C’est un moment génial de l’histoire de France. Toute la communauté issue de l’immigration adhère complètement à la position de la France. Tout d’un coup, il y a une espèce de ferment. Profitons de cet espace de francitude nouvelle. Jean-Louis Borloo (ministre délégué à la Ville, avril 2003)
Même aux pires moments de notre relation, quand le général De Gaulle a quitté l’OTAN, critiqué la guerre du Vietnam et voulu remplacer le dollar par l’étalon-or, il n’est jamais allé aussi loin. Il n’a jamais tenté, lui, de monter une coalition contre nous. Kissinger (Paris, automne 2003)
Dans l’année qui vient, de nombreux défis, bien sûr, nous attendent. Sur le plan opérationnel, il y a tout lieu de croire que les théâtres d’opérations sur lesquels nos forces sont déployées continueront de nous solliciter. D’autres, hélas, pourraient s’ouvrir. Se tenir prêt à toutes éventualités est au coeur du métier de soldat que vous avez choisi. En particulier, nous devons être attentifs à la manière dont est appliquée par l’Irak la résolution 1441 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Jacques Chirac (Voeux aux armées, 07.01.03)
Le désarmement de l’Irak est une obligation pour le Moyen-Orient et pour le monde. C’est un problème de paix et de sécurité collective. Nous devons donc le résoudre collectivement. Le cadre prévu à cet effet est celui des Nations unies. C’est le seul qui soit légitime. L’action internationale ne peut, sous peine d’être discréditée, s’affranchir des principes sur lesquels elle se fonde : le respect du droit, la responsabilité, l’équité, la démocratie. La communauté internationale ne saurait recourir à la guerre qu’en dernière extrémité, une fois que toutes les autres options ont été épuisées. L’éventuelle décision d’utiliser la force doit être explicite, et être prise par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies sur la base d’un rapport motivé des inspecteurs. La France, qui a toujours assumé ses responsabilités, entend garder sa pleine liberté d’appréciation. (…) Le message adressé aux responsables irakiens est clair : une dernière chance leur est proposée de désarmer dans la paix. (…) Ils s’exposeraient sinon à une guerre aux conséquences incalculables pour eux, pour la région et pour le monde. Sur l’ensemble des questions posées par la crise irakienne, j’invite le gouvernement à organiser un nouveau débat au Parlement, qui sera associé naturellement à toutes les étapes de l’évolution de cette crise. J’attache (…) le plus grand prix à ce que, face à de tels enjeux pour notre pays, la nation soit tout entière rassemblée. Jacques Chirac (Voeux au corps diplomatique, 07.01.03)
« L’Inconnu de l’Élysée, » the country’s top nonfiction best seller, while idealizing Chirac’s role, brings unexpected new support to a thesis that France’s government was not so much struggling to save humanity as looking out for Numéro Un. (…) It credits the idea that France maneuvered for months while considering whether to participate in an American-led invasion of Iraq. And it suggests that Villepin, after summoning the United Nations Security Council to rise in opposition against America, actually thought that France could not sustain its position and would « link up with the United States » before the war began in March 2003. (…) Péan cites, without challenge or elaboration, research by Henri Vernet, a French journalist, and by James Rubin, a U.S. assistant secretary of state for public affairs under Bill Clinton. Parts of their individual reporting — concerning a French general’s dispatch to Washington in December 2002 to explore a joint invasion plan (four months after Germany told the United States it would not join the war), or French conversations with the Bush administration about a method to accept an American justification for it — obviously contradict the consecrated vision of the French role. Writing in 2004, Vernet told of General Jean-Patrick Gaviard’s « offer of services » to the Americans, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 troops in total, if the UN gave its green light to an intervention. Péan’s book points further to a 2003 article by Rubin that tells of Villepin assuring the Americans that, under certain circumstances, France would participate in the military coalition even if Russia and China vetoed the war’s authorization. (Separately, but not mentioned by Péan, Rubin describes a France that later in February, after forming an opposition front with Germany and Russia, was « suddenly scrambling to avoid a showdown with the United States. » According to Rubin, the French, in high-level communications, advised « the Americans to bypass the Security Council entirely. ‘Your interpretation [of Resolution 1441] is sufficient [to justify war],’ they counseled Washington, and ‘you should rely on your interpretation.' »). By Péan’s own account, French intelligence services actually « agreed in part with the American analysis on Iraq’s will to acquire a nuclear weapon » but had no proof. (…) As Chirac and Villepin depart, the country’s role in the Middle East has shriveled to a bystander’s, and what was its dwindling primacy in the European Union — which they hoped to reassert by massing European opposition to the United States — has basically vanished. The NYT
Serait-ce la loi des conséquences inattendues ou la justice de l’Histoire?
S’il est une chose, en ce 4e anniversaire d’Operation Iraqi Freedom, que même ses détracteurs sont prêts à concéder au bilan calamiteux du président français (une dissolution manquée, la plus grande crise avec nos alliés américains depuis le retrait de l’OTAN de 66, tous les deux inspirés directement, on le sait, par son fidèle Villepin), c’est bien sa position contre la guerre d’lrak.
Et s’il est un livre qu’on ne peut accuser d’acharnement critique envers la personne de l’actuel squatter de l’Elysée, c’est bien le dernier hymne que vient de lui consacrer l’ex-tontolâtre Pierre Péan (« L’Inconnu de l’Elysée »).
