personal integrity, Rubio’s charisma, Walker’s hands-on experience, Cruz’s commitment to constitutional conservatism, and Trump’s energy, animal cunning, and ferocity, but unfortunately such multifaceted candidates are rare. Victor Davis Hanson

What I was hearing was this general sense of being on the short end of the stick. Rural people felt like they’re not getting their fair share. (…)  First, people felt that they were not getting their fair share of decision-making power. For example, people would say: All the decisions are made in Madison and Milwaukee and nobody’s listening to us. Nobody’s paying attention, nobody’s coming out here and asking us what we think. Decisions are made in the cities, and we have to abide by them. Second, people would complain that they weren’t getting their fair share of stuff, that they weren’t getting their fair share of public resources. That often came up in perceptions of taxation. People had this sense that all the money is sucked in by Madison, but never spent on places like theirs. And third, people felt that they weren’t getting respect. They would say: The real kicker is that people in the city don’t understand us. They don’t understand what rural life is like, what’s important to us and what challenges that we’re facing. They think we’re a bunch of redneck racists. So it’s all three of these things — the power, the money, the respect. People are feeling like they’re not getting their fair share of any of that. (…)  It’s been this slow burn. Resentment is like that. It builds and builds and builds until something happens. Some confluence of things makes people notice: I am so pissed off. I am really the victim of injustice here. (…) Then, I also think that having our first African American president is part of the mix, too. (…) when the health-care debate ramped up, once he was in office and became very, very partisan, I think people took partisan sides. (…) It’s not just resentment toward people of color. It’s resentment toward elites, city people. (…) Of course [some of this resentment] is about race, but it’s also very much about the actual lived conditions that people are experiencing. We do need to pay attention to both. As the work that you did on mortality rates shows, it’s not just about dollars. People are experiencing a decline in prosperity, and that’s real. The other really important element here is people’s perceptions. Surveys show that it may not actually be the case that Trump supporters themselves are doing less well — but they live in places where it’s reasonable for them to conclude that people like them are struggling. Support for Trump is rooted in reality in some respects — in people’s actual economic struggles, and the actual increases in mortality. But it’s the perceptions that people have about their reality are the key driving force here. (…) One of the key stories in our political culture has been the American Dream — the sense that if you work hard, you will get ahead. (…) But here’s where having Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump running alongside one another for a while was so interesting. I think the support for Sanders represented a different interpretation of the problem. For Sanders supporters, the problem is not that other population groups are getting more than their fair share, but that the government isn’t doing enough to intervene here and right a ship that’s headed in the wrong direction. (…) There is definitely some misinformation, some misunderstandings. But we all do that thing of encountering information and interpreting it in a way that supports our own predispositions. Recent studies in political science have shown that it’s actually those of us who think of ourselves as the most politically sophisticated, the most educated, who do it more than others. So I really resist this characterization of Trump supporters as ignorant. There’s just more and more of a recognition that politics for people is not — and this is going to sound awful, but — it’s not about facts and policies. It’s so much about identities, people forming ideas about the kind of person they are and the kind of people others are. Who am I for, and who am I against? Policy is part of that, but policy is not the driver of these judgments. There are assessments of, is this someone like me? Is this someone who gets someone like me? (…) All of us, even well-educated, politically sophisticated people interpret facts through our own perspectives, our sense of what who we are, our own identities. I don’t think that what you do is give people more information. Because they are going to interpret it through the perspectives they already have. People are only going to absorb facts when they’re communicated from a source that they respect, from a source who they perceive has respect for people like them. And so whenever a liberal calls out Trump supporters as ignorant or fooled or misinformed, that does absolutely nothing to convey the facts that the liberal is trying to convey. Katherine Cramer

Traditional political polling in America has been living on borrowed time, and the divergence of the actual votes in Tuesday’s election from what was expected in the polls may signal that its time is up. The fact that the polls apparently missed the preferences of a large portion of the American electorate indicates a larger, more systematic issue, one that’s unlikely to be fixed anytime soon. The basic problem — and the reason pollsters have been nervous about just this sort of large-scale polling failure — comes from the low response rates that have plagued even the best polls since the widespread use of caller ID technology. Caller ID, more than any other single factor, means that fewer Americans pick up the phone when a pollster calls. That means it takes more calls for a poll to reach enough respondents to make a valid sample, but it also means that Americans are screening themselves before they pick up the phone. So even as our ability to analyze data has gotten better and better, thanks to advanced computing and an increase in the amount of data available to analysts, our ability to collect data has gotten worse. And if the inputs are bad, the analysis won’t be any good either. That self-screening is enormously problematic for pollsters. A sample is only valid to the extent that the individuals reached are a random sample of the overall population of interest. It’s not at all problematic for some people to refuse to pick up the phone, as long as their refusal is driven by a random process. If it’s random, the people who do pick up the phone will still be a representative sample of the overall population, and the pollster will just have to make more calls. Similarly, it’s not a serious problem for pollsters if people refuse to answer the phone according to known characteristics. For instance, pollsters know that African-Americans are less likely to answer a survey than white Americans and that men are less likely to pick up the phone than women. Thanks to the U.S. Census, we know what proportion of these groups are supposed to be in our sample, so when the proportion of men, or African-Americans, falls short in the sample, pollsters can make use of weighting techniques to correct for the shortfall. The real problem comes when potential respondents to a poll are systematically refusing to pick up the phone according to characteristics that pollsters aren’t measuring or can’t adjust to match what’s in the population. (…) None of this would be a problem if response rates were at the levels they were at in the 1980s, or even the 1990s. But with response rates to modern telephone polls languishing below 15%, it becomes harder and harder to determine whether systematic nonresponse problems are even happening. These problems go from nagging to consequential when the characteristics that are leading people to exclude themselves from polls are correlated with the major outcome that the poll is trying to measure. For instance, if Donald Trump voters were more likely to decide not to participate in polls because they’re rigged, and did so in a way that wasn’t correlated with known characteristics like race and gender, pollsters would have no way of knowing. Of course, if unobserved nonresponse is driving poll errors, it’s necessary to ask how polls have done so well up to this point. After all, response rates have been similarly low in at least the last four presidential elections, and the polls did well enough in those. Part of the problem, and what makes this election different, is a seeming failure of likely voter models. One of the most difficult tasks facing any election pollster is determining who is and is not actually going to vote on Election Day. People tend to say they’re going to vote even when they won’t, so it’s necessary to ask more questions. Every major pollster has their own set of questions in the likely voter questions, but they typically include items about interest in the election, past vote behavior, and knowledge of where a polling place is. Using these questions to determine who is and is not going to vote is a tricky business; the failure of a complex likely voter model is why Gallup got out of the election forecasting business. (…) It may be the case that standard sampling and weighting techniques are able to correct for sampling problems in a normal election — one in which voter turnout patterns remain predictable — but fail when the polls are missing portions of the electorate who are likely to turn out in one election but not in previous ones. Imagine that there’s a group of voters who don’t generally vote and are systematically less likely to respond to a survey. So long as they continue to not vote, there isn’t a problem. But if a candidate activates these voters, the polls will systematically underestimate support for the candidate. That seems to be what happened Tuesday night. (…) At least for unusual elections, polling seems broken — and we have no way of knowing which elections are unusual until the votes actually come in. Dan Cassino

Ce qui est nouveau, c’est d’abord que la bourgeoisie a le visage de l’ouverture et de la bienveillance. Elle a trouvé un truc génial : plutôt que de parler de « loi du marché », elle dit « société ouverte », « ouverture à l’Autre » et liberté de choisir… Les Rougon-Macquart sont déguisés en hipsters. Ils sont tous très cools, ils aiment l’Autre. Mieux : ils ne cessent de critiquer le système, « la finance », les « paradis fiscaux ». On appelle cela la rebellocratie. C’est un discours imparable : on ne peut pas s’opposer à des gens bienveillants et ouverts aux autres ! Mais derrière cette posture, il y a le brouillage de classes, et la fin de la classe moyenne. La classe moyenne telle qu’on l’a connue, celle des Trente Glorieuses, qui a profité de l’intégration économique, d’une ascension sociale conjuguée à une intégration politique et culturelle, n’existe plus même si, pour des raisons politiques, culturelles et anthropologiques, on continue de la faire vivre par le discours et les représentations. (…)  C’est aussi une conséquence de la non-intégration économique. Aujourd’hui, quand on regarde les chiffres – notamment le dernier rapport sur les inégalités territoriales publié en juillet dernier –, on constate une hyper-concentration de l’emploi dans les grands centres urbains et une désertification de ce même emploi partout ailleurs. Et cette tendance ne cesse de s’accélérer ! Or, face à cette situation, ce même rapport préconise seulement de continuer vers encore plus de métropolisation et de mondialisation pour permettre un peu de redistribution. Aujourd’hui, et c’est une grande nouveauté, il y a une majorité qui, sans être « pauvre » ni faire les poubelles, n’est plus intégrée à la machine économique et ne vit plus là où se crée la richesse. Notre système économique nécessite essentiellement des cadres et n’a donc plus besoin de ces millions d’ouvriers, d’employés et de paysans. La mondialisation aboutit à une division internationale du travail : cadres, ingénieurs et bac+5 dans les pays du Nord, ouvriers, contremaîtres et employés là où le coût du travail est moindre. La mondialisation s’est donc faite sur le dos des anciennes classes moyennes, sans qu’on le leur dise ! Ces catégories sociales sont éjectées du marché du travail et éloignées des poumons économiques. Cependant, cette« France périphérique » représente quand même 60 % de la population. (…) Ce phénomène présent en France, en Europe et aux États-Unis a des répercussions politiques : les scores du FN se gonflent à mesure que la classe moyenne décroît car il est aujourd’hui le parti de ces « superflus invisibles » déclassés de l’ancienne classe moyenne. (…) Face à eux, et sans eux, dans les quinze plus grandes aires urbaines, le système marche parfaitement. Le marché de l’emploi y est désormais polarisé. Dans les grandes métropoles il faut d’une part beaucoup de cadres, de travailleurs très qualifiés, et de l’autre des immigrés pour les emplois subalternes dans le BTP, la restauration ou le ménage. Ainsi les immigrés permettent-ils à la nouvelle bourgeoisie de maintenir son niveau de vie en ayant une nounou et des restaurants pas trop chers. (…) Il n’y a aucun complot mais le fait, logique, que la classe supérieure soutient un système dont elle bénéficie – c’est ça, la « main invisible du marché» ! Et aujourd’hui, elle a un nom plus sympathique : la « société ouverte ». Mais je ne pense pas qu’aux bobos. Globalement, on trouve dans les métropoles tous ceux qui profitent de la mondialisation, qu’ils votent Mélenchon ou Juppé ! D’ailleurs, la gauche votera Juppé. C’est pour cela que je ne parle ni de gauche, ni de droite, ni d’élites, mais de « la France d’en haut », de tous ceux qui bénéficient peu ou prou du système et y sont intégrés, ainsi que des gens aux statuts protégés : les cadres de la fonction publique ou les retraités aisés. Tout ce monde fait un bloc d’environ 30 ou 35 %, qui vit là où la richesse se crée. Et c’est la raison pour laquelle le système tient si bien. (…) La France périphérique connaît une phase de sédentarisation. Aujourd’hui, la majorité des Français vivent dans le département où ils sont nés, dans les territoires de la France périphérique il s’agit de plus de 60 % de la population. C’est pourquoi quand une usine ferme – comme Alstom à Belfort –, une espèce de rage désespérée s’empare des habitants. Les gens deviennent dingues parce qu’ils savent que pour eux « il n’y a pas d’alternative » ! Le discours libéral répond : « Il n’y a qu’à bouger ! » Mais pour aller où ? Vous allez vendre votre baraque et déménager à Paris ou à Bordeaux quand vous êtes licencié par ArcelorMittal ou par les abattoirs Gad ? Avec quel argent ? Des logiques foncières, sociales, culturelles et économiques se superposent pour rendre cette mobilité quasi impossible. Et on le voit : autrefois, les vieux restaient ou revenaient au village pour leur retraite. Aujourd’hui, la pyramide des âges de la France périphérique se normalise. Jeunes, actifs, retraités, tous sont logés à la même enseigne. La mobilité pour tous est un mythe. Les jeunes qui bougent, vont dans les métropoles et à l’étranger sont en majorité issus des couches supérieures. Pour les autres ce sera la sédentarisation. Autrefois, les emplois publics permettaient de maintenir un semblant d’équilibre économique et proposaient quelques débouchés aux populations. Seulement, en plus de la mondialisation et donc de la désindustrialisation, ces territoires ont subi la retraite de l’État. (…) Aujourd’hui, ce parc privé « social de fait » s’est gentrifié et accueille des catégories supérieures. Quant au parc social, il est devenu la piste d’atterrissage des flux migratoires. Si l’on regarde la carte de l’immigration, la dynamique principale se situe dans le Grand Ouest, et ce n’est pas dans les villages que les immigrés s’installent, mais dans les quartiers de logements sociaux de Rennes, de Brest ou de Nantes. (…) In fine, il y a aussi un rejet du multiculturalisme. Les gens n’ont pas envie d’aller vivre dans les derniers territoires des grandes villes ouverts aux catégories populaires : les banlieues et les quartiers à logements sociaux qui accueillent et concentrent les flux migratoires. (…) En  réalité,  [mixité  sociale » et « mixité  ethnique »] vont  rarement  ensemble.  En  région   parisienne,  on  peut  avoir  un  peu  de  mixité  sociale   sans mixité ethnique. La famille maghrébine en phase  d’ascension sociale achète un pavillon à proximité des  cités.  Par  ailleurs,  les  logiques  séparatistes  se  poursuivent  et  aujourd’hui  les  ouvriers,  les  cadres  de  la   fonction  publique  et  les  membres  de  la  petite  bourgeoisie  maghrébine  en  ascension  sociale  évitent  les   quartiers où se concentre l’immigration africaine.  Ça me fait penser à la phrase de Valls sur l’apartheid.  Il  devait  penser  à  Évry,  où  le  quartier  des  Pyramides   s’est  complètement  ethnicisé  :  là  où  vivaient  hier  des   Blancs et des Maghrébins, ne restent plus aujourd’hui  que des gens issus de l’immigration subsaharienne. En  réalité, tout le monde – le petit Blanc, le bobo comme  le Maghrébin en phase d’ascension sociale – souhaite  éviter  le  collège  pourri  du  coin  et  contourne  la  carte   scolaire. On est tous pareils, seul le discours change…  (…) À  catégories  égales,  la  mobilité  sociale  est  plus  forte   dans les grandes métropoles. C’est normal : c’est là que  se  concentrent  les  emplois.  Contrairement  aux  zones   rurales, où l’accès au marché de l’emploi et à l’enseignement  supérieur  est  difficile,  les  aires  métropolitaines   offrent   des   opportunités   y   compris   aux   catégories    modestes. Or ces catégories, compte tenu de la recomposition  démographique,  sont  aujourd’hui  issues  de   l’immigration. Cela explique l’intégration économique  et  sociale  d’une  partie  de  cette  population.  Évidemment,  l’ascension  sociale  reste  minoritaire  mais  c’est   une constante des milieux populaires depuis toujours :  quand on naît  « en bas » , on meurt  « en bas » .  (…) les   classes   populaires   immigrées   bénéficient    simplement  d’un  atout  :  celui  de  vivre   «  là  où  ça  se   passe  » .  Il  ne  s’agit  pas  d’un  privilège  résultant  d’une   politique  volontariste.  Tout  ça  s’est  fait  lentement.  Il   y  a  des  logiques  démographiques,  foncières  et  économiques.  Il  faut  avoir  à  l’esprit  que  la  France  périphérique  n’est  pas  100  %  blanche,  elle  comporte  aussi  des   immigrés, et puis il y a également les DOM-TOM, territoires ultrapériphériques !    (..) Notre  erreur  est  d’avoir  pensé  qu’on  pouvait  appliquer   le   modèle   mondialisé   économique   sans   obtenir   ses    effets  sociétaux,  c’est-à-dire  le  multiculturalisme  et  une   forme  de  communautarisme.  La  prétention  française,   c’était  de  dire  :   «  Nous,  gros  malins  de  Français,  allons   faire  la  mondialisation  républicaine  !  »   Il  faut  constater  que  nous  sommes  devenus  une  société  américaine   comme les autres. La laïcité et l’assimilation sont mortes  de  facto.  Il  suffit  d’écouter  les  élèves  d’un  collège  pour   s’en convaincre : ils parlent de Noirs, de Blancs, d’Arabes.  La société multiculturelle mondialisée génère partout les  mêmes tensions et paranoïas identitaires, nous sommes  banalement dans ce schéma en France. Dans ce contexte,  la question du rapport entre minorité et majorité est en  permanence  posée,  quelle  que  soit  l’origine.  Quand  ils   deviennent  minoritaires,  les  Maghrébins  eux-mêmes   quittent les cités qui concentrent l’immigration subsaharienne. Sauf que comme en France il n’y a officiellement  ni religion ni race, on ne peut pas en parler… Ceux qui  osent le faire, comme Michèle Tribalat, le paient cher.  (…)  La  création  de  zones  piétonnières  fait  augmenter les prix du foncier. Et les aménagements écolos des  villes correspondent, de fait, à des embourgeoisements.  Tous  ces  dispositifs  amènent  un  renchérissement  du   foncier  et  davantage  de  gentrification.  Pour  baisser   les prix ? Il faut moins de standing. Or la pression est  forte  :  à  Paris,  plus  de  40  %  de  la  population  active   est composée de cadres. C’est énorme ! Même le XX e arrondissement est devenu une commune bourgeoise.  Et  puis  l’embourgeoisement  est  un  rouleau  compresseur.  On  avait  pensé  que  certaines  zones  resteraient   populaires,  comme  la  Seine-et-Marne,  mais  ce  n’est   pas le cas. Ce système reproduit le modèle du marché  mondialisé,  c’est-à-dire  qu’il  se  sépare  des  gens  dont   on n’a pas besoin pour faire tourner l’économie.  (…) La  politique  municipale  de  Bordeaux  est  la  même   que  celle  de  Lyon  ou  de  Paris.  Il  y  a  une  logique  qui   est celle de la bourgeoisie mondialisée, qu’elle soit de  droite ou de gauche. Elle est libérale-libertaire, tantôt  plus libertaire (gauche), tantôt plus libérale (droite)…  (…) L’un des codes fondamentaux de la nouvelle bourgeoisie  est  l’ouverture.  Si  on  lâche  ce  principe,  on  est   presque  en  phase  de  déclassement.  Le  vote  populiste,   c’est  celui  des  gens  qui  ne  sont  plus  dans  le  système,   les  « ratés » , et personne, dans le milieu bobo, n’a envie  d’avoir  l’image  d’un  loser.  Le  discours  d’ouverture  de   la supériorité morale du bourgeois est presque un signe  extérieur  de  richesse.  C’est  un  attribut  d’intégration.   Aux yeux de la classe dominante, un homme tolérant est  quelqu’un qui a fondamentalement compris le monde. (…) Mais plus personne ne l’écoute ! Quand on regarde catégorie après catégorie, c’est un processus de désaffiliation  qui  s’enchaîne  et  se  reproduit,  incluant  notamment  le   divorce des banlieues avec la gauche. Le magistère de la  France d’en haut est terminé ! Électoralement, on le voit  déjà avec la montée de l’abstention et du vote FN. Le FN  existe  uniquement  parce  qu’il  est  capable  de  capter  ce   qui  vient  d’en  bas,  pas  parce  qu’il  influence  le  bas.  Ce   sont les gens qui influencent le discours du FN, et pas le  contraire ! Ce n’est pas le discours du FN qui imprègne  l’atmosphère  !  Le  Pen  père  n’était  pas  ouvriériste,  ce   sont les ouvriers qui sont allés vers lui. Le FN s’est mis  à parler du rural parce qu’il a observé des cartes électorales…  les  campagnes  sont  un  désert  politique  rempli   de Français dans l’attente d’une nouvelle offre. Bref, ce  système ne peut pas perdurer. (…) Si l’on regarde le dernier sondage Ipsos réalisé  dans  22  pays,  on  y  découvre  que  seulement  11  %  des   Français (dont beaucoup d’immigrés !) considèrent que  l’immigration est positive pour le pays. C’est marrant,  les  journalistes  sont  90  %  à  penser  le  contraire.  En   vérité, il n’y a plus de débat sur l’immigration : tout le  monde est d’accord sauf des gens qui nous mentent… (…)  Les   ministres   et   gouvernements    successifs  sont  pris  dans  la  même   contradiction  :  ils  ont  choisi  un   modèle économique qui crée de la  richesse,  mais  qui  n’est  pas  socialement   durable,   qui   ne   fait   pas    société.  Ils  n’ont  de  fait  aucune   solution,   si   ce   n’est   de   gérer   le   court terme en faisant de la redistribution.  La  dernière  idée  dans   ce  sens  est  le  revenu  universel,  ce   qui  fait  penser  qu’on  a  définitivement  renoncé  à  tout  espoir  d’un   développement  économique  de  la   France périphérique. Christophe Guilluy

Experts et commentateurs se sont, dans leur grande majorité, mis le doigt dans l’œil parce qu’ils pensent à l’intérieur du système. À Paris comme à Washington, on reste persuadé qu’un «outsider» n’a aucune chance face aux appareils des partis, des lobbies et des machines électorales. Que ce soit dans notre monarchie républicaine ou dans leur hiérarchie de Grands Électeurs, si l’on n’est pas un familier du sérail, on n’existe pas. Tout le dédain et la condescendance envers Trump, qui n’était jusqu’ici connu que par ses gratte-ciel et son émission de téléréalité, pouvaient donc s’afficher envers cette grosse brute qui ne sait pas rester à sa place. On connaît la suite. (…) Trump est l’un des premiers à avoir compris et utilisé la désintermédiation. Ce n’est pas vraiment l’ubérisation de la politique, mais ça y ressemble quelque peu. Quand je l’ai interrogé sur le mouvement qu’il suscitait dans la population américaine, il m’a répondu: Twitter, Facebook et Instagram. Avec ses 15 millions d’abonnés, il dispose d’une force de frappe avec laquelle il dialogue sans aucun intermédiaire. Il y a trente ans, il écrivait qu’aucun politique ne pouvait se passer d’un quotidien comme le New York Times. Aujourd’hui, il affirme que les réseaux sociaux sont beaucoup plus efficaces – et beaucoup moins onéreux – que la possession de ce journal. (…) Là-bas comme ici, l’avenir n’est plus ce qu’il était, la classe moyenne se désosse, la précarité est toujours prégnante, les attentats terroristes ne sont plus, depuis un certain 11 septembre, des images lointaines vues sur petit ou grand écran. (…) Et la fureur s’explique par le décalage entre la ritournelle de «Nous sommes la plus grande puissance et le plus beau pays du monde» et le «Je n’arrive pas à finir le mois et payer les études de mes enfants et l’assurance médicale de mes parents». Sans parler de l’écart toujours plus abyssal entre riches et modestes. (…) Il existe, depuis quelques années, un étonnant rapprochement entre les problématiques européennes et américaines. Qui aurait pu penser, dans ce pays d’accueil traditionnel, que l’immigration provoquerait une telle hostilité chez certains, qui peut permettre à Trump de percer dans les sondages en proclamant sa volonté de construire un grand mur? Il y a certes des points communs avec Marine Le Pen, y compris dans la nécessité de relocaliser, de rebâtir des frontières et de proclamer la grandeur de son pays. Mais évidemment, Trump a d’autres moyens que la présidente du Front National… De plus, répétons-le, c’est d’abord un pragmatique et un négociateur. Je ne crois pas que ce soit les qualités les plus apparentes de Marine Le Pen… (…) Son programme économique le situe beaucoup plus à gauche que les caciques Républicains et les néo-conservateurs proches d’Hillary Clinton qui le haïssent, parce que lui croit, dans certains domaines, à l’intervention de l’État et aux limites nécessaires du laisser-faire, laisser-aller. (…) Il ne ménage personne et peut aller beaucoup plus loin que Marine Le Pen, tout simplement parce qu’il n’a jamais eu à régler le problème du père fondateur et encore moins à porter le fardeau d’une étiquette tout de même controversée. Sa marque à lui, ce n’est pas la politique, mais le bâtiment et la réussite. Ça change pas mal de choses. (…) il trouve insupportable que des villes comme Paris et Bruxelles, qu’il adore et a visitées maintes fois, deviennent des camps retranchés où l’on n’est même pas capable de répliquer à un massacre comme celui du Bataclan. On peut être vent debout contre le port d’arme, mais, dit-il, s’il y avait eu des vigiles armés boulevard Voltaire, il n’y aurait pas eu autant de victimes. Pour lui, un pays qui ne sait pas se défendre est un pays en danger de mort. (…) Il s’entendra assez bien avec Poutine pour le partage des zones d’influence, et même pour une collaboration active contre Daesh et autres menaces, mais, comme il le répète sur tous les tons, l’Amérique de Trump ne défendra que les pays qui paieront pour leur protection. Ça fait un peu Al Capone, mais ça a le mérite de la clarté. Si l’Europe n’a pas les moyens de protéger son identité, son mode de vie, ses valeurs et sa culture, alors, personne ne le fera à sa place. En résumé, pour Trump, la politique est une chose trop grave pour la laisser aux politiciens professionnels, et la liberté un état trop fragile pour la confier aux pacifistes de tout poil. André Bercoff

