Humanisme: Le monde moderne est bien trop bon (Making the decisions while bearing none of the costs: It’s the decriminalization, stupid !)

Merkel Merkel2
heroin
Lorsque l’esprit impur est sorti d’un homme, il va par des lieux arides, cherchant du repos, et il n’en trouve point. Alors il dit: Je retournerai dans ma maison d’où je suis sorti; et, quand il arrive, il la trouve vide, balayée et ornée. Il s’en va, et il prend avec lui sept autres esprits plus méchants que lui; ils entrent dans la maison, s’y établissent, et la dernière condition de cet homme est pire que la première. Il en sera de même pour cette génération méchante. Jésus (Matthieu 12 : 43-45)
Le monde moderne n’est pas mauvais : à certains égards, il est bien trop bon. Il est rempli de vertus féroces et gâchées. Lorsqu’un dispositif religieux est brisé (comme le fut le christianisme pendant la Réforme), ce ne sont pas seulement les vices qui sont libérés. Les vices sont en effet libérés, et ils errent de par le monde en faisant des ravages ; mais les vertus le sont aussi, et elles errent plus férocement encore en faisant des ravages plus terribles. Le monde moderne est saturé des vieilles vertus chrétiennes virant à la folie.  G.K. Chesterton
On peut parler aujourd’hui d’invasion arabe. C’est un fait social. Combien d’invasions l’Europe a connu tout au long de son histoire ! Elle a toujours su se surmonter elle-même, aller de l’avant pour se trouver ensuite comme agrandie par l’échange entre les cultures. Pape François
Je ne crois pas qu’il y ait aujourd’hui une peur de l’islam, en tant que tel, mais de Daech et de sa guerre de conquête, tirée en partie de l’islam. L’idée de conquête est inhérente à l’âme de l’islam, il est vrai. Mais on pourrait interpréter, avec la même idée de conquête, la fin de l’Évangile de Matthieu, où Jésus envoie ses disciples dans toutes les nations. (…) Devant l’actuel terrorisme islamiste, il conviendrait de s’interroger sur la manière dont a été exporté un modèle de démocratie trop occidentale dans des pays où il y avait un pouvoir fort, comme en Irak. Ou en Libye, à la structure tribale. On ne peut avancer sans tenir compte de cette culture.  (…) Sur le fond, la coexistence entre chrétiens et musulmans est possible. Je viens d’un pays où ils cohabitent en bonne familiarité. (…) En Centrafrique, avant la guerre, chrétiens et musulmans vivaient ensemble et doivent le réapprendre aujourd’hui. Le Liban aussi montre que c’est possible. Pape François
In the past, groups employing terrorism, such as the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization, were driven by specific political aims: a united Ireland or an independent Palestine. There was generally a relationship between the organization’s political cause and its violent activities. Jihadists are different. They have little or no explicit political aim but are driven by a visceral hatred of the West. Some commentators claim that an attack like the one in Nice is “blowback” from Western foreign policy, but it’s difficult to discern any rational relationship between Western policy in Iraq or Libya and the murder of revelers on a promenade. (…) Whatever one thinks of the activities of groups like the I.R.A. or the P.L.O., those activities were governed by certain norms and contained a rational kernel. It is the arbitrariness of jihadist violence and its disregard for moral bounds that make it terrifying. What defines jihadist violence today is not righteous anger or political fury but a sense of inchoate, often personal, rage. Such rage is not uniquely Islamist. (…) In the past, the distinction between political violence and sociopathic rage was relatively clear. No longer. There seems today almost a continuum between ideological violence, disjointed fury and some degree of sociopathy or mental illness. What constitutes ideological violence has decayed; instead, amorphous rage has become a persistent feature of public life. One reason is the breakdown of social and moral boundaries that once acted as firewalls against such behavior. Western societies have become more socially atomized and more riven by identity politics. The influence of institutions from the church to labor unions that once helped socialize individuals and inculcate them with a sense of obligation to others has declined. As broader identities have eroded, and traditional social networks and sources of authority have weakened, people’s sense of belonging has become more parochial. Progressive movements that gave social grievance a political form have faded. Instead, the new oppositional movements are often rooted in religious or ethnic identity and take sectarian or separatist forms. There is a growing disaffection with anything “mainstream,” and a perception of the world as out of control and driven by malign forces. All this has helped incubate a sense of rage without an outlet, undermined people’s ties to others as human beings, and weakened the distinction between sociopathy and political violence. It is a world in which, as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany observed last week, the “taboos of civilization” are too easily broken. It is not so much the acts of violence themselves as the seeming fragility of our social and moral orders that makes contemporary terrorism so threatening. Kenan Malik
Palestinian culture encourages suicidal youngsters to kill by offering a simple bargain: Murder a Jew, and you instantly become a hero. While the West has long turned a blind eye to this behavior, its refusal to look reality in the face is now coming back to haunt it. For today, the Islamic State is making the very same tempting offer to distraught Muslims in Western countries–murder a Westerner, and you can instantly become a hero instead of a failure. It’s no accident that several recent terror attacks in Western countries have been carried out by people who apparently had histories of mental illness, including Nice, Orlando, and several attacks in Germany. Nor is it any accident that the Islamic State is cultivating such people. As with many other terrorist techniques pioneered by the Palestinians, ISIS has copied this one precisely because it proved successful–and not just as a means of recruiting assailants.This tactic also serves two other important purposes. First, it encourages an already strong Western tendency to ignore the terrorists’ true aims. I discussed this with regard to the Palestinians in my previous post; a classic example concerning the Islamic State was Kenan Malik’s op-ed in the New York Times on Tuesday. “In the past, groups employing terrorism, such as the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization, were driven by specific political aims: a united Ireland or an independent Palestine,” Malik wrote. “Jihadists are different. They have little or no explicit political aim but are driven by a visceral hatred of the West.” In reality, Islamic State is quite open about its aims: It wants to destroy the West and establish a global Islamic caliphate. Indeed, being open about its goals is part of how it attracts new recruits, just as Palestinian organizations attract support by boasting of their efforts to destroy the Jewish state. But at the same time, both the Palestinians and ISIS would prefer that the West not take their goals too seriously since, if it did, it might stop supporting the Palestinians or actually get serious about destroying ISIS. The use of emotionally distressed recruits is an ideal way for terrorists to foster confusion about their aims because it makes it even easier for well-meaning Westerners to reassure themselves that Islamist death cults, which exploit such distress to turn people into killers, aren’t actually the problem. The real issue, they tell themselves, is mental health or social alienation.Second, this tactic helps divide the West and turn it against itself, because it reinforces another existing tendency of many well-meaning Westerners–blaming the victim for having driven the attacker to such a dreadful deed. Westerners have been blaming Palestinian terror on Israel for years, and now, many are blaming themselves for ISIS. (…) Using assailants with a history of mental or emotional problems is an ideal way for terrorists to reinforce this tendency as well, because it enables people to focus on the assailant’s distress, and society’s failure to deal with it, rather than on the evil intent of those who incited him to kill by telling him he would thereby become a hero instead of a loser. Yet both gambits are working for ISIS now precisely because Westerners were conditioned for decades to believe them by the way their own journalists, academics, and political leaders insistently treated Palestinian terror as Israel’s fault. Some Westerners, like the young Parisians (…) have so internalized this attitude that they simply transfer it to their own countries; asserting that their society, too, must be to blame for the attacks against it. Others, like Malik, perform a kind of inversion: Indoctrinated to believe that terror is the victim’s fault, yet unable to believe their own societies evil enough to merit such attacks, they resolve the dilemma by asserting that unlike Palestinian violence–which Malik deems “rational” and “governed by certain norms”– jihadist violence must be senseless than rather than purposeful. “It is the arbitrariness of jihadist violence and its disregard for moral bounds that make it terrifying,” he proclaimed (he evidently thinks murdering random civilians in Israel is well within moral bounds). But whichever approach they choose, the one thing people like Malik and those young Parisians aren’t doing is putting the blame where it belongs: on the terrorist leaders who groom perpetrators to commit mass murder by indoctrinating them to believe that the road to glory runs through killing others. Terror can never be defeated until Westerners recognizes the crucial role played by this glorification of murder. And that won’t happen as long as the West keeps giving it a pass among the Palestinians, for they are the ones who pioneered this culture of death and inspired all the subsequent copycats. Evelyn Gordon
Un passage des propos du pape François attire l’œil: «L’idée de conquête est inhérente à l’âme de l’islam, il est vrai. Mais on pourrait interpréter avec la même idée de conquête la fin de l’Évangile de Matthieu, où Jésus envoie ses disciples dans toutes les nations». Voici le passage évoqué: «Allez donc, faites des disciples (“mathèteuein”, en grec) de toutes les nations, baptisant les gens (…), leur enseignant (“didaskein”) à observer tout ce que je vous ai commandé (Matthieu, 28, 19)». On peut appeler «conquête» la tâche de prêcher, d’enseigner et de baptiser. Il s’agit bien d’une mission universelle, proposant la foi à tout homme, à la différence de religions nationales comme le shintô. Le christianisme ressemble par là à l’islam, dont le prophète a été envoyé «aux rouges comme aux noirs». Mais son but est la conversion des cœurs, par enseignement, non la prise du pouvoir. Les tentatives d’imposer la foi par la force, comme Charlemagne avec les Saxons, sont de monstrueuses perversions, moins interprétation que pur et simple contresens. Le Coran ne contient pas d’équivalent de l’envoi en mission des disciples. Il se peut que les exhortations à tuer qu’on y lit n’aient qu’une portée circonstancielle, et l’on ignore les causes de l’expansion arabe du VIIe siècle. Reste que le mot de conquête n’est plus alors une métaphore et prend un sens plus concret, carrément militaire. Les deux recueils les plus autorisés (sahīh) attribuent à Mahomet cette déclaration (hadith), constamment citée depuis: «J’ai reçu l’ordre de combattre (qātala) les gens (nās) jusqu’à ce qu’ils attestent “Il n’y a de dieu qu’Allah et Muhammad est l’envoyé d’Allah”, accomplissent la prière et versent l’aumône (zakāt). S’ils le font, leur sang et leurs biens sont à l’abri de moi, sauf selon le droit de l’islam (bi-haqqi ‘l-islām), et leur compte revient à Allah (hisābu-hum ‘alā ‘Llah) (Bukhari, Foi, 17 (25) ; Muslim, Foi, 8, [124] 32-[129] 36)». J’ai reproduit l’arabe de passages obscurs. Pour le dernier, la récente traduction de Harkat Ahmed explique: «Quant à leur for intérieur, leur compte n’incombera qu’à Dieu (p. 62)» Indication précieuse: il s’agit d’obtenir la confession verbale, les gestes de la prière et le versement de l’impôt. Non pas une conversion des cœurs, mais une soumission, sens du mot «islam» dans bien des récits sur la vie de Mahomet. L’adhésion sincère pourra et devra venir, mais elle n’est pas première. Nul ne peut la forcer, car «il n’y a pas de contrainte en religion (Coran, II, 256)». Elle viendra quand la loi islamique sera en vigueur. Il sera alors dans l’intérêt des conquis de passer à la religion des conquérants. On voit que le mot «conquête» a un tout autre sens que pour le verset de Matthieu. Pourquoi insister sur ces différences? Un vaste examen de conscience est à l’œuvre chez bien des musulmans, en réaction aux horreurs de l’État islamique. Ce n’est pas en entretenant la confusion intellectuelle qu’on les aidera à se mettre au clair sur les sources textuelles et les origines historiques de leur religion. Rémi Brague