Pourtant, c’est à travers ce dossier là et dans ce livre-là (qui s’appuie lui-même sur celui de deux autres de ses thuriféraires: « Chirac contre Bush, l’autre guerre « , Vernet et Cantaloube, 2004) que le correspondant américain à Paris du NYT John Vinocur nous fait (re)découvrir la face cachée d’une position qui fut tout sauf claire …
Comme, dès décembre 2002, l’envoi (dans le plus grand secret) au Pentagone du général Jean-Patrick Gaviard, sous-chef « opérations » à l’état-major des armées, pour présenter ses offres de service pour une éventuelle guerre en Irak …
Comme le fait que jusqu’au début 2003 et en France même, tout le monde était persuadé, comme s’en gaussait alors Le Canard (très) enchainé, que Chirac allait suivre les Américains dans la guerre …
Comme en janvier 2003 et en plus de préparatifs militaires poussés en France en prévision d’une éventuelle participation à la guerre d’Irak (Le Canard ayant, encore lui et entre autres, révélé l’indiscrétion d’un marchand de peinture s’étonnant d’une anormalement importante commande de peinture sable), les vœux de Chirac aux armées leur demandant de « se tenir prêts à toute éventualité » …
Comme, le 21 février (soit APRÈS le « Massacre de la St Valentin » perpétré par Villepin à la tribune de l’ONU), le conseil que Chirac fera délivrer aux Américains via notre ambassadeur à Washington de ne PAS passer par une deuxième résolution à l’ONU, les rassurant que la France se contenterait de « râler pour la forme » …
Comme le fait que les services français (les mieux renseignés avec les Russes, par tous leurs contacts sur place) étaient comme les autres à peu près sûrs que Saddam possédait encore des ADM …
Comme (aurait pu ajouter Vinocur) une fois la guerre déclenchée, l’assurance envoyée par l’Etat-major français de l’envoi de renforts français ou de fourniture au Qatar des équipements anti-ABC au cas où Saddam les utiliseraient …
Comme les paquets de vrais-faux passeports français découverts plus tard à Bagdad par les Américains et destinés aux dignitaires du régime que la France s’apprêtait éventuellement à exfiltrer …
Comme le fait enfin et à l’instar de l’autre membre du « camp de la paix » Gerhard Schroeder depuis recasé à la tête d’un des méga-projets gaziers de Poutine (dont, sans compter l’ambassadeur livrant à l’avance à Saddam, les plans de l’invasion américaine, l’une des ministres s’était permise, pendant sa campagne de ré-élection, de comparer les méthodes de Bush à celles d’Hitler!), que Chirac comme Villepin ont, manifs monstres aidant (où se cotoyaient, dans la bonne humeur que l’on sait, trostkos LCR ou LO, antimondialistes de Bové ou d’ATTAC, propalestiniens et islamistes avec leurs portraits de Saddam et… leurs « Mort aux juifs »!) vite été grisés par les sondages et les sommets de popularité que l’option antiguerre leur permettait d’atteindre …
A very different take on France’s role in Iraq
March 19, 2007
PARIS: When Jacques Chirac leaves office in May, he hopes to take with him into history the notion of having made France the most active international opponent of the American march into Iraq.
At a distance of four years, and with the United States’ grief as a measure, Chirac and his grandiloquent prime minister and former foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, who will leave office with him, have been working hard at chiseling memorials to their Iraq positions.
This is an easier job here than finding reverent recollections of how they ran France. These days, deep in a recriminatory presidential election campaign, the French are called on daily by nearly a dozen candidates to lift the country from what they insist is its decline and neglect.
Villepin, who wanted to succeed Chirac but ran aground as a clumsy domestic political manager, nonetheless felt qualified recently to issue a timetable for how the Americans should get out of Iraq. Chirac sat down and talked extensively to a writer for a valedictory book.
But in trying to transmute the fog of the runup to the war into glory, the book may provide more clarity than intended: « L’Inconnu de l’Élysée, » the country’s top nonfiction best seller, while idealizing Chirac’s role, brings unexpected new support to a thesis that France’s government was not so much struggling to save humanity as looking out for Numéro Un.
It credits the idea that France maneuvered for months while considering whether to participate in an American-led invasion of Iraq. And it suggests that Villepin, after summoning the United Nations Security Council to rise in opposition against America, actually thought that France could not sustain its position and would « link up with the United States » before the war began in March 2003.
Its author, Pierre Péan, seems to be trying hard to establish that the president — not Villepin, as some say — was the motor of the French position on Iraq. All those around Chirac, Péan intimates, were not the convinced crusaders they might have seemed.
In stressing this theme, Péan cites, without challenge or elaboration, research by Henri Vernet, a French journalist, and by James Rubin, a U.S. assistant secretary of state for public affairs under Bill Clinton.
Parts of their individual reporting — concerning a French general’s dispatch to Washington in December 2002 to explore a joint invasion plan (four months after Germany told the United States it would not join the war), or French conversations with the Bush administration about a method to accept an American justification for it — obviously contradict the consecrated vision of the French role.
Writing in 2004, Vernet told of General Jean-Patrick Gaviard’s « offer of services » to the Americans, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 troops in total, if the UN gave its green light to an intervention.
Péan’s book points further to a 2003 article by Rubin that tells of Villepin assuring the Americans that, under certain circumstances, France would participate in the military coalition even if Russia and China vetoed the war’s authorization.
(Separately, but not mentioned by Péan, Rubin describes a France that later in February, after forming an opposition front with Germany and Russia, was « suddenly scrambling to avoid a showdown with the United States. » According to Rubin, the French, in high-level communications, advised « the Americans to bypass the Security Council entirely. ‘Your interpretation [of Resolution 1441] is sufficient [to justify war],’ they counseled Washington, and ‘you should rely on your interpretation.' »)
By Péan’s own account, French intelligence services actually « agreed in part with the American analysis on Iraq’s will to acquire a nuclear weapon » but had no proof.
Péan goes on to directly assert Villepin’s « wavering, » singling out an incident on Feb. 17, 2003, three days after the foreign minister’s theatrical call in New York for the world to stop the Americans. He writes that Villepin, « pushed by his administration, » confided that France could not hold its stance beyond mid-March « and would then link up with the United States. » At a news conference in Brussels, when a reporter asked Chirac about Villepin’s view, the president replied angrily that the question was « lacking the slightest basis in fact. »
Taking up the issue recently with Chirac, Péan described him as having « to be reminded of Villepin’s hesitation and his own brutal reaction to it. He contested that, and laid the responsibility for the wavering on the Quai d’Orsay administration’s influence on the minister. »
I asked Péan last week about Villepin’s wobbling. He replied, « It’s an ultra-sensitive subject, an essential subject, but one I didn’t sort out. No one wants to talk about it today. It’s a place where there was a problem. »
How did the event, if Péan’s account is right, blip off history’s scope? One explanation could be that it was lost in the storm over Chirac’s remarks at the same news conference that countries from the former Soviet bloc would have done better to shut up than announce their support for the United States.
In the end, riding his great poll numbers in March, Chirac threatened a veto if the United States pressed for a UN vote to authorize military action. The Arab regimes he hoped to please considered this an excessive overplay, and Chirac’s action further widened Europe’s internal split.
If it caused nothing like the awful repercussions of America’s failure to win the war, France’s lurching pursuit of the best yield for itself in the runup left it totally short of what its leaders hoped their opposition would bring.
As Chirac and Villepin depart, the country’s role in the Middle East has shriveled to a bystander’s, and what was its dwindling primacy in the European Union — which they hoped to reassert by massing European opposition to the United States — has basically vanished.
Péan’s book, with its in-spite-of-itself insights, acknowledges none of this failure. Last week, the newspaper Le Parisien reported that Chirac adored reading it. All the same, it quoted the president as saying, « You can’t accuse the author of trying to please. »
France Was Ready to Send Troops to Iraq, Book Says
The Washington Post
October 6, 2004
French officials were prepared to provide as many as 15,000 troops for an invasion of Iraq before relations soured between the Bush administration and the French government over the timing of an attack, according to a new book published in France this week.