La grande difficulté, avec Donald Trump, c’est qu’on est à la fois face à une caricature et face à un phénomène bien plus complexe. Une caricature d’abord, car tout chez lui, semble magnifié. L’appétit de pouvoir, l’ego, la grossièreté des manières, les obsessions, les tweets épidermiques, l’étalage voyant de son succès sur toutes les tours qu’il a construites et qui portent son nom. Donald Trump joue en réalité à merveille de son côté caricatural, il simplifie les choses, provoque, indigne, et cela marche parce que notre monde du 21e siècle se gargarise de ces simplifications outrancières, à l’heure de l’information immédiate et fragmentée. La machine médiatique est comme un ventre qui a toujours besoin de nouveaux scandales et Donald, le commercial, le sait mieux que personne, parce qu’il a créé et animé une émission de téléréalité pendant des années. Il sait que la politique américaine actuelle est un grand cirque, où celui qui crie le plus fort a souvent raison parce que c’est lui qui «fait le buzz». En même temps, ne voir que la caricature qu’il projette serait rater le phénomène Trump et l’histoire stupéfiante de son succès électoral. Derrière l’image télévisuelle simplificatrice, se cache un homme intelligent, rusé et avisé, qui a géré un empire de milliards de dollars et employé des dizaines de milliers de personnes. Ce n’est pas rien! Selon plusieurs proches du milliardaire que j’ai interrogés, Trump réfléchit de plus à une candidature présidentielle depuis des années, et il a su capter, au-delà de l’air du temps, la colère profonde qui traversait l’Amérique, puis l’exprimer et la chevaucher. Grâce à ses instincts politiques exceptionnels, il a vu ce que personne d’autre – à part peut-être le démocrate Bernie Sanders – n’avait su voir: le gigantesque ras le bol d’un pays en quête de protection contre les effets déstabilisants de la globalisation, de l’immigration massive et du terrorisme islamique; sa peur du déclin aussi. En ce sens, Donald Trump s’est dressé contre le modèle dominant plébiscité par les élites et a changé la nature du débat de la présidentielle. Il a remis à l’ordre du jour l’idée de protection du pays, en prétendant au rôle de shérif aux larges épaules face aux dangers d’un monde instable et dangereux. Cela révèle au minimum une personnalité sacrément indépendante, un côté indomptable qui explique sans doute l’admiration de ses partisans…Ils ont l’impression que cet homme explosif ne se laissera impressionner par rien ni personne. Beaucoup des gens qui le connaissent affirment d’ailleurs que Donald Trump a plusieurs visages: le personnage public, flashy, égotiste, excessif, qui ne veut jamais avouer ses faiblesses parce qu’il doit «vendre» sa marchandise, perpétuer le mythe, et un personnage privé plus nuancé, plus modéré et plus pragmatique, qui sait écouter les autres et ne choisit pas toujours l’option la plus extrême…Toute la difficulté et tout le mystère, pour l’observateur est de s’y retrouver entre ces différents Trump. C’est loin d’être facile, surtout dans le contexte de quasi hystérie qui règne dans l’élite médiatique et politique américaine, tout entière liguée contre lui. Il est parfois très difficile de discerner ce qui relève de l’analyse pertinente ou de la posture de combat anti-Trump. (…) à de rares exceptions près, les commentateurs n’ont pas vu venir le phénomène Trump, parce qu’il était «en dehors des clous», impensable selon leurs propres «grilles de lecture». Trop scandaleux et trop extrême, pensaient-ils. Il a fait exploser tant de codes en attaquant ses adversaires au dessous de la ceinture et s’emparant de sujets largement tabous, qu’ils ont cru que «le grossier personnage» ne durerait pas! Ils se sont dit que quelqu’un qui se contredisait autant ou disait autant de contre vérités, finirait par en subir les conséquences. Bref, ils ont vu en lui soit un clown soit un fasciste – sans réaliser que toutes les inexactitudes ou dérapages de Trump lui seraient pardonnés comme autant de péchés véniels, parce qu’il ose dire haut et fort ce que son électorat considère comme une vérité fondamentale: à savoir que l’Amérique doit faire respecter ses frontières parce qu’un pays sans frontières n’est plus un pays. Plus profondément, je pense que les élites des deux côtes ont raté le phénomène Trump (et le phénomène Sanders), parce qu’elles sont de plus en plus coupées du peuple et de ses préoccupations, qu’elles vivent entre elles, se cooptent entre elles, s’enrichissent entre elles, et défendent une version «du progrès» très post-moderne, détachée des préoccupations de nombreux Américains. Soyons clairs, si Trump est à bien des égards exaspérant et inquiétant, il y a néanmoins quelque chose de pourri et d’endogame dans le royaume de Washington. Le peuple se sent hors jeu. (…) Ce statut de milliardaire du peuple est crédible parce qu’il ne s’est jamais senti membre de l’élite bien née, dont il aime se moquer en la taxant «d’élite du sperme chanceux». Cette dernière ne l’a d’ailleurs jamais vraiment accepté, lui le parvenu de Queens, venu de la banlieue, qui aime tout ce qui brille. Il ne faut pas oublier en revanche que Donald a grandi sur les chantiers de construction, où il accompagnait son père déjà tout petit, ce qui l’a mis au contact des classes populaires. Il parle exactement comme eux! Quand je me promenais à travers l’Amérique à la rencontre de ses électeurs, c’est toujours ce dont ils s’étonnaient. Ils disaient: «Donald parle comme nous, pense comme nous, est comme nous». Le fait qu’il soit riche, n’est pas un obstacle parce qu’on est en Amérique, pas en France. Les Américains aiment la richesse et le succès. (…) L’un des atouts de Trump, pour ses partisans, c’est qu’il est politiquement incorrect dans un pays qui l’est devenu à l’excès. Sur l’islam radical (qu’Obama ne voulait même pas nommer comme une menace!), sur les maux de l’immigration illégale et maints autres sujets. Ses fans se disent notamment exaspérés par le tour pris par certains débats, comme celui sur les toilettes «neutres» que l’administration actuelle veut établir au nom du droit des «personnes au genre fluide» à «ne pas être offensés». Ils apprécient que Donald veuille rétablir l’expression de Joyeux Noël, de plus en plus bannie au profit de l’expression Joyeuses fêtes, au motif qu’il ne faut pas risquer de blesser certaines minorités religieuses non chrétiennes…Ils se demandent pourquoi les salles de classe des universités, lieu où la liberté d’expression est supposée sacro-sainte, sont désormais surveillées par une «police de la pensée» étudiante orwellienne, prête à demander des comptes aux professeurs chaque fois qu’un élève s’estime «offensé» dans son identité…Les fans de Trump sont exaspérés d’avoir vu le nom du club de football américain «Red Skins» soudainement banni du vocabulaire de plusieurs journaux, dont le Washington Post, (et remplacé par le mot R…avec trois points de suspension), au motif que certaines tribus indiennes jugeaient l’appellation raciste et insultante. (Le débat, qui avait mobilisé le Congrès, et l’administration Obama, a finalement été enterré après de longs mois, quand une enquête a révélé que l’écrasante majorité des tribus indiennes aimait finalement ce nom…). Dans ce contexte, Trump a été jugé«rafraîchissant» par ses soutiens, presque libérateur. (…) Pour moi, le phénomène Trump est la rencontre d’un homme hors normes et d’un mouvement de rébellion populaire profond, qui dépasse de loin sa propre personne. C’est une lame de fond, anti globalisation et anti immigration illégale, qui traverse en réalité tout l’Occident. Trump surfe sur la même vague que les politiques britanniques qui ont soutenu le Brexit, ou que Marine Le Pen en France. La différence, c’est que Trump est une version américaine du phénomène, avec tout ce que cela implique de pragmatisme et d’attachement au capitalisme. (…) Trump n’est pas un idéologue. Il a longtemps été démocrate avant d’être républicain et il transgresse les frontières politiques classiques des partis. Favorable à une forme de protectionnisme et une remise en cause des accords de commerce qui sont défavorables à son pays, il est à gauche sur les questions de libre échange, mais aussi sur la protection sociale des plus pauvres, qu’il veut renforcer, et sur les questions de société, sur lesquelles il affiche une vision libérale de New Yorkais, certainement pas un credo conservateur clair. De ce point de vue là, il est post reaganien. Mais Donald Trump est clairement à droite sur la question de l’immigration illégale et des frontières, et celle des impôts. Au fond, c’est à la fois un marchand et un nationaliste, qui se voit comme un pragmatique, dont le but sera de faire «des bons deals» pour son pays. Il n’est pas là pour changer le monde, contrairement à Obama. Ce qu’il veut, c’est remettre l’Amérique au premier plan, la protéger. Son instinct de politique étrangère est clairement du côté des réalistes et des prudents, car Trump juge que les Etats-Unis se sont laissé entrainer dans des aventures qui les ont affaiblis et n’ont pas réglé les crises. Il ne veut plus d’une Amérique jouant les gendarmes du monde. Mais vu sa tendance aux volte face et vu ce qu’il dit sur le rôle que devrait jouer l’Amérique pour venir à bout de la menace de l’islam radical, comme elle l’a fait avec le nazisme et le communisme, Donald Trump pourrait fort bien changer d’avis, et revenir à un credo plus interventionniste avec le temps. Ses instincts sont au repli, mais il reste largement imprévisible. (…) De nombreuses questions se posent sur son caractère, ses foucades, son narcissisme et sa capacité à se contrôler, si importante chez le président de la première puissance du monde! Je ne suis pas pour autant convaincue par l’image de «Hitler», fasciste et raciste, qui lui a été accolée par la presse américaine. Hitler avait écrit Mein Kamp. Donald Trump, lui, a écrit «L ‘art du deal» et avait envisagé juste après la publication de ce premier livre, de se présenter à la présidence en prenant sur son ticket la vedette de télévision afro-américaine démocrate Oprah Winfrey, un élément qui ne colle pas avec l’image d’un raciste anti femmes! Ses enfants et nombre de ses collaborateurs affirment qu’il ne discrimine pas les gens en fonction de leur sexe ou de la couleur de leur peau, mais en fonction de leurs mérites, et que c’est pour cette même raison qu’il est capable de s’en prendre aux représentants du sexe faible ou des minorités avec une grande brutalité verbale, ne voyant pas la nécessité de prendre des gants. Les questions les plus lourdes concernant Trump, sont selon moi plutôt liées à la manière dont il réagirait, s’il ne parvenait pas à tenir ses promesses, une fois à la Maison-Blanche. Tout président américain est confronté à la complexité de l’exercice du pouvoir dans un système démocratique extrêmement contraignant. Cet homme d’affaires habitué à diriger un empire immobilier pyramidal, dont il est le seul maître à bord, tenterait-il de contourner le système pour arriver à ses fins et prouver au peuple qu’il est bien le meilleur, en agissant dans une zone grise, avec l’aide des personnages sulfureux qui l’ont accompagné dans ses affaires? Et comment se comporterait-il avec ses adversaires politiques ou les représentants de la presse, vu la brutalité et l’acharnement dont il fait preuve envers ceux qui se mettent sur sa route? Hériterait-on d’un Berlusconi ou d’un Nixon puissance 1000? Autre interrogation, vu la fascination qu’exerce sur lui le régime autoritaire de Vladimir Poutine: serait-il prêt à sacrifier le droit international et l’indépendance de certains alliés européens, pour trouver un accord avec le patron du Kremlin sur les sujets lui tenant à cœur, notamment en Syrie? Bref, pourrait-il accepter une forme de Yalta bis, et remettre en cause le rôle de l’Amérique dans la défense de l’ordre libéral et démocratique de l’Occident et du monde depuis 1945? Autant de questions cruciales auxquelles Donald Trump a pour l’instant répondu avec plus de désinvolture que de clarté. Laure Mandeville

Après les référendums de 2005 (France et Pays-Bas) et le Brexit (2016), voici une nouvelle surprise avec l’élection de Donald Trump par une franche majorité d’Américains. À chaque fois, le suffrage universel a eu raison des médias, des sondeurs et de leurs commanditaires. On peut au moins se réjouir de cette vitalité démocratique. (…) C’est en partie en raison du libre-échange et du primat de la finance que les électeurs américains ont voté pour Donald Trump : il a su capter leur colère sourde, tout comme d’ailleurs le candidat démocrate Bernie Sanders, rival malheureux d’Hillary Clinton.  L’autre motif qui a conduit à la victoire de Trump et à l’élimination de Sanders tient à l’exaspération d’une majorité de citoyens face aux tromperies de l’utopie « multiculturaliste » et de la société « ouverte ». À preuve le vote de l’Iowa en faveur de Donald Trump : dans cet État plutôt prospère, avec un faible taux de chômage, c’est évidemment l’enjeu multiculturaliste qui a fait basculer les électeurs. En effet, l’élection en 2008 d’un président noir (pas un Afro-Américain mais un métis, fils d’une blanche du Kansas et d’un Kényan) n’a pas empêché le retour à de nouvelles formes de ségrégation raciale. C’est ainsi que la candidate démocrate Hillary Clinton a tenté de jouer la carte « racialiste » en cajolant les électeurs afro-américains et latinos. Mais sans doute s’est-elle trompée dans son évaluation du vote latino : beaucoup d’Étasuniens latino-américains aspirent à leur intégration dans la classe moyenne et ne se sentent guère solidaires des Afro-Américains. Le même phénomène s’observe en Europe de l’Ouest, sous l’effet d’un emballement migratoire sans précédent dans l’Histoire. Les nouveaux arrivants font bloc avec leur « communauté » dans les quartiers et les écoles : Africains de la zone équatoriale, Sahéliens, Maghrébins, Turcs, Orientaux, Chinois etc. Il compromettent ce faisant l’intégration des immigrants plus anciennement installés. À quoi les classes dirigeantes répondent par des propos hors-contexte sur le « vivre-ensemble » et l’occultation de la mémoire. La chancelière Angela Merkel et même le pape François ont perçu les dangers de cette politique dans leurs dernières déclarations, en novembre 2016. Quant aux élus français, qui ont abandonné leur souveraineté à Bruxelles et Berlin et se tiennent désormais à la remorque des puissants, ils feraient bien de prendre à leur tour la mesure de l’exaspération populaire face au néolibéralisme financier, au multiculturalisme et à l’emballement migratoire. Ils se doivent de nommer et analyser ces phénomènes sans faux-semblants, et de préconiser des solutions respectueuses de la démocratie. Hérodote

Make no mistake about it: this election is Barack Obama’s legacy. He pushed hard for Hillary Clinton in the end because he understood that as such. And it was all for naught. No celebrity, no sports star, and no current president with a strong approval rating was enough to drag Hillary Clinton over the finish line. (…) Last night Jamelle Bouie and Van Jones voiced something I expect we will hear from many of Obama’s firmest supporters in the coming weeks – the idea that Trump represents a “whitelash” against eight years of Obama. But this dramatically oversimplifies the case, particularly if as it seems at the moment Trump won more minority votes than Mitt Romney in 2012. In fact, as Nate Cohn notes, Clinton failed in areas of the country where Obama’s support had been strongest among white Americans.   She failed to keep pace with Obama in the Rust Belt states that he won repeatedly. Her vaunted GOTV machine failed to attract the votes of young people, of union members, and of minorities to the degree necessary to win. And meanwhile, Trump’s utter lack of a campaign was more than made up for by the emotional dedication of his supporters. This was about more than just race – it was a sustained rejection of the country’s ruling class. But expect the media to try to make it about two things: race, and about Hillary Clinton’s lousy campaign. (…) The majority of political reporters never seemed to get outside their bubble. They spoke to anti-Trump conservatives, and printed anti-Trump views from conservatives, but rarely would even publish the sorts of views I and others have been sounding for months about the real and rational gripes of Trump voters. Many in the media preferred the caricature to the real thing. If you are a member of the media who does not know anyone who was pro-Trump, who has no Trump voters among your family or friends, realize how thick your bubble is. Change this. Don’t stick to the old sources, who clearly didn’t know what was going on – add new ones, who offer the perspective from the ground. (…) What is clear is this: Donald Trump is the man Americans have chosen as their vehicle for the dramatic change they demand from Washington. They have utterly rejected the change offered in the eight year Barack Obama agenda as wholly insufficient. And they have given Trump the rare gift of a united government in order to make those changes happen. They have tossed aside the assumptions of an elite class of gatekeepers and commentators whose opinions they disrespect and disavow. And they have sent a message to Washington that nothing less than wholesale change will satisfy them, including a change in the fundamental character of the commander in chief. Ben Domenech

Since the 1960s, when America finally became fully accountable for its past, deference toward all groups with any claim to past or present victimization became mandatory. The Great Society and the War on Poverty were some of the first truly deferential policies. Since then deference has become an almost universal marker of simple human decency that asserts one’s innocence of the American past. (…)  Since the ’60s the Democratic Party, and liberalism generally, have thrived on the power of deference. When Hillary Clinton speaks of a “basket of deplorables,“ she follows with a basket of isms and phobias—racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia and Islamaphobia. Each ism and phobia is an opportunity for her to show deference toward a victimized group and to cast herself as America’s redeemer. And, by implication, conservatism is bereft of deference. (…) And they have been fairly successful in this so that many conservatives are at least a little embarrassed to “come out” as it were. Conservatism is an insurgent point of view, while liberalism is mainstream. And this is oppressive for conservatives because it puts them in the position of being a bit embarrassed by who they really are and what they really believe. Deference has been codified in American life as political correctness. And political correctness functions like a despotic regime. It is an oppressiveness that spreads its edicts further and further into the crevices of everyday life. We resent it, yet for the most part we at least tolerate its demands. (…) And into all this steps Mr. Trump, a fundamentally limited man but a man with overwhelming charisma, a man impossible to ignore. The moment he entered the presidential contest America’s long simmering culture war rose to full boil. Mr. Trump was a non-deferential candidate. He seemed at odds with every code of decency. He invoked every possible stigma, and screechingly argued against them all. He did much of the dirty work that millions of Americans wanted to do but lacked the platform to do. Thus Mr. Trump’s extraordinary charisma has been far more about what he represents than what he might actually do as the president. He stands to alter the culture of deference itself. After all, the problem with deference is that it is never more than superficial. We are polite. We don’t offend. But we don’t ever transform people either. Out of deference we refuse to ask those we seek to help to be primarily responsible for their own advancement. Yet only this level of responsibility transforms people, no matter past or even present injustice. Some 3,000 shootings in Chicago this year alone is the result of deference camouflaging a lapse of personal responsibility with empty claims of systemic racism. As a society we are so captive to our historical shame that we thoughtlessly rush to deference simply to relieve the pressure. And yet every deferential gesture—the war on poverty, affirmative action, ObamaCare, every kind of “diversity” scheme—only weakens those who still suffer the legacy of our shameful history. Deference is now the great enemy of those toward whom it gushes compassion. Societies, like individuals, have intuitions. Donald Trump is an intuition. At least on the level of symbol, maybe he would push back against the hegemony of deference—if not as a liberator then possibly as a reformer. Possibly he could lift the word responsibility out of its somnambulant stigmatization as a judgmental and bigoted request to make of people. This, added to a fundamental respect for the capacity of people to lift themselves up, could go a long way toward a fairer and better America. Shelby Steele

For the past six months, one big question has loomed over the 2016 election: Is the candidacy of Donald J. Trump an amusing bit of reality TV or a terrifying and dangerous challenge to the country’s political system? At first, Trump’s popularity was easy to dismiss. It was nothing more than a phase, the result of Trump’s celebrity status and his talent for provocation. His antics made it hard to look away, but it was easy to convince yourself that Trump mania would never lead to anything serious, like the Republican nomination. It was especially easy to come to that conclusion if you were reading FiveThirtyEight, the statistics-driven news website founded by Nate Silver. Since the beginning of Trump’s campaign last June, the election guru and his colleagues have been consistently bearish on Trump’s chances. Silver, who made his name by using cold hard math to call 49 out of 50 states in the 2008 general election and all 50 in 2012, has served as a reassuring voice in the midst of Trump’s shocking rise. For those of us who didn’t want to believe we lived in a country where Donald Trump could be president, Silver’s steady, level-headed certainty felt just as soothing as his unwavering confidence in Barack Obama’s triumph over Mitt Romney four years ago. What exactly has Silver been saying? In September, he told CNN’s Anderson Cooper that Trump had a roughly 5-percent chance of beating his GOP rivals. In November, he explained that Trump’s national following was about as negligible as the share of Americans who believe the Apollo moon landing was faked. On Twitter, he compared Trump to the band Nickelback, which he described as being “[d]isliked by most, super popular with a few.” In a post titled “Why Donald Trump Isn’t A Real Candidate, In One Chart,” Silver’s colleague Harry Enten wrote that Trump had a better chance of “playing in the NBA Finals” than winning the Republican nomination. Multiple times over the past six months, Silver has reminded his readers that four years ago, daffy fly-by-nighters like Herman Cain and Michele Bachmann led the GOP field at various points. Trump’s poll numbers, he wrote, would drop just like theirs had. In one August post, “Donald Trump’s Six Stages of Doom,” Silver actually laid out a schedule for the candidate’s inevitable collapse. (…) It’s clear, now, that Silver and his fellow analysts at FiveThirtyEight underestimated Trump. Silver himself recently admitted as much, writing in a blog post published last week that he’d been too skeptical about Trump’s chances.  (…)  Maybe, like many people who have watched Trump’s rise with increasing horror, Silver latched onto a narrative that justified rejecting the Apprentice star’s achievements, identifying them as symptoms of a media bubble rather than a reflection of real popular sentiment. If that’s the case, Silver turns out to have a good bit in common with the pundits that he and his unemotional, numbers-driven worldview were supposed to render obsolete. Faced with uncertainty, Silver chose to go all in on an outcome that felt right, one that meshed with his preexisting beliefs about how the world is supposed to work. (…)Missing the significance of Trumpism is a different kind of failure than, say, calling the 2012 election for Mitt Romney. It also might be a more damning one. Botching your general election forecast by a couple of percentage points suggests a flawed mathematical formula. Actively denying the reality of Trump’s success suggests Silver may never have been capable of explaining the world in a way so many believed he could in 2008 and 2012, when he was telling them how likely it was that Obama would become, and remain, the president. Leon Neyfakh (Jan. 2016)

Mr Silver predicted, with an absurdly precise 71.4% chance, that Mrs Clinton would take 302 electoral votes and beat Mr Trump by 3.6% in the popular vote. He was wildly incorrect. (As of the writing of this article, Mr Trump will win 306 electoral votes but will lose the popular vote by merely 0.2%.) Even worse, Mr Silver got several key states wrong: He predicted that Clinton would win Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida. In reality, Trump swept all of them. Alex Berezow

It was a big polling miss in the worst possible race. On the eve of America’s presidential election, national surveys gave Hillary Clinton a lead of around four percentage points, which betting markets and statistical models translated into a probability of victory ranging from 70% to 99%. That wound up misfiring modestly: according to the forecast from New York Times’s Upshot, Mrs Clinton is still likely to win the popular vote, by more than a full percentage point. But at the state level, the errors were extreme. The polling average in Wisconsin gave her a lead of more than five points; she is expected to lose it by two and a half. It gave Mr Trump a relatively narrow two-point edge in Ohio; he ran away with the state by more than eight. He trailed in Michigan and Pennsylvania by four, and looks likely to take both by about a point. How did it all go wrong? Every survey result is made up of a combination of two variables: the demographic composition of the electorate, and how each group is expected to vote. Because some groups—say, young Hispanic men—are far less likely to respond than others (old white women, for example), pollsters typically weight the answers they receive to match their projections of what the electorate will look like. Polling errors can stem either from getting an unrepresentative sample of respondents within each group, or from incorrectly predicting how many of each type of voter will show up. The electoral map leaves no doubt as to how Mr Trump won. In states where white voters tend to be well-educated, such as Colorado and Virginia, the polls pegged the final results perfectly. Conversely, in northern states that have lots of whites without a college degree, Mr Trump blew his polls away—including ones he is still expected to lose, but by a far smaller margin than expected, such as Minnesota. The simplest explanation for this would be that these voters preferred him by an even larger margin than pollsters foresaw—the so-called “shy Trump” phenomenon, in which people might be wary of admitting they supported him. Pre-election polls gave little evidence for this phenomenon: they showed him with a massive 30-point lead among this group. But remarkably, even that figure wound up understating Mr Trump’s appeal to them: the national exit poll put him 39 points ahead. Given that such voters make up 58% of the eligible population in Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania—though a smaller share of those who actually turn out—this nine-point miss among them accounts for a large chunk of the overall error. It is also likely that less-educated whites, who historically have had a low propensity to vote, turned out in greater numbers than pollsters predicted. The Economist

Election polling is harder than other forms of survey research, because you must assess two things at once. Not only do you have to find out who people say they will support, you also have to estimate their likelihood of actually turning up to vote. So Trump may have been right in claiming that he’d created a new movement of people who had previously shunned political engagement. If so, pollsters who relied on prior voting behavior to predict who would turn out this time would have systematically underestimated Trump’s support. Problems with likely voter modeling could also mean that the pollsters overestimated the extent to which the “Obama coalition” of black, Latino, and younger voters would turn out for Clinton.(…) “Shy Trumpers,” who were embarrassed to admit their support for the GOP candidate, quietly delivered their verdict in the polling booths. This theory first emerged in the run-up to the Republican primaries, as pollsters noticed that Trump was doing better in online polls than in those conducted over the phone. The idea was that some of Trump’s supporters were embarrassed to admit their choice to a real person. The idea gained traction when a polling experiment run last December by Morning Consult seemed to confirm that the effect was real. In the match-up against Clinton, however, Trump’s advantage in online polls mostly evaporated. And when Morning Consult ran a poll with Politico in late October to specifically probe for the effect, it seemed to operate only among college-educated voters. “Overall, it didn’t look like it massively shifted the race,” Morning Consult’s Cartwright said. (…) Trump’s anti-establishment supporters believed the polls were rigged, and so they refused to answer the phone or respond to online surveys. For pollsters, this is a much darker possibility. The idea that the polls were rigged became a popular refrain among Trump’s supporters. So maybe these people simply refused to participate in polls, either on the phone or online. If so, all of the pollsters may have been systematically blind to many of the disaffected, mostly white voters who drove Trump to victory, especially in the Rust Belt states of the Midwest. “People who don’t like the government often perceive the polls as being part of the government,” said Johnson of the University of Illinois, who believes this is the most plausible explanation for the pollsters’ miss. BuzzFeed

L’effet Bradley (en anglais Bradley effect) (…) est le nom donné aux États-Unis au décalage souvent observé entre les sondages électoraux et les résultats des élections américaines quand un candidat blanc est opposé à un candidat non blanc (noir, hispanique, latino, asiatique ou océanien). Le nom du phénomène vient de Tom Bradley, un Afro-Américain qui perdit l’élection de 1982 au poste de gouverneur de Californie, à la surprise générale, alors qu’il était largement en tête dans tous les sondages. L’effet Bradley reflète une tendance de la part des votants, noirs aussi bien que blancs, à dire aux sondeurs qu’ils sont indécis ou qu’ils vont probablement voter pour le candidat noir ou issu de la minorité ethnique mais qui, le jour de l’élection, votent pour son opposant blanc. Une des théories pour expliquer l’effet Bradley est que certains électeurs donnent une réponse fausse lors des sondages, de peur qu’en déclarant leur réelle préférence, ils ne prêtent le flanc à la critique d’une motivation raciale de leur vote. Cet effet est similaire à celui d’une personne refusant de discuter de son choix électoral. Si la personne déclare qu’elle est indécise, elle peut ainsi éviter d’être forcée à entrer dans une discussion politique avec une personne partisane. La réticence à donner une réponse exacte s’étend parfois jusqu’aux sondages dits de sortie de bureau de vote. La façon dont les sondeurs conduisent l’interview peut être un déterminant dans la réponse du sondé. Wikipedia