Une piscine située dans un hôtel à Marrakech a décidé d’interdire le port du burkini. (…) L’établissement hôtelier, qui n’a pas souhaité être mentionné dans cet article, justifie cette interdiction par des « raisons de sécurité et d’hygiène ». L’administration a donc exigé que les femmes désirant nager dans les piscines portent un maillot de bain et a même installé un panneau interdisant l’usage du burkini. Face à cette interdiction inhabituelle, certains internautes ont exprimé leur colère: « La femme voilée est devenue interdite telle un chien dans un hôtel ! » D’autres ont posé des questions sur l’application des droits de l’homme et des libertés individuelles au Maroc. Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’un incident de ce genre arrive dans le royaume. L’année dernière, une piscine de Casablanca avait aussi interdit le burkini et avait imposé le maillot de bain comme seule possibilité pour les femmes. D’autres hôtels et piscines avaient également prohibé la « combinaison islamique ». L’hôtel Ibis d’El Jadida et de nombreux hôtels à Marrakech appliquent cette interdiction. Le Tamaris Aqua Park, situé à quelques kilomètres de Casablanca s’était également opposé au port du burkini pour des raisons officiellement liées à l’hygiène. Une polémique qui refait surface chaque été au Maroc. Site info
Aujourd’hui, dans le contexte d’un affrontement de civilisations donnant lieu à un conflit armé ayant fait en un an des centaines de victimes sur le territoire national, il est logique que reviennent au premier plan les exigences de l’ordre public, et le juge des référés a d’ailleurs invoqué «le contexte de l’état d’urgence et des récents attentats» pour justifier sa décision en la fondant sur «un risque de troubles à l’ordre public».  (…) L’islam est, par nature, politique. On ne saurait trop le rappeler: l’islam est un système total qui mêle le religieux, le politique, le juridique, la civilisation. L’islam est un code de droit qui prétend remplacer le droit du pays d’accueil. Si bien que toute concession faite à l’islam comme religion est un abandon consenti à l’islam comme système politico-juridique ainsi qu’à la civilisation islamique. Face à l’islam, la laïcité conçue comme neutralité ne suffit pas. Le cas de figure n’est pas le même qu’avec le catholicisme. Notre laïcité s’est certes construite contre l’Église, mais en accord avec les paroles fondatrices du christianisme: rendre à César et à Dieu ce qui leur revient respectivement. L’islam est au contraire l’anti-laïcité par excellence, si bien que notre État laïque devrait le combattre beaucoup plus durement qu’il n’a combattu le catholicisme. [La Corse] C’est un exemple des troubles à l’ordre public que peut entraîner cet étalage sur les plages françaises des pratiques identitaires islamiques. Surtout dans le contexte des récents massacres commis par des islamistes au nom de leur dieu. Par ailleurs, il est clair qu’en Corse où la population est restée plus près de son sol, plus ancrée dans ses villages, elle se montre plus réactive face au processus de la conquête islamiste non dite mais bien réelle dont l’Europe occidentale est l’objet. Cependant, même dans l’Hexagone, de plus en plus de gens ont conscience du lien qui existe entre les carnages des terroristes islamistes et le folklore identitaire arabo-musulman qui est le terreau où se nourrit le djihadisme. (…) Notre pays est actuellement en guerre, et s’il ne veut pas être vaincu dans cette guerre, il doit savoir contre qui et contre quoi il se bat. Pour ne pas perdre une guerre, il faut impérativement nommer l’ennemi. Or, en l’espèce, celui-ci est double: d’une part les djihadistes violents qui massacrent dans notre pays; et d’autre part, les djihadistes «civilisationnels», qui œuvrent inlassablement à rendre toujours plus présents sur notre sol leur civilisation, leurs règles et leur mode de vie. À moyen et long terme, le plus grand danger pour les Français est la conquête feutrée de la France par le djihadisme civilisationnel, conquête qui s’opère au nom des droits de l’homme. Les femmes qui portent des vêtements de bain islamiques sont des militantes de la conquête de notre pays par un groupe humain porteur d’une civilisation antagoniste. Cet été, les plages sont la nouvelle partie de notre territoire que visent à s’approprier les islamistes. Jean-Louis Harouel
The furor of ignored Europeans against their union is not just directed against rich and powerful government elites per se, or against the flood of mostly young male migrants from the war-torn Middle East. The rage also arises from the hypocrisy of a governing elite that never seems to be subject to the ramifications of its own top-down policies. The bureaucratic class that runs Europe from Brussels and Strasbourg too often lectures European voters on climate change, immigration, politically correct attitudes about diversity, and the constant need for more bureaucracy, more regulations, and more redistributive taxes. But Euro-managers are able to navigate around their own injunctions, enjoying private schools for their children; generous public pay, retirement packages and perks; frequent carbon-spewing jet travel; homes in non-diverse neighborhoods; and profitable revolving-door careers between government and business. The Western elite classes, both professedly liberal and conservative, square the circle of their privilege with politically correct sermonizing. They romanticize the distant “other” — usually immigrants and minorities — while condescendingly lecturing the middle and working classes, often the losers in globalization, about their lack of sensitivity. On this side of the Atlantic, President Obama has developed a curious habit of talking down to Americans about their supposedly reactionary opposition to rampant immigration, affirmative action, multiculturalism, and political correctness — most notably in his caricatures of the purported “clingers” of Pennsylvania. Yet Obama seems uncomfortable when confronted with the prospect of living out what he envisions for others. He prefers golfing with celebrities to bowling. He vacations in tony Martha’s Vineyard rather than returning home to his Chicago mansion. His travel entourage is royal and hardly green. And he insists on private prep schools for his children rather than enrolling them in the public schools of Washington, D.C., whose educators he so often shields from long-needed reform. In similar fashion, grandees such as Facebook billionaire Mark Zuckerberg and Univision anchorman Jorge Ramos do not live what they profess. They often lecture supposedly less sophisticated Americans on their backward opposition to illegal immigration. But both live in communities segregated from those they champion in the abstract. The Clintons often pontificate about “fairness” but somehow managed to amass a personal fortune of more than $100 million by speaking to and lobbying banks, Wall Street profiteers, and foreign entities. The pay-to-play rich were willing to brush aside the insincere, pro forma social-justice talk of the Clintons and reward Hillary and Bill with obscene fees that would presumably result in lucrative government attention. Consider the recent Orlando tragedy for more of the same paradoxes. The terrorist killer, Omar Mateen — a registered Democrat, proud radical Muslim, and occasional patron of gay dating sites — murdered 49 people and wounded even more in a gay nightclub. His profile and motive certainly did not fit the elite narrative that unsophisticated right-wing American gun owners were responsible because of their support for gun rights. No matter. The Obama administration and much of the media refused to attribute the horror in Orlando to Mateen’s self-confessed radical Islamist agenda. Instead, they blamed the shooter’s semi-automatic .223 caliber rifle and a purported climate of hate toward gays. (…) In sum, elites ignored the likely causes of the Orlando shooting: the appeal of ISIS-generated hatred to some young, second-generation radical Muslim men living in Western societies, and the politically correct inability of Western authorities to short-circuit that clear-cut connection. Instead, the establishment all but blamed Middle America for supposedly being anti-gay and pro-gun. In both the U.S. and Britain, such politically correct hypocrisy is superimposed on highly regulated, highly taxed, and highly governmentalized economies that are becoming ossified and stagnant. The tax-paying middle classes, who lack the romance of the poor and the connections of the elite, have become convenient whipping boys of both in order to leverage more government social programs and to assuage the guilt of the elites who have no desire to live out their utopian theories in the flesh. Victor Davis Hanson
Le 1er août 2016, les ministres de l’Intérieur et du Logement ont publié un communiqué passé totalement inaperçu dans la torpeur de l’été mais d’une importance capitale sur le plan de l’évolution des mentalités et de l’idéologie politique française. Ce texte marque une inflexion de la conception française de l’immigration. Jusqu’alors, celle-ci était fondée sur la distinction entre l’immigration régulière et l’immigration illégale. La première, conforme à la loi, était destinée par exemple à accueillir des travailleurs dont la France peut avoir besoin, à former des étudiants dans l’intérêt de la France ou du pays d’origine, ou bien à assurer le principe d’unité familiale. Elle était évaluée à environ 200 000 personnes par an. En revanche, les migrants en situation irrégulière, entrés ou séjournant en infraction avec la loi, devaient impérativement repartir dans leur pays, volontairement ou par la contrainte. Tel était le principe. Cette différence, pour la première fois depuis que l’immigration est devenue un sujet politique au début des années 1980, semble désormais ni par l’Etat. Le migrant en situation irrégulière n’a plus vocation à être reconduit dans son pays, mais à être accueilli en France et pris en charge par la puissance publique, au même titre qu’un étranger en situation régulière ou qu’un citoyen français en difficulté. (…) Ce communiqué enterre donc de fait toute notion d’immigration irrégulière. Il abolit le clivage entre légalité et illégalité en matière d’immigration. Il va dans le sens de la loi du 7 mars 2016, dont les dispositions reviennent à rendre très difficiles l’application des mesures d’éloignement. Il proclame que la France a le devoir d’accueillir et de prendre en charge tout étranger sur son territoire, qu’il soit autorisé à entrer et à séjourner ou qu’il ne le soit pas. De facto, le principe ainsi proclamé abroge l’idée de frontière ou de respect du droit de l’entrée et de séjour. Les associations humanitaires, les idéologues, les partisans de la liberté totale d’immigrer en rêvaient depuis au moins quarante ans. M. Cazeneuve et Mme Cosse l’ont fait. La question est de savoir quel sera l’ampleur de l’appel d’air que cette transformation profonde de tous les fondements de la politique d’immigration française est susceptible provoquer à terme. Le communiqué annonce une France ouverte, qui n’éloigne plus ses migrants illégaux mais au contraire les accueille. Le potentiel d’émigration est élevé: des centaines de millions de personnes déshéritées et désœuvrées, dans ce monde en ébullition, ne songent qu’à trouver un point d’accueil. Reste à savoir si la France, qui compte cinq millions de chômeurs, de gigantesques problèmes de logement, des centaines de milliers de personnes vivant sous le seuil de pauvreté, un millier de cités sensibles dévastées par la violence, l’exclusion, le communautarisme, l’islamisme radical, si cette France a les moyens d’accueillir une immigration supplémentaire. Mais pour M. Cazeneuve et Mme Cosse, c’est une autre affaire. Et ce n’est visiblement pas la leur. Alexis Théas