The book, « Chirac Contre Bush: L’Autre Guerre » (« Chirac vs. Bush: The Other War »), reports that a French general, Jean Patrick Gaviard, visited the Pentagon to meet with Central Command staff on Dec. 16, 2002 — three months before the war began — to discuss a French contribution of 10,000 to 15,000 troops and to negotiate landing and docking rights for French jets and ships.
French military officials were especially interested in joining in an attack, because they felt that not participating with the United States in a major war would leave French forces unprepared for future conflicts, according to Thomas Cantaloube, one of the authors. But the negotiations did not progress far before French President Jacques Chirac decided that the Americans were pushing too fast to short-circuit inspections by U.N. weapons inspectors.
Chirac, the book says, was prepared to join in an attack if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had not allowed inspectors into Iraq. « Up until December 2002, what everyone told us is that France thought Saddam Hussein was going to make a mistake and not allow inspections, » Cantaloube said in an interview. After inspectors appeared to make progress in Iraq, Chirac’s thinking changed, especially after polls in France showed vast opposition to an attack.
White House officials declined to comment.
The book is a detailed recounting of the deteriorating relationship between President Bush and Chirac by two journalists based in Washington and Paris for the newspaper Le Parisien. The journalists, Cantaloube and Henri Vernet, said they interviewed more than 50 military and diplomatic officials in both countries.
The book also discloses that French officials became convinced the United States had eavesdropped on Chirac’s phone conversations after a U.S. official warned a French military official that « the relationship between your president and ours is irreparable on the personal level. You have to understand that President Bush knows exactly what President Chirac thinks of him. »
Cantaloube said the threat was believable to French officials because Chirac has a habit of not using secure lines for phone calls, often just pulling out his cell phone to make impromptu calls. « Chirac is a compulsive phone dialer, » he said.
Chirac knew Bush’s father, former president George H.W. Bush, well, but that relationship actually proved to be a distraction for the current president, according to the book, which says that Bush was annoyed that Chirac kept mentioning his father at every occasion. For months, French diplomats asked Chirac not to refer to Bush’s father when he met the president, but he kept doing it.
During one of Bush’s first European trips, when the new president impressed other European leaders at a summit, Chirac excitedly pulled out his cell phone to call Bush’s father to report that the new president had done a great job, the authors said.
« The father reported this to his son, » Cantaloube said. « It was not very well received in the White House. »
Stumbling Into War
James P. Rubin
Summary: Why did most of the world abandon Washington when it went after Saddam Hussein? The war in Iraq could never have been an easy sell, but nor should it have been such a difficult one. The Bush administration badly botched the prewar maneuvering, presenting a textbook study in how not to wage a diplomatic campaign.
James P. Rubin is a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997 to 2000.
A DIPLOMATIC POSTMORTEM
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States put together a historic, worldwide coalition to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda. China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and Russia all supported the enterprise, as did Europe. The subsequent war may have scattered al Qaeda rather than destroyed it — key operatives remain at large today — but the mission was widely seen as a success.
Eighteen months later, the Bush administration went to war again, this time to overthrow Saddam Hussein. On this occasion, however, most of the same countries that had backed the United States in Afghanistan bluntly opposed the campaign — as, indeed, did most of the world. Washington’s failure to muster international support to depose a despised dictator was a stunning diplomatic defeat — a failure that has not only made it harder to attract foreign troop contributions to help stabilize post-Saddam Iraq, but will more generally damage U.S. foreign policy for years to come.
Support for the Bush administration’s Iraq policy should not have been so hard to gain. After all, Baghdad was in clear violation of a series of UN Security Council resolutions. And Bill Clinton had also deemed Iraq a substantial threat, both because of its apparent capability to field weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and because of its demonstrated willingness to use them. For those reasons, coupled with Saddam’s history of gross human rights violations and his refusal to comply with the demands of the international community, the Clinton team had also supported regime change in Iraq.
Of course, an invasion of that country was never going to be an easy sell, even after the attacks of September 11. Legitimizing the use of force and preventing the United States from being seen as an aggressor would have required a comprehensive game plan. And the Bush administration did seem to recognize this fact at first, when, last fall, it managed to unite the world around its demand that Iraq finally disarm. But despite months of subsequent international debate and diplomacy, Washington did not then muster much support for its policy before actually going to war. The United Kingdom and Spain remained stalwart allies, as did most states in central and eastern Europe. But these countries, like Australia, had been on the United States’ side from the beginning.
What went wrong? Why, when the leader of the free world went to war with a brutal and hated dictator, did so many countries refuse to take America’s side? How much collateral damage was caused in the process? And what lessons can be learned from this debacle? After extensive debriefings of key participants in Europe and at the United Nations, as well as of a number of informed American diplomats, some important lessons from the recent crisis are starting to emerge.
First, the fact that Washington’s justification for war seemed to shift as occasion demanded led many outside observers to question the Bush administration’s motives and to doubt it would ever accept Iraq’s peaceful disarmament. Second, the United States failed to synchronize its military and diplomatic tracks. The deployment of American forces in the Middle East seemed to determine American policy, not the other way around, and diplomatic imperatives were given short shrift. Third, the failure to anticipate Saddam’s decision to comply partially with UN demands proved disastrous to Washington’s strategy. Fourth, the belated effort to achieve a second Security Council resolution could still have succeeded, had the United States been willing to compromise by extending the deadline by just a few weeks. But such a compromise was not forthcoming, which leads to the last lesson: the Bush administration’s rhetoric and style alienated rather than persuaded key officials and foreign constituencies, especially in light of Washington’s two-year history of scorn for international institutions and agreements.
TAKING YES FOR AN ANSWER
One of the main sources of European skepticism toward the U.S. campaign in Iraq was the sense that Washington was determined to go to war regardless of what Saddam did. Perhaps this suspicion was due to Bush’s shifting justifications for war; perhaps it was due to his failure to engage comprehensively and consistently enough with key friends and allies. Whatever the cause, much of the world believed that Washington was so determined to overthrow Saddam that it would never take yes for an answer — even if the Iraqi leader did comply with international ultimatums.
To be fair, the administration had compelling rationales for war beyond the threat of Iraqi WMD. For example, Bush administration officials claimed that toppling Saddam would uphold the sanctity of un resolutions, eliminate a murderous government that brutalized its citizens, deprive Osama bin Laden of a key ally, and bolster democracy in the Middle East. But each of these arguments, although perhaps otherwise convincing, were undermined by the administration’s record or reputation. The claim that Washington sought to enhance the UN’s authority clashed with the administration’s previous reluctance to support international institutions and international law. Belief in Bush’s last-minute Wilsonianism was similarly undermined by his previous scorn for humanitarian intervention, by distrust of his neoconservative aides (whom many regard as enemies of international cooperation who are interested only in strengthening Israel), and by the perception that the United States was not interested in promoting democracy in friendly Middle Eastern regimes such as Saudi Arabia. The allegations of close cooperation between Saddam and bin Laden, if proved, would have been decisive. But the link was never established, only alleged, and no other country accepted it; in fact, foreign intelligence services were told by the CIA that the agency itself doubted these claims.