Silicon Valley these days is a very intolerant place for people who do not hold so called ‘socially liberal’ ideas. In Silicon Valley, because of the high prevalence of highly smart people, there is a general stereotype that voting Republican is for dummies. So many people see considering supporting Republican candidates, particularly Donald Trump, anathema to the whole Silicon Valley ethos that values smarts and merit. A couple of friends thought that me supporting Trump made me unworthy of being part of the Silicon Valley tribe and stopped talking to me. At the end of the day, we choose our politics the way we choose our lovers and our friends — not so much out a rational analysis, but based on impressions and our own personal backgrounds. My main reason for supporting Trump is that I basically agree with the notion that unless the trend is stopped, our country is going to hell … The Silicon Valley elite is highly hypocritical on this matter. One of the reasons, I assume, they don’t like Trump is because on this area, as in many others, he is calling a spade a spade. I believe Trump is right in this case. … supporting Trump only offers [an] upside. Electing Hillary Clinton would keep the status quo. If Trump wins, there’s a whole set of new possibilities that would emerge for the nation. Even if it remains socially liberal, it would be good for it if the president were to be a Republican so that the Valley could recover a little bit of its rebel spirit (that was the case during the Bush years for instance). I believe that the increased relevance in national politics of companies like Google (whose Chairman [Eric] Schmidt has been very cozy with the Obama administration) and Apple (at the center of several political disputes) has been bad for the Valley. A Trump presidency would allow the Valley to focus on what it does best: dreaming and building the technology of the future, leaving politics for DC types. Silicon valley software engineer

Many people are saying to maybe their friends while they’re having a sip of Chardonnay in Washington or Boston, ‘Oh, I would never vote for him, he’s so – not politically correct,’ or whatever, but then they’re going to go and vote for him. Because he’s saying things that they would like to say, but they’re not politically courageous enough to say it and I think that’s the real question in this election. Trump is kind of a combination of the gun referendum, because he’s an emotional energy source for people who want to make sure that they’re voicing their concerns about all these issues – immigration, et cetera – but then I think there’s this other piece. They don’t find it to be correct or acceptable to a lot of their friends, but when push comes to shove, they’re going to vote for him. Gregory Payne (Emerson College)

Donald Trump performs consistently better in online polling where a human being is not talking to another human being about what he or she may do in the election. It’s because it’s become socially desirable, if you’re a college educated person in the United States of America, to say that you’re against Donald Trump. Kellyanne Conway (Trump campaign manager)

They’ll go ahead and vote for that candidate in the privacy of a [voting] booth But they won’t admit to voting for that candidate to somebody who’s calling them for a poll. Joe Bafumi (Dartmouth College)

Trump’s advantage in online polls compared with live telephone polling is eight or nine percentage points among likely voters. Kyle A. Dropp

It’s easier to express potentially ‘unacceptable’ responses on a screen than it is to give them to a person. Kathy Frankovic

This may be due to social desirability bias — people are more willing to express support for this privately than when asked by someone else. Douglas Rivers

In a May 2015 report, Pew Research analyzed the differences between results derived from telephone polling and those from online Internet polling. Pew determined that the biggest differences in answers elicited via these two survey modes were on questions in which social desirability bias — that is, “the desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others” — played a role. In a detailed analysis of phone versus online polling in Republican primaries, Kyle A. Dropp, the executive director of polling and data science at Morning Consult, writes: Trump’s advantage in online polls compared with live telephone polling is eight or nine percentage points among likely voters. This difference, Dropp notes, is driven largely by more educated voters — those who would be most concerned with “social desirability.” These findings suggest that Trump will head into the general election with support from voters who are reluctant to admit their preferences to a live person in a phone survey, but who may well be inclined to cast a ballot for Trump on Election Day. The NYT (May 2016)

Les analystes politiques, les sondeurs et les journalistes ont donné à penser que la victoire d’Hillary Clinton était assurée avant l’élection. En cela, c’est une surprise, car la sphère médiatique n’imaginait pas la victoire du candidat républicain. Elle a eu tort. Si elle avait su observer la société américaine et entendre son malaise, elle n’aurait jamais exclu la possibilité d’une élection de Trump. Pour cette raison, ce n’est pas une surprise. (…) Sans doute, ils ont rejeté Donald Trump car ils le trouvaient – et c’est le cas – démagogue, populiste et vulgaire. Je n’ai d’ailleurs jamais vu une élection américaine avec un tel parti pris médiatique. Même le très réputé hebdomadaire britannique « The Economist » a fait un clin d’oeil à Hillary Clinton. Je pense que la stigmatisation sans précédent de Donald Trump par les médias a favorisé chez les électeurs américains la dissimulation de leur intention de vote auprès des instituts de sondage. En clair, un certain nombre de votants n’a pas osé admettre qu’il soutenait le candidat américain. Ce phénomène est classique en politique. Souvenez du 21 avril 2002 et de la qualification surprise de Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader du Front national, au second tour de l’élection présidentielle française. (…) A travers l’élection de Trump, certains Américains ont exprimé leur colère. Une partie de l’Amérique ne trouve pas ses gains dans la globalisation. Cette Amérique-là ne parvient pas à retrouver son niveau de vie d’avant la crise des subprimes, elle a le sentiment d’être abandonnée. Ce sentiment était particulièrement perceptible chez les ouvriers, qui voient l’industrie s’effilocher. Ne se sentant pas assez considérés, ils ont davantage choisi Donald Trump qu’Hillary Clinton. (…) Cette formule [victoire du peuple américain contre l’establishment] est très exagérée. Oui, une partie des électeurs de Donald Trump ont voté contre Washington et ses élites. Oui, certains Américains souffrent d’un mépris de classe, en particulier dans l’Amérique profonde. Mais dire que le peuple s’est tourné vers Trump est inexact. Le candidat républicain et la candidate démocrate sont au coude à coude en termes de suffrages exprimés [à 15 heures, 47,5% pour Trump et 47,6% pour Clinton , NDLR]. Au passage, nous avons affaire à deux candidats richissimes. Si ma mémoire est bonne, Donald Trump, pseudo-candidat du peuple, n’est pas issu de la classe ouvrière… (…) L’arrivée au pouvoir de dirigeants populistes s’explique avant tout par des spécificités locales. Après, il y a des effets communs. De nouvelles puissances émergent. Les gens se sentent décentrés. Il y a une surabondance d’innovations technologiques et scientifiques. Une partie de la société se sent déclassée. L’immigration accélère les mécanismes de recomposition culturelle. Aux Etats-Unis, les Blancs anglo-saxons deviennent minoritaires. Ceci induit une réaction exprimée en votant pour un candidat populiste : Donald Trump. (…) Une chose est certaine : l’élection de Trump, mais aussi le Brexit, vont peser sur le langage et le lexique employés par une partie des prétendants à la présidentielle française. Des acteurs politiques, de droite comme de gauche, seront tentés de durcir leur discours. Mais ce climat chauffé à blanc devrait avant tout profiter à Marine Le Pen, la candidate du Front national. Personne ne fait mieux qu’elle dans ce registre. Dominique Reynié

Attention: un fiasco peut en cacher un autre !

Au lendemain de la victoire aussi reaganesque qu’inattendue du candidat républicain Donald Trump …

Et partant, à une ou deux exceptions près, d’un des plus grands fiascos de l’histoire sondagière …

Comment, comme le rappelle le politologue Dominique Reynié, ne pas voir …

Derrière cette revanche des « clingers » et « deplorables » si longtemps méprisés par un establishment prêt pour se maintenir en place à tous les coups tordus  …

Et à l’instar du récent référendum du Brexit outre-manche comme de la qualification surprise du candidat frontiste au deuxième tour en France en 2002 …

La part du fameux effet Bradley …

A  savoir la tendance de certains électeurs …

Dans un système de recueil de réponses téléphonique qui, option présentation du numéro oblige, n’atteint même pas les 15% …

Et des élections particulièrement atypiques où un candidat comme Trump peut brusquement donner voix à des millions de jusqu’ici non-votants …

Face à la démonisation généralisée – véritable terrorisme intellectuel – de leurs candidats par les médias et l’opinion en général …

A la dissimulation de leur intention de vote auprès des instituts de sondage ?

Dominique Reynié : «L’élection de Trump n’est pas une surprise»

Kevin Badeau
Les Echos
09/11/2016

LE CERCLE/INTERVIEW – Pour Dominique Reynié, directeur général de la Fondapol, les médias n’ont pas su entendre le malaise de la population américaine.

Donald Trump a été élu Président des Etats-Unis, est-ce vraiment une surprise ?

Les analystes politiques, les sondeurs et les journalistes ont donné à penser que la victoire d’Hillary Clinton était assurée avant l’élection. En cela, c’est une surprise, car la sphère médiatique n’imaginait pas la victoire du candidat républicain. Elle a eu tort. Si elle avait su observer la société américaine et entendre son malaise, elle n’aurait jamais exclu la possibilité d’une élection de Trump. Pour cette raison, ce n’est pas une surprise.

Pourquoi les médias n’ont-ils rien vu venir ?

Sans doute, ils ont rejeté Donald Trump car ils le trouvaient – et c’est le cas – démagogue, populiste et vulgaire. Je n’ai d’ailleurs jamais vu une élection américaine avec un tel parti pris médiatique. Même le très réputé hebdomadaire britannique « The Economist » a fait un clin d’oeil à Hillary Clinton.

Je pense que la stigmatisation sans précédent de Donald Trump par les médias a favorisé chez les électeurs américains la dissimulation de leur intention de vote auprès des instituts de sondage. En clair, un certain nombre de votants n’a pas osé admettre qu’il soutenait le candidat américain. Ce phénomène est classique en politique. Souvenez du 21 avril 2002 et de la qualification surprise de Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader du Front national, au second tour de l’élection présidentielle française.

L’élection de Donald Trump traduit-elle le refus de la mondialisation par les Américains ?

A travers l’élection de Trump, certains Américains ont exprimé leur colère. Une partie de l’Amérique ne trouve pas ses gains dans la globalisation. Cette Amérique-là ne parvient pas à retrouver son niveau de vie d’avant la crise des subprimes, elle a le sentiment d’être abandonnée. Ce sentiment était particulièrement perceptible chez les ouvriers, qui voient l’industrie s’effilocher. Ne se sentant pas assez considérés, ils ont davantage choisi Donald Trump qu’Hillary Clinton.

Est-ce une victoire du peuple américain contre l’establishment, comme on l’entend parfois ?

Cette formule est très exagérée. Oui, une partie des électeurs de Donald Trump ont voté contre Washington et ses élites. Oui, certains Américains souffrent d’un mépris de classe, en particulier dans l’Amérique profonde. Mais dire que le peuple s’est tourné vers Trump est inexact. Le candidat républicain et la candidate démocrate sont au coude à coude en termes de suffrages exprimés [à 15 heures, 47,5% pour Trump et 47,6% pour Clinton , NDLR]. Au passage, nous avons affaire à deux candidats richissimes. Si ma mémoire est bonne, Donald Trump, pseudo-candidat du peuple, n’est pas issu de la classe ouvrière…

Victor Orban en Hongrie, Andrzej Duda en Pologne, Trump aux Etats-Unis, pourquoi une telle vague populiste dans le monde occidental ?

L’arrivée au pouvoir de dirigeants populistes s’explique avant tout par des spécificités locales. Après, il y a des effets communs. De nouvelles puissances émergent. Les gens se sentent décentrés. Il y a une surabondance d’innovations technologiques et scientifiques. Une partie de la société se sent déclassée. L’immigration accélère les mécanismes de recomposition culturelle. Aux Etats-Unis, les Blancs anglo-saxons deviennent minoritaires. Ceci induit une réaction exprimée en votant pour un candidat populiste : Donald Trump.

L’élection de Trump est-elle une excellente nouvelle pour Marine Le Pen ?

Une chose est certaine : l’élection de Trump, mais aussi le Brexit, vont peser sur le langage et le lexique employés par une partie des prétendants à la présidentielle française. Des acteurs politiques, de droite comme de gauche, seront tentés de durcir leur discours. Mais ce climat chauffé à blanc devrait avant tout profiter à Marine Le Pen, la candidate du Front national. Personne ne fait mieux qu’elle dans ce registre.
Propos recueillis par Kévin Badeau

Voir aussi:

Will Closeted Trump Voters Pull a Bradley Effect

Bill Berkovitz

Truthout

03 October 2016 

Just before Election Day in November 1982, according to most polls, Tom Bradley, the first African American mayor of Los Angeles, appeared poised to become governor of California. Despite leading in the polls, Bradley lost the election to Republican George Deukmejian. Instead of becoming the first African American governor of California, Bradley became the namesake of something called The Bradley Effect.

The Bradley Effect — also known as The Wilder Effect — proposed that voters that said they would vote for the African American candidate were either too embarrassed, or ashamed for fear of being labeled racist, to admit to pollsters that they wouldn’t vote for a Black man as Governor.

According to Ballotpedia, “A related concept is social desirability bias, which describes the tendency of individuals to ‘report inaccurately on sensitive topics in order to present themselves in the best possible light.’ According to New York University professor Patrick Egan, ‘Anyone who studies survey research will tell you one of the biggest problems we encounter is this notion of social desirability bias.’ Some researchers and pollsters theorize that a number of white voters may give inaccurate polling responses for fear that, by stating their true preference, they will open themselves to criticism of racial motivation.”

While most of the above appear to apply particularly to elections where African Americans are facing off again white candidates, this year’s presidential election may contain some of those same dynamics. Some pundits are claiming that a Bradley Effect-like situation might be in play with voters who support Donald Trump, but are un-willing to admit it to pollsters.

Ever since the Bradley-Wilson contest, the notion of a Bradley Effect has been raised fairly frequently. In this presidential race, it may be worth posing two countervailing questions: Are independent voters – not the hardcore who support Trump regardless of what he says or does – reluctant to admit they are going to vote for him, yet when they arrive at the polling places they will vote for him?

Or, might it be possible some voters that have declared support for Trump will, in the sanctity of the voting booth, vote for Hillary Clinton, thereby reflecting an inversion of The Bradley Effect?

In late August, Emerson College Professor Gregory Payne told Breitbart News that he sees the same Bradley Effect taking place amongst Trump voters. In 1982, Payne said: “People, when you’d ask them if they were going to vote, oftentimes they would say they were going to vote for Bradley or a Black candidate so they felt socially acceptable. Then when they went behind the curtain, they decided that they didn’t really want to vote for Bradley.”

“I think with Trump, what you have is you have the opposite,” Payne, who wrote speeches for Bradley and also wrote Tom Bradley: The Impossible Dream, said. “Many people are saying to maybe their friends while they’re having a sip of Chardonnay in Washington or Boston, ‘Oh, I would never vote for him, he’s so – not politically correct,’ or whatever, but then they’re going to go and vote for him. Because he’s saying things that they would like to say, but they’re not politically courageous enough to say it and I think that’s the real question in this election.”

“Trump is kind of a combination of the gun referendum, because he’s an emotional energy source for people who want to make sure that they’re voicing their concerns about all these issues – immigration, et cetera – but then I think there’s this other piece. They don’t find it to be correct or acceptable to a lot of their friends, but when push comes to shove, they’re going to vote for him.”

In May, The New York Times’ Thomas B. Edsall interviewed Kyle A. Dropp, the executive director of polling for Morning Consult: “Trump’s advantage in online polls compared with live telephone polling is eight or nine percentage points among likely voters. This difference, Dropp notes, is driven largely by more educated voters — those who would be most concerned with “social desirability.” These findings suggest that Trump will head into the general election with support from voters who are reluctant to admit their preferences to a live person in a phone survey, but who may well be inclined to cast a ballot for Trump on Election Day.”

Some of this might explain why after the first debate, Trump’s online unscientific poll numbers as to who won the debate far outpace his numbers done by accredited polling companies.

Trump campaign manager Kellyanne Conway has called Team Trump’s efforts the « Undercover Trump Voter » project. « Donald Trump performs consistently better in online polling where a human being is not talking to another human being about what he or she may do in the election. It’s because it’s become socially desirable, if you’re a college educated person in the United States of America, to say that you’re against Donald Trump. »

“They’ll go ahead and vote for that candidate in the privacy of a [voting] booth,” says Dartmouth College political science professor Joe Bafumi. “But they won’t admit to voting for that candidate to somebody who’s calling them for a poll.”

 Voir également:

Clinton clings to tiny lead — but ‘Brexit’ and ‘Bradley’ factors could be skewing the polls

Chris Keall

BNR

November 7, 2016

Is Donald Trump’s support being underestimated by pollsters?

Two factors indicate it’s possible.

1. The Brexit effect
UKIP leader Nigel Farage says lots of people who don’t usually vote will cast a ballot for Mr Trump, mirroring the so-called « Brexit effect » in the UK that caught pollsters off guard.

There’s a possibility this is happening. As I type, just over 40 million early votes have been cast [UPDATE: the final early voting tally was 47 million].

Early votes have been coming in at around 1.5 million to 2 million a day, so it would take quite a last-minute surge to beat the 46 million early votes in 2012 (of a total 128 million).

Yet in some key areas, earlier voting has been heavier. Exhibit A is that battleground-of-battlegrounds, Florida, where early voting closes today NZT (most states will keep early voting open).

Figures post this morning show 6.1 million early votes cast, compared to 4.7 million in 2012.

So the Brexit effect could be in play.

Against this, the Clinton campaign has a far larger get-out-the-vote field operation, and surveys indicate that Hispanic voters are turning out in greater numbers than 2012 — unlikely to be a positive for Mr Trump.

And in key swings states, including Nevada, registered Democrat turnout is up over 2012. But the lingering question is: Are they staying loyal? How many white working class supporters are crossing over, a la the blue-collar « Reagan Democrats » in 1984?

2. The Bradley effect
In the 1982 race for Governor of California, black candidate Tom Bradley (a Democrat), enjoyed a lead in the polls but lost to white Republican George Deukmejian.

Poll historians call this the « Bradley effect. » Some people lied and told pollsters they would support Mr Bradley because they did not want to appear racist.

Variations on this theme include the « Shy Tory » effect in the UK in 1992 when some people were too sheepish to tell pollsters they would vote for the Conservative Party as led by the unfashionable John Major (his party was behind in the polls, but won). And the « Wilder » effect 1989, where polls showed Democrat candidate Douglas Wilder comfortably on track to become Virgina’s first black governor — but ultimately he only won his race against his white Republican rival by a razor-thin margin.

Are some Trump supporters also too sheepish to declare their support?

This cycle, due to the spiralling cost of trying to reach people by live phone as due to so many ditching landlines, around half the polls are online (with online panels weighted to match census data).

Pundits say voters are more likely to express their true preference with an online form rather than when they talk to a human pollster.

Morning Consult, which has been conducting a tracking poll for Politico, decided to test the « Shy Trump voter » hypothesis by conducting phone and online interviews with a sample of 2075 likely voters (read its full report here).

The test found there is a « social desirability » effect, which is quite marked among higher income and college educated voters (blue = Clinton, red = Trump).

But once voters across the board are factored in, the « Shy Trump voter » effect is a lot smaller; around 2%:

Politico deems that 2% too small to influence the race … but bear in mind we’re now talking about a race where Clinton has a margin of two points or under according to the latest poll-of-poll surveys.

Some real-life evidence runs against it. Some online surveys, such as that conducted by IPSOS/Reuters, which has Clinton in the lead by four points as of this morning, are actually more bullish for the Democrat that some live phone surveys, such as the one conducted by the Trump-friendly Fox News, which as of today actually shows a tighter race with more people avowing support for Trump to put him within 2 points of the lead.

You could also argue for some degree of a « Shy Clinton supporter » effect, given the Democrat’s flat campaign and various baggage.

But overall, the 2% « Shy Trumper » effect vs a 2% Clinton lead, and a possible « Brexit » effect boosting Trump’s vote mean this election is too close to call.

The Democrat’s best hope remains that the race comes down to the state-by-state electoral college vote, where she maintains a narrow lead in a couple of key battlegrounds that make it tricky for Trump to get to the magic 270 needed to take the Whitehouse (Politico has a good summary here). But even in her so-called « firewall » states, Clinton’s lead is still close to the margin of error.

Nigel Farage might be deeply unloveable, but his Brexit poll theory proved correct — unlike polling guru Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight, who called it wrong.

Voir également:

The Trump Effect

Is Trump down in polls because voters are too embarrassed to admit they are voting for him?

Joseph P. Williams

US News & world report

July 1, 2016

During the Republican presidential primaries, Donald Trump frequently bragged about polls showing him leading the pack of GOP contenders, declaring himself the people’s choice. Now that his poll numbers have plunged since he locked up the nomination, Trump insists voters are still with him: a silent majority too embarrassed to tell it to the pollsters.

« People say ‘I’m not going to say who I’m voting for' » when pollsters call, Trump said, in his signature broken syntax, at a rally earlier this month. « Don’t be embarrassed, I’m not going to say who I’m voting for and then they get it and I do much better. It’s, like, an amazing effect. »

Call it the Trump Effect: the notion that voters won’t admit they support him, because it’s distasteful to back a populist celebrity billionaire who’s unafraid to offend immigrants, women and minorities. There’s some evidence to support the theory, including a recent analysis that shows Trump’s support increases by about six points in online surveys, compared with surveys conducted over the phone.

Coupled with recent face-plants by pollsters at home and abroad – including erroneous numbers on President Barack Obama’s re-election, the Scottish independence referendum and the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote – polling skeptics and Trump supporters have room to embrace the theory.

« What happens is the elites, the establishment all pile on. The average citizen will not tell pollsters the truth, » Newt Gingrich, a Trump surrogate, said Tuesday morning on Fox News. « You get much better results for Trump for example in a computerized online poll than a telephone poll because people don’t want to tell the pollster something they think is not socially acceptable. »

While not dismissing the possibility outright, however, political analysts doubt that Trump, running about five points behind presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton in polling averages, is poised to surge past her on the strength of voters too embarrassed to say they support him.

« Intuitively, it makes a lot of sense, » says William Galston, a senior fellow and political analyst at the Brookings Institution. Trump, he said, could be supported by « people who are not as bold as Donald Trump to say in public what [others think] is politically incorrect. It might make them more reticent » to admit they’re on his side.

Still, « as is the case with many other things, it’s possible. But I know of no evidence that directly supports it, » Galston says. « The evidence I’ve reviewed is far from enough to move the possible to the probable. I’m not there yet. »

Geoffrey Skelley, a political analyst at the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics, concurs, dismissing the possibility of « social desirability bias » skewing the numbers against the GOP’s presidential nominee.

« Trump is claiming it to be the case, but there’s really no evidence for it, » he says.

The phenomenon of voters telling pollsters what they think they want to hear, however, actually has a name: the Bradley Effect, a well-studied political phenomenon.

In 1982, poll after poll showed Tom Bradley, Los Angeles’ first black mayor and a Democrat, with a solid lead over George Deukmejian, a white Republican, in the California gubernatorial race. Instead, Bradley narrowly lost to Deukmejian, a stunning upset that led experts to wonder how the polls got it wrong.

Pollsters, and some political scientists, later concluded that voters didn’t want to say they were voting against Bradley, who would have been the nation’s first popularly-elected African-American governor, because they didn’t want to appear to be racist.

Trump has begun to allude to Bradley at rallies and in interviews (« He was supposed to win by 10 points, and he lost by 5 or something, » Trump said) – and he says polls improperly include too many Democrats and are conducted by news outlets that are biased against him.

In December, a Morning Consult poll examined whether Trump supporters were more likely to say they supported him in online polls than in polls conducted by live questioners. Their finding was surprising: « Trump performs about six percentage points better online than via live telephone interviewing, » according to the study.

At the same time, « his advantage online is driven by adults with higher levels of education, » the study says, countering data showing Trump’s bedrock support comes from voters without college degrees. « Importantly, the differences between online and live telephone [surveys] persist even when examining only highly engaged, likely voters. »

But Galston says while the study examines « a legitimate question, » the methodology is unclear, and « it’s really important to compare apples to apples. You need to be sure that the online community has the same demographic profile » as phone polling.

« It may also be the case that people who are online and willing to participate in that study are already, in effect, a self-selected sample » of pro-Trump voters, Galston says.

Nevertheless, « what prompts the question is obvious: We’ve probably never had a political candidate quite like Donald Trump, » Galston says. « An unusual candidate is likely to spark lots and lots of unusual questions. The American people, at least in my lifetime, have never been presented with such a choice. »

« It’s logically possible for a reverse Bradley Effect to be happening, » he says, « but that doesn’t mean that it is happening. »

Skelly says math and logic also work against Trump’s claim of a reverse Bradley Effect.

« In a fair number of the early states and caucuses, Trump underperformed his poll numbers. Not until Wisconsin did he start routinely outperforming them, » Skelley says. « Also, kind of anecdotally, have you met a Trump supporter who isn’t vocally for Trump? Every Trump supporter I’ve talked to is happy to tell me they’re a Trump supporter. »

Still, if more reticent ones are engaging in social desirability, the poll numbers probably wouldn’t move enough to have a dramatic impact on Trump’s race with Clinton if they come out of the closet on Election Day, Skelley says.

« I guess if there were something to this it would have to be at the margins, » he says. « Studies have shown Obama’s race may have cost him a couple of points, but nothing compared to what happened to Tom Bradley in that race. Trump may lose a couple of points, if it were actually a thing. But I can’t imagine it would be very substantial. »

Although the U.S. Census « almost always finds more people who say they voted than actually voted, » Skelley says, « I think when it comes to asking people who they’re planning to vote for, in this day and age, I don’t think those type of people who will respond if asked. »

Ultimately, Trump’s claim « is more of a way to try to explain poor polling numbers. Trump is losing at the moment and he’s trying to explain it off, » Skelley says. « This doesn’t really hold up under scrutiny. »

‘Lots of contempt’: What it’s like to be a secret Trump fan in Silicon Valley
Biz Carson
Business Insider
Jul. 15, 2016

Jake is like many people working in Silicon Valley.

The software engineer works for a big tech company, went to a top-tier university, and loves doing innovative work.