The heroin epidemic was caused by the legalization of marijuana. We wanted legal weed, and for the most part, we got it. Four states have legalized it outright, others have decriminalized it, and in many jurisdictions police refuse to enforce the laws that are on the books, creating a de facto street legalization. Good news, right? Not for the Sinaloa Cartel, which by the time Colorado passed Amendment 64 in 2012 had become the dominant cartel in Mexico. Weed was a major profit center for them, but suddenly they couldn’t compete against a superior American product that also had drastically lower transportation and security costs. In a single year, the cartel suffered a 40 percent drop in marijuana sales, representing billions of dollars. Mexican marijuana became an almost worthless product. They’ve basically stopped growing the shit: Once-vast fields in Durango now lie fallow. More good news, right? Yeah, no. Guzmán and his boys are businessmen. They’re not going to take a forty-point hit and not do something about it. They had to make up those profits somewhere. Looking at the American drug market as it existed, Guzmán and his partners saw an opportunity. An increasing number of Americans were addicted to prescription opioids such as Oxycontin. And their addiction was expensive. One capsule of Oxy might sell on the street for thirty dollars, and an addict might need ten hits a day. Well, shit, they thought. We have some of the best poppy fields in the world. Opium, morphine, Oxy, heroin—they’re basically the same drug, so … The Sinaloa Cartel decided to undercut the pharmaceutical companies. They increased the production of Mexican heroin by almost 70 percent, and also raised the purity level, bringing in Colombian cooks to create « cinnamon » heroin as strong as the East Asian product. They had been selling a product that was about 46 percent pure, now they improved it to 90 percent. Their third move was classic market economics—they dropped the price. A kilo of heroin went for as much as $200,000 in New York City a few years ago, cost $80,000 in 2013, and now has dropped to around $50,000. More of a better product for less money: You can’t beat it. At the same time, American drug and law-enforcement officials, concerned about the dramatic surge in overdose deaths from pharmaceutical opioids (165,000 from 1999 to 2014), cracked down on both legal and illegal distribution, opening the door for Mexican heroin, which sold for five to ten bucks a dose. But pill users were not accustomed to the potency of this new heroin. Even heroin addicts were taken by surprise. As a result, overdose deaths have skyrocketed, more than doubling from 2000 to 2014. More people—47,055—died from drug overdoses in 2014 than in any other year in American history. (Perhaps the most famous of these, Philip Seymour Hoffman, died on February 2, 2014, right at the height of the epidemic.) That’s 125 people a day, more than five lives every hour, a fatality level that matched the AIDS epidemic’s peak in 1995. (…)  Just as this mess was heating up, a new drug—actually an old drug—entered the scene. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is thirty to fifty times as strong as heroin. It was developed in 1960 by Janssen Pharmaceuticals (now a division of Johnson & Johnson) as a treatment for the severe pain caused by terminal cancer. Fentanyl is so powerful that the DEA warns police that they can be injured just by touching it, and it can be taken as a pill (brand names: Duragesic, Actiq, and Fentora), a spray, snorted, shot, used as a transdermal patch, mixed with heroin, you name it. Prince died from an overdose of fentanyl; as many as seven hundred Americans overdosed on the drug last year. (…) In New Orleans, The Times-Picayune reported that fentanyl deaths exceeded the number of murders for the first month of 2016. In Connecticut, fentanyl-related deaths increased by 151 percent between 2014 and 2015 and are expected to rise another 77 percent in 2016. For the narcos, the advantages of fentanyl over heroin are enormous. First of all, it’s made in a lab, so you don’t need fields of poppies that can be raided, fumigated, or seized. You don’t need hundreds of campesinos to harvest your crop and you don’t need to take or control territory. (Well, not territory for cultivation—you still have to control access to smuggling turf, hence the renewed violence in Baja, where the murder rate has tripled.) But it’s the profits that will make fentanyl the new crack cocaine, which created the enormous wealth of the Mexican cartels in the eighties and nineties. A kilo of fentanyl can be stepped on sixteen to twenty-four times to create an astounding return on investment of $1.3 million per kilo, compared with $271,000 per kilo of heroin. No wonder the DEA estimates that the importation of fentanyl from Mexico is up by 65 percent from 2014. Because fentanyl is now often mixed with heroin to increase the latter’s potency, unaware heroin users are dying from the same doses that used to just get them well. EMTs, ER personnel, and cops don’t know what they’re looking at, or that they need twice the dosage of naloxone, or Narcan, to revive an addict whose respiratory system has been shut down by fentanyl. Those who survive become more addicted. The cartels mix fentanyl with heroin because once an addict has shot that mix, they won’t go back to « just heroin, » since they can’t get high on it anymore. The combination of lab-produced illegal fentanyl and the fracturing of the Sinaloa Cartel is a catastrophe for law enforcement and American society as a whole but an absolute boon for the narcos seeking to supplant the old order. Splinter groups such as CJNG can easily use the enormous profit potential of fentanyl to fund their rebellions, and those same profits will encourage them toward violence to control the smuggling routes. ISIS is waning in Iraq largely because it can no longer pay its fighters. Fentanyl assures the new narcos that they will not have that problem. All they’ll need is the will for violence, and they already have that, in spades. Mexico has done little to fill the vacuum created by Guzmán’s fall. As a result, there will not be three groups seeking to fill that gap, there will be dozens. On the American side, the rise of splinter groups makes it all the harder for law enforcement to track and intercept the drug. We’ll no longer know where’s it coming from, and worse, what’s in it. First responders will not be able to tell if they’re dealing with pure heroin, heroin laced with fentanyl, pure fentanyl, fentanyl cut with God knows what … there will be pharmacological chaos. We talk about the heroin epidemic. Fentanyl will be the plague. (…) In the Middle East, we traded the devil we knew for the devils we didn’t. In Mexico, the devils we know will be replaced by a multiplicity of devils we’ll never know. The ability to hide production (unlike marijuana or poppy fields) and the anonymity of communicating on social media will create anarchy. The era of the cartel might be coming to an end. (…) So Guzmán is behind bars, it’s over, and we won. Just like we won when Hussein literally reached the end of his rope. The Los Angeles Times estimates that two thirds of Mexican drug lords have been either killed or imprisoned. And what’s the result? Drugs are more plentiful, more potent, and cheaper than ever. Deaths from overdoses are at an all-time high. Violence in Mexico, once declining, is starting to rise again. Just last week, I looked at photographs of the bodies of four people stuffed into a car trunk in Tijuana. The bodies showed signs of torture. Gang violence is on the rise in every major American city, most notably Chicago and New York, and the cowardly lions in Congress will do exactly shit about either the drugs or the guns that fuel and enable the killings and deaths—more than ISIS ever dreamed of. Seems like old times. There will be more phone calls and more overdoses. Someone will replace El Chapo, just as he replaced his predecessors. My bet’s on El Mencho, but it really doesn’t matter. That’s the lesson we seem to have to learn over and over and over again, world without end, amen. Guzmán was right: « If there was no consumption, there would be no sales. » I’m always amazed that progressive young millennials will picket a grocery chain for not buying fair-trade coffee but will go home and do drugs that are brought to them by the killers, torturers, and sadists of the cartels. We’re as addicted to the War on Drugs as we are to the drugs themselves. Our justice system is a machine fueled by hundreds of thousands of arrests, trials, and imprisonments. As long as the U. S. and Europe continue to buy billions of dollars’ worth of drugs a year while at the same time spending billions to intercept them, we will create an endless succession of Chapos and Menchos. An entire economy is based on drug prohibition and punishment, something to the tune of $50 billion a year, more than double the estimated $22 billion we spend on heroin. Don Winslow
There was a fundamental problem with the decision that you can see rippling now throughout the West. Ms. Merkel had put the entire burden of a huge cultural change not on herself and those like her but on regular people who live closer to the edge, who do not have the resources to meet the burden, who have no particular protection or money or connections. Ms. Merkel, her cabinet and government, the media and cultural apparatus that lauded her decision were not in the least affected by it and likely never would be. Nothing in their lives will get worse. The challenge of integrating different cultures, negotiating daily tensions, dealing with crime and extremism and fearfulness on the street—that was put on those with comparatively little, whom I’ve called the unprotected. They were left to struggle, not gradually and over the years but suddenly and in an air of ongoing crisis that shows no signs of ending—because nobody cares about them enough to stop it. The powerful show no particular sign of worrying about any of this. When the working and middle class pushed back in shocked indignation, the people on top called them “xenophobic,” “narrow-minded,” “racist.” The detached, who made the decisions and bore none of the costs, got to be called “humanist,” “compassionate,” and “hero of human rights.” The larger point is that this is something we are seeing all over, the top detaching itself from the bottom, feeling little loyalty to it or affiliation with it. It is a theme I see working its way throughout the West’s power centers. At its heart it is not only a detachment from, but a lack of interest in, the lives of your countrymen, of those who are not at the table, and who understand that they’ve been abandoned by their leaders’ selfishness and mad virtue-signalling. On Wall Street, where they used to make statesmen, they now barely make citizens. CEOs are consumed with short-term thinking, stock prices, quarterly profits. They don’t really believe that they have to be involved with “America” now; they see their job as thinking globally and meeting shareholder expectations. In Silicon Valley the idea of “the national interest” is not much discussed. They adhere to higher, more abstract, more global values. They’re not about America, they’re about . . . well, I suppose they’d say the future. In Hollywood the wealthy protect their own children from cultural decay, from the sick images they create for all the screens, but they don’t mind if poor, unparented children from broken-up families get those messages and, in the way of things, act on them down the road. From what I’ve seen of those in power throughout business and politics now, the people of your country are not your countrymen, they’re aliens whose bizarre emotions you must attempt occasionally to anticipate and manage. In Manhattan, my little island off the continent, I see the children of the global business elite marry each other and settle in London or New York or Mumbai. They send their children to the same schools and are alert to all class markers. And those elites, of Mumbai and Manhattan, do not often identify with, or see a connection to or an obligation toward, the rough, struggling people who live at the bottom in their countries. In fact, they fear them, and often devise ways, when home, of not having their wealth and worldly success fully noticed. Affluence detaches, power adds distance to experience. I don’t have it fully right in my mind but something big is happening here with this division between the leaders and the led. It is very much a feature of our age. But it is odd that our elites have abandoned or are abandoning the idea that they belong to a country, that they have ties that bring responsibilities, that they should feel loyalty to their people or, at the very least, a grounded respect. I close with a story that I haven’t seen in the mainstream press. This week the Daily Caller’s Peter Hasson reported that recent Syrian refugees being resettled in Virginia, were sent to the state’s poorest communities. Data from the State Department showed that almost all Virginia’s refugees since October “have been placed in towns with lower incomes and higher poverty rates, hours away from the wealthy suburbs outside of Washington, D.C.” Of 121 refugees, 112 were placed in communities at least 100 miles from the nation’s capital. The suburban counties of Fairfax, Loudoun and Arlington—among the wealthiest in the nation, and home to high concentrations of those who create, and populate, government and the media—have received only nine refugees. Some of the detachment isn’t unconscious. Some of it is sheer and clever self-protection. At least on some level they can take care of their own. Peggy Noonan