Moreover, although many of the United States’ declared objectives were individually appealing, their diversity harmed rather than helped the administration’s case. Diplomatic consistency was lost when different corners of the American bureaucracy stressed different reasons for the war: the State Department, for example, focused on Iraq’s violations of UN resolutions, whereas the Pentagon pushed the al Qaeda link. Because the administration lacked the discipline to speak with one voice, a coherent message never emerged.
Especially unhelpful were statements by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which skeptical European observers focused on to a remarkable degree. In their public statements, both Cheney and Rumsfeld emphasized the flaws inherent in any UN inspection regime, disparaging the un’s arms inspectors, downplaying the chances of peaceful disarmament, and promoting Washington’s military buildup in the Persian Gulf. In mid-September 2002, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, explaining his break with Bush, even cited a Cheney speech from a few weeks earlier, complaining, « it just isn’t good enough to learn from the American press about a speech which clearly states ‘we are going to do it, no matter what the world or our allies think.' » Bush did later accept that if Saddam complied with the UN’s demands, regime change would no longer be necessary (since the regime would, according to Bush, already have « changed »). But the administration’s earlier announcements — especially warnings by Cheney and Rumsfeld that the UN process was bound to fail — undercut Bush’s pledge and led many foreign observers to doubt whether Washington would be satisfied with anything less than war.
CALIBRATING FORCE AND DIPLOMACY
Above all, it was the belief that the military buildup in the Persian Gulf was driving the United States’ policy decisions that led many to conclude war was inevitable. The Europeans felt that rather than force’s serving American diplomacy, force had become an objective in itself, and Washington was using diplomacy simply to smooth the way for an invasion. High-level officials, including key British policymakers, were frustrated that military timetables seemed to determine rather than support U.S. foreign policy. Some critics even argued that the Bush administration viewed the whole UN exercise as a way to stall for time until America’s military force became operational.
At the best of times, synchronizing force and diplomacy is a delicate balancing act, one that requires careful planning. Europeans, mindful of the way that the mobilization of armies rendered diplomacy impotent and fighting inevitable before World War I, are particularly sensitive to this process. This is not to suggest that the Europeans failed to recognize the crucial role that force could still play. Continental pundits and officials understood that it was America’s willingness to deploy and use force, alone if necessary, that had prompted the Security Council to toughen its posture toward Iraq, demanding the return of UN inspectors with expanded and unconditional access to key facilities. Even French President Jacques Chirac acknowledged that the deployment of U.S. forces had pressured Saddam into agreeing to these measures. Chirac’s mistake, however, was to think that he could limit the United States’ role to supporting his own favored policy for Iraq: containment through aggressive inspections.
American power did indeed promote effective multilateral action on Iraq. But to maintain international support, the Bush administration should have then shown a willingness to adjust its military timetable to diplomatic realities. A synchronized policy would have had the diplomatic and military tracks converge sometime this fall. All of the key players in Europe now say that they would have been prepared to support or at least sanction force against Iraq if it had not fully disarmed by then. And waiting that long would have demonstrated to all that Washington was prepared to go the extra mile to secure international backing. But the Bush administration showed no such willingness.
No doubt, such a timetable would have entailed serious logistical questions and complications. For example, could military forces have been maintained in the region throughout the summer? Such problems could have been solved, however. The pace of deployment could have been slowed, making it less onerous for the allied armies to wait out the summer. Or, as the British military started to contemplate, materiel could have been left in the region while troops were rotated in and out. London strongly believed that the diplomatic advantages of waiting until the fall far outweighed the technical difficulties. In other words, Washington’s most important supporter assigned a high priority to getting a positive vote in the Security Council and garnering international support and was prepared to make the arrangements necessary to ensure those results. The Bush administration, however, was not.
Indeed, the administration would not make even modest adjustments to its military plans, although doing so could have dramatically increased diplomatic support for the war. For example, in the endgame of the negotiations over the second resolution, London could not get Washington to acquiesce to several weeks’ delay, despite the fact that waiting could have helped secure majority support and that top military officials said such a delay would have no appreciable impact on the conduct of the war. The administration simply did not care very much whether it had international backing or not, and the Europeans knew it.
PLANNING FOR PARTIAL COMPLIANCE
The American government’s biggest mistake in the lead-up to the war was its lack of foresight and planning. Critically, no effort was made to lay the groundwork for the possibility that Saddam would partially comply with Resolution 1441. Thus Washington had no strategy to deal with Baghdad’s actual response to the UN’s demands and the threat of invasion.
The unanimous passage of Resolution 1441 in November of last year had masked a number of major differences among key members of the UN Security Council. Although the vote was a clear diplomatic success, insofar as it represented international support for a tougher stance on Iraqi disarmament, the council had also kicked a number of hard questions down the road. Would, for example, a second resolution be required before military action took place? How would Iraqi compliance be judged? And, most important, how much time would Iraq get to clear up discrepancies in its reported stockpiles of WMD? Unfortunately, no effort was made to resolve these ambiguities once 1441 was passed. Nor did the major powers develop a diplomatic game plan for each of Iraq’s four possible responses to the resolution. Instead, as one of the architects of the UN diplomacy put it, all the key players took a « diplomatic holiday. »
The first imaginable Iraqi response was capitulation. Facing the prospect of losing power, Saddam might well have complied fully. If he did come clean and give inspectors immediate access to his scientists, documents, and proof of either the existence of his WMD or their destruction, war would have been averted. Although much of the world did not trust the Bush administration to accept such a result, Blair and Bush had agreed that if Iraq really did disarm, war would be avoided.
The second possible outcome was the « smoking gun » scenario. If Saddam refused to acknowledge having any WMD programs but did provide unconditional access to all relevant sites in Iraq, UN inspectors were expected to find the famous « smoking gun » — that is, unequivocal proof of Saddam’s illegal weapons, such as a Scud missile or a cache of biological agents. Top officials in Washington and London genuinely believed that such evidence would be uncovered. Had the evidence emerged, support for war would have materialized. Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, told Bush in a private message that he would accept a war if such evidence were found.
The third scenario involved Saddam’s « shooting himself in the foot, » as he did in 1998 and on numerous occasions in the past, starting with his refusal to pull out of Kuwait in 1991. Another such provocation this spring would have again led to widespread support for war. If, for example, Iraq had refused to allow access to suspected weapons sites or did not at least appear to cooperate with UN inspectors, all the key governments would have backed an invasion. Ironically, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin even made it clear privately that had another power such as Russia or China tried to veto a war under such circumstances, France would have joined the military coalition anyway.