But one thing makes him very different: He supports Donald Trump.

In Silicon Valley — which prides itself on open-mindedness, a system of meritocracy, and a thirst for innovation — Jake’s support of Trump is more than just outside the mainstream. It’s a dangerous liability.

Since he’s told people of his support, friends who he thought were close have stopped talking to him. His coworkers shirk the subject. What used to be personal relationships at work are now only professional conversations, he says.

Now Jake tries to keep his Trump support a secret. Despite supporting the candidate both financially and in person, Jake believes his entire career could be at risk if his name were publicly linked to Trump. Business Insider agreed to interview him over email on conditions of anonymity and that we change his first name in the story.

Jake points often to Brendan Eich, a millionaire and creator of the Mozilla browser, who had to step down after his financial support of Prop 8, a California measure aimed at blocking same-sex marriage, came to light a couple of years ago. And unlike Eich, Jake says he doesn’t have the millions or the untouchable public stature of Peter Thiel to be out as a Trump supporter.

The sense of risk was driven home on Thursday, when 140 Silicon Valley bigwigs, including Apple cofounder Steve Wozniak and « Shark Tank » judge Chris Sacca, came together to decry Trump in an open letter. Y Combinator President Sam Altman has compared Trump to Hitler.

« Silicon Valley these days is a very intolerant place for people who do not hold so called ‘socially liberal’ ideas, » Jake says.

The experience of the former Mozilla creator is « exhibit A of the lack of tolerance in Silicon Valley for certain ideas, ideas which [by the way] were mainstream in American society until very recently or that, in fact, ideas that continue to be divisive today, » Jake says.

No one knows how many other « Jake »s are in Silicon Valley. But his existence there shows the power of Trump’s appeal in some of the most unlikely places.

Bloomberg called a Trump supporter in tech’s cradle « rarer than unicorns » — although in Santa Clara County, home to the likes of Google and Apple, 49,771 people voted for him in the primary. Like Jake, there are others who opt for secrecy and silence over the potential repercussions.

Here is the story of one Trump supporter’s existence in Silicon Valley’s politically hostile environment.

Unworthy of the tech tribe

Jake didn’t say much at first when his colleagues at work would make jokes about Trump — after all, he initially thought Trump’s campaign was a joke. His first donation was meant as a « middle finger » to the Washington establishment.

Eventually, though, he began to see Trump as a serious candidate, and he soon revealed to his team that he was in Trump’s camp. His colleagues « couldn’t believe it, » and he said there was « lots of contempt, even from people who are right of center. »

« In Silicon Valley, because of the high prevalence of highly smart people, there is a general stereotype that voting Republican is for dummies, » he says. « So many people see considering supporting Republican candidates, particularly Donald Trump, anathema to the whole Silicon Valley ethos that values smarts and merit. »

He’s talked about his positions more with coworkers and feels as if he’s earned respect back from some, although no one has come to team Trump with him. But the collegial work atmosphere is now tense and stilted.

« The relationship with those who were more upset is different. Now it is strictly professional, whereas before we talked more about personal stuff, » he says.

Peter Thiel, a Silicon Valley billionaire who cofounded PayPal, is a delegate for Trump and speaking at the Republican National Convention. Tristan Fewings/Getty Images

Some of his friends have demonized him and stopped talking to him entirely.

« A couple of friends thought that me supporting Trump made me unworthy of being part of the Silicon Valley tribe and stopped talking to me, » Jake says. « Honestly, I couldn’t care less. This says more about them than about me. »

Even with the thinly veiled malice toward Trump by members of the tech elite, Jake has no plans to leave his job or his career. For the most part, he’s found tech employees have an indifference towards politics.

« The main reason I stay in Silicon Valley is that I love my work and doing innovative stuff. I am willing to put up with the rest. And, as I said, most people are not very ideological, so the situation is not that bad, » he said. « It is mostly the motivated few that I am concerned about that could go the extra mile to do to me what was done to Brendan Eich. »

True believer

Why does an educated, well-compensated Silicon Valley engineer support the man who is such a pariah among his Silicon Valley peers?

Brendan Eich resigned from Mozilla after backlash from his financial support for Prop 8 in California. Brave

Like many Trump supporters, Jake believes the country is in trouble, saddled with too much debt, not enough good jobs, and a political system that benefits the wealthy and the elite. In his view, it’s the very rich who have benefited from the Obama economy, including the banks that were bailed out after the financial crisis.

Jake has historically voted Republican, although he skipped the last two elections, and he describes his political views as closer to Libertarian. Government is a « necessary evil, but evil nonetheless, » he says. He’s socially conservative on some issues (particularly abortion) and is against same-sex marriage for utilitarian reasons, but fine with civil unions.

After months of studying Trump’s message, Jake says that he found himself to be a true believer.

« At the end of the day, we choose our politics the way we choose our lovers and our friends — not so much out a rational analysis, but based on impressions and our own personal backgrounds. My main reason for supporting Trump is that I basically agree with the notion that unless the trend is stopped, our country is going to hell, » Jake says.

The ‘sideshow’

Of course, much of the backlash against Trump in Silicon Valley is due to the candidate’s comments, considered by many to be xenophobic and racist, about immigrants, Muslims, and Mexicans.

Jake says he doesn’t agree with Trump on many of those points, but Jake doesn’t really take them seriously either, describing them as a « sideshow. »

On Trump’s proposed ban on Muslims? Jake thinks Trump’s perceived extremist remarks wouldn’t be backed up with actions.

« I do not agree with a blanket ban (and personally I think he never meant it), but I do agree with the notion of increasing the scrutiny of people who come from high-risk countries or zones, » he says.

Donald Trump. Sara D. Davis/Getty Images

Nor does he expect Trump to build his famous wall on the US-Mexico border and evict millions from the country. « He might complete the fence that already exists and probably make it stronger, but I have no doubt that Trump is a smart guy who won’t be deporting massively millions of people, » he says.

Jake says he is sympathetic to the idea of making it easier for highly qualified immigrants to stay legally in the US, and even finding a solution for the problem of illegal immigration that doesn’t involve deportation. But he also believes many companies abuse the H-1B program that allows skilled foreigners to come work in the US, bringing in not only highly qualified engineers, but also barely qualified service contractors to staff their data centers.

« The Silicon Valley elite is highly hypocritical on this matter. One of the reasons, I assume, they don’t like Trump is because on this area, as in many others, he is calling a spade a spade. I believe Trump is right in this case, » Jake says.

Help Silicon Valley do what it does best

From his position, « supporting Trump only offers [an] upside. » Electing Hillary Clinton would keep the status quo, he says. If Trump wins, there’s a whole set of new possibilities that would emerge for the nation.

While most tech leaders predict doom and gloom during a Trump presidency, Jake sees the opposite for Silicon Valley: a return to the contrarian spirit that has fueled it in the past.

« Even if it remains socially liberal, it would be good for it if the president were to be a Republican so that the Valley could recover a little bit of its rebel spirit (that was the case during the Bush years for instance). I believe that the increased relevance in national politics of companies like Google (whose Chairman [Eric] Schmidt has been very cozy with the Obama administration) and Apple (at the center of several political disputes) has been bad for the Valley, » he says. « A Trump presidency would allow the Valley to focus on what it does best: dreaming and building the technology of the future, leaving politics for DC types. »

Voir également:

How Many People Support Trump but Don’t Want to Admit It?

Thomas B. Edsall

The New York Times

May 11, 2016

No one is more perplexed by Donald Trump than the leaders of the Republican Party. On May 5, after Trump effectively clinched the Republican nomination, Paul Ryan famously asked:

Does he share our values and our principles on limited government, the proper role of the executive, adherence to the Constitution?

As the speaker of the Republican-dominated House, Ryan could have posed a harder question: Do Republican voters “share our values and our principles”?

The answer to this question, based at least on the 10.7 million votes cast for Trump in Republican primaries and caucuses so far, is “no.”

But that’s not all. There is also strong evidence that most traditional public opinion surveys inadvertently hide a segment of Trump’s supporters. Many voters are reluctant to admit to a live interviewer that they back a candidate who has adopted such divisive positions.

In matchups between Trump and Hillary Clinton, Trump does much better in polls conducted online, in which respondents click their answers on a computer screen, rather than in person-to-person landline and cellphone surveys.

An aggregation by RealClearPolitics of 10 recent telephone polls gives Clinton a nine-point lead over Trump. In contrast, the combined results for the YouGov and Morning Consult polls, which rely on online surveys, place Clinton’s lead at four points.

Why is this important? Because an online survey, whatever other flaws it might have, resembles an anonymous voting booth far more than what you tell a pollster does.

In a May 2015 report, Pew Research analyzed the differences between results derived from telephone polling and those from online Internet polling. Pew determined that the biggest differences in answers elicited via these two survey modes were on questions in which social desirability bias — that is, “the desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others” — played a role.

In a detailed analysis of phone versus online polling in Republican primaries, Kyle A. Dropp, the executive director of polling and data science at Morning Consult, writes:

Trump’s advantage in online polls compared with live telephone polling is eight or nine percentage points among likely voters.

This difference, Dropp notes, is driven largely by more educated voters — those who would be most concerned with “social desirability.”

These findings suggest that Trump will head into the general election with support from voters who are reluctant to admit their preferences to a live person in a phone survey, but who may well be inclined to cast a ballot for Trump on Election Day.

Conflicting online and phone poll findings in response to Trump’s call on Dec. 7, 2015 — five days after two terrorists killed 14 people in San Bernardino, Calif. — for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” demonstrate the difficulty gauging Trump’s strength.

Phone-based surveys in December by the Washington Post/ABC News, CBS News and NBC/Wall Street Journal found strong majorities — 57 to 60 percent — of Americans opposed to the proposal.

At the same time, YouGov, operating online, found substantial and growing support for Trump’s proposal, with a plurality, 45-41, in support. When YouGov repeated the question on March 24-25 — just after the terrorist attacks in Brussels — support had grown to 51-40.

This December-to-March shift was strongest among independent voters, who increased their support from 42-37 in favor of the ban to 62-37 in favor. Similarly, a March 29 Morning Consult online poll found majority support for the ban, 50-38, with voters who identified themselves as independents favoring Trump’s plan 49-36.

I asked a number of experts about the disparity between online and phone polls. All of them — Alan Abramowitz, John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, political scientists who specialize in the analysis of poll data — agreed that in the case of highly contentious issues, respondents can be more willing to express their real views anonymously, to a computer rather than to a human.

Kathy Frankovic, the former CBS polling director who now works for YouGov, told me that “it’s easier to express potentially ‘unacceptable’ responses on a screen than it is to give them to a person.” Douglas Rivers, a political scientist at Stanford and the chief scientist for YouGov, agreed, noting in an email that stronger support in online polls for a ban on Muslims

may be due to social desirability bias — people are more willing to express support for this privately than when asked by someone else.

Needless to say, Trump has expressed confrontational views on a number of fronts. He claims that as president he will impose harsh tariffs on imports from China, suspend Muslim immigration, deport 11 million immigrants and build an $8 billion wall that Mexico will pay for.

Taken together, these positions have provided a foundation for the strong correlation between support for Trump and white ethnocentrism and white racial resentment.

One method of ranking whites on ethnocentrism is to measure the degree to which they believe Caucasians are more trustworthy, intelligent, industrious and less violent than African-Americans, Hispanics and other minorities. These are the kinds of questions that prompt certain respondents in phone surveys to mask their views and provide socially acceptable answers instead.

The accompanying chart, which uses data provided to The Times by Marc Hetherington and Drew Engelhardt, political scientists at Vanderbilt, shows that white Republicans are the most ethnocentric of all voters, but also that there are substantial numbers of ethnocentric white Democrats and white independents..

This suggests that Trump could potentially find significant levels of support not only among Republican voters, but also among white Democrats and independents.

Now that Trump appears to have the Republican nomination in hand, the question becomes: Can he capitalize on racial resentment among Democrats and independents in the general election?

Perhaps not surprisingly, Hetherington and Engelhardt found that racial resentment follows a similar pattern to the expression of white ethnocentrism. It is highest among Republicans, but it is also present among Democrats and independents. The second chart derived from their data shows that in rankings of racial resentment, more than half of white Republicans, 58 percent, fall into the top four most resentful categories.

What should prove worrisome for Democrats is that 42 percent of white independents also fall into the four most resentful categories, as do 22 percent of white Democrats.

Even polls using traditional phone survey methods find notable support for issues high on Trump’s agenda. You can see this, for example, in attitudes toward the Chinese, Muslims and Mexicans — all of whom Trump has demonized.

Anger toward China appears to offer fertile ground for Trump in the general election. In its 2015 American Values Survey, the Public Religion Research Institute asked how responsible China is for American “economic problems.” Solid majorities of Democrats (70 percent), independents (72 percent) and Republicans (80 percent) said China is “very” or “somewhat” responsible.

Or take another Trump theme: Islam. The P.R.R.I. values survey asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “the values of Islam are at odds with American values and way of life.” Among all voters, 56 percent said that they agreed. Republican were strongest at 76 percent, but independents came in at 57 percent, with Democrats trailing at a still robust 43 percent.

The Polling Report, an aggregation of public opinion surveys, presents data on immigration from multiple sources. On a basic question — what should happen to the 11 million undocumented men, women and children now living within the borders of the United States — most traditional surveys show strong support for finding ways to legalize the status of those who have not committed crimes and have paid taxes.

A March 2016 Pew study found, for example, that voters preferred allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States over attempting to deport them by 74-25. It also found that a majority said immigrants strengthen the country (as opposed to adding a burden), 57-35. These are not good numbers for Trump.

But poll results (irrespective of whether questions are posed online or by phone) can change quite a bit depending on their exact wording, the specific issues addressed and even the placement of a query in a series of questions.

For example, a September 2015 Pew survey asked a related but different set of questions about immigrants that produced results more favorable to Trump’s prospects. Voters reported (50-28) that they believe that immigrants damage the economy (as opposed to making it better), with a fifth saying that immigrants don’t have much effect. Voters also reported that they think that immigrants make crime worse rather than better (50-7), with 41 percent saying that they don’t have much effect.

There are a few conclusions to be drawn.

First, the way Trump has positioned himself outside of the traditional boundaries of politics will make it unusually difficult to gauge public support for him and for many of his positions.

Second, the allegiance of many white Democrats and independents is difficult to predict — cross-pressured as they are by the conflict between unsavory Trump positions they are drawn to and conscience or compunction. The ambivalence of many Republicans toward Trump as their party’s brazenly defiant nominee will further compound the volatility of the electorate.

Finally, the simple fact that Trump has beaten the odds so far means that it is not beyond the realm of possibility that he could beat them again. If he does take the White House, much, if not all, of his margin of victory will come from voters too ashamed to acknowledge publicly how they intend to cast their vote.

Voir encore:

Why are people afraid to admit they voted Conservative?

Ed West
Catholic Herald
8 May 2015

About one in eight Tories won’t even admit their support to pollsters

Alas, the tragicomic spectacle of the British Labour leader Ed Miliband going eyeball to eyeball with Vladimir Putin now belongs in a very niche sub-genre of “what if” history books.

I wonder if Miliband was surprised by the exit polls in yesterday’s general election. I certainly was, being all prepared for the “ajockalypse” and an Ed Miliband-Nicola Sturgeon government.

Despite Miliband being tipped by most pundits, last night was a disaster for Labour, both in England and Scotland, where they have as many seats as the Tories. It’s been a while since that happened.

The biggest losers, however, were the pollsters, who all had Labour and the Conservatives neck and neck, when in fact there was a six-point gap.

Why did the opinion polls get it so spectacularly wrong, worse even than in the 1992 general election?

Margaret Thatcher wrote about the phenomenon of shy Tories back in 1979. It’s the very nature of small-C conservatives that they’re wary of tribal displays. In contrast, proclaiming socialism is a good way of expressing what some call “virtue signalling”.

Part of the reason for this shyness, it has to be said, is that people don’t like other people shouting “Tory scum” at them or vandalising their cars. Such violence, which has also been known to happen to Republicans in America, is the extreme end of a more general hostility towards conservatism.

My six-year-old daughter, who happens to share the same name as our new Labour MP (she was confused that lots of people were displaying her name in their windows), asked the other day why, if there are two main parties, no one had the blue Conservative party banner outside their front door.

Although where I live is barren territory for the Tories, in American terms rather like Vermont, even in my part of town one in six vote Tory. Probably twice that number would if the Liberal Democrats were not the main anti-Labour opposition. Yet out of hundreds of placards displayed outside people’s home, not a single person dared to admit voting Conservative.

And being a conservative, both big and small-C, has become so socially unacceptable that about one in eight Conservative voters routinely lie about it even when they are guaranteed anonymity by polling companies, let alone on Facebook.

Conservative causes generally tend to suffer from their supporters being “shy” about expressing views they know to be unfashionable or unpopular, but which they feel to be right.

David Quinn is making the same point about the Irish same-sex marriage referendum, which may well also surprise the pollsters.

It doesn’t help that socially liberal people tend to have a higher status in society. They are richer, more successful and more socially sophisticated – and it’s human instinct to defer on these subjects.

The general election obviously represents a great result for the Conservatives, but in the longer term Tories may want to ask what it means for their future if being a supporter has become something to hide.

Voir de même:

Voices
‘Did they keep quiet after the election?’: 5 ways to identify a ‘shy Tory’

Because Conservatives don’t all come in red trousers…
Jamie Campbell
The Independent
11 May 2015

If there was one major revelation of this mad election, it’s that Conservatives don’t all come in red trousers dripping in fox blood carrying polo mallets.

2015 saw the rise of the Secret Tory, Conservatives who, whether it be because they’re genuinely embarrassed about their views or fearful of the scorn of liberal friends, keep schtum about voting blue.

Picking them out isn’t as easy as spotting the corners of broadsheet Telegraph poking out from a Guardian Berliner but here are a few tips that might just help you identify this muted majority:

Disclaimer: Instructions are not watertight. Liberals may well also play tennis.

Did they keep quiet after the election? Such was the pummelling that Labour and the Lib Dems took last week, apathy’s been off the menu for the liberals of the UK. It feels a bit like a football match where the losers are inconsolable whilst the winners are too sheepish to celebrate. No tears? Probably Tory.What sports do they play? This isn’t to say that if someone goes down to Clapham Common every weekend for a game of rugger with Hugo, Digby and Xander they definitely won’t go to anti-fox hunting protests and love Polly Toynbee, but it’s probably a good sign. Golf, cricket and even an innocent game of tennis can be clues of the furtive Tory.

What does five more years of the Tories mean for Britain?

What magazines do they read? We all know where the newspapers stand but you’ve got to know your magazines for more subtle indications of where people are voting. The Spectator and The Economist for politics and Country Life and Tatler more generally are all blue warning lights, but also look out for Esquire, OK! and GQ –  the more discreet end of the Tory rag.

What do they drink? Are your friends conspicuously steering clear of continental lager beer? Do they order a Bombadier and announce “Bang on!” when it comes? Are they ordering rounds of Jagerbombs and making explosion noises after they neck each one? The testosterone fuelled machismo of the Secret Tory may only be revealed when somewhat squiffy. Of course, in vino veritas, so jump on the vulnerability of inebriation to quiz them about their views on Friedman.

Do they still love Tony Blair? He may now be better known for his slightly suspect relationships with lovely men like Nursultan Nazarbayez these days but it’s worth remembering that the father of New Labour was the best Prime Minister the Conservatives never had. Secret Torys will most likely drop in a load of “yeah but…” comments into conservations about the man who took us to war in Iraq, dragged the Labour party into an ideological and cosies up to dictators. ‘He did do a hell of a lot for the free market though.” Busted!

Voir de plus:

The Economist explains
How did the polls get it wrong?
D.R.

The Economist

Nov 9th 2016

IT WAS a big polling miss in the worst possible race. On the eve of America’s presidential election, national surveys gave Hillary Clinton a lead of around four percentage points, which betting markets and statistical models translated into a probability of victory ranging from 70% to 99%. That wound up misfiring modestly: according to the forecast from New York Times’s Upshot, Mrs Clinton is still likely to win the popular vote, by more than a full percentage point. But at the state level, the errors were extreme. The polling average in Wisconsin gave her a lead of more than five points; she is expected to lose it by two and a half. It gave Mr Trump a relatively narrow two-point edge in Ohio; he ran away with the state by more than eight. He trailed in Michigan and Pennsylvania by four, and looks likely to take both by about a point. How did it all go wrong?

Every survey result is made up of a combination of two variables: the demographic composition of the electorate, and how each group is expected to vote. Because some groups—say, young Hispanic men—are far less likely to respond than others (old white women, for example), pollsters typically weight the answers they receive to match their projections of what the electorate will look like. Polling errors can stem either from getting an unrepresentative sample of respondents within each group, or from incorrectly predicting how many of each type of voter will show up.

The electoral map leaves no doubt as to how Mr Trump won. In states where white voters tend to be well-educated, such as Colorado and Virginia, the polls pegged the final results perfectly. Conversely, in northern states that have lots of whites without a college degree, Mr Trump blew his polls away—including ones he is still expected to lose, but by a far smaller margin than expected, such as Minnesota. The simplest explanation for this would be that these voters preferred him by an even larger margin than pollsters foresaw—the so-called “shy Trump” phenomenon, in which people might be wary of admitting they supported him. Pre-election polls gave little evidence for this phenomenon: they showed him with a massive 30-point lead among this group. But remarkably, even that figure wound up understating Mr Trump’s appeal to them: the national exit poll put him 39 points ahead. Given that such voters make up 58% of the eligible population in Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania—though a smaller share of those who actually turn out—this nine-point miss among them accounts for a large chunk of the overall error. It is also likely that less-educated whites, who historically have had a low propensity to vote, turned out in greater numbers than pollsters predicted.

Of all the consequences of Mr Trump’s stunning victory, its impact on the public-opinion-research industry is surely among the least important. Nonetheless, it should inspire pollsters to redouble their efforts to better forecast turnout, beyond merely relying on the census and applying simple likely-voter screens. For the layman, it serves as a devastating reminder of the uncertainty in polling, and a warning about being overconfident even when the weight of surveying evidence seems overwhelming. As the physicist Niels Bohr famously quipped, “prediction is difficult—especially about the future.”

Here Are The Leading Theories On Why The Polls Went So Wrong
Election polling is in crisis, as pollsters struggle to understand how they could have missed the surge of Trump voters that prevailed on Election Day.
Peter Aldhous
Nov. 9, 2016

As Nov. 8 dawned, it all seemed so clear: National polls predicted that Hillary Clinton would prevail. Polls conducted at the state level, meanwhile, indicated that a “blue firewall” of Democratic-leaning states would comfortably propel her to victory in the electoral college.

Now we know better. In the final reckoning, Clinton underperformed across the board, not only losing battlegrounds like Florida and North Carolina, but also sliding to defeat in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, long seen as safely in the Democratic corner.

In their defense, some polling firms say that they weren’t too far off on the national popular vote, in which Clinton led by about 1 percentage point.

“Our final poll had Clinton plus three, with a margin of error of three,” Jeff Cartwright, director of communications with Morning Consult, told BuzzFeed News. “We’ve had her at that number for weeks.”

But in states with close battles, where the presidential election is actually won and lost, there seems to have been a systematic polling bias in Clinton’s favor.

So, what went wrong? Here are the leading theories, from polling experts who are struggling to work out what just happened.

1. Don’t blame any one type of poll. They all got it wrong.

 Before the election, traditional phone pollsters were sparring with the new breed of online survey firms, each arguing that their methods were superior.

Phone pollsters were sticking with the established method of random digit dialing to get a representative sample of voters — but that “gold standard” was getting increasingly expensive, given dwindling response rates to phone surveys.

Online pollsters, meanwhile, argued that they could piece together good samples by carefully selecting from the people who volunteer for online polls.

Neither camp has much to shout about right now. “Everybody got it wrong. Everybody missed this. Whatever the explanation, it is something that functions across all the methodologies,” Timothy Johnson, director of the Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois at Chicago, told BuzzFeed News.

2. A late surge of “undecided” Republicans swung back to their traditional home at the last minute.

The idea here is that Trump’s unorthodox campaign alienated mainstream Republicans, who sat on the fence until the final reckoning.

“One significant source of polling error might have been a late break of voters,” Sam Wang of the Princeton Election Consortium told BuzzFeed News. His prediction model, based on aggregated poll results, was particularly bullish about a Clinton victory, putting her chances of prevailing at 99% certainty on the eve of the election.

As FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver noted in his final election forecast (which gave Clinton a 72% chance of winning), about 12% of voters were either undecided or said they’d vote for a third-party candidate in the most recent pre-election polls. That’s much more than in recent elections.

But the late-surge idea could easily be wishful thinking. “That would be the favorite of pollsters because it means there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with polling,” said Claudia Deane, vice president of research at the Pew Research Center in Washington, DC.

Deane is skeptical of the surge idea, given what people said about their voting decisions in exit polls: According to the New York Times, those who said they decided “in the last few days” went 46% for Trump, 44% for Clinton — a far smaller difference than the 51% to 37% split for those who said they’d made their minds up in October.

Also, while the Republican leadership distanced themselves from Trump at various flash points in his controversial candidacy, rank-and-file GOP voters mostly seem to have stuck with the party throughout, according to Deane. “They weren’t treating Trump differently,” she said.

3. The “likely voter” models used by pollsters were flummoxed by Trump’s movement of disaffected white people, and wrongly put them in the “not likely to vote” column.

Election polling is harder than other forms of survey research, because you must assess two things at once. Not only do you have to find out who people say they will support, you also have to estimate their likelihood of actually turning up to vote.

So Trump may have been right in claiming that he’d created a new movement of people who had previously shunned political engagement. If so, pollsters who relied on prior voting behavior to predict who would turn out this time would have systematically underestimated Trump’s support.

Problems with likely voter modeling could also mean that the pollsters overestimated the extent to which the “Obama coalition” of black, Latino, and younger voters would turn out for Clinton.

One problem with this explanation, however, is that different pollsters approach likely voter modeling in different ways. Yes, some place a lot of weight on votes in previous elections, but others place more faith in other methods, such as trying to gauge respondents’ enthusiasm about their preferred candidates. And yet on Tuesday, every method got it wrong in a similar way.

“There is such incredible variability in those models. And to see such a wide diversity of models all get it wrong seems a little implausible,” said Johnson.

4. “Shy Trumpers,” who were embarrassed to admit their support for the GOP candidate, quietly delivered their verdict in the polling booths.