Attention: une ignorance peut en cacher une autre !

Ouverture à tout va allemande des vannes face à l’immigration majoritairement musulmane, célèbration par le Pape lui-même de l’invasion qui s’en est suivi,  abolition discrète française, sous la menace désormais constante des djihadistes tant violents que « civilisationnels », de la frontière entre immigration régulière et irrégulière, accès du mariage et bientôt de l’adoption et de la gestation pour autrui aux couples de même sexe, légalisation rampante de l’inceste, véritable explosion aux Etats-Unis, suite entre autres à la dépénalisation du cannabis, de la consommation d’héroïne et du nombre de victimes de surdoses …

Y a-t-il une mesure aberrante que nos apprentis sorciers de gouvernants n’auront pas prise ?

Et de mots assez durs, dans la bouche des mêmes et de leur claque médiatique, pour qualifier ces masses prétendument ignorantes …

Qui comme le rappelle très judicieusement l’éditorialiste du Wall Street Journal Peggy Noonan …

Vont seules en subir les conséquences ?

How Global Elites Forsake Their Countrymen
Those in power see people at the bottom as aliens whose bizarre emotions they must try to manage.
Peggy Noonan
The Wall Street Journal
Aug. 11, 2016

This is about distance, and detachment, and a kind of historic decoupling between the top and the bottom in the West that did not, in more moderate recent times, exist.

Recently I spoke with an acquaintance of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and the conversation quickly turned, as conversations about Ms. Merkel now always do, to her decisions on immigration. Last summer when Europe was engulfed with increasing waves of migrants and refugees from Muslim countries, Ms. Merkel, moving unilaterally, announced that Germany would take in an astounding 800,000. Naturally this was taken as an invitation, and more than a million came. The result has been widespread public furor over crime, cultural dissimilation and fears of terrorism. From such a sturdy, grounded character as Ms. Merkel the decision was puzzling—uncharacteristically romantic about people, how they live their lives, and history itself, which is more charnel house than settlement house.

Ms. Merkel’s acquaintance sighed and agreed. It’s one thing to be overwhelmed by an unexpected force, quite another to invite your invaders in! But, the acquaintance said, he believed the chancellor was operating in pursuit of ideals. As the daughter of a Lutheran minister, someone who grew up in East Germany, Ms. Merkel would have natural sympathy for those who feel marginalized and displaced. Moreover she is attempting to provide a kind of counter-statement, in the 21st century, to Germany’s great sin of the 20th. The historical stain of Nazism, the murder and abuse of the minority, will be followed by the moral triumph of open arms toward the dispossessed. That’s what’s driving it, said the acquaintance.

It was as good an explanation as I’d heard. But there was a fundamental problem with the decision that you can see rippling now throughout the West. Ms. Merkel had put the entire burden of a huge cultural change not on herself and those like her but on regular people who live closer to the edge, who do not have the resources to meet the burden, who have no particular protection or money or connections. Ms. Merkel, her cabinet and government, the media and cultural apparatus that lauded her decision were not in the least affected by it and likely never would be.

Nothing in their lives will get worse. The challenge of integrating different cultures, negotiating daily tensions, dealing with crime and extremism and fearfulness on the street—that was put on those with comparatively little, whom I’ve called the unprotected. They were left to struggle, not gradually and over the years but suddenly and in an air of ongoing crisis that shows no signs of ending—because nobody cares about them enough to stop it.

The powerful show no particular sign of worrying about any of this. When the working and middle class pushed back in shocked indignation, the people on top called them “xenophobic,” “narrow-minded,” “racist.” The detached, who made the decisions and bore none of the costs, got to be called “humanist,” “compassionate,” and “hero of human rights.”

And so the great separating incident at Cologne last New Year’s, and the hundreds of sexual assaults by mostly young migrant men who were brought up in societies where women are veiled—who think they should be veiled—and who chose to see women in short skirts and high heels as asking for it.

Cologne of course was followed by other crimes.

The journalist Chris Caldwell reports in the Weekly Standard on Ms. Merkel’s statement a few weeks ago, in which she told Germans that history was asking them to “master the flip side, the shadow side, of all the positive effects of globalization.”

Caldwell: “This was the chancellor’s . . . way of acknowledging that various newcomers to the national household had begun to attack and kill her voters at an alarming rate.” Soon after her remarks, more horrific crimes followed, including in Munich (nine killed in a McDonald’s ) Reutlingen (a knife attack) and Ansbach (a suicide bomber).

***

The larger point is that this is something we are seeing all over, the top detaching itself from the bottom, feeling little loyalty to it or affiliation with it. It is a theme I see working its way throughout the West’s power centers. At its heart it is not only a detachment from, but a lack of interest in, the lives of your countrymen, of those who are not at the table, and who understand that they’ve been abandoned by their leaders’ selfishness and mad virtue-signalling.

On Wall Street, where they used to make statesmen, they now barely make citizens. CEOs are consumed with short-term thinking, stock prices, quarterly profits. They don’t really believe that they have to be involved with “America” now; they see their job as thinking globally and meeting shareholder expectations.

In Silicon Valley the idea of “the national interest” is not much discussed. They adhere to higher, more abstract, more global values. They’re not about America, they’re about . . . well, I suppose they’d say the future.

In Hollywood the wealthy protect their own children from cultural decay, from the sick images they create for all the screens, but they don’t mind if poor, unparented children from broken-up families get those messages and, in the way of things, act on them down the road.

From what I’ve seen of those in power throughout business and politics now, the people of your country are not your countrymen, they’re aliens whose bizarre emotions you must attempt occasionally to anticipate and manage.

In Manhattan, my little island off the continent, I see the children of the global business elite marry each other and settle in London or New York or Mumbai. They send their children to the same schools and are alert to all class markers. And those elites, of Mumbai and Manhattan, do not often identify with, or see a connection to or an obligation toward, the rough, struggling people who live at the bottom in their countries. In fact, they fear them, and often devise ways, when home, of not having their wealth and worldly success fully noticed.

Affluence detaches, power adds distance to experience. I don’t have it fully right in my mind but something big is happening here with this division between the leaders and the led. It is very much a feature of our age. But it is odd that our elites have abandoned or are abandoning the idea that they belong to a country, that they have ties that bring responsibilities, that they should feel loyalty to their people or, at the very least, a grounded respect.

I close with a story that I haven’t seen in the mainstream press. This week the Daily Caller’s Peter Hasson reported that recent Syrian refugees being resettled in Virginia, were sent to the state’s poorest communities. Data from the State Department showed that almost all Virginia’s refugees since October “have been placed in towns with lower incomes and higher poverty rates, hours away from the wealthy suburbs outside of Washington, D.C.” Of 121 refugees, 112 were placed in communities at least 100 miles from the nation’s capital. The suburban counties of Fairfax, Loudoun and Arlington—among the wealthiest in the nation, and home to high concentrations of those who create, and populate, government and the media—have received only nine refugees.

Some of the detachment isn’t unconscious. Some of it is sheer and clever self-protection. At least on some level they can take care of their own.

Voir aussi:

Le communiqué qui nie la notion d’immigration illégale
Alexis Théas
Le Figaro
12/08/2016

FIGAROVOX/OPINION – Une communiqué du ministère de l’Intérieur et du Logement nie de fait la distinction entre immigration régulière et immigration illégale. Alexis Théas redoute l’appel d’air que pourrait suciter cette évolution de la politique d’immigration française.

Alexis Théas est universitaire et juriste.

Le 1er août 2016, les ministres de l’Intérieur et du Logement ont publié un communiqué passé totalement inaperçu dans la torpeur de l’été mais d’une importance capitale sur le plan de l’évolution des mentalités et de l’idéologie politique française. Ce texte marque une inflexion de la conception française de l’immigration. Jusqu’alors, celle-ci était fondée sur la distinction entre l’immigration régulière et l’immigration illégale. La première, conforme à la loi, était destinée par exemple à accueillir des travailleurs dont la France peut avoir besoin, à former des étudiants dans l’intérêt de la France ou du pays d’origine, ou bien à assurer le principe d’unité familiale. Elle était évaluée à environ 200 000 personnes par an. En revanche, les migrants en situation irrégulière, entrés ou séjournant en infraction avec la loi, devaient impérativement repartir dans leur pays, volontairement ou par la contrainte. Tel était le principe. Cette différence, pour la première fois depuis que l’immigration est devenue un sujet politique au début des années 1980, semble désormais ni par l’Etat. Le migrant en situation irrégulière n’a plus vocation à être reconduit dans son pays, mais à être accueilli en France et pris en charge par la puissance publique, au même titre qu’un étranger en situation régulière ou qu’un citoyen français en difficulté.

Communiqué du 1er août 2016 : «Créé le 25 février dernier à l’initiative de Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l’Intérieur, et d’Emmanuelle Cosse, ministre du Logement et de l’Habitat durable, le comité de suivi du plan de mise à l’abri des migrants sans-abri s’est à nouveau réuni mardi 26 juillet 2016. Présidée par Emmanuelle Cosse, en présence de représentants du Ministère de l’Intérieur, du Ministère de la Famille, de l’Enfance et des Droits des Femmes et de la Préfecture du Pas- de-Calais, cette séance a rassemblé une trentaine d’associations engagées dans l’accompagnement des migrants. Les pouvoirs publics ont tenu à saluer leur travail et leur mobilisation pour faire face à cette crise migratoire sans précédent. A cette occasion, le ministère de l’Intérieur et le ministère du Logement et de l’Habitat durable ont présenté aux associations la Charte de fonctionnement des Centres d’Accueil et d’Orientation (CAO). Répondant à un souhait partagé de l’Etat et des acteurs associatifs, et rédigée au terme de plusieurs semaines de dialogue avec les opérateurs des CAO, cette charte édicte des règles claires de fonctionnement et décrit les principales prestations délivrées aux migrants sans-abri qui y sont accueillis: conditions d’accueil et de localisation, taux d’encadrement, restauration, évaluation – juridique, sociale et médicale – de la situation des personnes accueillies et accompagnement adapté, sécurité, etc. La prise en charge en CAO doit ainsi permettre aux personnes migrantes sans-abri de bénéficier d’un temps de répit et d’engager, si elles le souhaitent, une démarche de demande d’asile. Elle leur permet également d’avoir accès à une offre de soins adaptée et d’être orientées rapidement vers des structures qui correspondent à leur situation (CADA pour les demandeurs d’asile, etc.). Depuis le 27 octobre dernier, 148 Centres d’accueil et d’orientation ont été ouverts sur l’ensemble du territoire national pour un total de près de 2000 places qui ont permis de mettre l’abri plus de 4700 personnes dans des délais très resserrés.»

Ce communiqué enterre donc de fait toute notion d’immigration irrégulière. Il abolit le clivage entre légalité et illégalité en matière d’immigration. Il va dans le sens de la loi du 7 mars 2016, dont les dispositions reviennent à rendre très difficiles l’application des mesures d’éloignement. Il proclame que la France a le devoir d’accueillir et de prendre en charge tout étranger sur son territoire, qu’il soit autorisé à entrer et à séjourner ou qu’il ne le soit pas. De facto, le principe ainsi proclamé abroge l’idée de frontière ou de respect du droit de l’entrée et de séjour. Les associations humanitaires, les idéologues, les partisans de la liberté totale d’immigrer en rêvaient depuis au moins quarante ans. M. Cazeneuve et Mme Cosse l’ont fait. La question est de savoir quel sera l’ampleur de l’appel d’air que cette transformation profonde de tous les fondements de la politique d’immigration française est susceptible provoquer à terme. Le communiqué annonce une France ouverte, qui n’éloigne plus ses migrants illégaux mais au contraire les accueille. Le potentiel d’émigration est élevé: des centaines de millions de personnes déshéritées et désœuvrées, dans ce monde en ébullition, ne songent qu’à trouver un point d’accueil. Reste à savoir si la France, qui compte cinq millions de chômeurs, de gigantesques problèmes de logement, des centaines de milliers de personnes vivant sous le seuil de pauvreté, un millier de cités sensibles dévastées par la violence, l’exclusion, le communautarisme, l’islamisme radical, si cette France a les moyens d’accueillir une immigration supplémentaire. Mais pour M. Cazeneuve et Mme Cosse, c’est une autre affaire. Et ce n’est visiblement pas la leur.