What actually happened, however, was the fourth scenario, one for which Washington was wholly unprepared: partial compliance. Iraq did not accept that it bore the burden of proof of showing that it had disarmed, and it gave the UN a preposterously implausible declaration of its weapons programs (comprised, in part, of previous reports to the UN). But it did allow inspectors unfettered access to suspected sites, and it generally cooperated with them. Iraq granted inspectors access to presidential palaces and other locations that they had been barred from or where they had been harassed in the past, and it destroyed dozens of al Samoud missiles after the UN declared that they exceeded their allowed ranges. Some key scientists were also allowed to be interviewed, and new methods were proposed to prove the past destruction of banned weapons. Washington, however, was caught flat-footed by these developments, and the result was disastrous.
The right way to deal with partial compliance would have been to develop a timetable for completing the verification of Iraq’s disarmament and a way to judge whether Baghdad had actually met it. To achieve such an outcome would have required careful multilateral diplomacy. The Bush administration could have approached all the key players at the outset to discuss this method and all the other options. Putin, for example, would have viewed summit-level discussions about how to respond to different scenarios as a sign of respect for Russia and a demonstration of real partnership. According to key Russian officials, he would then have agreed in advance to setting a deadline for Iraq’s compliance. French officials similarly claim that Chirac would have gone along with the use of force if a nine-month schedule had been set at the beginning. The swing voters on the council (Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico, and Pakistan) would have been satisfied with as little as four months. But no such consultations took place between Bush or Secretary of State Colin Powell and their counterparts.
In fact, the partial compliance scenario was not even seriously examined before or immediately after the passage of Resolution 1441. When Iraq then took such an approach, the United States seemed unprepared. This result may have occurred because of divisions within the administration over what to do in such a case, with hard-liners determined not to respond to anything short of unequivocal compliance. Regardless of the reasons, however, Washington had no plan in place. Not having laid the diplomatic groundwork, the allies waited until February to start scrambling for support of a resolution endorsing war.
MUSTERING A MAJORITY
Having decided to seek a second resolution, why couldn’t the United States even muster a majority of votes? This failure will be long remembered. The convenient response was to blame Chirac, on the grounds that his veto threat made it impossible for the undecided council members to support a losing cause. But the real story is more complex.
During the negotiation of Resolution 1441 in the fall of 2002, the administration repeatedly argued that a second resolution authorizing force would not be necessary. That remained its view for months, until February 2003, when Blair convinced Bush that he risked losing his leadership of the Labour Party if they did not seek a second resolution. Given Blair’s staunch support up until that point, Bush understandably decided to switch his stance to try to help his friend.
About the same time, the French also reversed their position. After insisting from the beginning that war would require a second vote to authorize it, suddenly Paris began scrambling to avoid a showdown with the United States. France’s ambassador in Washington, Jean-David Levitte, told Cheney in February that Washington and Paris should simply « agree to disagree. » Through other diplomatic channels, the French advised the Americans to bypass the council entirely. « Your interpretation [of 1441] is sufficient [to justify war], » they counseled Washington, and « you should rely on your interpretation. »
Despite this turnaround, however, Washington and London decided to seek another resolution. British diplomats insist that domestic politics was not the only reason for this decision; they also wanted to avert a UN resolution condemning military action, which British government lawyers feared might make their participation in the campaign illegal. Blair himself, however, was never advised that the second resolution was likely not to pass. On the contrary, he assumed, as did most observers, that once the White House got behind the effort, it would be determined enough to win.
But then Berlin, Moscow, and Paris joined forces, insisting that the Iraqi threat did not justify an American-led invasion and claiming that the inspections were serving their purpose: Iraq was no longer in a position to develop a militarily significant arsenal of biological or chemical weapons. With the emergence of this new alignment, London’s hopes for passage of a second resolution were crushed.
All along, most observers had assumed that Washington was quietly wooing Moscow. The strategy seemed obvious: once a nine-vote majority for the resolution was secured, Putin would be convinced to abstain in order to preserve good relations with the United States. France, isolated, might not risk using its veto alone.
But Washington never succeeded in winning over Putin, a continuing source of bitterness for British officials. Having gone along with NATO expansion, the deployment of U.S. military forces across Central Asia, and the termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Putin felt he had little to show for his cooperation with Bush. With the Russian economy improving, Moscow was no longer playing such a weak hand. One Russian described Washington’s attempts to appease them, such as by offering to repeal the famous Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, as « peanuts. » Moscow wanted respect, or at least a serious discussion of protecting Russia’s interests in Iraq. Neither was offered.
Despite the formation of a Moscow-Paris-Berlin axis, however, it would still have been possible to secure a majority on the Security Council. But the White House failed even to line up the support of the Africans or the Latin Americans on the council. Officials across Europe are still puzzled that the vaunted power of the U.S. president — not to mention the threats made and the incentives offered — was not enough to accomplish this feat.
In attempting to understand Washington’s failure, much has been made of the fact that Powell did not visit the key undecided nations. Powell’s refusal to travel did indeed harm U.S. diplomacy, but another, bigger problem was that multilateral diplomacy requires compromise and subtlety, which the Bush administration, with all its bullying and inflexibility, notably lacked.
Effective U.S. diplomacy at the United Nations requires an impartial validator, since other countries prefer to be seen as responding to neutral voices rather than bowing to Washington’s will. Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, could have played such a role and should therefore have been handled more skillfully. Regardless of whether he was too easy on Iraq ten years ago, as some in the administration complained, this was not a time for settling scores. Blix had an important job, and his judgments had influence on undecided countries. But instead of embracing him, working with him, and showing him that Washington and the UN inspectors were both tough-minded, top U.S. officials tried to bully him and even resorted to ridicule.
The worst example of the administration’s pressure tactics occurred when Blix and Muhammad ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, met with Vice President Cheney. Cheney warned that if his administration found fault with Blix’s judgments, « we will not hesitate to discredit you. » In a separate meeting, Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, ridiculed the inspectors’ caution, telling them, « You do know they have weapons of mass destruction, don’t you? » Such tactics were amateurish and unseemly. Blix, a stubborn Swedish bureaucrat, made a point of telling others that he intended to stand up to Washington, and was infuriated by the treatment he received. The British government was forced to do extensive repair work. And the cutting personal remarks look particularly unfortunate in light of the administration’s own subsequent difficulty in discovering Iraqi WMD — despite the fact that the U.S. military now controls all the real estate in Iraq and has key scientists in custody.