This theory first emerged in the run-up to the Republican primaries, as pollsters noticed that Trump was doing better in online polls than in those conducted over the phone. The idea was that some of Trump’s supporters were embarrassed to admit their choice to a real person. The idea gained traction when a polling experiment run last December by Morning Consult seemed to confirm that the effect was real.

In the match-up against Clinton, however, Trump’s advantage in online polls mostly evaporated. And when Morning Consult ran a poll with Politico in late October to specifically probe for the effect, it seemed to operate only among college-educated voters.

“Overall, it didn’t look like it massively shifted the race,” Morning Consult’s Cartwright said.

5. Trump’s anti-establishment supporters believed the polls were rigged, and so they refused to answer the phone or respond to online surveys.

For pollsters, this is a much darker possibility. The idea that the polls were rigged became a popular refrain among Trump’s supporters. So maybe these people simply refused to participate in polls, either on the phone or online.

If so, all of the pollsters may have been systematically blind to many of the disaffected, mostly white voters who drove Trump to victory, especially in the Rust Belt states of the Midwest.

“People who don’t like the government often perceive the polls as being part of the government,” said Johnson of the University of Illinois, who believes this is the most plausible explanation for the pollsters’ miss. “This does merit close investigation.”

That would be hard, because anti-establishment voters who don’t trust pollsters are unlikely to be keen on participating in research to find out what went wrong.

The bottom line is no one knows for sure, and the post mortem will take months.

“The ‘why’ is going to take a lot of time to seriously answer,” Charles Franklin, director of the Marquette Law School Poll in Milwaukee, told BuzzFeed News.

Solving the mystery will mean poring over the voter files maintained by states that show who voted and who did not. This research could show, for example, whether polling samples systematically missed chunks of the electorate that were solidly behind Trump, or whether those people were polled and then wrongly assumed to be unlikely to cast a vote. Or it could reveal some other, novel explanation.

The American Association for Public Opinion Research has a task force that was planning to investigate the accuracy of 2016 election polls, even before last night’s upset. It is expected to take several months to deliver a verdict.

“It’s going to be very hard to develop an adequate explanation,” Michael Traugott of the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor told BuzzFeed News.

Donald Trump, une surprise ? Pas vraiment

Joseph Savès

Hérodote
9 novembre 2016

Après les référendums de 2005 (France et Pays-Bas) et le Brexit (2016), voici une nouvelle surprise avec l’élection de Donald Trump par une franche majorité d’Américains. À chaque fois, le suffrage universel a eu raison des médias, des sondeurs et de leurs commanditaires (*). On peut au moins se réjouir de cette vitalité démocratique.

Les lecteurs et Amis d’Herodote.net peuvent heureusement se féliciter d’avoir accès à des analyses plus fines, parce que fondées sur les enseignements de l’Histoire.

Le 23 octobre 2016, nous avons titré notre lettre sur des élections pleines de surprises aux États-Unis et évoqué un précédent largement ignoré : l’élection du candidat « populiste » et « anti-système » Andrew Jackson, en 1828.

Par bien des aspects de sa personnalité, il n’était pas sans ressembler au nouveau président des États-Unis. Et lui aussi avait été rejeté par les instances de son parti et honni par les élites de la côte Est.

Ce 3 novembre 2016, à la lumière de l’Histoire, nous avons aussi rappelé ce qu’est le libre-échange prôné par ces mêmes élites comme par les fonctionnaires de Bruxelles et les élites françaises : une utopie aussi folle que le communisme soviétique.

C’est en partie en raison du libre-échange (*) et du primat de la finance que les électeurs américains ont voté pour Donald Trump : il a su capter leur colère sourde, tout comme d’ailleurs le candidat démocrate Bernie Sanders, rival malheureux d’Hillary Clinton (*).

L’autre motif qui a conduit à la victoire de Trump et à l’élimination de Sanders tient à l’exaspération d’une majorité de citoyens face aux tromperies de l’utopie « multiculturaliste » et de la société « ouverte ».

À preuve le vote de l’Iowa en faveur de Donald Trump : dans cet État plutôt prospère, avec un faible taux de chômage, c’est évidemment l’enjeu multiculturaliste qui a fait basculer les électeurs.

En effet, l’élection en 2008 d’un président noir (pas un Afro-Américain mais un métis, fils d’une blanche du Kansas et d’un Kényan) n’a pas empêché le retour à de nouvelles formes de ségrégation raciale. C’est ainsi que la candidate démocrate Hillary Clinton a tenté de jouer la carte « racialiste » en cajolant les électeurs afro-américains et latinos. Mais sans doute s’est-elle trompée dans son évaluation du vote latino : beaucoup d’Étasuniens latino-américains aspirent à leur intégration dans la classe moyenne et ne se sentent guère solidaires des Afro-Américains.

Le même phénomène s’observe en Europe de l’Ouest, sous l’effet d’un emballement migratoire sans précédent dans l’Histoire. Les nouveaux arrivants font bloc avec leur « communauté » dans les quartiers et les écoles : Africains de la zone équatoriale, Sahéliens, Maghrébins, Turcs, Orientaux, Chinois etc. Il compromettent ce faisant l’intégration des immigrants plus anciennement installés (*). À quoi les classes dirigeantes répondent par des propos hors-contexte sur le « vivre-ensemble » et l’occultation de la mémoire.

La chancelière Angela Merkel et même le pape François ont perçu les dangers de cette politique dans leurs dernières déclarations, en novembre 2016. Quant aux élus français, qui ont abandonné leur souveraineté à Bruxelles et Berlin et se tiennent désormais à la remorque des puissants, ils feraient bien de prendre à leur tour la mesure de l’exaspération populaire face au néolibéralisme financier, au multiculturalisme et à l’emballement migratoire. Ils se doivent de nommer et analyser ces phénomènes sans faux-semblants, et de préconiser des solutions respectueuses de la démocratie.

Voir encore:

Trump, Clinton and the Culture of Deference

Political correctness functions like a despotic regime. We resent it but we tolerate it.

Shelby Steele

The Wall Street Journal

Nov. 7, 2016

The current election—regardless of its outcome—reveals something tragic in the way modern conservatism sits in American life. As an ideology—and certainly as a political identity—conservatism is less popular than the very principles and values it stands for. There is a presumption in the culture that heartlessness and bigotry are somehow endemic to conservatism, that the rigors of freedom and capitalism literally require exploitation and inequality—this despite the fact that so many liberal policies since the 1960s have only worsened the inequalities they sought to overcome.

In the broader American culture—the mainstream media, the world of the arts and entertainment, the high-tech world, and the entire enterprise of public and private education—conservatism suffers a decided ill repute. Why?

The answer begins in a certain fact of American life. As the late writer William Styron once put it, slavery was “the great transforming circumstance of American history.” Slavery, and also the diminishment of women and all minorities, was especially tragic because America was otherwise the most enlightened nation in the world. Here, in this instance of profound hypocrisy, began the idea of America as a victimizing nation. And then came the inevitable corollary: the nation’s moral indebtedness to its former victims: blacks especially but all other put-upon peoples as well.

This indebtedness became a cultural imperative, what Styron might call a “transforming circumstance.” Today America must honor this indebtedness or lose much of its moral authority and legitimacy as a democracy. America must show itself redeemed of its oppressive past.

How to do this? In a word: deference. Since the 1960s, when America finally became fully accountable for its past, deference toward all groups with any claim to past or present victimization became mandatory. The Great Society and the War on Poverty were some of the first truly deferential policies. Since then deference has become an almost universal marker of simple human decency that asserts one’s innocence of the American past. Deference is, above all else, an apology.

One thing this means is that deference toward victimization has evolved into a means to power. As deference acknowledges America’s indebtedness, it seems to redeem the nation and to validate its exceptional status in the world. This brings real power—the kind of power that puts people into office and that gives a special shine to commercial ventures it attaches to.

Since the ’60s the Democratic Party, and liberalism generally, have thrived on the power of deference. When Hillary Clinton speaks of a “basket of deplorables,“ she follows with a basket of isms and phobias—racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia and Islamaphobia. Each ism and phobia is an opportunity for her to show deference toward a victimized group and to cast herself as America’s redeemer. And, by implication, conservatism is bereft of deference. Donald Trump supporters are cast as small grudging people, as haters who blindly love America and long for its exclusionary past. Against this she is the very archetype of American redemption. The term “progressive” is code for redemption from a hate-driven America.

So deference is a power to muscle with. And it works by stigmatization, by threatening to label people as regressive bigots. Mrs. Clinton, Democrats and liberals generally practice combat by stigma. And they have been fairly successful in this so that many conservatives are at least a little embarrassed to “come out” as it were. Conservatism is an insurgent point of view, while liberalism is mainstream. And this is oppressive for conservatives because it puts them in the position of being a bit embarrassed by who they really are and what they really believe.

Deference has been codified in American life as political correctness. And political correctness functions like a despotic regime. It is an oppressiveness that spreads its edicts further and further into the crevices of everyday life. We resent it, yet for the most part we at least tolerate its demands. But it means that we live in a society that is ever willing to cast judgment on us, to shame us in the name of a politics we don’t really believe in. It means our decency requires a degree of self-betrayal.

And into all this steps Mr. Trump, a fundamentally limited man but a man with overwhelming charisma, a man impossible to ignore. The moment he entered the presidential contest America’s long simmering culture war rose to full boil. Mr. Trump was a non-deferential candidate. He seemed at odds with every code of decency. He invoked every possible stigma, and screechingly argued against them all. He did much of the dirty work that millions of Americans wanted to do but lacked the platform to do.

Thus Mr. Trump’s extraordinary charisma has been far more about what he represents than what he might actually do as the president. He stands to alter the culture of deference itself. After all, the problem with deference is that it is never more than superficial. We are polite. We don’t offend. But we don’t ever transform people either. Out of deference we refuse to ask those we seek to help to be primarily responsible for their own advancement. Yet only this level of responsibility transforms people, no matter past or even present injustice. Some 3,000 shootings in Chicago this year alone is the result of deference camouflaging a lapse of personal responsibility with empty claims of systemic racism.

As a society we are so captive to our historical shame that we thoughtlessly rush to deference simply to relieve the pressure. And yet every deferential gesture—the war on poverty, affirmative action, ObamaCare, every kind of “diversity” scheme—only weakens those who still suffer the legacy of our shameful history. Deference is now the great enemy of those toward whom it gushes compassion.

Societies, like individuals, have intuitions. Donald Trump is an intuition. At least on the level of symbol, maybe he would push back against the hegemony of deference—if not as a liberator then possibly as a reformer. Possibly he could lift the word responsibility out of its somnambulant stigmatization as a judgmental and bigoted request to make of people. This, added to a fundamental respect for the capacity of people to lift themselves up, could go a long way toward a fairer and better America.

Mr. Steele, a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, is the author of “Shame: How America’s Past Sins Have Polarized Our Country” (Basic Books, 2015).

Voir de plus:

Who Really Deserves The Credit For Trump’s Win? Barack Obama And The Media

Donald Trump is the man Americans have chosen as their vehicle for the dramatic change they demand from Washington.

 The Federalist

Ben Domenech

November 9, 2016

It is not breaking the protocols of green room conversations, I think, to say that a certain prominent pollster arrived last night at CBS headquarters in New York City declaring firmly that Hillary Clinton would win by five points, the GOP would lose the Senate, and that it would not be close. I believe he said as much on Twitter. I was more skeptical. Having heard the exit polling myself, and knowing as we all do that Trump voters are less eager to talk to these youngsters with their clipboards, I had already warned The Federalist’s staff to not anticipate an early call. As the night wore on, it became abundantly clear that the exits had dramatically underestimated the support for Donald Trump in key states. And then it became clear that they had overestimated support for Clinton in several key states. And then, at some point, it became clear that this would not be a Bush-Gore close loss at all – that she was sinking to the point that her performance was comparable to Michael Dukakis. And then everyone started to lose their minds.

The strongest thought in my head as the night wore on, and Wisconsin and Pennsylvania remained uncalled despite a clear advantage for Donald Trump, was: what on earth must the conversation be like in that room with Barack and Michelle Obama, watching the returns, followed by that magnanimous speech. Make no mistake about it: this election is Barack Obama’s legacy. He pushed hard for Hillary Clinton in the end because he understood that as such. And it was all for naught. No celebrity, no sports star, and no current president with a strong approval rating was enough to drag Hillary Clinton over the finish line. What did Obama say? What epithets did he utter? And on what did he blame the result? Schadenfreude has always been part of the case for Trump, and it is particularly sharp when it comes to the feelings of the current chief executive.

Last night Jamelle Bouie and Van Jones voiced something I expect we will hear from many of Obama’s firmest supporters in the coming weeks – the idea that Trump represents a “whitelash” against eight years of Obama. But this dramatically oversimplifies the case, particularly if as it seems at the moment Trump won more minority votes than Mitt Romney in 2012. In fact, as Nate Cohn notes, Clinton failed in areas of the country where Obama’s support had been strongest among white Americans.   She failed to keep pace with Obama in the Rust Belt states that he won repeatedly. Her vaunted GOTV machine failed to attract the votes of young people, of union members, and of minorities to the degree necessary to win. And meanwhile, Trump’s utter lack of a campaign was more than made up for by the emotional dedication of his supporters. This was about more than just race – it was a sustained rejection of the country’s ruling class. But expect the media to try to make it about two things: race, and about Hillary Clinton’s lousy campaign. Ah, look, they’re doing it already.

The big winners from last night, beyond Donald Trump: Reince Priebus, who gets to keep his job; The Heritage Foundation, which bit the bullet and worked with Trump’s transition team on numerous points; Nate Silver, who got pounded by the left for a month for his poll skepticism only to be proven correct; TV networks who sold ads; Republican pragmatists who backed Trump while criticizing his excesses; Republican Senators who won back their majority while keeping Trump at arm’s length; Peter Thiel; pro-lifers and federalists, who will likely get two Supreme Court seats; Breitbart and Laura Ingraham and the pro-Trump factions of cable television, who were to the hilt defenders of Trump; Claremonsters; and civil libertarians, who probably will get to work with liberals again, which they love.

The big losers, beyond the Clinton family and Barack Obama: The Democratic Party, which now looks like a leaderless husk of what was once a coalition sure of its demographic destiny; the true NeverTrumpers who hoped Trump would lose big; John Podesta and the Clinton team; TV networks who garnered a new degree of hate from a frustrated electorate; James Comey, who will get it from both sides; old media conservatives who didn’t just reject but dismissed Trump and the phenomenon as mere celebrity worship; conservatives in the foreign policy space who explicitly backed her; any consultants who specialize in expensive GOTV efforts; the GOP autopsy; Bill Weld, who pretended to be a libertarian to try and get Hillary Clinton elected; and Joe Biden, who everyone will look back to as being able to beat Trump handily had he run.

A word about the overall failure of the media this cycle: it will be very interesting to see which reporters learn from this, and which ones double down on their ignorance. The majority of political reporters never seemed to get outside their bubble. They spoke to anti-Trump conservatives, and printed anti-Trump views from conservatives, but rarely would even publish the sorts of views I and others have been sounding for months about the real and rational gripes of Trump voters. Many in the media preferred the caricature to the real thing. If you are a member of the media who does not know anyone who was pro-Trump, who has no Trump voters among your family or friends, realize how thick your bubble is. Change this. Don’t stick to the old sources, who clearly didn’t know what was going on – add new ones, who offer the perspective from the ground.

 On The Federalist Radio Hour over the past several months, we’ve tried to analyze things from the perspective of the likeliest polling result – which has pretty consistently been a Hillary Clinton victory. Had the polls gone steadily in the other direction, we would’ve spent more time on the possibility of a Trump victory. The challenge in analyzing that result is Trump’s unpredictability as a chief executive. He has destroyed the GOP as we knew it and remade it as a more nationalist and populist coalition, in favor of a great deal of ideas that ring of Keynesian spending (the first agenda item mentioned in his victory speech was rebuilding infrastructure). How does he adapt to working with Mitch McConnell and Paul Ryan, assuming he even wants to do that? To whom does he listen, given that he has ignored so many of his own advisors on so many areas of policy? These are things that are inherently impossible to predict for a man who has had three campaign managers in a year’s time.

What is clear is this: Donald Trump is the man Americans have chosen as their vehicle for the dramatic change they demand from Washington. They have utterly rejected the change offered in the eight year Barack Obama agenda as wholly insufficient. And they have given Trump the rare gift of a united government in order to make those changes happen. They have tossed aside the assumptions of an elite class of gatekeepers and commentators whose opinions they disrespect and disavow. And they have sent a message to Washington that nothing less than wholesale change will satisfy them, including a change in the fundamental character of the commander in chief.

As a believer in constitutional limited government, this is an electoral result I find hopeful for more reason than one. Trump is not a believer in that, but there are those around him who do. More importantly, his attitude and character are so abrasive to the sentiments of the American elites that it almost has to result in a reassertion of the powers of other branches of government, particularly the Congress. This would be a very good thing, not just for the next four years, but for a generation that has seen the executive office expanded without any pause. It may take a change agent like Trump to necessitate a return to the limitations the Constitution demands.

So we’re doing this, America. President Donald Trump. It will be a crazy ride for the next four years. Let’s see what comes next.

Ben Domenech is the publisher of The Federalist. Sign up for a free trial of his daily newsletter, The Transom.

Voir aussi:

Politics

Who’s winning, who’s losing, and why.

How Nate Silver Missed Donald Trump

The election guru said Trump had no shot. Where did he go wrong?

Leon Neyfakh

Slate

Jan. 25 2016

For the past six months, one big question has loomed over the 2016 election: Is the candidacy of Donald J. Trump an amusing bit of reality TV or a terrifying and dangerous challenge to the country’s political system? At first, Trump’s popularity was easy to dismiss. It was nothing more than a phase, the result of Trump’s celebrity status and his talent for provocation. His antics made it hard to look away, but it was easy to convince yourself that Trump mania would never lead to anything serious, like the Republican nomination.

It was especially easy to come to that conclusion if you were reading FiveThirtyEight, the statistics-driven news website founded by Nate Silver. Since the beginning of Trump’s campaign last June, the election guru and his colleagues have been consistently bearish on Trump’s chances. Silver, who made his name by using cold hard math to call 49 out of 50 states in the 2008 general election and all 50 in 2012, has served as a reassuring voice in the midst of Trump’s shocking rise. For those of us who didn’t want to believe we lived in a country where Donald Trump could be president, Silver’s steady, level-headed certainty felt just as soothing as his unwavering confidence in Barack Obama’s triumph over Mitt Romney four years ago.

If any of you are worried about a Trump presidency just read some of Nate Silver’s stuff and you will see how unlikely it is

— Tribune of the Plebs (@Handsome_Jake_) August 19, 2015

What exactly has Silver been saying? In September, he told CNN’s Anderson Cooper that Trump had a roughly 5-percent chance of beating his GOP rivals. In November, he explained that Trump’s national following was about as negligible as the share of Americans who believe the Apollo moon landing was faked. On Twitter, he compared Trump to the band Nickelback, which he described as being “[d]isliked by most, super popular with a few.” In a post titled “Why Donald Trump Isn’t A Real Candidate, In One Chart,” Silver’s colleague Harry Enten wrote that Trump had a better chance of “playing in the NBA Finals” than winning the Republican nomination.

Multiple times over the past six months, Silver has reminded his readers that four years ago, daffy fly-by-nighters like Herman Cain and Michele Bachmann led the GOP field at various points. Trump’s poll numbers, he wrote, would drop just like theirs had. In one August post, “Donald Trump’s Six Stages of Doom,” Silver actually laid out a schedule for the candidate’s inevitable collapse.

That collapse is running late. Here we are, a few days from the Iowa caucus, and Trump’s poll numbers haven’t gone down at all. The latest data suggest that he leads his closest rival, Ted Cruz, by about 5 points in Iowa and almost 20 points in New Hampshire. He has also recently become the top GOP contender according to the betting market Betfair. Meanwhile, members of the so-called GOP establishment, who previously expressed open contempt for Trump, now seem to be warming to him. On Jan. 16, the Washington Post quoted the former finance chairman for Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign saying there was a “growing feeling” among many in the GOP that Trump “may be the guy.” Bob Dole praised Trump in the New York Times as a dealmaker who has the “right personality” to do business with Congress. Orrin Hatch, the most senior Republican in the Senate, told CNN he was “coming around” on Trump.

It’s clear, now, that Silver and his fellow analysts at FiveThirtyEight underestimated Trump. Silver himself recently admitted as much, writing in a blog post published last week that he’d been too skeptical about Trump’s chances. “Things are lining up better for Trump than I would have imagined,” he wrote, adding that “[i]f, like me, you expected” the show to have been over by now, “you have to revisit your assumptions.”

Everyone makes mistakes—even Nate Silver. It’s also entirely possible that the Trump collapse is still to come and that as soon as we see the actual voting process play out, the hollowness of his popularity will reveal itself. Still, Silver is right that his assumptions are worth revisiting. Maybe the Trump phenomenon is so unprecedented that no statistical model could have foreseen it. Or maybe it took a candidate as unique as Donald Trump to reveal the flaws and limitations of Silver’s prediction machine.

* * *

To understand how Silver got Trump wrong, it helps to understand what exactly he was skeptical about, and why. A look at his campaign coverage reveals that two basic beliefs guided Silver’s thinking.

The first centered on the polls showing Trump miles ahead of his rivals. These polls have been plentiful, and they have been consistent. To pick two more or less at random, CNN showed Trump’s support in Iowa grow from 22 percent in August to 37 percent this past week. According to national polls conducted by CBS and the New York Times, he has gone from polling at 24 percent nationally in August to 36 percent earlier this month.

None of this has impressed Silver. No matter what the polls said, as he wrote on FiveThirtyEight week after week, it was important to remember they were fundamentally unreliable and not at all indicative of how primary voters would ultimately cast their ballots. This has always been true of pre-primary polls, Silver argued, in part because primary voters have historically waited until the last minute to decide whom to support and in part because the people answering questions from pollsters are not necessarily the ones who will end up actually voting.

Anything Silver says about polling carries weight. Polls are his bread and butter—the raw materials he filters through his proprietary model to predict the outcomes of elections. His expertise on which polls to ignore, which ones to trust, and how much to trust them is central to his political wisdom. The early national polls showing Trump in the lead, Silver wrote, were basically worthless. As he put it in a post titled “Donald Trump Is Winning The Polls—and Losing the Nomination,” they not only “lack empirical power to predict the nomination” but “describe a fiction.”

Silver thought that it was foolish of reporters and columnists to act like Trump’s numbers were significant. The fact that pundits insisted on investing them with so much importance proved they were motivated more by the demands of the news cycle than by a commitment to truth—a tendency Silver has always taken pride in avoiding.

The problem, Silver believed, wasn’t just that the media legitimized polls that didn’t deserve people’s attention. It was worse than that: By talking about Trump’s poll numbers like they mattered, the media risked distorting future polls, thereby reinforcing the false narrative of Trump’s dominance. “Some voters may be coughing up Trump’s name in polls because he’s the only candidate they’ve been hearing about,” Silver wrote in December, noting that the media has given Trump’s campaign “more coverage than literally all the other Republicans combined.”

Silver’s error, in retrospect, was to conflate his doubts about the polls with his doubts about Trump’s viability as a candidate. In other words, it’s perfectly possible for Silver to have been correct in saying the early polls did not constitute proof of a massive Trump lead, while also being wrong about the likelihood that Trump would become the nominee. This mistake is illustrated most clearly in that post headlined “Donald Trump’s Six Stages of Doom,” in which Silver asserted that “Trump’s campaign will fail by one means or another” before ticking off a bunch of reasons to be suspicious of the early polls that showed him in the lead. While the post made brief mention of Trump’s “poor organization in caucus states, poor understanding of delegate rules,” and his lack of “support from superdelegates,” it didn’t offer much on why Silver found it so unlikely that lots and lots of people would vote for him.

This brings us to the second basic belief guiding Silver’s skepticism about Trump mania. Polls aside, the history of modern American politics made it clear to him that a “Trump-like candidate” could never win the nomination.

What is a “Trump-like candidate”? Under Silver’s definition, it’s someone who has low favorability ratings and, more important, is hated by party leaders. Citing a theory laid out in The Party Decides—an influential work of political science which says that primary candidates don’t win without the support of the party establishment—Silver has argued that Trump was an almost certain loser. Even if Trump managed to survive until the Republican National Convention, Silver wrote, “the Republican Party would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid nominating him.”

The race has not played out that way. Indications in December that GOP leaders were either powerless against Trump or unwilling to go after him struck Silver as “perplexing”—precisely the emotion you would expect from a quantitatively inclined thinker confronted with a reality that hasn’t conformed to his calculations. In a chat with colleagues published on FiveThirtyEight, Silver discussed possible reasons why GOP leaders had not been more aggressive in snuffing out Trump earlier, when he might have been an easier target. “From the get-go, they haven’t seemed to have any plan at all for how to deal with Trump,” he wrote.

What’s crucial to note here is that Silver’s confidence about how the GOP would respond to Trump was never really based on any statistical calculations. Rather, in repeatedly citing The Party Decides, he was relying on a theory about how political parties work—one that’s been embraced by some of the very same pundits that Silver has defined himself against. And while it’s true that The Party Decides was an empirical work based on historical data, the notion that GOP leaders would find a way to kill Trump’s campaign is, on some level, premised on a belief that the individual actors who control the Republican Party would all act as rationally as Nate Silver would if he were in their shoes. When news reports came out this month that influential Republican donors were starting to think Trump wouldn’t be such a bad candidate, Silver wrote, with some exasperation, “the donor class is probably wrong.”

Maybe what happened here is that Silver was the one sober guy in a room full of drunks, powerless to stop irrational party leaders from taking unreliable polling data seriously. Even if you believe that establishment figures are only giving Trump a look because they despise his closest rival, Ted Cruz, it’s undeniable that their thinking is being informed by Trump’s numbers. The fact that Silver thinks those numbers are silly doesn’t matter. They were consequential, and now that the Iowa caucus is one week away, those consequences are becoming more and more serious.

Why was Silver so confident that the “party decides” theory would hold? One reason, surely, is that it always had in the past—if you want a recent example, think back to the mavericks of the 2012 GOP contest, who were squashed like bugs until party favorite Romney was the last man standing. But it also seems possible that Silver believed the GOP would stop Trump for a simpler reason: It was what he wanted to happen.