Voir encore:

Jean-Louis Harouel : «Les femmes qui portent le burkini sont des militantes»

Alexandre Devecchio

Le Figaro

16/08/2016

FIGAROVOX/ANALYSE – Pour Jean-Louis Harouel, l’interdiction du burkini sur certaines plages est parfaitement conforme au droit. Pour lui, le port du vêtement islamique traduit une volonté politique d’imposer une culture et des modes de vie contraires à notre histoire et nos valeurs.


Jean-Louis Harouel est professeur agrégé de droit à Paris II et auteur de «La grande falsification. L’art contemporain», «Le vrai génie du christianisme» et «Revenir à la nation» (Editions Jean-Cyrille Godefroy). Son dernier ouvrage Les droits de l’homme contre le peuple est paru aux éditions Desclée de Brouwer.


LE FIGARO – La justice a validé ce week-end l’arrêté municipal interdisant le port du burkini à Cannes. Des associations «anti-islamophobie» réclamant en urgence la suspension de l’arrêté municipal cannois du 28 juillet se sont vues déboutées par le tribunal administratif de Nice. Cette décision est-elle surprenante? Vous semble-t-elle conforme au droit français?

Jean-Louis HAROUEL – Cette décision n’est aucunement surprenante car parfaitement conforme à la jurisprudence du Conseil d’État, sachant que celle-ci n’a pas été statique à travers le temps mais a évolué en fonction du contexte politique et social. Dans des périodes relativement apaisées, cette jurisprudence était résolument libérale et faisait passer les libertés avant les soucis de l’ordre public, comme en témoigne le célèbre arrêt Benjamin de 1933. Cependant, dans la seconde moitié des années 1930, les passions politiques s’exacerbant et l’ordre public étant sans cesse plus menacé, intervient en 1936 le tournant de l’arrêt Bucard, par lequel le Conseil d’État a abandonné cette jurisprudence libérale pour faire prévaloir les impératifs de l’ordre public. Et il faudra attendre 1953 pour que s’opère avec l’arrêt Naud un retour au libéralisme de la jurisprudence Benjamin.

Aujourd’hui, dans le contexte d’un affrontement de civilisations donnant lieu à un conflit armé ayant fait en un an des centaines de victimes sur le territoire national, il est logique que reviennent au premier plan les exigences de l’ordre public, et le juge des référés a d’ailleurs invoqué «le contexte de l’état d’urgence et des récents attentats» pour justifier sa décision en la fondant sur «un risque de troubles à l’ordre public».

Le juge note en outre que «sont respectées les dispositions de l’article 1er de la Constitution («La France est une République laïque»), qui interdisent à quiconque de se prévaloir de ses croyances religieuses pour s’affranchir des règles communes régissant les relations entre collectivités publiques et particuliers.»

Certes, mais en l’occurrence, il ne s’agit pas d’un service public, mais d’une plage…

Le fait d’administrer et gérer au bénéfice des usagers une portion du domaine public affectée à l’usage du public constitue une activité exercée dans l’intérêt général, et relève donc de la notion de service public.

Est-ce un premier pas vers l’interdiction de tous les signes religieux dans l’espace public? N’est-ce pas une vision de la laïcité excessive? Cette dernière sert-elle de cache-sexe à un combat plus spécifique contre l’islam politique?

L’islam est, par nature, politique. On ne saurait trop le rappeler: l’islam est un système total qui mêle le religieux, le politique, le juridique, la civilisation. L’islam est un code de droit qui prétend remplacer le droit du pays d’accueil. Si bien que toute concession faite à l’islam comme religion est un abandon consenti à l’islam comme système politico-juridique ainsi qu’à la civilisation islamique.

Face à l’islam, la laïcité conçue comme neutralité ne suffit pas. Le cas de figure n’est pas le même qu’avec le catholicisme. Notre laïcité s’est certes construite contre l’Église, mais en accord avec les paroles fondatrices du christianisme: rendre à César et à Dieu ce qui leur revient respectivement. L’islam est au contraire l’anti-laïcité par excellence, si bien que notre État laïque devrait le combattre beaucoup plus durement qu’il n’a combattu le catholicisme.

Ainsi que je le préconise dans mon récent livre Les droits de l’homme contre le peuple, il faut pour l’islam un régime dérogatoire comme en Suisse où la construction de minarets est interdite alors qu’on peut bien sûr y construire des clochers.

Cela vient après l’affaire du parc aquatique privatisé pour les salafistes dans les Bouches-du-Rhône. Ce genre de pratique est tolérée dans certaines villes pour la communauté juive par exemple. Que répondez-vous à ceux qui dénoncent le «deux poids, deux mesures»?

Peut-on citer le nom de quelqu’un ayant opéré un massacre en France au nom d’une quelconque mouvance du judaïsme?

En Corse, la baignade de jeunes filles en burkini a provoqué une violente rixe entre jeunes corses et jeunes d’origine maghrébine. Que cela vous inspire-t-il?

C’est un exemple des troubles à l’ordre public que peut entraîner cet étalage sur les plages françaises des pratiques identitaires islamiques. Surtout dans le contexte des récents massacres commis par des islamistes au nom de leur dieu.

Par ailleurs, il est clair qu’en Corse où la population est restée plus près de son sol, plus ancrée dans ses villages, elle se montre plus réactive face au processus de la conquête islamiste non dite mais bien réelle dont l’Europe occidentale est l’objet. Cependant, même dans l’Hexagone, de plus en plus de gens ont conscience du lien qui existe entre les carnages des terroristes islamistes et le folklore identitaire arabo-musulman qui est le terreau où se nourrit le djihadisme.

Après l’arrêté de Cannes, pris le 28 juillet, une autre commune des Alpes-Maritimes interdit la baignade en burkini: Villeneuve-Loubet. Cela est-il le signe d’une prise de conscience face au danger de l’islam politique, au-delà de la menace terroriste?

On peut l’espérer. Notre pays est actuellement en guerre, et s’il ne veut pas être vaincu dans cette guerre, il doit savoir contre qui et contre quoi il se bat. Pour ne pas perdre une guerre, il faut impérativement nommer l’ennemi. Or, en l’espèce, celui-ci est double: d’une part les djihadistes violents qui massacrent dans notre pays; et d’autre part, les djihadistes «civilisationnels», qui œuvrent inlassablement à rendre toujours plus présents sur notre sol leur civilisation, leurs règles et leur mode de vie.

À moyen et long terme, le plus grand danger pour les Français est la conquête feutrée de la France par le djihadisme civilisationnel, conquête qui s’opère au nom des droits de l’homme. Les femmes qui portent des vêtements de bain islamiques sont des militantes de la conquête de notre pays par un groupe humain porteur d’une civilisation antagoniste. Cet été, les plages sont la nouvelle partie de notre territoire que visent à s’approprier les islamistes.

Voir enfin:

El Chapo and the Secret History of the Heroin Crisis
If you wonder why America is in the grips of a heroin epidemic that kills two hundred people a week, take a hard look at the legalization of pot, which destroyed the profits of the Mexican cartels. How did they respond to a major loss in revenue? Like any company, they created an irresistible new product and flooded the market. The scariest part: this might not have happened with El Chapo in charge.
Don Winslow
Esquire
Aug. 9, 2016

The phone rang. It was July 2014, and I was in a motel room in Tucumcari, New Mexico, about to step into the shower. My wife and I were two days into a cross-country drive from our home in California, and I wanted to clean up before we went to a sports bar across the parking lot to grab something to eat.

Looking at the phone, I recognized the number and felt my heart drop. The woman was a close friend. Her twenty-three-year-old son had struggled with heroin addiction for several years.

I knew the young man. He was smart, talented, funny—and charming when he wasn’t high or jonesing. He was supposed to have called me that day to discuss getting back into school.

I didn’t get that call.

It was his mother on the phone, sobbing, barely able to stammer out the words that I already knew she was going to say. « He’s gone. »

That afternoon, she told me, he was walking to a treatment center that finally had a bed for him, but he stopped for one last « get well » fix. He died on the sidewalk.

His mother and I were on the phone for quite a while. Mostly I listened, because what was there to say? Then I got into the shower and cried.

I’ve been writing about and researching the so-called War on Drugs for more than twenty years. During that time I’ve been to funerals, I’ve sat with the families of teenage hitmen, I’ve explained to people why their loved ones were killed, providing information that the government would not. I’ve analyzed autopsy photos, trying to put names to anonymous victims. I’ve watched the atrocity videos. I thought I was inured to it, hardened to insensitivity by the numbing sameness of this never-ending tragedy. I thought I was beyond tears.

This one hurt. It was personal (why hadn’t he called me, why the fuck hadn’t he called me?), and, moreover, I knew how it had happened.

It was his mother on the phone, sobbing, barely able to stammer out the words that I already knew she was going to say. « He’s gone. »
The heroin that killed him came from Mexico. The people who grew the poppies, manufactured the drug, and shipped it north were members of Mexico’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, and the death of my friend’s son came as a direct result of a business decision made by several of these men.

One of them was Joaquín Guzmán Loera.

The jefe of the Sinaloa Cartel, the largest drug trafficker in the world. Aka « El Chapo. »

Yeah, him.

Guzmán and I go way back. (I resist calling him El Chapo because the diminutive makes him seem like some sort of cute Disney dwarf who whistles while he works rather than the mass murderer he is.) I remember the days when young Joaquín was learning the pista secreta as an errand boy/driver for the old giants of the trade, such as Pedro Avilés Pérez and Rafael Caro Quintero.

Guzmán had worked and killed his way up to the big leagues by the time he first went to prison, in 1993. While he was running his business from his suite inside Puente Grande federal prison, I was working on a book called The Power of the Dog, the first of three novels I’ve written about the evolution of the Mexican drug scene. I was talking to cops and convicts, drug traffickers and addicts, gangbangers and their families. I was in the prisons and on the streets, in the archives and the courts, on the border and across it. I was still working on that book when Guzmán made his first escape in 2001.

At the time, Mexican drug traffic was divided among several major and a dozen minor groups, the most important being the Juárez Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel, and the Gulf Cartel, with its hyperviolent armed wing, the Zetas.

When Guzmán got out of Puente Grande, he sought to control the entire Mexican drug business under the name of the Sinaloa Cartel. Over the next ten years, he went to war against the other traffickers.

That war took more than a hundred thousand lives in Mexico, with more than twenty-two thousand people still « missing. » It’s been a catastrophe on this side of the border, too, directly causing, among other things, the recent heroin epidemic that has killed thousands, among them my friend’s son.

Last summer I went on a book tour for my novel The Cartel. At every stop on that tour, I met people who had lost a loved one to drug-related violence in Mexico or to a drug overdose here in the U. S. In Scottsdale a woman asked me if I knew anything about her best friend’s murder. (I did.) In Seattle a man asked if I had any information about his brother-in-law’s kidnapping. (I didn’t.)

One night was the anniversary of my friend’s son’s death. I called her from outside a bookstore in a Los Angeles mall and then went in to talk about the damn novel.

THE POT PARADOX
Okay, I’m going to say it: The heroin epidemic was caused by the legalization of marijuana.

We wanted legal weed, and for the most part, we got it. Four states have legalized it outright, others have decriminalized it, and in many jurisdictions police refuse to enforce the laws that are on the books, creating a de facto street legalization.