To secure a second resolution would have also required some compromise on substance, especially the question of timing. London was willing to endorse such an approach, but Washington was not. Had the Bush administration shown some flexibility in early March, however, it would have been France that ended up on the losing side of the tally, not the United States. In fact, a compromise text did emerge that would have had the tacit backing of Blix and the support of ten countries. This resolution would have entailed the following elements: the establishment of benchmarks for compliance (which would have included accounting for vx gas and anthrax, the destruction of al Samoud and other illegal missiles, allowing scientists to be interviewed abroad, and resolving the issue of long-range drones); the setting of a mid-April deadline for Iraq to meet the established tests; and, finally, a presumption that failure to comply would constitute a material breach and thus trigger the use of force.
Blair and his diplomats worked hard to craft this compromise plan, but Washington’s inflexibility doomed the effort. Instead, either because of the military timetable or because he was frustrated with the diplomatic process, Bush offered a one-week extension to mid-March — no compromise at all, since that was when military operations ultimately commenced anyway. Merely offering several more weeks would likely have yielded ten votes for the British resolution, but Bush refused. Obtaining a majority simply was not a high priority for the White House, which believed that it would be vindicated by military success. So long as Blair believed a good faith effort to compromise had been made, the Americans considered that good enough.
As for the French, until the very end of the process they feared ending up in the minority. They desperately wanted to avoid using their veto and thus being excluded from any role in a post-Saddam Iraq. This is why de Villepin went on his infamous trip to Africa to line up opposition to the United States and why, at the 11th hour, even after his explicit veto threat, Chirac proposed a 30-day timetable based on a weaker version of the British benchmarks.
But from the White House’s perspective, Chirac had already crossed the line. In a phone call with Bush, Chirac told him, « I am convinced there is no immediate or urgent threat, » but Bush insisted that Iraq « threatens the American people. » Rightly or wrongly, the administration believed that vital U.S. interests were at stake and thus regarded Chirac’s veto threat as profoundly unfriendly.
It is true, then, that France’s opposition made passage of a second resolution impossible. But it is also true that the United States’ failure to lay the diplomatic groundwork and offer modest compromises made achieving even a moral majority on the council impossible.
THE POWER OF PAYBACK
The public struggle in the Security Council over the second resolution was about more than just Iraq. The opponents of the American and British resolution say they were fighting a White House that they believed threatened to undermine international order.
Above all, it was the so-called preemptive strike doctrine, published in last September’s National Security Strategy, that harmed America’s diplomatic cause. Viewed through this lens, the war in Iraq looked less like a way to uphold UN Security Council resolutions than like the manifestation of a new American approach. Whichever U.S. officials decided to include the now-infamous language about preemptive strikes and the primacy of American power in the annual document, and then singled them out as marking a new U.S. doctrine, either did not consider or did not care how it would affect the debate.
Whatever the explanation, the result was that every time U.S. officials insisted their goal was to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq, they ran up against a wall of skepticism. Is Iraq the first in a series of preemptive attacks? they were asked. Who decides when an existing threat justifies preemptive action? How can the UN endorse an unprovoked attack on another country? What will happen if other countries, such as India, Pakistan, Russia, or China, insist on their right to attack preemptively whenever they see a threat? Much of the world became determined to prevent the Security Council from rubber-stamping American decisions to conduct preemptive strikes. If gaining support for action against Iraq was truly Washington’s highest priority in the fall of 2002, it is hard to imagine a more counterproductive step than to initiate a debate over whether the United States has the right to attack whomever it wants, whenever it deems it necessary.
Having said that, the controversy over preemptive strikes might, by itself, have been manageable. But international relations are a lot like interpersonal relations. Every country has a certain amount of goodwill on deposit with others. Unfortunately, by last fall, the United States’ goodwill account had been exhausted. The president seemed to have forgotten the tenet he had articulated so well as a candidate: « It’s important to be friends with people when you don’t need each other, so that when you do, there’s a strong bond of friendship. »
One reason Washington’s goodwill reserve had all but vanished is that European countries pay a lot of attention to treaties. Their foreign ministers meet, week after week, in a rolling discussion of how to modify and improve the treaties that form the European Union, and these ministers regard international law and formal accords as the primary currency of foreign policy. Nonetheless, early in its term, the Bush administration declared war on all outstanding international treaties. First he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on the environment. Then came Washington’s withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and its repudiation of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.
Just as unpopular was the U.S. policy on the International Criminal Court. The ICC accord may have its flaws, but the Bush team broke new legal ground when it declared Clinton’s signature of the treaty null and void (a gratuitous step, since the agreement had never been ratified by Congress). In order to weaken the ICC further, Bush also provoked a bitter battle over the court with the entire EU, demanding that every country sign a special waiver to exempt American citizens and soldiers from the court’s jurisdiction. This step was overkill; the idea that the ICC would ever have forced a European country to imprison an American citizen over the objections of the U.S. government is not only hypothetical in the extreme, but also politically unthinkable.
Next, the matter of the prisoners held on Guantánamo may have actually marked the beginning of the end of European sympathy for and solidarity with the United States after September 11. Europeans across the political spectrum reacted with shock and condemnation when Rumsfeld brusquely dismissed the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to these prisoners on January 16, 2002, saying he didn’t have « the slightest concern » about how they would be treated in light of their organizations’ attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Even the normally pro-American weekly The Economist called this view « unworthy of a nation which has cherished the rule of law from its birth. »
Unfortunately, Guantánamo became a rallying point for anti-Americanism. The fact that the United States would not even accept the Geneva Conventions in this case, critics argued, showed that the Bush administration really did see itself as above the law of nations. A more careful diplomat than Rumsfeld would, in answer to a question about the convention’s applicability to the prisoners, have simply said, « of course we will apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions to any prisoners we are holding » — and then gone on to explain that government lawyers were considering how to apply those principles in this unprecedented situation. Indeed, this is precisely what the U.S. government ended up doing, but by then the damage had been done.
Washington had also alienated Europe through its approach to NATO. Top NATO officials have been stewing ever since the alliance’s offer of help after September 11 was spurned. Although the now-famous invocation of Article V (the mutual self-defense clause) of NATO’s founding treaty was more of a political act than a prescription for joint military operations, the Pentagon’s subsequent, disparaging attitude toward a NATO role in Afghanistan stung Brussels deeply. Nato had long been the United States’ favorite multilateral forum; but Washington’s recent « don’t call us, we’ll call you » message led many Europeans to conclude that even NATO was no longer valued by the Americans.