Silver did not respond to multiple requests for comment for this story, so the best I can do is venture a guess. Maybe, like many people who have watched Trump’s rise with increasing horror, Silver latched onto a narrative that justified rejecting the Apprentice star’s achievements, identifying them as symptoms of a media bubble rather than a reflection of real popular sentiment. If that’s the case, Silver turns out to have a good bit in common with the pundits that he and his unemotional, numbers-driven worldview were supposed to render obsolete. Faced with uncertainty, Silver chose to go all in on an outcome that felt right, one that meshed with his preexisting beliefs about how the world is supposed to work.

* * *

There is another, more narrow explanation for why Trump eluded Silver. As effective as the FiveThirtyEight approach was when applied to Obama vs. McCain and Obama vs. Romney, perhaps it just doesn’t work nearly as well when applied to primaries. If Silver’s system depends largely on interpreting poll numbers, how reliable can that system be if the pre–Iowa and New Hampshire polls are basically worthless? Garbage in, garbage out.

“I think figuring out what’s going on in a primary is more of an art than a science,” says Steve Kornacki, a political analyst at MSNBC who has been covering presidential campaigns since 2002. “There’s just so much more volatility, coming from so many different levels in a primary. And there’s a lot more art involved in figuring out what’s going on than there is in a general election, especially in an era when 80 percent of the country knows whether they’re team blue or team red and which way they vote.”

Of course, Silver knows this, and he has taken certain steps to compensate for it. In a 2,800-word blog post laying out FiveThirtyEight’s methodology for forecasting primaries, he explained how he and his team use state and national polls alongside party leader endorsements. He also left room for the possibility that FiveThirtyEight’s prediction “might be totally wrong.” “Forecasting primaries and caucuses is challenging, much more so than general elections,” Silver wrote, adding that “an unusual candidate like Donald Trump tends to have especially uncertain forecasts.”

Where does all that uncertainty leave FiveThirtyEight? In the months leading up to Iowa and New Hampshire, frequent Silver critic Matt Bruenig told me the FiveThirtyEight founder is “in a situation where the only thing he’s really capable of doing—the thing that he’s exceptional at—is not really available to him, so he ends up doing what normal reporters do.” Bruenig added: “It just makes him like everyone else. … Anyone can read The Party Decides and be like, ‘Oh yeah, this is what social science says will happen.’ ”

(It may not be entirely true that this GOP primary was a hopeless exercise for data journalists. Though early polls may not be the most solid data points, it’s possible that FiveThirtyEight could have done a better job interpreting them: As Kornacki points out, Silver’s insistence on comparing Trump to Joe Lieberman and Rudy Giuliani—candidates with high name recognition who led in primary polls before imploding—failed to consider that both Lieberman and Giuliani led their respective races very early, while Trump has built his lead more gradually. RealClearPolitics, which averages multiple polls, shows Trump starting at just 6 percent last July.)

In Silver’s defense, he has occasionally given voice to self-doubt. He concluded a Jan. 6 chat with FiveThirtyEight staff by saying, “Yeah, the pundits are probably full of shit, but there’s a chance we’re full of shit too, so let’s wait and see what happens.” For the most part, though, Silver his proclaimed his skepticism about Trump loudly, repeatedly, and unequivocally. His predictions of Trump’s collapse—at an event at the 92^nd Street Y in September he literally told the audience to “calm down” about his supposed march to the nomination—have not betrayed much caution or uncertainty.

As irrational as it seems for a quantitative analyst to comment so confidently on something he knows he can’t reliably predict, it’s also not all that surprising. Silver has a website to run, after all, and that means covering Trump—and making predictions about him—whether the necessary data is available or not.

The theory that Donald Trump was a real threat to the status quo was a perfect target for Silver and his colleagues. Throughout 2015 and into 2016, they set out to prove that this media sensation was being amplified by a credulous, mathematically illiterate press corps. A Trump implosion would be a classic Silver victory, one that would demonstrate the superiority of rational, data-driven analysis over the chatter of insiders and vague notions of “momentum.”

Instead, the rise of Trump might have demonstrated the limits of Silver’s powers. As Dave Weigel wrote in the Washington Post recently, Trump’s enormous popularity—a tidal wave of support that Silver has said will soon abate—has been the story of the campaign. In his piece, Weigel argued that it wasn’t the first time a primary bid turned out to signal a major shift in the political winds, from the campaign of George Wallace in 1964, which Weigel said represented “a historic moment in the politics of backlash,” to that of Pat Robertson in 1988, which “cemented the influence of the religious right in Republican electoral politics.” While none of those candidates won their party’s nomination, it would have been irresponsible for the media to ignore the significance of their campaigns, as Silver has encouraged his audience, and the press, to do with Trump.

While it’s true that “the rise of Trump” may not end with Trump becoming the nominee, it has revealed, or perhaps even caused, a profound shift in the nation’s political climate. As Kornacki put it to me, “It took Donald Trump saying all this stuff”—floating the idea of denying Muslims entry into the United States, for instance—“to reveal there was a massive constituency for it.”

Missing the significance of Trumpism is a different kind of failure than, say, calling the 2012 election for Mitt Romney. It also might be a more damning one. Botching your general election forecast by a couple of percentage points suggests a flawed mathematical formula. Actively denying the reality of Trump’s success suggests Silver may never have been capable of explaining the world in a way so many believed he could in 2008 and 2012, when he was telling them how likely it was that Obama would become, and remain, the president.

“This is an extraordinary, unusual, utterly bizarre election year, in which events that have never happened before are happening,” says Blake Zeff, the editor of the political news site Cafe and a former campaign aide to Obama and Hillary Clinton. “That’s a nightmare scenario for a projection model that is predicated on historical trends.” While Zeff cautioned it was premature to pillory Silver for missing out on Trumpism, the point stands: What was true yesterday is not necessarily true today, and that’s a problem for Silver and his team of prognosticators.

In 2008, Silver emerged as a new kind of journalist. His data-driven approach to political analysis was a necessary corrective to a media herd that too often relied on gut feelings and received wisdom. So long as punditry continues to exist, thinkers like Silver will remain essential. But the rise of FiveThirtyEight hasn’t changed the fundamental purpose of journalism: to pay attention as the world changes and to try to understand what’s driving that change.

You could argue Silver never promised he was capable of doing those things—that all he ever intended to do was predict the future, not explain it. But Trump’s campaign, which is forcing Americans to ask themselves how such a hateful, boorish candidate could capture the imagination of so many of their fellow citizens, makes it clear that truly revelatory analysis must tell us “why,” not just “what.” If only Nate Silver could give us both.

Voir également:

Le professeur qui a prédit la victoire de Trump fustige les sondages

Alexander Panetta
La Presse Canadienne
09 novembre 2016

Ses amitiés ont été mises à l’épreuve, ses méthodes contestées, mais au bout du compte, il a encore eu raison. Allan Lichtman a désormais prédit avec succès les résultats de neuf élections présidentielles consécutives – incluant la victoire de Donald Trump – grâce à un modèle qu’il a créé.

M. Lichtman est très critique des sondages et des journalistes politiques qui s’en inspirent, et affirme que son questionnaire en 13 parties est beaucoup plus probant dans ses prédictions que les cartes numérisées des batailles par État.

Le professeur d’histoire à l’American University à Washington a tout de même dit, mercredi, qu’il ne tirait aucune satisfaction à avoir eu raison sur la victoire du controversé républicain Donald Trump.

M. Lichtman estime que les analystes électoraux errent en étudiant une campagne comme une série de zones de combat – le nord en opposition au sud de la Floride, l’ouest par rapport à l’est de la Pennsylvanie, etc. Il préfère voir tout cela comme un jeu de dominos, les morceaux s’abattant les uns sur les autres.

Le professeur a dit croire que les campagnes américaines étaient l’affaire d’élans insufflés à un candidat ou à l’autre.

Au début des années 1980, un collègue et lui-même ont examiné les résultats électoraux depuis la guerre civile et ont repéré des tendances. Ils ont établi 13 affirmations vraies ou fausses, et déterminé que si la réponse à six d’entre elles ou plus était «fausse», le parti au pouvoir allait subir la défaite. Parmi ces affirmations figurent «l’économie n’est pas en récession»; «il n’y a pas de course véritable pour l’investiture du parti au pouvoir»; «le parti a remporté des sièges au cours des deux précédents demi-mandats» et «le candidat est charismatique ou un héros national».

La méthode a porté ses fruits chaque fois depuis 1984.

Cette fois, le sixième et ultime domino s’est abattu sur Hillary Clinton durant les primaires – en ayant une concurrence étonnamment forte de la part du sénateur Bernie Sanders.

M. Lichtman a rapidement prédit une victoire de M. Trump dans des entrevues, et s’est attiré la foudre de certains.

«Pas de courriels haineux. Mais une tonne de critiques», a dit le professeur âgé de 69 ans, qui avait déjà brigué un siège démocrate au Sénat dans le Maryland.

«Je crois que j’ai perdu tous mes amis démocrates, à tout le moins pour un certain moment. J’ai subi beaucoup de pressions pour changer ma prédiction», a-t-il confié.

Voir de même:

Trump is headed for a win, says professor who has predicted 30 years of presidential outcomes correctly
Peter W. Stevenson
The Washington Post
September 23, 2016

Allan Lichtman, a distinguished professor of history at American University, created his « 13 Keys to the White House » more than 30 years ago—and he’s ready to predict who will win in 2016. (Peter Stevenson/The Washington Post)

Update: The Fix caught up with Lichtman again on Oct. 28. Here’s his latest prediction.

Nobody knows for certain who will win on Nov. 8 — but one man is pretty sure: Professor Allan Lichtman, who has correctly predicted the winner of the popular vote in every presidential election since 1984.

When we sat down in May, he explained how he comes to a decision. Lichtman’s prediction isn’t based on horse-race polls, shifting demographics or his own political opinions. Rather, he uses a system of true/false statements he calls the « Keys to the White House » to determine his predicted winner.

And this year, he says, Donald Trump is the favorite to win.

The keys, which are explained in depth in Lichtman’s book “Predicting the Next President: The Keys to the White House 2016” are:

1. Party Mandate: After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives than after the previous midterm elections.
2. Contest: There is no serious contest for the incumbent party nomination.
3. Incumbency: The incumbent party candidate is the sitting president.
4. Third party: There is no significant third party or independent campaign.
5. Short-term economy: The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.
6. Long-term economy: Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean growth during the previous two terms.
7. Policy change: The incumbent administration effects major changes in national policy.
8. Social unrest: There is no sustained social unrest during the term.
9. Scandal: The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.
10. Foreign/military failure: The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs.
11. Foreign/military success: The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs.
12. Incumbent charisma: The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.
13. Challenger charisma: The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero.

Lichtman, a distinguished professor of history at American University, sat down with The Fix this week to reveal who he thinks will win in November and why 2016 was the most difficult election to predict yet. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

THE FIX: Can you tell me about the keys, and how you use them to evaluate the election from the point where — I assume it’s very murky a year or two out, and they start to crystallize over the course of the election.

LICHTMAN: « The Keys to the White House » is a historically based prediction system. I derived the system by looking at every American presidential election from 1860 to 1980, and have since used the system to correctly predict the outcomes of all eight American presidential elections from 1984 to 2012.

The keys are 13 true/false questions, where an answer of « true » always favors the reelection of the party holding the White House, in this case the Democrats. And the keys are phrased to reflect the basic theory that elections are primarily judgments on the performance of the party holding the White House. And if six or more of the 13 keys are false — that is, they go against the party in power — they lose. If fewer than six are false, the party in power gets four more years.

So people who hear just the surface-level argument there might say, well, President Obama has a 58 percent approval rating, doesn’t that mean the Democrats are a shoo-in? Why is that wrong?

It absolutely does not mean the Democrats are a shoo-in. First of all, one of my keys is whether or not the sitting president is running for reelection, and right away, they are down that key. Another one of my keys is whether or not the candidate of the White House party is, like Obama was in 2008, charismatic. Hillary Clinton doesn’t fit the bill.

The keys have nothing to do with presidential approval polls or horse-race polls, with one exception, and that is to assess the possibility of a significant third-party campaign.

What about Donald Trump on the other side? He’s not affiliated with the sitting party, but has his campaign been an enigma in terms of your ability to assess this election?

Donald Trump has made this the most difficult election to assess since 1984. We have never before seen a candidate like Donald Trump, and Donald Trump may well break patterns of history that have held since 1860.

We’ve never before seen a candidate who’s spent his life enriching himself at the expense of others. He’s the first candidate in our history to be a serial fabricator, making up things as he goes along. Even when he tells the truth, such as, « Barack Obama really was born in the U.S., » he adds two lines, that Hillary Clinton started the birther movement, and that he finished it, even though when Barack Obama put out his birth certificate, he didn’t believe it. We’ve never had a candidate before who not just once, but twice in a thinly disguised way, has incited violence against an opponent. We’ve never had a candidate before who’s invited a hostile foreign power to meddle in American elections. We’ve never had a candidate before who’s threatened to start a war by blowing ships out of the water in the Persian Gulf if they come too close to us. We’ve never had a candidate before who has embraced as a role model a murderous, hostile foreign dictator. Given all of these exceptions that Donald Trump represents, he may well shatter patterns of history that have held for more than 150 years, lose this election even if the historical circumstances favor it.

We’re a little bit less than seven weeks out from the election today. Who do you predict will win in November?

Based on the 13 keys, it would predict a Donald Trump victory. Remember, six keys and you’re out, and right now the Democrats are out — for sure — five keys.

Key 1 is the party mandate — how well they did in the midterms. They got crushed.

Key number 3 is, the sitting president is not running.

Key number 7, no major policy change in Obama’s second term like the Affordable Care Act.

Key number 11, no major smashing foreign policy success.

And Key number 12, Hillary Clinton is not a Franklin Roosevelt.

One more key and the Democrats are down, and we have the Gary Johnson Key. One of my keys would be that the party in power gets a « false » if a third-party candidate is anticipated to get 5 percent of the vote or more. In his highest polling, Gary Johnson is at about 12 to 14 percent. My rule is that you cut it in half. That would mean that he gets six to seven, and that would be the sixth and final key against the Democrats.

So very, very narrowly, the keys point to a Trump victory. But I would say, more to the point, they point to a generic Republican victory, because I believe that given the unprecedented nature of the Trump candidacy and Trump himself, he could defy all odds and lose even though the verdict of history is in his favor. So this would also suggest, you know, the possibility this election could go either way. Nobody should be complacent, no matter who you’re for, you gotta get out and vote.

Do you think the fact that Trump is not a traditional Republican — certainly not an establishment Republican, from a rhetorical or policy perspective — contributes to that uncertainty over where he fits in with the standard methodology for evaluating the Keys?

I think the fact that he’s a bit of a maverick, and nobody knows where he stands on policy, because he’s constantly shifting. I defy anyone to say what his immigration policy is, what his policy is on banning Muslims, or whoever, from entering the United States, that’s certainly a factor. But it’s more his history in Trump University, the Trump Institute, his bankruptcies, the charitable foundation, of enriching himself at the expense of others, and all of the lies and dangerous things he’s said in this campaign, that could make him a precedent-shattering candidate.

It’s interesting, I don’t use the polls, as I’ve just explained, but the polls have very recently tightened. Clinton is less ahead than she was before, but it’s not because Trump is rising, it’s because Clinton is falling. He’s still around 39 percent in the polls. You can’t win if you can’t crack 40 percent.

As people realize the choice is not Gary Johnson, the only choice is between Trump and Clinton, those Gary Johnson supporters may move away from Johnson and toward Clinton, particularly those millennials. And, you know, I’ve seen this movie before. My first vote was in 1968, when I was the equivalent of a millennial, and lots of my friends, very liberal, wouldn’t vote for Hubert Humphrey because he was part of the Democratic establishment, and guess what? They elected Richard Nixon.

And, of course, as I have said for over 30 years, predictions are not endorsements. My prediction is based off a scientific system. It does not necessarily represent, in any way, shape or form, an Allan Lichtman or American University endorsement of any candidate. And of course, as a successful forecaster, I’ve predicted in almost equal measure both Republican and Democratic victories.

Voir également:

Wonkblog
A new theory for why Trump voters are so angry — that actually makes sense
Jeff Guo
The Washington Post
November 8, 2016

Regardless of who wins on Election Day, we will spend the next few years trying to unpack what the heck just happened. We know that Donald Trump voters are angry, and we know that they are fed up. By now, there have been so many attempts to explain Trumpism that the genre has become a target of parody.

But if you’re wondering about the widening fissure between red and blue America, why politics these days have become so fraught and so emotional, Kathy Cramer is one of the best people to ask. For the better part of the past decade, the political science professor has been crisscrossing Wisconsin trying to get inside the minds of rural voters.

Well before President Obama or the tea party, well before the rise of Trump sent reporters scrambling into the heartland looking for answers, Cramer was hanging out in dairy barns and diners and gas stations, sitting with her tape recorder taking notes. Her research seeks to understand how the people of small towns make sense of politics — why they feel the way they feel, why they vote the way they vote.

There’s been great thirst this election cycle for insight into the psychology of Trump voters. J.D. Vance’s memoir “Hillbilly Elegy” offers a narrative about broken families and social decay. “There is a lack of agency here — a feeling that you have little control over your life and a willingness to blame everyone but yourself,” he writes. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild tells a tale of perceived betrayal. According to her research, white voters feel the American Dream is drifting out of reach for them, and they are angry because they believe minorities and immigrants have butted in line.

Cramer’s recent book, “The Politics of Resentment,” offers a third perspective. Through her repeated interviews with the people of rural Wisconsin, she shows how politics have increasingly become a matter of personal identity. Just about all of her subjects felt a deep sense of bitterness toward elites and city dwellers; just about all of them felt tread on, disrespected and cheated out of what they felt they deserved.

Cramer argues that this “rural consciousness” is key to understanding which political arguments ring true to her subjects. For instance, she says, most rural Wisconsinites supported the tea party’s quest to shrink government not out of any belief in the virtues of small government but because they did not trust the government to help “people like them.”

“Support for less government among lower-income people is often derided as the opinions of people who have been duped,” she writes. However, she continues: “Listening in on these conversations, it is hard to conclude that the people I studied believe what they do because they have been hoodwinked. Their views are rooted in identities and values, as well as in economic perceptions; and these things are all intertwined.”

Rural voters, of course, are not precisely the same as Trump voters, but Cramer’s book offers an important way to think about politics in the era of Trump. Many have pointed out that American politics have become increasingly tribal; Cramer takes that idea a step further, showing how these tribal identities shape our perspectives on reality.

It will not be enough, in the coming months, to say that Trump voters were simply angry. Cramer shows that there are nuances to political rage. To understand Trump’s success, she argues, we have to understand how he tapped into people’s sense of self.

Recently, Cramer chatted with us about Trump and the future of white identity politics.

(As you’ll notice, Cramer has spent so much time with rural Wisconsinites that she often slips, subconsciously, into their voice. We’ve tagged those segments in italics. The interview has also been edited for clarity and length.)

For people who haven’t read your book yet, can you explain a little bit what you discovered after spending so many years interviewing people in rural Wisconsin?

Cramer: To be honest, it took me many months — I went to these 27 communities several times — before I realized that there was a pattern in all these places. What I was hearing was this general sense of being on the short end of the stick. Rural people felt like they’re not getting their fair share.

That feeling is primarily composed of three things. First, people felt that they were not getting their fair share of decision-making power. For example, people would say: All the decisions are made in Madison and Milwaukee and nobody’s listening to us. Nobody’s paying attention, nobody’s coming out here and asking us what we think. Decisions are made in the cities, and we have to abide by them.

Second, people would complain that they weren’t getting their fair share of stuff, that they weren’t getting their fair share of public resources. That often came up in perceptions of taxation. People had this sense that all the money is sucked in by Madison, but never spent on places like theirs.

And third, people felt that they weren’t getting respect. They would say: The real kicker is that people in the city don’t understand us. They don’t understand what rural life is like, what’s important to us and what challenges that we’re facing. They think we’re a bunch of redneck racists.

So it’s all three of these things — the power, the money, the respect. People are feeling like they’re not getting their fair share of any of that.

Was there a sense that anything had changed recently? That anything occurred to harden this sentiment? Why does the resentment seem so much worse now?

Cramer: These sentiments are not new. When I first heard them in 2007, they had been building for a long time — decades.

Look at all the graphs showing how economic inequality has been increasing for decades. Many of the stories that people would tell about the trajectories of their own lives map onto those graphs, which show that since the mid-’70s, something has increasingly been going wrong.

It’s just been harder and harder for the vast majority of people to make ends meet. So I think that’s part of this story. It’s been this slow burn.

Resentment is like that. It builds and builds and builds until something happens. Some confluence of things makes people notice: I am so pissed off. I am really the victim of injustice here.

So what do you think set it all off?

Cramer: The Great Recession didn’t help. Though, as I describe in the book, people weren’t talking about it in the ways I expected them to. People were like,Whatever, we’ve been in a recession for decades. What’s the big deal?

Part of it is that the Republican Party over the years has honed its arguments to tap into this resentment. They’re saying: “You’re right, you’re not getting your fair share, and the problem is that it’s all going to the government. So let’s roll government back.”

So there’s a little bit of an elite-driven effect here, where people are told: “You are right to be upset. You are right to notice this injustice.”

Then, I also think that having our first African American president is part of the mix, too. Now, many of the people that I spent time with were very intrigued by Barack Obama. I think that his race, in a way, signaled to people that this was different kind of candidate. They were keeping an open mind about him. Maybe this person is going to be different.

But then when the health-care debate ramped up, once he was in office and became very, very partisan, I think people took partisan sides. And truth be told, I think many people saw the election of an African American to the presidency as a threat. They were thinking: Wow something is going on in our nation and it’s really unfamiliar, and what does that mean for people like me?

I think in the end his presence has added to the anxieties people have about where this country is headed.

One of the endless debates among the chattering class on Twitter is whether Trump is mostly a phenomenon related to racial resentment, or whether Trump support is rooted in deeper economic anxieties. And a lot of times, the debate is framed like it has to be one or the other — but I think your book offers an interesting way to connect these ideas.

Cramer: What I heard from my conversations is that, in these three elements of resentment — I’m not getting my fair share of power, stuff or respect — there’s race and economics intertwined in each of those ideas.

When people are talking about those people in the city getting an “unfair share,” there’s certainly a racial component to that. But they’re also talking about people like me [a white, female professor]. They’re asking questions like, how often do I teach, what am I doing driving around the state Wisconsin when I’m supposed to be working full time in Madison, like, what kind of a job is that, right?

It’s not just resentment toward people of color. It’s resentment toward elites, city people.

And maybe the best way to explain how these things are intertwined is through noticing how much conceptions of hard work and deservingness matter for the way these resentments matter to politics.

We know that when people think about their support for policies, a lot of the time what they’re doing is thinking about whether the recipients of these policies are deserving. Those calculations are often intertwined with notions of hard work, because in the American political culture, we tend to equate hard work with deservingness.

And a lot of racial stereotypes carry this notion of laziness, so when people are making these judgments about who’s working hard, oftentimes people of color don’t fare well in those judgments. But it’s not just people of color. People are like: Are you sitting behind a desk all day? Well that’s not hard work. Hard work is someone like me — I’m a logger, I get up at 4:30 and break my back. For my entire life that’s what I’m doing. I’m wearing my body out in the process of earning a living.

In my mind, through resentment and these notions of deservingness, that’s where you can see how economic anxiety and racial anxiety are intertwined.

The reason the “Trumpism = racism” argument doesn’t ring true for me is that, well, you can’t eat racism. You can’t make a living off of racism. I don’t dispute that the surveys show there’s a lot of racial resentment among Trump voters, but often the argument just ends there. “They’re racist.” It seems like a very blinkered way to look at this issue.

Cramer: It’s absolutely racist to think that black people don’t work as hard as white people. So what? We write off a huge chunk of the population as racist and therefore their concerns aren’t worth attending to?

How do we ever address racial injustice with that limited understanding?

Of course [some of this resentment] is about race, but it’s also very much about the actual lived conditions that people are experiencing. We do need to pay attention to both. As the work that you did on mortality rates shows, it’s not just about dollars. People are experiencing a decline in prosperity, and that’s real.

The other really important element here is people’s perceptions. Surveys show that it may not actually be the case that Trump supporters themselves are doing less well — but they live in places where it’s reasonable for them to conclude that people like them are struggling.

Support for Trump is rooted in reality in some respects — in people’s actual economic struggles, and the actual increases in mortality. But it’s the perceptionsthat people have about their reality are the key driving force here. That’s been a really important lesson from this election.

I want to get into this idea of deservingness. As I was reading your book it really struck me that the people you talked to, they really have a strong sense of what they deserve, and what they think they ought to have. Where does that come from?

Cramer: Part of where that comes from is just the overarching story that we tell ourselves in the U.S. One of the key stories in our political culture has been the American Dream — the sense that if you work hard, you will get ahead.

Well, holy cow, the people I encountered seem to me to be working extremely hard. I’m with them when they’re getting their coffee before they start their workday at 5:30 a.m. I can see the fatigue in their eyes. And I think the notion that they are not getting what they deserve, it comes from them feeling like they’re struggling. They feel like they’re doing what they were told they needed to do to get ahead. And somehow it’s not enough.

Oftentimes in some of these smaller communities, people are in the occupations their parents were in, they’re farmers and loggers. They say, it used to be the case that my dad could do this job and retire at a relatively decent age, and make a decent wage. We had a pretty good quality of life, the community was thriving. Now I’m doing what he did, but my life is really much more difficult.

I’m doing what I was told I should do in order to be a good American and get ahead, but I’m not getting what I was told I would get.

The hollowing out of the middle class has been happening for everyone, not just for white people. But it seems that this phenomenon is only driving some voters into supporting Trump. One theme of your book is how we can take the same reality, the same facts, but interpret them through different frames of mind and come to such different conclusions.

Cramer: It’s not inevitable that people should assume that the decline in their quality of life is the fault of other population groups. In my book I talk about rural folks resenting people in the city. In the presidential campaign, Trump is very clear about saying: You’re right, you’re not getting your fair share, and look at these other groups of people who are getting more than their fair share. Immigrants. Muslims. Uppity women.

But here’s where having Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump running alongside one another for a while was so interesting. I think the support for Sanders represented a different interpretation of the problem. For Sanders supporters, the problem is not that other population groups are getting more than their fair share, but that the government isn’t doing enough to intervene here and right a ship that’s headed in the wrong direction.