Good news, right?

Not for the Sinaloa Cartel, which by the time Colorado passed Amendment 64 in 2012 had become the dominant cartel in Mexico. Weed was a major profit center for them, but suddenly they couldn’t compete against a superior American product that also had drastically lower transportation and security costs.

In Scottsdale a woman asked me if I knew anything about her best friend’s murder. (I did.) In Seattle a man asked if I had any information about his brother-in-law’s kidnapping. (I didn’t.)
In a single year, the cartel suffered a 40 percent drop in marijuana sales, representing billions of dollars. Mexican marijuana became an almost worthless product. They’ve basically stopped growing the shit: Once-vast fields in Durango now lie fallow.

More good news, right?

Yeah, no. Guzmán and his boys are businessmen. They’re not going to take a forty-point hit and not do something about it. They had to make up those profits somewhere.

Looking at the American drug market as it existed, Guzmán and his partners saw an opportunity. An increasing number of Americans were addicted to prescription opioids such as Oxycontin.

And their addiction was expensive. One capsule of Oxy might sell on the street for thirty dollars, and an addict might need ten hits a day.

Well, shit, they thought. We have some of the best poppy fields in the world. Opium, morphine, Oxy, heroin—they’re basically the same drug, so …

The Sinaloa Cartel decided to undercut the pharmaceutical companies. They increased the production of Mexican heroin by almost 70 percent, and also raised the purity level, bringing in Colombian cooks to create « cinnamon » heroin as strong as the East Asian product. They had been selling a product that was about 46 percent pure, now they improved it to 90 percent.

Their third move was classic market economics—they dropped the price. A kilo of heroin went for as much as $200,000 in New York City a few years ago, cost $80,000 in 2013, and now has dropped to around $50,000. More of a better product for less money: You can’t beat it.

At the same time, American drug and law-enforcement officials, concerned about the dramatic surge in overdose deaths from pharmaceutical opioids (165,000 from 1999 to 2014), cracked down on both legal and illegal distribution, opening the door for Mexican heroin, which sold for five to ten bucks a dose.

But pill users were not accustomed to the potency of this new heroin. Even heroin addicts were taken by surprise.

As a result, overdose deaths have skyrocketed, more than doubling from 2000 to 2014. More people—47,055—died from drug overdoses in 2014 than in any other year in American history. (Perhaps the most famous of these, Philip Seymour Hoffman, died on February 2, 2014, right at the height of the epidemic.) That’s 125 people a day, more than five lives every hour, a fatality level that matched the AIDS epidemic’s peak in 1995.

PANDORA’S NEW BOX
On February 21, 2014, after thirteen years of being the most wanted man in Mexico (despite frequent appearances at restaurants, concerts, and holiday parties), Guzmán was recaptured.

When journalists called to get my comment, I had a one-word answer: Iraq.

« What do you mean? » they asked. I reminded them that in the power vacuum that followed Saddam Hussein’s capture and subsequent execution, Iraq splintered into sectarian violence, Shiite against Sunni. ISIS came into being, overran Iraqi and Syrian cities, and launched a reign of terror.

Look, I shed no tears for either Hussein or Guzmán. Both were killers and torturers. But the fact is that the horrific violence of Guzmán’s war of conquest had largely abated by 2014, precisely because he had won the war (with at least the passive assistance of the Mexican and U. S. governments) and established what’s come to be called the Pax Sinaloa.

The Sinaloan Peace.

Historically, the Sinaloa Cartel has been the least violent of the Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Admittedly, this isn’t a high bar to clear, but it has long been axiomatic that the Mexican government felt that it could at least talk to Guzmán and his partners in ways it never could with, for instance, the Zetas.

Many journalists and writers, myself among them, believe that the Mexican government eventually supported the Sinaloa Cartel during the worst years of the drug war in an attempt to establish some modicum of order. The numbers back this theory—the Sinaloa Cartel, while by far the largest group, makes up only 12 percent of the thousands of police and military arrests and killings of narcos.

Guzmán and his partners were famously averse to violence against civilians (again, this is all relative). For instance, Guzmán prohibited his people from carrying out kidnappings, a lucrative business for the other cartels.

The overwhelming power of the Sinaloa Cartel, led by Guzmán and his partners Ismael « El Mayo » Zambada García and (the possibly late) Juan Jose Esparragoza-Moreno, was holding together a fragile peace among scores of smaller trafficking organizations.

Which is why the Mexican government was, shall we say, ambivalent about Guzmán’s capture in the first place. And let’s face it—if corruption were an Olympic event, Mexico would be a perennial gold-medal winner. The Sinaloa Cartel had simply purchased elements of the Mexican government on the local, state, and federal levels. Zambada in particular was the political connection between the cartel and the Mexican government and business powers.

That, coupled with the fact that the cartels control somewhere between 8 and 12 percent of the Mexican economy, gave the Sinaloans enormous power and influence. With billions of dollars in drug profits invested in legitimate business, the economy of Mexico is simply dependent on the drug trade.

Just seven months after Guzmán’s capture, as the Sinaloan Peace faltered, Mexico saw its highest-profile massacre in years. On September 26, 2014, forty-three students from the Ayotzinapa teachers college went missing in Iguala, Mexico, a town three hours south of Mexico City.

International outrage and mass protests forced the government to launch a cover-up—er, investigation, which eventually determined that Mexican police took the students off four buses they had commandeered to travel to a protest in Mexico City and turned them over to an up-and-coming drug-trafficking organization with the vainglorious name of Guerreros Unidos (United Warriors).

The students were taken to a dump on the outskirts of the nearest town. Fifteen died of suffocation on the drive there. The rest were interrogated and then killed, their bodies burned with gasoline and old tires.

The students’ crime? One version has it that the local mayor simply didn’t like the students’ left-wing politics. Okay, so they had their police turn them over to…narcos? Sure, that makes sense, about as much sense as any of the other cover stories that Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto’s government has asked us to accept.

The second explanation is a Mexican classic that gets reheated every time there’s a massacre—the narcos of Guerreros Unidos suspected some of the students of being associated with a rival trafficking group, Los Rojos.

It’s possible, and this is where the Iraq analogy plays out. Just as Hussein’s demise unleashed ancient hatreds, Guzmán’s capture revived old blood feuds, the complexity of which could fill a season of Game of Thrones.

The condensed version: Guzmán and the four Beltrán Leyva brothers were once close friends, but they had a falling out after Guzmán had one of the brothers arrested and another was killed during an arrest attempt. One of the battlefields of the ensuing war between the Beltrán Leyva Organization and the Sinaloa Cartel was Guerrero State, where the students were massacred. The Sinaloa Cartel took it from BLO after bloody fighting.

The Guerreros Unidos narcos who murdered the students were a faction loyal to BLO who only reluctantly gave their fealty to the Sinaloans after being defeated in the war. Now, in the aftermath of Guzmán’s capture, the remnants of BLO saw the opportunity for a comeback.

Los Rojos, the other insurgent group fighting for Guerrero, also has scores to settle, both with Guerreros Unidos and the Sinaloans. A faction of the old Gulf Cartel, it had fought against BLO when it was still part of the Sinaloa coalition. In the perceived vacuum created by Guzmán’s arrest, it saw its chance to recapture territory.

Sunni versus Shiite.

In a Sinaloa Cartel–controlled Guerrero, the murders of forty-three college students would have required Guzmán’s explicit permission, which he would not have given. That Guerreros Unidos felt free to perpetrate this massacre is deeply problematic for the future of a peaceful Mexico.

EL CHAPO’S « ESCAPE »
The end of the Pax Sinaloa probably also had something to do with Guzmán’s second escape from prison, on July 12, 2015.The details of the caper were catnip to the media—the story was that Guzmán had gone through a trapdoor in his shower (yes, he had a private shower, complete with a « privacy wall »; I will leave you to ponder the concept of a privacy wall in a maximum-security prison) into a mile-long tunnel through which he rode a motorcycle, right under the noses of oblivious prison authorities who apparently heretofore believed they had a wicked gopher problem.

For the record, Guzmán did not go out that tunnel on a motorcycle. Steve McQueen escapes on motorcycles. My money says that Guzmán didn’t go into that tunnel at all; anyone who can afford to pay $50 million in bribes and finance the excavation of a mile-long tunnel can also afford not to use it.

Gentle reader, the man is worth $1 billion. He was thinking about buying the Chelsea Football Club. He went out the front door.

After Chapo Guzmán became a household name, the media was voracious for details about his life. He grew up poor, harvesting opium in the fields when he was eight years old. He started selling his own cocaine at age fifteen. All of this is true. He gave money to the poor. (True.) He built schools, clinics, churches. (True, true, true.) He was good to his mother. (True.)

He had escaped before. (Sort of true.) We’d better run this down here, because the history of Guzmán’s various arrests and escapes gets a bit confusing:

1993: Guzmán was arrested and sentenced to twenty years at a maximum-security prison, which he ran as his personal country club, replete with call girls, gourmet food and wine, and weekly movie nights.

2001: Guzmán made his first « escape, » which, like his most recent one, wasn’t an escape at all. (An escape generally doesn’t involve the active participation of one’s jailers.) The cover story that year was that he went out in a laundry cart, but insiders allege he actually went off the roof in a helicopter.

2014: Guzmán was recaptured, probably in a deal that his partner Zambada made to get Zambada’s son out of a ten-to-life cocaine-trafficking rap in Arizona. (The son has disappeared from any U. S. federal-prison registries—read: Witness Protection Program.)

2015: Guzmán escaped again, the cover story this time being the tunnel.

I gave the same explanation to the media over and over again: Guzmán didn’t escape; he was let out so that he could try to reestablish order.

THE ISIS OF MEXICO
If Mexico has become Iraq, then the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is the country’s ISIS. Even its name suggests that it considers itself something different, a new breed of narco ready to take over and correct the failures of the previous generation. There’s some truth to that viewpoint—one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s problems is indeed generational. The frankly brilliant leadership that brought it to prominence is dead or graying.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel used to be a wing of the Sinaloa Cartel under the leadership of Ignacio « Nacho » Coronel. But Nacho’s organization broke in half after he was killed in a shootout with the Mexican army in 2010, and one of those factions, Los Torcidos (the Twisted Ones), evolved into CJNG.

The CJNG boss, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, « El Mencho, » did three years in a California prison for heroin trafficking and then came back to Mexico to head up the assassination squad of the Torcidos. At the time, their major target was the rival Zetas, and El Mencho carried out the 2011 massacre of thirty-five of them in Veracruz, then another thirty-two a month later.

El Mencho’s son, inevitably glossed « El Menchito, » was once a close Guzmán ally, but he was captured in January 2014. A month later, Guzmán was arrested and El Mencho saw his opportunity to split from the Sinaloa Cartel.

What makes CJNG so ISIS-like is that they just don’t give a shit. To consolidate power, El Mencho allegedly authorized the murder of Jalisco’s tourism secretary and the assassination of a congressman.
In March 2015, lugging assault rifles and grenade launchers, CJNG gunmen rolled into a town and killed five police officers. Two weeks later, they ambushed a police convoy and killed fifteen officers. The next day, they murdered the police chief of another town.