A final reason for the loss of goodwill toward the United States was the White House’s approach to peace in the Middle East. Although most of the world recognizes how difficult stopping Arab-Israeli violence will be, they expect the U.S. government to try. Bush’s across-the-board support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, therefore, and his administration’s lack of high-level engagement in the peace process prior to this summer made it hard for Washington to attract support for its war in Iraq. Blair, at least, understood this problem and pushed Bush hard to commit political capital to getting both the Palestinians and the Israelis to compromise. Although the White House did begin to move in this direction right before the invasion of Iraq began, its effort was too little and too late to repair the damage done by its two years of studied avoidance of this critical issue.
IN THE COURT OF WORLD OPINION
After the diplomatic failure in New York, it became fashionable to ask why the United States should have had to try to win support in the first place from African countries such as Angola, Cameroon, or Guinea, or Latin American nations such as Chile and Mexico. Many wondered why these smaller countries should play such an important role in deciding whether international action is legitimate or not.
The truth, however, is that the UN system worked. The nonpermanent council members took positions that did, in fact, reflect the views of their regional groups. The three African countries, for example, accurately represented Africa’s overwhelming opposition to the war. So did Mexico and Chile for Latin America. The Europeans on the council also acted in accordance with the views of most of their neighbors. Bulgaria represented the sense of solidarity with the United States felt by central and eastern European countries and their opposition to Saddam. And the split between France and Germany on one side and Spain and the United Kingdom on the other fairly represented the split among governments in Western Europe. The lack of support in the council for the American and British position, therefore, was not a systemic failure but a reflection of international reality.
That China and the countries of the Middle East and Africa would oppose the war in Iraq could have been predicted. The real surprise was that the world’s democracies did not see the importance of upholding UN disarmament demands or ending the misery of the Iraqi people. One explanation is that Bush’s emphasis on personal diplomacy between leaders was not enough to win him support in democratic countries, where governments cannot simply act in complete defiance of public opinion. The United States should have deployed public diplomacy to help fill this gap, but the Bush administration’s efforts on this front were lackluster. True, Powell made an impressive presentation on the evils of Saddam’s regime to the Security Council in New York, but that performance was a one-off, not part of a campaign. Moreover, Powell did not provide an irrefutable case. He cited communications intercepts that suggested Iraq was hiding something and was afraid of what the UN inspectors might find. But what exactly that « something » was could only be speculated about, not identified with certainty. This is not to diminish Powell’s efforts or Blair’s, since both men were genuinely convinced that WMD existed in Iraq. Uncertainty is inevitable in intelligence work when investigating closed societies. But in the absence of diplomatic backing and trust from other countries, the United States needed proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. Powell’s case was strong, but not strong enough.
As mentioned above, another problem was the shifting rationales for war. The evolution of the administration’s arguments — from the threat of WMD, to the link to al Qaeda, to the Wilsonian claims about human rights abuses and democracy in the Middle East — convinced many that the American president was determined to invade no matter what. Of all of these claims, the Wilsonian argument especially might have been effective had it been argued consistently from the beginning.
The lack of coordination between the State and Defense Departments was a further problem. American diplomats emphasized the wmd argument because that allowed war to be justified in terms of Iraqi violations of mandatory UN resolutions. Meanwhile, Defense Department officials too often played up the al Qaeda link, which did not resonate anywhere outside the United States.
In fact, Rumsfeld’s frequent public appearances harmed rather than helped his country’s case in the court of world opinion. His blunt language may have won him a few laughs in domestic settings, but his every gaffe and insult was greeted with disgust throughout Europe. Public diplomacy is supposed to persuade, not infuriate. German officials still cannot forgive Rumsfeld’s rhetorical lumping together of Germany with countries such as Cuba on the grounds that all refused to support the war. Overcoming Germany’s postwar pacifism would not have been easy in the best of circumstances, but challenging Germany’s core democratic values by comparing it to dictatorships only caused its diplomats to dig in their heels.
Rumsfeld’s reputed disdain for NATO, the UN, and any force other than the American military rendered him particularly unsuitable to pushing Washington’s case in Europe. Yet, to the dismay of many American and British officials alike, he persisted throughout the crisis in accepting interview requests and maintaining the highest possible profile. The most candid quote of the whole failed diplomatic effort came from Spain’s normally reticent prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, a crucial Bush ally, who broke precedent by complaining that in order to build a coalition, « we need a lot of Powell and not much of Rumsfeld. »
Even Rumsfeld, however, cannot be blamed for the diplomatic disaster in Turkey, where parliament voted on March 1 to block the deployment of U.S. troops and thereby prevented them from opening a northern front against Saddam. Fault for that debacle lies with the whole Bush administration. Despite their professed admiration for Turkish democracy, American diplomats were just not prepared to deal with the inexperienced and rowdy Turkish legislature. Moreover, almost nothing was done to try and turn around the Turkish public, which staunchly opposed the war. Instead, the Turkish press ran frequent reports of bullying by and insults from U.S. officials, as well as their attempts to bluff Turkey with phony deadlines. At the beginning of the crisis, Wolfowitz boasted that Turkish support for the deployment of American troops was « assured. » But when things began to get dicey, rather than insisting that Powell travel to Ankara to persuade key Turkish legislators one by one, both the Pentagon and the State Department relied on the Turkish military to assure a victory. Given that the measure ultimately lost by a mere handful of votes, it seems obvious that providing some personal care and attention would have made the difference. But the Bush administration failed to do this. The subsequent Turkish vote not only undercut U.S. military operations, but also emboldened smaller countries to stand up to U.S. pressure on the Security Council.
American diplomats have since lamented the fact that no serious public diplomacy strategy existed to persuade key foreign publics or at least reduce opposition. It is hard to overstate how important this failure was. Crucial votes were lost in democratic countries such as Chile and Mexico. No matter how close their personal ties to Bush were, Presidents Ricardo Lagos and Vicente Fox simply could not sell a matter of war and peace to their constituents by saying that they did not want to upset the White House or risk trade retaliation. Similarly, had public opinion not been so overwhelmingly antiwar in France and throughout Europe, it seems fair to assume that even Chirac’s opposition would not have been so rigid.
The problem, in sum, was that the United States did not approach its prewar diplomacy with a coherent and comprehensive strategy. Although the use of decisive and overwhelming military force may have been his signature at the Pentagon, Powell did not convince the Bush administration to adopt a similar approach to diplomacy. Perhaps that was because Cheney and Rumsfeld would not support such a strategy. Or perhaps the administration as a whole just did not think securing international legitimacy for the war was particularly important. Whether the reason was incompetence or ideology, however, Washington’s failure to maintain diplomatic consistency on its justification for war, to synchronize force and diplomacy, to plan for partial compliance by Iraq, to lay the groundwork for a second resolution, and to win over international opinion constituted a diplomatic defeat of the highest order for American foreign policy.