One of the really interesting parts of your book is where you discuss how rural people seem to hate government and want to shrink it, even though government provides them with a lot of benefits. It raises the Thomas Frank question — on some level, are people just being fooled or deluded?

Cramer: There is definitely some misinformation, some misunderstandings. But we all do that thing of encountering information and interpreting it in a way that supports our own predispositions. Recent studies in political science have shown that it’s actually those of us who think of ourselves as the most politically sophisticated, the most educated, who do it more than others.

So I really resist this characterization of Trump supporters as ignorant.

There’s just more and more of a recognition that politics for people is not — and this is going to sound awful, but — it’s not about facts and policies. It’s so much about identities, people forming ideas about the kind of person they are and the kind of people others are. Who am I for, and who am I against?

Policy is part of that, but policy is not the driver of these judgments. There are assessments of, is this someone like me? Is this someone who gets someone like me?

I think all too often, we put our energies into figuring out where people stand on particular policies. I think putting energy into trying to understand the way they view the world and their place in it — that gets us so much further toward understanding how they’re going to vote, or which candidates are going to be appealing to them.

All of us, even well-educated, politically sophisticated people interpret facts through our own perspectives, our sense of what who we are, our own identities.

I don’t think that what you do is give people more information. Because they are going to interpret it through the perspectives they already have. People are only going to absorb facts when they’re communicated from a source that they respect, from a source who they perceive has respect for people like them.

And so whenever a liberal calls out Trump supporters as ignorant or fooled or misinformed, that does absolutely nothing to convey the facts that the liberal is trying to convey.

If, hypothetically, we see a Clinton victory on Tuesday, a lot of people have suggested that she should go out and have a listening tour. What would be her best strategy to reach out to people?

Cramer: The very best strategy would be for Donald Trump, if he were to lose the presidential election, to say, “We need to come together as a country, and we need to be nice to each other.”

That’s not going to happen.

As for the next best approach … well I’m trying to be mindful of what is realistic. It’s not a great strategy for someone from the outside to say, “Look, we really do care about you.” The level of resentment is so high.

People for months now have been told they’re absolutely right to be angry at the federal government, and they should absolutely not trust this woman, she’s a liar and a cheat, and heaven forbid if she becomes president of the United States. Our political leaders have to model for us what it’s like to disagree, but also to not lose basic faith in the system. Unless our national leaders do that, I don’t think we should expect people to.

Maybe it would be good to end on this idea of listening. There was thisrecent interview with Arlie Hochschild where someone asked her how we could empathize with Trump supporters. This was ridiculed by some liberals on Twitter. They were like, “Why should we try to have this deep, nuanced understanding of people who are chanting JEW-S-A at Trump rallies?” It was this really violent reaction, and it got me thinking about your book.

Cramer: One of the very sad aspects of resentment is that it breeds more of itself. Now you have liberals saying, “There is no justification for these points of view, and why would I ever show respect for these points of view by spending time and listening to them?”

Thank God I was as naive as I was when I started. If I knew then what I know now about the level of resentment people have toward urban, professional elite women, would I walk into a gas station at 5:30 in the morning and say, “Hi! I’m Kathy from the University of Madison”?

I’d be scared to death after this presidential campaign! But thankfully I wasn’t aware of these views. So what happened to me is that, within three minutes, people knew I was a professor at UW-Madison, and they gave me an earful about the many ways in which that riled them up — and then we kept talking.

And then I would go back for a second visit, a third visit, a fourth, fifth and sixth. And we liked each other. Even at the end of my first visit, they would say, “You know, you’re the first professor from Madison I’ve ever met, and you’re actually kind of normal.” And we’d laugh. We got to know each other as human beings.

That’s partly about listening, and that’s partly about spending time with people from a different walk of life, from a different perspective. There’s nothing like it. You can’t achieve it through online communication. You can’t achieve it through having good intentions. It’s the act of being with other people that establishes the sense we actually are all in this together.

As Pollyannaish as that sounds, I really do believe it.

Voir encore:

Hillary Clinton prévenue à l’avance de questions des débats lors des primaires démocrates

Hillary Clinton a reçu en avance des questions qui lui ont été posées lors de débats de la primaire démocrate, révèlent des emails publiés lundi par WikiLeaks, qui confirment des accusations lancées par Donald Trump.

De nouveaux emails publiés lundi par WikiLeaks embarrassent la campagne Clinton. Ils démontrent qu’Hillary Clinton avait reçu en avance des questions qui allaient lui être posés lors des débats de la primaire démocrate.

« Une des questions qui sera posée à HRC proviendra d’une femme qui a une éruption cutanée »

Un des emails rendus publics est particulièrement parlant : rédigé par l’actuelle présidente intérimaire du Parti démocrate, Donna Brazile, il est adressé à John Podesta, président de la campagne de Mme Clinton et Jennifer Palmieri, directrice de la communication de la candidate.

Le message est daté du 5 mars, veille d’un débat qui s’est déroulé dans la ville septentrionale de Flint, devenue symbole des injustices sociales aux Etats-Unis en raison de son réseau d’eau gravement contaminé au plomb. « Une des questions qui sera posée à HRC (Hillary Rodham Clinton, NDLR) proviendra d’une femme qui a une éruption cutanée », avertit Donna Brazile, qui officiait alors comme commentatrice sur la chaîne CNN.

« Sa famille a été empoisonnée au plomb et elle demandera ce qu’Hillary pourrait faire pour les gens de Flint si elle devient présidente », précise Donna Brazile. Au débat le lendemain, Hillary Clinton avait en effet été interrogée par une femme qui avait dénoncé les problèmes cutanés de sa famille, même si les termes de la question énoncée étaient sensiblement différents.

« De temps en temps j’obtiens les questions à l’avance »

Dans un message du 12 mars, veille d’un débat organisé par CNN, Donna Brazile promet à Jennifer Palmieri d’en « envoyer quelques-unes supplémentaires », en faisant très vraisemblablement référence à des questions de débat.

Enfin, dans un autre email récemment révélé, Donna Brazile avait écrit : « De temps en temps j’obtiens les questions à l’avance ». Dans ce même message, la stratège du Parti démocrate sous-entendait que Hillary Clinton se verrait poser une question sur la peine de mort.

Après ces révélations, CNN a affirmé lundi que Donna Brazile avait donné sa démission de la chaîne. « Merci CNN. Honorée d’avoir été une politologue et commentatrice démocrate sur votre chaîne », a tweeté lundi Donna Brazile.

Cela confirme des accusations lancées par Donald Trump

Depuis des semaines le candidat républicain à la présidentielle, Donald Trump, répète que sa rivale a été avantagée dans la campagne de la primaire démocrate face à son principal concurrent Bernie Sanders, notamment en bénéficiant à l’avance des questions des débats. Donald Trump n’a pas présenté de preuves à l’appui de ses affirmations mais les faits lui ont ici donné raison.

Les emails rendus publics par WikiLeaks ont été piratés sur le compte de John Podesta, par des hackers proches du pouvoir russe, selon les services de renseignement américains. Le Parti démocrate n’a pas confirmé ni infirmé leur authenticité.

Voir enfin:

Le racisme reste un non-dit dans la course à la présidentielle

Selon un sondage récent, Barack Obama pourrait perdre six points de pourcentage le jour de l’élection présidentielle du fait de sa couleur. Le prix du préjugé racial pour le candidat qui s’est pourtant toujours gardé d’apparaître comme le champion de la minorité noire.

L’Obs
06 octobre 2008

Cela relève du non-dit et peu d’Américains l’avoueront en votant le 4 novembre mais le racisme reste, lundi 6 octobre, un préjugé latent dans cette élection historique qui pourrait porter au pouvoir le premier président noir des Etats-Unis, Barack Obama.
Le candidat démocrate à la Maison Blanche s’est toujours présenté comme celui de tous les Américains. Il s’est gardé d’apparaître comme le champion de la minorité noire mais s’est affirmé fier de sa double identité, lui, né d’un père kényan et d’une mère blanche du Kansas.« Les racistes nieront »

« Le racisme est un thème que notre pays ne peut se permettre d’ignorer. C’est une impasse qui nous bloque depuis des années », avait lancé au printemps le sénateur de 47 ans.
Selon un sondage récent de l’université de Stanford, Barack Obama pourrait perdre six points de pourcentage le jour de l’élection présidentielle du fait de sa couleur. Le prix du préjugé racial.
« La race est un facteur pour ceux qui voteront pour ou contre Barack Obama », explique Gary Weaver, professeur à l’American University et directeur de l’Institut de gestion des relations interculturelles.
« Certains Blancs ne voteront jamais pour un Noir. Mais il est peu probable qu’ils l’admettront publiquement. Ils pourront le faire lors d’un sondage anonyme », explique-t-il à l’AFP.
« Les racistes nieront le plus souvent qu’ils sont influencés dans leur vote par la race car c’est inacceptable socialement. Mais, dans l’isoloir, ils voteront vraisemblablement contre Obama », poursuit Gary Weaver.

Pas un obstacle mais une question centrale

Les Américains appellent ce phénomène « l’effet Bradley », du nom d’un ancien maire noir de Los Angeles Tom Bradley, battu à l’élection de gouverneur de Californie alors que tous les sondages le donnaient gagnant.
« La race peut être un obstacle mais ce n’est pas une question primordiale pour beaucoup d’Américains. Elle reste néanmoins centrale pour quelques-uns, en particulier les ruraux blancs des Etats du sud », observe Paul Herrnson, professeur à l’université du Maryland (est).
« Beaucoup de racistes ne voteront tout simplement pas, le 4 novembre. Certains voteront pour McCain », le candidat républicain, estime Gary Weaver, universitaire blanc, marié à une Noire il y a 38 ans, quand des Etats interdisaient encore les unions mixtes.
« Plus de 90% des Noirs devraient voter Obama, ainsi qu’une majorité des Hispaniques et une proportion énorme des jeunes. Ces trois catégories d’électeurs devraient contrebalancer ceux qui ne voteront jamais pour un candidat noir », souligne-t-il.
« Très peu d’Américains admettent qu’ils sont racistes, si ce n’est quelques milliers de Néo-Nazis, ou de membres du Ku Klux Klan, qui ne sont plus que 1.000 à 2.000 dans le Sud. L’Américain moyen ne l’avouera jamais », assure Gary Weaver.

Pas de problèmes chez les jeunes

« Il y a une évolution parmi les jeunes, eux n’ont pas de problème à fréquenter ceux qui sont différents », se réjouit Bryan Monroe, rédacteur en chef adjoint d’Ebony, le plus ancien magazine noir américain.
« Le plus grand fossé se trouve entre les personnes âgées blanches et les jeunes. Si les jeunes votent, ils décideront de cette élection », renchérit M. Weaver.
« Ils ont grandi après la lutte pour les droits civiques, ont appris à l’école que l’Amérique était censée être multiculturelle, plurielle, égalitaire. Pour eux, Obama est le représentant de cette société-là », relève-t-il.
Les Noirs ne représentent plus que 13% de la population américaine (40 millions), derrière les Hispaniques (42 millions).
Concentrée dans les Etats du Nord industriel et au sud de la Virginie, la communauté noire urbaine vit le plus souvent séparée des Blancs, dans des quartiers ghettoïsés.
Les inégalités sociales sont frappantes. Dans les prisons, il y a six fois plus de Noirs que de Blancs. Un Noir sur 15 est un détenu.
Et si les préjugés racistes reculent, ils n’ont pas disparu. Ainsi, sur le campus d’une université de l’Oregon, une effigie de Barack Obama vient d’être retrouvée, pendue à un arbre. (avec AFP)

COMPLEMENT:

Trump promet une restauration de l’autorité des blancs

 Trump a forgé la politique du communautarisme blanc, et les blancs se la sont appropriée.

Jamelle Bouie, traduit par Pierre Marti

Slate

10.11.2016

Vers 11h30 mardi soir, j’ai quitté les studios de CBS à New York et j’ai marché en téléphonant à ma femme. Nous avons parlé de l’élection. Nous avons parlé de Donald Trump président. Nous avons parlé, juste pour parler, mais nous n’avons pas parlé longtemps. Nous devions travailler. Je devais écrire et elle devait réfléchir à ce qu’elle dirait à ses étudiants, parmi lesquelles beaucoup d’Hispano-américains, et parmi ceux-ci beaucoup d’enfants d’immigrés.

En rentrant, j’ai surpris une conversation entre deux policiers. Ils étaient en dehors du bâtiment, en service. Ils étaient noirs. Et ils avaient besoin de parler encore et encore. Je me suis approché et j’ai rejoint leur conversation. Aucun d’eux ne m’a interrogé ou chassé. A la place, ils m’ont invité à partager leur peine.

L’ère de l’impunité

«J’y crois pas, je peux pas le croire», a dit un des agents, le plus jeune des deux. L’autre s’est contenté de remuer la tête. J’ai demandé au plus jeune ce qu’il pensait de tout ça, du président Donald Trump. «C’est sérieux, mon gars, c’est sérieux. Qui dois-je protéger maintenant?» Il a regardé son propre uniforme. «Pourquoi est-ce que je porte cet uniforme?» Il n’a pas eu besoin d’expliquer.

Le Donald Trump qui a gagné l’élection présidentielle ce mardi est le même Donald Trump qui a demandé l’exécution de cinq jeunes garçons accusés d’un crime qu’ils n’avaient en fait pas commis. C’est le Trump qui s’est présenté comme le candidat de la loi et de l’ordre. L’âge de Trump sera une ère où la police pourra agir en toute impunité. En tant qu’agent de police de couleur, il savait sans doute mieux que quiconque que ce sont les gens qui nous ressemblent, les basanés, les noirs, qui devront faire face à la force brute de cette impunité.

Les commentateurs et observateurs attribueront la victoire de Trump au «populisme», à son message «anti-élites». C’est un non-sens. Trump s’est présenté comme un combattant nationaliste en faveur de l’Amérique blanche. Il a promis de chasser les immigrants hispaniques. Il a promis de chasser les musulmans des Etats-Unis. Il a refusé de reconnaître la légitimité de Barack Obama, le présentant jusqu’à aujourd’hui comme une sorte d’usurpateur de l’autorité légitime. Lorsqu’il a dû faire face aux relents fétides de la réaction blanche, des suprématistes blancs aux antisémites et nationalistes, il a cligné de l’œil et ils l’ont acclamé en retour. Ils avaient en effet de bonnes raisons de le faire.

Plus que toute autre chose, Trump promet une restauration de l’autorité des blancs

Plus que toute autre chose, Trump promet une restauration de l’autorité des blancs. Après huit ans de présidence d’un noir, huit années durant lesquelles l’Amérique cosmopolite a exercé son pouvoir et son influence, huit années durant lesquelles les femmes se sont affirmées et durant lesquelles les noirs ont déclaré que leurs vies ne comptaient pas pour rien, des millions d’Américains blancs ont dit qu’ils en avaient assez. Ils en avaient assez de ce monde et voulaient retrouver celui d’avant. Et bien qu’il soit tentant de voir cela uniquement comme une partie d’un anti-élitisme aveugle, cela n’explique pas la relative unité des électeurs blancs lors de ce vote. Trump n’a pas seulement attiré les blancs des classes laborieuses mais également les riches et ceux qui avaient fait des études supérieures. Il l’a même emporté chez les jeunes blancs. Dix-sept mois après l’annonce de sa candidature, des millions d’Américains blancs se sont pressés aux urnes pour mettre Trump à la Maison-Blanche. Ils l’ont fait en tant qu’Herrenvolk blanc, peuple dominateur racialisé et radicalisé par Trump.

La politique du communautarisme blanc

Il y a alors un argument facile: comment cela pourrait-il être une question de race alors que Trump a convaincu aussi des électeurs qui avaient voté Obama ? Il y a une réponse facile: John McCain a été complaisant avec des craintes raciales et Mitt Romney a joué sur le ressentiment raciste mais tous deux ont refusé d’aller plus loin. Pour citer George Wallace, ils ont refusé de crier au «nègre». C’est important. En rejetant la politique du racisme explicite et de la réaction blanche, ils ont fait du champ de bataille politique un lieu de préoccupations officiellement aveugles aux questions raciales.

La question raciale était toujours partie intégrante des conflits, c’est inévitable, mais ni les libéraux ni les conservateurs ne s’en prenaient à l’idée d’une démocratie plurielle et multiraciale. Je pensais alors que cela signifiait que nous avions un consensus. Il semble en réalité que nous n’avions qu’une accalmie, et que Trump l’a faite voler en éclats. Par ses jérémiades contre les Hispano-américains et les musulmans, par ses visions de villes contre-utopiques et de réfugiés radicalisés, Trump a dit aux Américains que leurs peurs et leur colère étaient justifiées, que cette peur et et cette colère devaient être le fil conducteur de la politique. Trump a forgé la politique du communautarisme blanc, et les blancs se la sont appropriée.

Nous sommes toujours le pays qui a produit George Wallace, l’avocat de la ségrégation. Nous sommes toujours le pays qui a tué Emmett Till, l’adolescent noir de 14 ans, lynché pour avoir flirté avec une blanche.

L’incurable racisme américain

Voilà ce que nous devons comprendre: c’est déjà arrivé par le passé. Pendant 10 ans, après la guerre d’indépendance (de 1775 à 1783), une coalition d’anciens esclaves et de fermiers blancs a tenté de forger la démocratie dans l’ancienne confédération. Avec l’aide du gouvernement fédéral, ils sont parvenus à de réelles victoires et ont obtenu des gains importants. Mais leur succès a nourri une réaction violente de la part de sudistes blancs en colère, furieux de devoir partager le pouvoir avec les noirs et leurs alliés du nord, prêts à assassiner, piqués par la seule notion d’égalité sociale. Ces blancs menèrent une guerre contre les gouvernements de la reconstruction, et lorsqu’ils l’emportèrent, ils déclarèrent le sud sauvé.

Quelques décennies plus tard, un autre groupe de noirs et de blancs, en Caroline du Nord cette fois-ci, s’unirent pour affronter les réactionnaires et établir la démocratie. Pendant une brève période, ils réussirent. Travaillant ensemble en tant que «fusionistes», ils construisirent des écoles, améliorèrent la situation, établirent un gouvernement véritablement représentatif dans le sud. La réaction ne se fit pas attendre. Certains blancs abandonnèrent la suprématie blanche. Mais pas la plupart d’entre eux. Utilisant la violence et le terrorisme, ils affrontèrent les fusionistes et établirent un régime de domination blanche qui dura jusqu’au XXème siècle, pour n’être démantelé que lors de notre seconde reconstruction, le mouvement des droits civiques.

Lorsqu’un homme noir a remporté l’élection présidentielle, le sommet symbolique du pouvoir et des prérogatives des blancs aux Etats-Unis, nous avons fêté cela en tant que Nation. C’était prématuré

Dès que la reconstruction prit fin, il y eut une réaction. Elle n’était pas aussi forte que les précédentes. Elle amena au pouvoir des leaders qui reconnaissaient les problèmes de racisme et de discrimination raciale tout en jouant sur les peurs et les anxiétés des blancs. Après des années de lutte, nous étions arrivés à un accord: nous croyions à l’égalité. Et lorsqu’un homme noir a remporté l’élection présidentielle, le sommet symbolique du pouvoir et des prérogatives des blancs aux Etats-Unis, nous avons fêté cela en tant que Nation.

Cinquante ans après que le mouvement de libération des noirs a forcé les Etats-Unis à se montrer digne de ses idéaux, du moins sur le papier, il semble bien que c’était prématuré. Presque mécaniquement, les Américains blancs ont élu un homme qui promettait une forme de suprématie blanche. Nous ne sommes pas arrivés au terme de notre cycle de progrès et de réaction. Nous sommes toujours le pays qui a tué George Wallace. Nous sommes toujours le pays qui a tué Emmett Till.

Les Américains sont obstinément, congénitalement optimistes. Et les millions de personnes qui ont soutenu Trump voient quelque chose dans son visage. Ils y voient quelque chose qui leur donne de l’espoir. Ce que j’y vois, c’est un homme qui a donné du pouvoir aux nationalistes blancs et l’a emporté. Je vois un homme qui a demandé l’expulsion des immigrés non-blancs et l’a emporté. Je vois un homme qui a promis de commettre des crimes de guerre contre des ennemis étrangers et l’a emporté. Je vois un homme qui donne du crédit à Rudy Giuliani et à d’autres qui considèrent les noirs comme des criminels potentiels à contrôler plutôt que comme des citoyens à respecter.

Après la «rédemption» du sud, les Américains noirs ou non-blancs partout dans le pays avaient touché le fond. Les blancs avaient imposé de nouvelles formes de discrimination et refusé de voir les pogroms et le terrorisme raciste qui laissaient des cicatrices dans le paysage américain. Dans quelques heures, des millions d’Américains se réveilleront et ce sera l’âge de Trump. Moi et des millions d’autres qui me ressemblent ouvriront les yeux et se trouveront face à une nouvelle «rédemption». Tout ce que nous pouvons espérer (nous ne pouvons plus que prier), c’est de ne pas à nouveau toucher le fond.

Voir aussi:

Donald Trump est un produit du racisme anti-Obama

Il n’y a pas que la peur du chômage et de l’immigration: les électeurs blancs du candidat républicain espèrent qu’il rétablira la hiérarchie raciale mise à mal par l’actuel président.

Jamelle Bouie, traduit par Yann Champion

Slate

21.03.2016

«D’abord ils vous ignorent, ensuite ils vous raillent, puis ils vous combattent et enfin vous gagnez.» Cette citation est attribuée au Mahatma Gandhi. En règle générale, on la trouve affichée dans des cours de motivation ou sur des posters pour ados. Mais en février 2016, à la veille du Super Tuesday –mardi durant lequel une dizaine d’États américains ont voté pour élire le candidat républicain à l’élection présidentielle–, on a pu la trouver sur la page Instagram de Donald Trump, en légende d’une photographie le représentant lors d’un immense meeting qu’il avait donné en Alabama le jour d’avant.

Aussi pervers puisse-t-il paraître de voir un magnat de l’immobilier pro-guerre reprendre à son compte une citation, même apocryphe, de Gandhi, elle n’en est pas moins bien choisie. D’abord, nous l’avons ignoré, pensant qu’il ne s’agissait que d’un bouffon qui ne passerait pas l’été. Puis, nous nous sommes moqués de lui, pensant qu’il ne s’agissait que d’un bouffon qui ne passerait pas l’automne. Ensuite, les Républicains ont commencé à le combattre, terrorisés qu’ils étaient par l’attraction qu’il exerce sur les électeurs. Aujourd’hui, il l’emporte, avec plus de votes et de délégués que tous les autres candidats en lice et n’est plus qu’à quelques pas de l’investiture républicaine.

Nous savons désormais qu’il ne faut pas sous-estimer Donald Trump, mais nous peinons encore à comprendre son ascension. Pourquoi maintenant? Pourquoi, alors que les États-Unis sont plus puissants et plus solides qu’ils ne l’ont jamais été depuis le début de la «Grande Récession», est-ce que certains électeurs deviennent subitement sensibles à la démagogie nativiste? Comment Trump, qui a été décrit comme proto-fasciste, voire comme ouvertement fasciste, peut-il se retrouver en passe d’être le candidat du plus ancien parti des États-Unis?

Rancœurs raciales

Pour certains à gauche, Trump est le résultat de décennies de politiques divisant l’opinion –le résultat inévitable d’une stratégie politique républicaine qui a alimenté le ressentiment raciste blanc pour remporter les élections. «Pour bien comprendre la campagne de Trump, il faut le considérer non pas comme un signe mais comme la dernière manifestation de la stratégie déployée depuis un demi-siècle par le Parti républicain dans les États du Sud en misant sur le ressentiment racial et la solidarité blanche», écrit Jeet Heer dans New Republic.

Pour certains à droite, Trump est la réponse de la base aux élites républicaines, qui ont abandonné leurs électeurs de la classe ouvrière pour céder aux sirènes du libéralisme économique. «Le Parti républicain et le mouvement conservateur n’offrent quasiment rien aux membres de la classe ouvrière qui soutiennent Trump», a écrit Michael Brendan Dougherty dans Week. Aucune politique conservatrice évidente ne peut générer le type de croissance nécessaire à l’élévation du niveau de vie des électeurs des classes ouvrières.»

Ces explications ne s’excluent pas mutuellement; chacune touche à un aspect important du phénomène Trump. De la célèbre rhétorique de la «Welfare Queen» de Ronald Reagan à Newt Gingrich, qui avait qualifié Barack Obama de «food stamp president» (en référence aux coupons d’alimentation distribués aux Américains les plus démunis) lors des élections présidentielles de 2012, le Parti républicain a l’habitude de jouer avec les rancœurs raciales des blancs lorsqu’il souhaite emporter des élections. Les élites républicaines ne sont pas parvenues à offrir de solutions aux blancs pauvres, qui ont beaucoup souffert de l’effondrement du secteur industriel. Et il est vrai que la rapidité des changements économiques et culturels a poussé un nombre conséquent d’Américains à se tourner vers un candidat qui raille l’incompétence des politiciens et promet de faire retrouver au pays toute sa puissance.

Le principal catalyseur de l’ascension du magnat de l’immobilier est, je pense, Barack Obama

Néanmoins, aucune de ces théories ne répond à la question du «pourquoi maintenant?». Chacune de ces forces est en place depuis des années. Les salaires de la classe ouvrière américaine stagnent depuis longtemps et l’effondrement des offres d’emploi pour les non-diplômés est apparent depuis les années 1990, soit bien longtemps avant la crise de 2008. En outre, le déclin économique et social –ainsi que la frustration envers la concurrence internationale, que Trump n’a pas manqué d’aborder dans sa campagne– n’est pas réservé aux Américains blancs. Des millions d’Américains –en particulier les noirs et les Latino-Américains– font face depuis des années à des problèmes de baisse des perspectives économiques et de désintégration sociale sans pour autant se tourner vers des démagogues comme Trump.

L’ethnie joue un rôle dans chacune de ces analyses mais son rôle n’est pas encore assez central pour expliquer véritablement l’ascension de Trump. Non seulement son mouvement est presque exclusivement constitué de blancs mécontents mais c’est dans les États et les comtés enregistrant la plus forte polarisation raciale qu’il trouve la majeure partie de son électorat. Des sondages ont montré que, chez les électeurs blancs, le «ressentiment racial» augmentait avec le soutien à Trump.