In April 2016, they shot down a military helicopter with a rocket launcher. Now they are taking on the Sinaloa Cartel in Baja, threatening the stability of the border region. Law-enforcement sources tell me that CJNG has also allied with a revived Beltrán Leyva group to take on their old bosses in Acapulco, leading to renewed violence in that resort town.

Just as this mess was heating up, a new drug—actually an old drug—entered the scene. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is thirty to fifty times as strong as heroin. It was developed in 1960 by Janssen Pharmaceuticals (now a division of Johnson & Johnson) as a treatment for the severe pain caused by terminal cancer.

Fentanyl is so powerful that the DEA warns police that they can be injured just by touching it, and it can be taken as a pill (brand names: Duragesic, Actiq, and Fentora), a spray, snorted, shot, used as a transdermal patch, mixed with heroin, you name it. Prince died from an overdose of fentanyl; as many as seven hundred Americans overdosed on the drug last year.

It’s a versatile killer.

Crystal Sharee Moulden’s body was found in a Baltimore alley last June. The straight-A student had shot a dose of fentanyl-laced heroin. She was sixteen years old. Photos on her obituary page show a smiling girl with her cheerleading squad.

In New Orleans, The Times-Picayune reported that fentanyl deaths exceeded the number of murders for the first month of 2016. In Connecticut, fentanyl-related deaths increased by 151 percent between 2014 and 2015 and are expected to rise another 77 percent in 2016.

For the narcos, the advantages of fentanyl over heroin are enormous.

First of all, it’s made in a lab, so you don’t need fields of poppies that can be raided, fumigated, or seized. You don’t need hundreds of campesinos to harvest your crop and you don’t need to take or control territory. (Well, not territory for cultivation—you still have to control access to smuggling turf, hence the renewed violence in Baja, where the murder rate has tripled.)

But it’s the profits that will make fentanyl the new crack cocaine, which created the enormous wealth of the Mexican cartels in the eighties and nineties. A kilo of fentanyl can be stepped on sixteen to twenty-four times to create an astounding return on investment of $1.3 million per kilo, compared with $271,000 per kilo of heroin.

No wonder the DEA estimates that the importation of fentanyl from Mexico is up by 65 percent from 2014.
Because fentanyl is now often mixed with heroin to increase the latter’s potency, unaware heroin users are dying from the same doses that used to just get them well. EMTs, ER personnel, and cops don’t know what they’re looking at, or that they need twice the dosage of naloxone, or Narcan, to revive an addict whose respiratory system has been shut down by fentanyl.

Those who survive become more addicted. The cartels mix fentanyl with heroin because once an addict has shot that mix, they won’t go back to « just heroin, » since they can’t get high on it anymore.

The combination of lab-produced illegal fentanyl and the fracturing of the Sinaloa Cartel is a catastrophe for law enforcement and American society as a whole but an absolute boon for the narcos seeking to supplant the old order. Splinter groups such as CJNG can easily use the enormous profit potential of fentanyl to fund their rebellions, and those same profits will encourage them toward violence to control the smuggling routes.

ISIS is waning in Iraq largely because it can no longer pay its fighters. Fentanyl assures the new narcos that they will not have that problem. All they’ll need is the will for violence, and they already have that, in spades. Mexico has done little to fill the vacuum created by Guzmán’s fall. As a result, there will not be three groups seeking to fill that gap, there will be dozens.

On the American side, the rise of splinter groups makes it all the harder for law enforcement to track and intercept the drug. We’ll no longer know where’s it coming from, and worse, what’s in it. First responders will not be able to tell if they’re dealing with pure heroin, heroin laced with fentanyl, pure fentanyl, fentanyl cut with God knows what … there will be pharmacological chaos.

We talk about the heroin epidemic.

Fentanyl will be the plague.

SEAN PENN WHO?
Guzmán’s months of freedom after July 2015 were a farce. As the media played an endless game of « Where’s Waldo? » (he’s in Colombia, he’s in Costa Rica, he’s in Los Angeles, he’s in Donald Trump’s hair), Mexican and American intelligence almost certainly had a line on Guzmán’s whereabouts from the moment that he didn’t emerge from the tunnel.

Certainly by the fall, Mexican authorities knew that Guzmán was frequenting the coastal town of Los Mochis, in Sinaloa State, where he was eventually captured. The house he was living in wasn’t remote but on a four-lane boulevard around the corner from the mother of Sinaloa’s governor.

(Shades of Abbottabad, anyone?)

There is no question that Guzmán got overconfident and sloppy, starting to believe his own press. He let his son Ivan, who makes Anthony Junior in The Sopranos look like Michael Corleone in The Godfather, put a photo of him out on social media with the location identified as Costa Rica. This led to breathless speculation that Guzmán had fled Mexico, although as a few of us tried to point out, Costa Rica is also the name of a town in Sinaloa.

At one point he threatened to have Donald Trump whacked. (Oddly enough, Trump didn’t respond with a dismissive nickname, maybe because, of all the Mexicans who would scratch a check for the wall, Guzmán would have jumped at the chance, as it would increase his profits.)

Then Guzmán pissed off a lot of people by trying to take over the domestic sale of drugs, especially heroin, from the independent storefront sellers in Sinaloa. This uncharacteristically stupid move caused an uprising in the southern half of Sinaloa and constricted Guzmán’s freedom of movement. The gangs who controlled the local markets wanted Guzmán’s hands out of their pockets and were ready to go to the AKs to do it, threatening to derail the whole gravy train—tens of billions of dollars that Guzmán’s partners were making from international trafficking of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and, to a shrinking extent, marijuana.

Guzmán’s partners in the Sinaloa Cartel were getting fed up with his high-profile antics—Ismael Zambada, for instance, cannot have been pleased by Guzmán’s new media stardom—and were ready to have their old cuate back behind bars where it would be harder for him to mess up their business.

The deal the cartel made with the Mexican government probably went something like this: Please get the guy out of our hair, but whatever you do, don’t kill him. He’s made us a lot of money and we still have strong ties with his family and with loyalists.

The only people not shot in the raid that recaptured Guzmán were the guy himself and his right-hand man, and if you think that’s a coincidence, I have a tunnel you can bid on.

In the interim came the squalid burlesque involving Sean Penn and Kate del Castillo.

Del Castillo had been vocal in her praise of Guzmán, declaring on social media that she believed in Guzmán more than she believed in governments and urging him to become a modern-day Robin Hood, in which case he would « become a hero of heroes. »

She added, « Let’s traffic in love, you know how. » Guzmán was definitely interested in trafficking in love.

Look, he wasn’t the first guy to get taken in by a beautiful, ambitious actress who wanted to further her career, and he won’t be the last, but the sorry fact is that the most powerful drug lord in the world, a man who had created a multibillion-dollar empire, got suckered by a pretty face.

You almost feel bad for Guzmán. His texts to del Castillo are pathetic: « I really want to meet you and become good friends. You are the best thing in the world. » He asks her to visit him. « Have faith that you’ll be comfortable. I’ll watch you more than I do my own eyes. »

Del Castillo plays him. « I’m so moved you say you’ll look after me. No one ever has. »

Guzmán worked with his lawyer to facilitate communications with del Castillo, insisting that the attorney get her a pink BlackBerry, which, tragically, the company didn’t make.

Then del Castillo told the lawyer she wanted to bring Sean Penn along.

Guzmán didn’t know who Penn was, but he wasn’t going to let that get in the way. « Have her bring the actor. If she needs to bring more people, bring them. As she wishes. »

Their meeting took place on October 2, 2015. A few days later, in a move that Mexican authorities later said was « helped » by the del Castillo-Penn visit but was more likely a result of American cell-phone intercepts, the Mexican marines raided the ranch where Guzmán fled with his two personal chefs. Marine snipers have said that they had him in their sights but were ordered not to fire, as our hero had a little girl in his arms as a shield.

On January 8, 2016, he was captured in Los Mochis. All the authorities had to do was follow the monkey.

That’s right. It wasn’t a Hollywood actor that did Chapo Guzmán in. It wasn’t even a sexy soap-opera star that got him recaptured a year after his « dramatic, » « daring » (read: « bullshit ») « escape » from a maximum-security (I’d hate to see a minimum-security) Mexican prison. It was a monkey.

The story goes that Guzmán asked for his twin daughters’ pet monkey, Boots, to be sent to the not-so-safe house where he was hiding, and the Mexican authorities had a line on the little bastard. So Mexican and American intelligence were already monitoring Guzmán when Sean Penn and Kate del Castillo made their farcical pilgrimage, after which Guzmán, always the optimist, reportedly visited Tijuana for erectile-dysfunction surgery. (You can’t make this shit up. I try, but it’s futile.)

Whether it was the monkey or the soap-opera star or American cell-phone intercepts, the deal was in place, and the Mexican marines went in shooting. A few hours later you had one of the most powerful men in the world popping up out of a sewer lid in the middle of a street like some sort of narco whack-a-mole game. Two cops picked him up and then realized—holy shit—what they had on their hands and were so scared they actually turned him over rather than negotiate a Get out of Jail for a Million card.

In the Middle East, we traded the devil we knew for the devils we didn’t. In Mexico, the devils we know will be replaced by a multiplicity of devils we’ll never know. The ability to hide production (unlike marijuana or poppy fields) and the anonymity of communicating on social media will create anarchy. The era of the cartel might be coming to an end.

Where does this leave Guzmán? If you didn’t know the things he’s done, it would be tempting to view him as a tragic figure, a Gabriel García Márquez character living out his twilight years in the shadows of his lost hopes.

He’s been moved to a prison in Juárez, Cefereso #9, a facility known for its violence, in a city where he has many enemies. Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has cleared the way for his extradition to the United States, but there are still many court challenges to go. Some Mexican legal experts I spoke to said that it will be at least two years, if it happens at all. I doubt that he’ll ever be extradited, but you never know. He might push for it now rather than face the threat of an assisted suicide in a Mexican cell.

The prison now has dogs taste Guzmán’s food in case it’s been poisoned (personally, I wouldn’t sacrifice Spot to save Guzmán), and two « elite » guards with GoPro cameras on their helmets watch him 24/7.

MONEY MONSTER
So Guzmán is behind bars, it’s over, and we won. Just like we won when Hussein literally reached the end of his rope.

The Los Angeles Times estimates that two thirds of Mexican drug lords have been either killed or imprisoned. And what’s the result? Drugs are more plentiful, more potent, and cheaper than ever. Deaths from overdoses are at an all-time high. Violence in Mexico, once declining, is starting to rise again. Just last week, I looked at photographs of the bodies of four people stuffed into a car trunk in Tijuana. The bodies showed signs of torture.

Gang violence is on the rise in every major American city, most notably Chicago and New York, and the cowardly lions in Congress will do exactly shit about either the drugs or the guns that fuel and enable the killings and deaths—more than ISIS ever dreamed of.

Seems like old times. There will be more phone calls and more overdoses. Someone will replace El Chapo, just as he replaced his predecessors. My bet’s on El Mencho, but it really doesn’t matter. That’s the lesson we seem to have to learn over and over and over again, world without end, amen. Guzmán was right: « If there was no consumption, there would be no sales. » I’m always amazed that progressive young millennials will picket a grocery chain for not buying fair-trade coffee but will go home and do drugs that are brought to them by the killers, torturers, and sadists of the cartels.

We’re as addicted to the War on Drugs as we are to the drugs themselves. Our justice system is a machine fueled by hundreds of thousands of arrests, trials, and imprisonments. As long as the U. S. and Europe continue to buy billions of dollars’ worth of drugs a year while at the same time spending billions to intercept them, we will create an endless succession of Chapos and Menchos.

An entire economy is based on drug prohibition and punishment, something to the tune of $50 billion a year, more than double the estimated $22 billion we spend on heroin.

That’s a lot of money. There will inevitably be another Guzmán, but he’ll be a distraction, too. Don’t follow the monkey. Follow the money.

Voir par ailleurs:

Le burkini interdit dans une piscine de Marrakech

Une piscine située dans un hôtel à Marrakech a décidé d’interdire le port du burkini. Cette mesure semble ne pas plaire à tout le monde…

L’établissement hôtelier, qui n’a pas souhaité être mentionné dans cet article, justifie cette interdiction par des « raisons de sécurité et d’hygiène ». L’administration a donc exigé que les femmes désirant nager dans les piscines portent un maillot de bain et a même installé un panneau interdisant l’usage du burkini.

Face à cette interdiction inhabituelle, certains internautes ont exprimé leur colère: « La femme voilée est devenue interdite telle un chien dans un hôtel ! » D’autres ont posé des questions sur l’application des droits de l’homme et des libertés individuelles au Maroc.

Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’un incident de ce genre arrive dans le royaume. L’année dernière, une piscine de Casablanca avait aussi interdit le burkini et avait imposé le maillot de bain comme seule possibilité pour les femmes. D’autres hôtels et piscines avaient également prohibé la « combinaison islamique ».

L’hôtel Ibis d’El Jadida et de nombreux hôtels à Marrakech appliquent cette interdiction. Le Tamaris Aqua Park, situé à quelques kilomètres de Casablanca s’était également opposé au port du burkini pour des raisons officiellement liées à l’hygiène. Une polémique qui refait surface chaque été au Maroc.

These Days of Rage
Kenan Malik
The New York Times
Aug. 9, 2016

LONDON — On July 14, Bastille Day, in Nice, France, 85 people died after being mowed down on the promenade by a man driving a truck. Four days later, a 17-year-old man attacked passengers with an ax on a train near Würzburg, Germany. Four days after that, an 18-year-old man shot dead nine people in a Munich shopping mall.

Two days later, a 27-year-old man blew himself up outside a music festival in Ansbach, in southern Germany. That same day, a 21-year-old Syrian refugee hacked a woman to death in Reutlingen, near Stuttgart, also in Germany.

Two days after that, two young men stormed a church in St.-Étienne-du-Rouvray, in northern France, and slit a priest’s throat. Last week, one person was killed when a man with a knife went on the rampage in Central London.

Little wonder that an article last month in the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel asked “Has the world gone mad?” We seem to be living in an age of psychopathic violence and political rage. “Many of us,” the article concluded, “simply don’t understand the world anymore.”

It is not that Europe has suddenly become susceptible to terrorist attacks. The Global Terrorism Database shows that in Western Europe, deaths from terrorism have decreased since the early 1990s. What’s changed is the character of terrorism.

In the past, groups employing terrorism, such as the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization, were driven by specific political aims: a united Ireland or an independent Palestine. There was generally a relationship between the organization’s political cause and its violent activities.

Jihadists are different. They have little or no explicit political aim but are driven by a visceral hatred of the West. Some commentators claim that an attack like the one in Nice is “blowback” from Western foreign policy, but it’s difficult to discern any rational relationship between Western policy in Iraq or Libya and the murder of revelers on a promenade.

Of course, in the mind of the perpetrators, there is always a relationship; they are waging a righteous war against the West, which they see as an almost mythical, all-encompassing monster. That is why a jihadist act is rarely linked to a political demand but is seen rather as an existential struggle to cut the monster down, in which almost any act becomes acceptable.

Whatever one thinks of the activities of groups like the I.R.A. or the P.L.O., those activities were governed by certain norms and contained a rational kernel. It is the arbitrariness of jihadist violence and its disregard for moral bounds that make it terrifying.

What defines jihadist violence today is not righteous anger or political fury but a sense of inchoate, often personal, rage. Such rage is not uniquely Islamist.

When a gunman of Iranian origin went berserk in a Munich shopping mall last month, it was immediately assumed that he was an Islamist terrorist. The man, Ali David Sonboly, might have been a terrorist, but he was no Islamist. He was apparently a mentally disturbed young man proud of sharing his birthday with Hitler and obsessed with mass shootings and in particular with Anders Breivik, the Norwegian neo-Nazi who killed 77 people in 2011.

Mr. Sonboly is not unique in being a non-Islamist killer driven by rage. In June, a British member of Parliament, Jo Cox, was shot and stabbed to death in the Yorkshire town of Birstall while campaigning ahead of the referendum on Britain’s membership in the European Union. When asked his name in court, the man accused of killing her, Thomas Mair, responded, “My name is death to traitors, freedom for Britain.”

A year earlier, Dylann Roof, a 21-year-old American obsessed with white supremacist ideas, shot dead nine African-American worshipers in a church in Charleston, S.C. Last month, Micah Xavier Johnson, an African-American Army veteran, fatally shot five police officers in Dallas, apparently in revenge for police shootings of black people.

Neither the attack in London nor the one near Stuttgart was politically driven; both seem rather the actions of mentally disturbed individuals. Some people, however, refused to believe that they were not jihadist attacks, warning darkly of a conspiracy to hide the truth. This may be irrational, but it also reflects the shifting character of public violence.

In the past, the distinction between political violence and sociopathic rage was relatively clear. No longer. There seems today almost a continuum between ideological violence, disjointed fury and some degree of sociopathy or mental illness. What constitutes ideological violence has decayed; instead, amorphous rage has become a persistent feature of public life.

One reason is the breakdown of social and moral boundaries that once acted as firewalls against such behavior. Western societies have become more socially atomized and more riven by identity politics. The influence of institutions from the church to labor unions that once helped socialize individuals and inculcate them with a sense of obligation to others has declined.

As broader identities have eroded, and traditional social networks and sources of authority have weakened, people’s sense of belonging has become more parochial. Progressive movements that gave social grievance a political form have faded. Instead, the new oppositional movements are often rooted in religious or ethnic identity and take sectarian or separatist forms.

There is a growing disaffection with anything “mainstream,” and a perception of the world as out of control and driven by malign forces. All this has helped incubate a sense of rage without an outlet, undermined people’s ties to others as human beings, and weakened the distinction between sociopathy and political violence.

It is a world in which, as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany observed last week, the “taboos of civilization” are too easily broken. It is not so much the acts of violence themselves as the seeming fragility of our social and moral orders that makes contemporary terrorism so threatening.

Kenan Malik is the author, most recently, of “The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics” and a contributing opinion writer.

Voir enfin:

ISIS Copies a Palestinian Tactic
Evelyn Gordon

Commentary

Aug. 15, 2016

In my last post, I discussed how Palestinian culture encourages suicidal youngsters to kill by offering a simple bargain: Murder a Jew, and you instantly become a hero. While the West has long turned a blind eye to this behavior, its refusal to look reality in the face is now coming back to haunt it. For today, the Islamic State is making the very same tempting offer to distraught Muslims in Western countries–murder a Westerner, and you can instantly become a hero instead of a failure.

It’s no accident that several recent terror attacks in Western countries have been carried out by people who apparently had histories of mental illness, including Nice, Orlando, and several attacks in Germany. Nor is it any accident that the Islamic State is cultivating such people. As with many other terrorist techniques pioneered by the Palestinians, ISIS has copied this one precisely because it proved successful–and not just as a means of recruiting assailants.

This tactic also serves two other important purposes. First, it encourages an already strong Western tendency to ignore the terrorists’ true aims. I discussed this with regard to the Palestinians in my previous post; a classic example concerning the Islamic State was Kenan Malik’s op-ed in the New York Times on Tuesday. “In the past, groups employing terrorism, such as the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization, were driven by specific political aims: a united Ireland or an independent Palestine,” Malik wrote. “Jihadists are different. They have little or no explicit political aim but are driven by a visceral hatred of the West.”

In reality, Islamic State is quite open about its aims: It wants to destroy the West and establish a global Islamic caliphate. Indeed, being open about its goals is part of how it attracts new recruits, just as Palestinian organizations attract support by boasting of their efforts to destroy the Jewish state. But at the same time, both the Palestinians and ISIS would prefer that the West not take their goals too seriously since, if it did, it might stop supporting the Palestinians or actually get serious about destroying ISIS.

The use of emotionally distressed recruits is an ideal way for terrorists to foster confusion about their aims because it makes it even easier for well-meaning Westerners to reassure themselves that Islamist death cults, which exploit such distress to turn people into killers, aren’t actually the problem. The real issue, they tell themselves, is mental health or social alienation.

Second, this tactic helps divide the West and turn it against itself, because it reinforces another existing tendency of many well-meaning Westerners–blaming the victim for having driven the attacker to such a dreadful deed. Westerners have been blaming Palestinian terror on Israel for years, and now, many are blaming themselves for ISIS.

A classic example of this tendency emerged the day after deadly attacks killed 129 people at the Bataclan concert hall and other venues around Paris last November. Anshel Pfeffer of Haaretz visited the 11th arrondissement, one of the neighborhoods where attacks took place and discovered that people “aren’t angry, at least not at the perpetrators.”

The terrorists are “stupid, but they aren’t evil,” a woman who works at one of the district’s theaters told him. “They are victims of a system that excluded them from society, that’s why they felt this doesn’t belong to them and they could attack. There are those who live here in alienation, and we are all to blame for this alienation.”

Some of the others blamed French or American foreign policy. But “no one wanted to talk about Islamists or the Islamic State, even after it took responsibility for the attacks,” Pfeffer wrote. “It was hard to find anyone at this gathering who would say a bad word about the attackers.”

Using assailants with a history of mental or emotional problems is an ideal way for terrorists to reinforce this tendency as well, because it enables people to focus on the assailant’s distress, and society’s failure to deal with it, rather than on the evil intent of those who incited him to kill by telling him he would thereby become a hero instead of a loser.

Yet both gambits are working for ISIS now precisely because Westerners were conditioned for decades to believe them by the way their own journalists, academics, and political leaders insistently treated Palestinian terror as Israel’s fault.

Some Westerners, like the young Parisians interviewed by Pfeffer, have so internalized this attitude that they simply transfer it to their own countries; asserting that their society, too, must be to blame for the attacks against it. Others, like Malik, perform a kind of inversion: Indoctrinated to believe that terror is the victim’s fault, yet unable to believe their own societies evil enough to merit such attacks, they resolve the dilemma by asserting that unlike Palestinian violence–which Malik deems “rational” and “governed by certain norms”– jihadist violence must be senseless than rather than purposeful. “It is the arbitrariness of jihadist violence and its disregard for moral bounds that make it terrifying,” he proclaimed (he evidently thinks murdering random civilians in Israel is well within moral bounds).

But whichever approach they choose, the one thing people like Malik and those young Parisians aren’t doing is putting the blame where it belongs: on the terrorist leaders who groom perpetrators to commit mass murder by indoctrinating them to believe that the road to glory runs through killing others.

Terror can never be defeated until Westerners recognizes the crucial role played by this glorification of murder. And that won’t happen as long as the West keeps giving it a pass among the Palestinians, for they are the ones who pioneered this culture of death and inspired all the subsequent copycats.

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