Tout cela pour dire qu’il nous manque toujours le principal catalyseur de l’ascension du magnat de l’immobilier. Qu’est-ce qui a allumé ce feu aujourd’hui hors de contrôle? La réponse est, je pense, Barack Obama.

Stress du métissage

Plusieurs auteurs conservateurs ont essayé de lier le succès de Trump à la politique du président américain en pointant du doigt ses positions prétendument extrêmes. Toutefois, à bien des égards, Obama est un dirigeant on ne peut plus conventionnel, bien ancré au centre gauche du Parti démocrate. Ou, du moins, c’est ainsi qu’il a gouverné, sagement, sans s’écarter des sentiers battus. Des lois comme le plan de relance économique de 2009 et l’Affordable Care Act n’ont pas été imposées par l’extrême gauche; elles ont été élaborées à partir de proposions issues de la droite comme de la gauche et on été votées par une majorité de parlementaires élus pour trouver des solutions aux problèmes sociaux et économiques. On peut dire bien des choses sur Barack Obama mais, en dehors de la rhétorique conservatrice, il est loin d’être un radical.

On ne peut toutefois pas en dire autant d’Obama en tant que symbole politique. Dans ce pays formé et défini par une hiérarchie raciale rigide, son élection a été un événement radical, puisqu’elle a vu un homme issu de l’une des castes les plus basses de la nation parvenir au sommet de son paysage politique. De plus, il le fit avec le soutien appuyé des minorités: les asiatiques et les Latino-Américains formaient une partie importante des soutiens d’Obama. Et les Afro-Américains n’avaient jamais été aussi nombreux à voter en 2008.

Pour les observateurs progressistes, cela annonçait un nouvel électorat et, en théorie, une majorité durable. «L’avenir de la politique américaine appartient au parti qui pourra rassembler un électorat plus métissé, mieux éduqué et plus métropolitain, avait écrit Harold Meyerson dans le Washington Post après les élections de 2008. En d’autres termes, il appartient aux démocrates de Barack Obama.»

Pour des millions d’Américains blancs qui n’étaient pas habitués à la diversité et au cosmopolitisme, néanmoins, Obama fut un choc, une figure apparue de nulle part pour dominer la vie politique du pays. Et en parlant de «majorité démocrate émergente», il annonçait des temps où leurs voix (qui avaient élu George W. Bush, George H.W. Bush et Ronald Reagan) ne compteraient plus. Plus qu’un simple «changement», l’élection d’Obama leur apparut comme une inversion. Associée aux baisses des revenus et du niveau de vie causées par la crise de 2008, elle semblait sonner le glas d’une hiérarchie qui avait toujours placé les Américains blancs au sommet, les dotant au moins d’un statut, même s’ils n’en tiraient aucun avantage matériel.

Dans un article de 2011, Robin DiAngelo (professeur d’éducation multiculturelle à la Westfield State University) avait décrit un phénomène qu’elle avait qualifié de «fragilité blanche»:

«La fragilité blanche est un état dans lequel une quantité même minimum de stress racial apparaît intolérable et suscite toute une palette de réactions défensives, écrit-elle. Ces réactions incluent des démonstrations ouvertes d’émotions telles que la colère, la peur ou la culpabilité, et des comportements tels que l’argumentation, le silence et la fuite de la situation ayant induit le stress. Ces comportements, à leur tour, servent à réinstaurer l’équilibre racial blanc.»

DiAngelo décrivait des comportements individuels dans le contexte de formations à la diversité au travail mais son analyse peut s’appliquer à la politique. Il est possible de considérer l’ascension d’Obama et l’avenir projeté d’une Amérique à majorité non blanche comme un stress racial donnant lieu à une réaction de la part de certains Américains blancs (réaction qui les pousse à un repli défensif).

L’ère Obama n’a pas tant annoncé une société post-races qu’une Amérique encore plus racialisée

On peut percevoir les manœuvres décrites par DiAngelo dans la croyance persistante, contre toute évidence, qu’Obama serait musulman –à l’automne 2015, ils étaient encore 29% d’Américains à le penser. C’est une manière de catégoriser Obama comme un «autre» dans une société où les insultes racistes sont publiquement inacceptables. Un autre exemple de ces peurs et anxiétés racialisées est le degré auquel les Américains blancs considèrent aujourd’hui la «discrimination inverse», ou «discrimination à rebours», comme un problème sérieux pour la vie nationale. Pour son American Values Survey (enquête sur les valeurs américaines) le Public Religion Research Institute a demandé à son panel si les «discriminations à l’encontre des blancs» constituaient un «problème significatif». Lors de l’enquête de2015, 43% des Américains sondés (parmi lesquels 60% de blancs de la classe ouvrière) avaient déclaré que la discrimination des blancs était devenue un problème aussi important que la discrimination des noirs et des autres minorités.

«Inversement majorité-minorité»

Les anxiétés décrites par DiAngelo et les peurs cataloguées par l’American Values Survey ont un véritable impact politique. Dans une étude publiée en 2014, les politologues Maureen Craig et Jennifer Richeson ont tenté de mesurer la «menace du statut perçu» par rapport aux données démographiques en étudiant comment les sondés répondaient lorsqu’on leur disait que la Californie comptait désormais plus de noirs, d’hispaniques et d’asiatiques que de blancs non hispaniques. En d’autres termes, comment les Américains blancs répondaient-ils à des questions politiques sans rapport lorsqu’on les exposait à un avenir où la majorité devenait minorité? Les résultats étaient très clairs. «Cette remarque sur l’inversement majorité-minorité en Californie a poussé les Américains blancs non politisés à tendre plus vers le Parti républicain», ont écrit Craig et Richeson. De même, «l’information sur les changements démographiques a poussé les Américains blancs (quelle que soit leur couleur politique) à soutenir plus fortement des positions politiques conservatrices liées au genre ethnique ou relativement neutres à ce sujet.»

L’ère Obama n’a pas tant annoncé une société post-races qu’une Amérique encore plus racialisée, dans laquelle des millions de blancs ont découvert leur statut racial et se sont mis à s’en préoccuper. Par exemple, durant un meeting de Marco Rubio tenu avant les primaires du New Hampshire en février, j’ai parlé avec une électrice qui, à sa manière, a exprimé cette inquiétude:

«Je pense qu’il a créé des divisions dans le pays, m’a dit Lori, une femme blanche d’un certain âge à propos d’Obama. Je trouve qu’aujourd’hui, dans plein d’endroits aux États-Unis, il y a une division entre les couleurs de peau… comme, quand je vais demander quelque chose à quelqu’un dans un magasin… Elle m’a regardé comme pour appuyer ce qu’elle voulait dire. J’ai l’impression que, eux, ils se demandent si je les aime bien ou non… Je n’avais pas cette impression avant. J’étais tolérante avec tout le monde. Je déteste qu’il ait apporté ça.»

Ce n’est pas la première fois de l’histoire américaine que les blancs ont peur de perdre leur prééminence. Au début du XX^e siècle, l’immigration massive d’Européens du Sud et de l’Est, ainsi que l’arrivée de nombreux Chinois dans l’Ouest américain, alimentèrent le nativisme et le racisme blanc, ce qui finit par conduire à la résurrection du Ku Klux Klan. Le KKK fédéra ainsi des millions d’Américains blancs dans un mouvement s’opposant aux immigrés, aux noirs et aux minorités religieuses, comme les catholiques. Cela, associé à un mouvement nativiste de plus grande ampleur, eut un énorme impact sur la politique américaine: des États entiers, tels que l’Indiana, étaient aux mains de politiciens soutenus par le KKK et, au niveau national, les parlementaires votèrent des lois sur l’immigration très dures et restrictives. L’explosion de nativisme et d’anxiété raciale à laquelle nous assistons aujourd’hui semble d’

«L’élection du premier président noir du pays a eu une importance tellement iconique qu’elle a permis aux vieilles idées racistes d’influencer les préférences partisanes alors que nous pensions depuis longtemps qu’elles avaient disparu de la politique américaine», a écrit en 2013 Michael Tesler, politologue à la Brown University, dans un article intitulé «Le retour du racisme à l’ancienne dans les préférences partisanes des Américains blancs au début de l’ère Obama». Quand Tesler parle de «racisme à l’ancienne», ce n’est pas un simple terme rhétorique: il fait référence à des croyances spécifiques sur l’infériorité biologique et culturelle des Afro-Américains. Son travail suggère que certains Américains blancs sont, pour reprendre ses termes «inquiets de voir le pays dirigé par un président issu d’un groupe racial qu’ils considèrent être intellectuellement et socialement inférieur».

Comportement anti-noirs

Une autre recherche montre à quel point l’élection d’Obama semble avoir exacerbé l’animosité raciale chez les électeurs blancs. Dans un article intitulé «Impact du racisme anti-noirs sur l’approbation du bilan de Barack Obama et sur les votes lors des élections présidentielles de 2012», trois chercheurs ont montré une augmentation conséquente (de 47,6% en 2008 à 50,9% en 2012) du nombre d’électeurs ayant une attitude anti-noirs: «La proportion de personnes faisant preuve de comportements anti-noirs, disaient-ils, était de 32% chez les Démocrates, 48% chez les indépendants et 79% chez les Républicains.»

Trump s’est emparé du complot du «birtherism» (théorie qui prétend qu’Obama serait né à l’étranger et qu’il serait un président illégitime) et l’a transformé en un véritable mouvement

Qu’est-ce que le racisme anti-noirs de l’époque Obama a à voir avec Donald Trump, qui est entré avec fracas dans la campagne de 2016 avec une salve de propos anti-Latino-Américains?

Trump a lancé sa campagne en dénigrant les Latino-Américains et les musulmans mais il a fait sa première apparition durant le mandat d’Obama dans un contexte de racisme anti-noirs. En 2011, Trump s’est emparé du complot du «birtherism» (théorie qui prétend qu’Obama serait né à l’étranger et qu’il serait un président illégitime) et l’a transformé en un véritable mouvement. Aujourd’hui encore, ses supporters sont convaincus qu’Obama n’a pas de légitimité: 62% affirment qu’il est musulman et 61% qu’il est né dans un autre pays. J’ai discuté avec un électeur qui s’est fait l’écho des discours discriminants envers Obama à Las Vegas, lors d’un meeting de Trump la veille des caucus du Nevada. «À mon avis, Obama est le président le plus antiaméricain que j’ai connu. Il s’incline devant tous les autres pays. Il fait passer les autres pays avant les États-Unis», m’a expliqué Martin, fervent partisan du magnat de l’immobilier.

Plus récemment, le racisme anti-noirs est revenu sur le devant de la scène, avec des comportements attirant la population qui aimerait voir restaurée l’ancienne hiérarchie raciale. Trump partage des mèmes racistes sur Twitter et a construit des relations symbiotiques avec des nationalistes blancs, refusant de condamner David Duke, ancien dirigeant du Ku Klux Klan, lors d’une interview, et proposant une interview de son fils à un présentateur radio nationaliste blanc. Ces dernières semaines, les supporters de Trump ont même attaqué des manifestants noirs lors de ses meetings. Durant un rassemblement en Caroline du Nord, un membre de l’auditoire a donné un coup de poing au visage d’un manifestant, tandis qu’un autre lançait une insulte raciste. Par la suite, Trump a excusé ce comportement. «Il était agité, tapait les gens et le public s’est défendu», a-t-il dit, bien qu’aucune preuve n’étaye le fait que le manifestant ait attaqué le premier. «C’est plus de gens comme ça, qu’il nous faut.»

À St. Louis, dans le Missouri, un meeting de Trump a été interrompu en raison de bagarres entre les partisans et les opposants du candidat, qui ont conduit à de nombreuses arrestations. Lors d’un autre rassemblement dans le Kentucky, le jour même où Trump a promis de payer les frais d’avocat aux supporters qui avaient frappé les manifestants, deux protestataires ont été attaqués par des membres d’un groupe suprémaciste blanc. Le vendredi soir, à Chicago, des manifestants se sont rassemblés en masse pour protester contre le meeting imminent de Trump, obligeant le milliardaire à l’annuler. Trump a condamné ceux qu’il jugeait responsables des échauffourées qui ont suivi en les qualifiant de «voyous».

Ouvriers blancs

Rien de tout cela ne permet toutefois de nier les faits matériels sur lesquels repose l’attrait pour Trump des blancs de la classe ouvrière. L’effondrement de l’économie industrielle au lendemain de la Grande Récession a provoqué un véritable désespoir. La classe moyenne perd du terrain depuis un long moment et les emplois se font rares pour les personnes qui n’ont pas de diplôme universitaire. Même dans les régions où de nouvelles usines ont vu le jour, les syndicats sont rares et les salaires sont bas, à la suite d’un nivellement par le bas qui se produit dans les villes qui se battent pour conserver les derniers emplois du secteur manufacturier. Lorsque le désespoir économique se double de la perte d’espoir –comme nous l’avons vu dans les années 1980, lorsqu’une première vague de désindustrialisation a dévasté les quartiers des centres-villes–, les conséquences sont tragiques.

L’impact de ces tendances a été souligné dans une vaste étude publiée à l’automne 2015, qui montrait un taux de mortalité en pleine hausse chez les Américains des classes moyenne et ouvrière, principaux partisans de Trump. Anne Case, professeure à l’université de Princeton, et Angus Deaton, son coauteur, ont découvert que les Américains blancs de la classe ouvrière sont de plus en plus nombreux à se suicider ou à mourir d’une trop grande consommation d’alcool et de drogues. «En 1999, écrit Case pour Quartz, les personnes de ce groupe mouraient quatre fois plus que les Américains possédant un diplôme d’enseignement secondaire ou universitaire d’un empoisonnement accidentel causé par l’alcool ou la drogue. En 2013, ils étaient sept fois plus nombreux à mourir que leurs concitoyens plus instruits. En 2013, ils se suicidaient aussi deux fois plus que les personnes ayant suivi des études plus poussées, et mouraient cinq fois plus d’une maladie du foie due à l’alcoolisme ou d’une cirrhose que les diplômés de l’université.»

Ces hausses de la mortalité sont si importantes, pour les blancs ayant entre 45 et 54 ans, qu’elles ont fait baisser l’espérance de vie globale. Les jeunes blancs, quant à eux, doivent faire face à des taux de toxicomanie en augmentation et à une augmentation correspondante de la mortalité.

Organisez un meeting de Trump et vous rencontrerez des personnes qui ont vécu ces changements de près. Ce sont des enseignants, des policiers, des propriétaires de petits commerces et des fonctionnaires municipaux, qui occupent des emplois proches des professions de classe moyenne dans les villes rurales ou les banlieues anciennes, zones dans lesquelles le soutien à Trump est le plus ardent. Lors de la primaire dans le Michigan, par exemple, Trump a remporté la plupart de ses votes d’électeurs dont les revenus s’élèvent à moins de 50.000 dollars annuels. Dans le New Hampshire, il a largement séduit les électeurs gagnant moins de 100.000 dollars. En fait, quels que soient les États, Trump remporte les primaires grâce au vote des salaires modestes de la classe moyenne.

Aujourd’hui, la sécurité que fournissait le fait d’être blanc a disparu pour de nombreux Américains

Ces Américains un peu plus nantis ont vu leurs proches et leurs amis tomber dans la dépendance, que ce soit à la drogue, à l’alcool ou aux aides sociales. S’ils sont compatissants pour ceux qui souffrent de cette situation critique (ce qui explique pourquoi la demande d’aides supplémentaires que fait Trump pour les vétérans et les seniors leur parle), ils sont également frustrés et en colère. Le pays et ses dirigeants ont fait une promesse: si vous travaillez dur, vous vous en sortirez. Mais ça ne s’est pas passé ainsi. En réalité, pour des millions d’Américains, c’est l’inverse qui s’est produit: ils ont travaillé dur et sont restés sur le bord du chemin. Ils ont peur, que ce soit pour eux-mêmes ou pour leurs enfants. Et Trump parle pour eux. «Que voulons-nous tous? a demandé Trump lors d’un rassemblement à la veille du caucus du Nevada. Nous voulons la sécurité. Nous voulons un pays fort.» Ceux qui ressentent le plus l’insécurité se sont tournés en masse vers le magnat de l’immobilier pour le soutenir.

Cela étant dit, les préjugés raciaux expliquent aussi le soutien à Trump. Ces dernières années, faire partie du plus haut rang de la hiérarchie raciale n’était pas sans avantages. Historien et politologue, Ira Katznelson explique dans Lorsque l’Affirmative Action était blanche: un récit inédit des inégalités raciales dans l’Amérique du XX^e siècle, qu’être blanc était traditionnellement la voie directe pour jouir de la sécurité de la classe moyenne, la clé qui permettait d’obtenir un emprunt immobilier et de bénéficier de programmes d’enseignement, le gouvernement fédéral cherchant à construire une classe moyenne blanche au milieu du XX^e siècle. Même après la naissance du mouvement pour la défense des droits civils et la fin de la discrimination officielle contre les Afro-Américains, être blanc et de classe moyenne offrait toujours une protection contre les pires accidents de notre économie. La drogue, les ghettos et la dépendance existaient chez les blancs dans certaines petites zones du pays mais ils étaient communément considérés comme des problèmes touchant les populations noire et latino-américaine mais pas les blancs. Ce n’est plus vrai aujourd’hui. Aujourd’hui, les blancs de classe moyenne sont aussi touchés par la toxicomanie et la dépendance, ce qui ajoute un élément racial à l’anxiété économique, puisque la sécurité que fournissait le fait d’être blanc a disparu pour de nombreux Américains.

Peur primale

Des objections peuvent être faites à cette analyse. Il est possible, par exemple, que la décision d’Obama de faire avancer les politiques progressistes et de galvaniser une base progressiste ait entraîné un contrecoup partisan inévitable, dont fait partie Trump. Si Obama avait gouverné plus modérément, s’il avait essayé de trouver un espace dans cette coalition pour les électeurs blancs de la classe ouvrière, alors le «trumpisme» serait peut-être resté au fond de sa tanière.

Mais cette analyse ignore à quel point Trump reflète les choix spécifiques des Républicains et des élites conservatrices. Des théories du complot anti-Obama aux attaques le faisant passer pour un ennemi des États-Unis, les conservateurs ont choisi de nourrir ce ressentiment et cette anxiété. On peut établir un lien direct entre l’essor de Trump et l’hystérie raciste de certaines émissions de radio, où des personnes comme Rush Limbaugh, soutien actif de Trump, ont prévenu qu’Obama mettrait le monde sens dessus dessous. «L’époque où [les minorités] n’avaient pas de pouvoir est terminée, et elles sont en colère, avait dit Limbaugh à ses auditeurs. Elles veulent utiliser leur pouvoir pour se venger.»

Il faut aussi songer à quel point ces électeurs auraient trouvé cet hypothétique partenariat défavorable à leurs intérêts tels qu’ils les conçoivent. Même si Obama était allé vers eux, ils n’auraient été que de simples partenaires dans une coalition plus grande, alors qu’ils veulent être ceux qui dirigent. Trump s’adresse à ce désir lorsqu’il déclare (de manière plus ou moins subtile) qu’il veut «rendre sa grandeur à l’Amérique» en faisant de l’ouvrier américain blanc le centre de son univers.

Durant toute leur histoire, les États-Unis ont vu leur paysage racial et économique évoluer. Et durant toute cette histoire, une importante minorité d’Américains blancs a répondu à ces changements incessants par une peur primale d’être dominé, de se retrouver au bas de l’échelle. C’est l’une des plus grandes forces de la vie américaine. Des politiques et des démagogues de toutes sortes se sont servis de cette peur bien avant Trump. Elle est si puissante que les chercheurs ont trouvé un lien direct et fort entre la proportion d’esclaves d’un comté donné avant l’abolition et la part de votes républicains aujourd’hui. Plus une région donnée possédait d’esclaves, plus le vote républicain y est important.

La bonne nouvelle est que les mouvements comme celui de Trump finissent souvent par disparaître. La mauvaise nouvelle est que, même s’ils perdent, ils ont une influence conséquente. L’un des prédécesseurs de Trump, le gouverneur de l’Alabama George Wallace, n’a jamais remporté l’investiture démocrate. Toutefois, il a eu une influence considérable sur la direction de la politique nationale, donnant à Richard Nixon les bases pour sa «Stratégie du Sud» misant sur le ressentiment racial qui façonnera et définira la politique américaine pour les quatre décennies à venir.

Pour les Américains opposés à Trump, il est tentant de croire que sa base électorale n’est qu’une minuscule partie des États-Unis, que ce ne sont que les derniers soubresauts de vieux préjugés raciaux. En fin de compte, pense-t-on, ils finiront aussi par disparaître.

Mais c’est un vœu pieux. Les États-Unis sont un pays hétéroclite mais ce pays est essentiellement blanc. Et le phénomène Trump peut encore rassembler des millions d’électeurs. Et cet «en fin de compte» pourrait mettre longtemps à venir. Entre temps, le phénomène Trump –puissant mélange de préjugés décomplexés, d’agressions nationalistes et de politique économique hétérodoxe– pourrait prospérer. En fait, c’est ce qu’il va probablement faire, puisque les tendances qui ont produit Trump –économie fragile, classe ouvrière blanche mal en point, classe moyenne blanche précaire, population non blanche en augmentation, impasse politique et puissance politique accrue des minorités– sont toujours actuelles.

Étant donné la montée plus que difficile qui l’attendrait à une élection générale, l’homme qu’est Trump possède une date de péremption. Mais le Trumpisme entrera dans le firmament de la politique moderne, un courant puissant qui façonnera l’avenir du parti républicain, et du parti démocrate également. Trump a fait son entrée en scène comme un clown. Mais, lorsqu’il en sortira, il le fera en tant que nouvelle icône d’un mouvement familier de la vie américaine.

Voir enfin:

Why Pollsters Were Completely and Utterly Wrong
Dan Cassino
Harvard Business Review
November 09, 2016

Traditional political polling in America has been living on borrowed time, and the divergence of the actual votes in Tuesday’s election from what was expected in the polls may signal that its time is up. The fact that the polls apparently missed the preferences of a large portion of the American electorate indicates a larger, more systematic issue, one that’s unlikely to be fixed anytime soon.

The basic problem — and the reason pollsters have been nervous about just this sort of large-scale polling failure — comes from the low response rates that have plagued even the best polls since the widespread use of caller ID technology. Caller ID, more than any other single factor, means that fewer Americans pick up the phone when a pollster calls. That means it takes more calls for a poll to reach enough respondents to make a valid sample, but it also means that Americans are screening themselves before they pick up the phone.

So even as our ability to analyze data has gotten better and better, thanks to advanced computing and an increase in the amount of data available to analysts, our ability to collect data has gotten worse. And if the inputs are bad, the analysis won’t be any good either.

That self-screening is enormously problematic for pollsters. A sample is only valid to the extent that the individuals reached are a random sample of the overall population of interest. It’s not at all problematic for some people to refuse to pick up the phone, as long as their refusal is driven by a random process. If it’s random, the people who do pick up the phone will still be a representative sample of the overall population, and the pollster will just have to make more calls.

Similarly, it’s not a serious problem for pollsters if people refuse to answer the phone according to known characteristics. For instance, pollsters know that African-Americans are less likely to answer a survey than white Americans and that men are less likely to pick up the phone than women. Thanks to the U.S. Census, we know what proportion of these groups are supposed to be in our sample, so when the proportion of men, or African-Americans, falls short in the sample, pollsters can make use of weighting techniques to correct for the shortfall.

The real problem comes when potential respondents to a poll are systematically refusing to pick up the phone according to characteristics that pollsters aren’t measuring or can’t adjust to match what’s in the population. For instance, while Census numbers can tell us how many Asian-Americans live in a particular state, they can’t reliably tell us how many Republicans, or liberals, or evangelicals are in that state. As a result, if a group like evangelicals or conservatives systematically exclude themselves from polls at higher rates than other groups, there’s no easy way to fix the problem. Often, it may not even be clear that there is a problem, especially for characteristics that aren’t commonly measured on polls or that can fluctuate, like church membership and political preferences, respectively.

None of this would be a problem if response rates were at the levels they were at in the 1980s, or even the 1990s. But with response rates to modern telephone polls languishing below 15%, it becomes harder and harder to determine whether systematic nonresponse problems are even happening. These problems go from nagging to consequential when the characteristics that are leading people to exclude themselves from polls are correlated with the major outcome that the poll is trying to measure. For instance, if Donald Trump voters were more likely to decide not to participate in polls because they’re rigged, and did so in a way that wasn’t correlated with known characteristics like race and gender, pollsters would have no way of knowing.

Of course, if unobserved nonresponse is driving poll errors, it’s necessary to ask how polls have done so well up to this point. After all, response rates have been similarly low in at least the last four presidential elections, and the polls did well enough in those. Part of the problem, and what makes this election different, is a seeming failure of likely voter models.

One of the most difficult tasks facing any election pollster is determining who is and is not actually going to vote on Election Day. People tend to say they’re going to vote even when they won’t, so it’s necessary to ask more questions. Every major pollster has their own set of questions in the likely voter questions, but they typically include items about interest in the election, past vote behavior, and knowledge of where a polling place is. Using these questions to determine who is and is not going to vote is a tricky business; the failure of a complex likely voter model is why Gallup got out of the election forecasting business. As long as voter behavior stays stable, these models should work. But in elections in which past voter behavior is upended, such as President Barack Obama’s win in 2008, they can fail catastrophically.

It may be the case that standard sampling and weighting techniques are able to correct for sampling problems in a normal election — one in which voter turnout patterns remain predictable — but fail when the polls are missing portions of the electorate who are likely to turn out in one election but not in previous ones. Imagine that there’s a group of voters who don’t generally vote and are systematically less likely to respond to a survey. So long as they continue to not vote, there isn’t a problem. But if a candidate activates these voters, the polls will systematically underestimate support for the candidate. That seems to be what happened Tuesday night.

This doesn’t mean modern political polling is doomed. If pollsters and political analysts can identify what went wrong, they may be able to stop a repeat of such errors and build models that account for them. But unless they can find some way of fixing the underlying issue of low response rates, it’s not certain that they’ll be able to. Without strong polling, the public and the markets won’t know what’s likely to happen and candidates won’t know where to most effectively put their resources. At least for unusual elections, polling seems broken — and we have no way of knowing which elections are unusual until the votes actually come in.

Dan Cassino is an associate professor of political science at Fairleigh Dickinson University, researching public opinion and political psychology. His new book, Fox News and American Politics, will be released at the end of April.