Many in the Bush administration apparently view the diplomatic failure as a minor setback and assume that the military victory is all that will be remembered. And to a certain extent, such officials are right. The United States did send a powerful message to dictators and supporters of terrorism, and the Iraqi people were liberated from tyranny. Stability in the region has improved now that its most pernicious government has been eliminated. If some form of representative government eventually takes charge in Baghdad, democratic values may finally start to spread through the Middle East, the one region of the world from which they have remained conspicuously absent until now.
Nonetheless, all of these worthy goals could and should have been achieved with international support. Americans should be worried that so many around the world hoped that they would fail in Iraq, that Saddam would put up greater resistance, killing more U.S. soldiers and dragging out the conflict. Some of the United States’ moral authority has also been lost, along with its cherished reputation as a superpower reluctant to use military might.
The most concrete consequences of Washington’s failure will be felt the next time a dangerous regime starts developing WMD. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons has become the United States’ top national security priority. Winning that battle will require more than just American resolve and military power, however; it will require cooperation from countries around the world. Unfortunately, the diplomatic debacle over Iraq has harmed the international system that monitors, controls, and responds to wmd threats; the whole concept of coercive disarmament has been discredited. Even the Bush administration has now recognized that dealing with North Korea and Iran requires the UN system. But what will happen the next time coercive disarmament is attempted by the UN? Washington’s recent attacks on the UN inspectors’ efficacy will make it harder to rely on their judgments in the future.
Even more worrisome is how the failure to actually find WMD in Iraq is playing out. By basing the decision for war on American intelligence and threat assessments, rather than the collective will of the UN, the United States placed its credibility on the line. Unfortunately, to justify early action, Washington appears to have exaggerated the near-term threat. Ironically, most of the underlying information that led most intelligence agencies to conclude Iraq had and was hiding chemical and biological weapons originally came from UN inspectors. That information alone would have been sufficient to justify military action, although perhaps not as quickly as the Bush administration wanted. Thus U.S. officials decided to play up the alleged imminent threat. The most egregious example of this was Cheney’s argument that Iraq had « reconstituted nuclear weapons. » The United States is still paying the price for those false claims.
The administration should have focused attention on Iraqi noncompliance, not U.S. intelligence. No country doubted that Iraq was failing to cooperate with the UN inspectors. Had war been launched later — after Blix had concluded and a majority of the Security Council had accepted that Iraq was never going to disarm fully — the search for WMD would never have become the kind of international spectacle it has. A war with greater legitimacy would have kept the spotlight on Iraq, not the United States.
Tragically, the truth about Saddam’s WMD may never be known. Apparently, little effort was made to secure and protect potential Iraqi WMD sites. It remains a mystery why the Pentagon reportedly did not make securing such sites one of its highest wartime priorities, especially given that materials looted and stolen may now be sold to criminal groups or terrorist organizations.
In the future, stopping wmd proliferation will require the United States to consider interdicting supplies on the high seas or possibly attacking nuclear facilities. To gain international support for such measures, Washington will need the international community to trust its information and motives — a proposition now unlikely at best. It is worth recalling the events of 1962, when John F. Kennedy sent former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to brief Charles de Gaulle about the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Acheson offered de Gaulle a full intelligence briefing, but the French president told him it wasn’t necessary, saying he trusted Kennedy never to risk war unless he was sure of his facts. After the diplomatic debacle over Iraq, it is hard to imagine a similar level of trust today.
Already the failure to find WMD is being noted closely in Paris. One key French official acknowledged that if significant quantities of chemical or biological weapons were found, « we would be dead. » But there have not yet been such findings. Still, although Chirac seems to have been right in his assessment of the limited nature of Saddam’s WMD capabilities, France’s interests have suffered too. French officials wince at the memory of de Villepin’s « delusions of grandeur, » which marked France’s dramatic but fruitless opposition to war. As a result of Paris’ position, many Iraqis continue to associate France with the hated Saddam regime, and throughout the Arab world, France is now perceived as impotent for having failed to stop or slow America’s invasion. Furthermore, France’s most cherished international institution — the United Nations — has been weakened and sidelined. And Chirac’s intemperate attack on the United States’ eastern European backers (« They should learn to shut up ») will be remembered in Europe long after Iraq is forgotten. Finally, Chirac also appears to have seriously misjudged how long American anger toward him would last. The political and business elite in Paris now feel that he went too far, and the majority of officials in the French foreign ministry who argued for abstention rather than opposition at the Security Council no doubt feel vindicated.
A war with greater legitimacy would have also minimized the resentment toward American forces in Iraq. With a UN blessing, it would have been much easier to recruit peacekeepers from around the world to serve under American command, helping to share the burden and growing risk of policing chaotic Iraq and building new institutions there. When it comes to occupying a country, there is simply no substitute for a UN stamp of approval. Past peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo show that U.S. troops operating under a UN mandate are far less likely to be regarded as invaders by the local population. Had Washington considered the diplomatic consequences of war as carefully as the military components, much of the collateral damage could have been avoided. The Bush administration deserves credit for mustering the international will to end Iraq’s ten-year defiance of the UN. America’s willingness to exercise its power alone if need be convinced the world last fall to finally confront the Iraqi dictatorship. But exercising power without careful diplomacy has left the United States’ reputation in tatters.
Next time — if there is a next time — the United States must more carefully calibrate force and diplomacy, remembering that these tools are complementary and are best used together. Just as U.S. military planners so often apply the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming and decisive force, so must American diplomatic strategists bring to bear all of the nations’ extensive persuasive powers. Only then will the world believe that America’s cause is just.
Voir par ailleurs :
Même s’il la déplore d’un « hélas » volontiers gaullien, Jacques Chirac s’inscrit désormais explicitement, et pour la première fois, dans la perspective d’une « guerre » – le mot est prononcé – à laquelle il reconnaît, à demi-mot, que la France s’associerait. C’est admettre que, en définitive, la France ne pourrait pas ne pas s’aligner sur les Etats-Unis.
La guerre, « hélas »
Le Monde du 09.01.03
JACQUES CHIRAC avait été étonnamment silencieux sur l’Irak lors de la présentation de ses voeux aux Français le 31 décembre. Au point de donner le sentiment que la position équilibrée défendue par la France, non sans succès, tout au long de l’automne atteignait ses limites. Comment, en effet, maintenir que seul le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies pouvait décider de la guerre ou de la paix, sur la base exclusive du rapport des inspecteurs en désarmement, quand les Américains et les Britanniques accumulent au grand jour, aux frontières de l’Irak, les moyens militaires nécessaires à une offensive contre le régime de Saddam Hussein ? Bref, comment continuer à prétendre que la guerre peut être évitée quand tout annonce qu’elle se prépare ?
Mardi 7 janvier, le chef de l’Etat a répondu à cette interrogation en deux temps et trois mouvements. Le matin, devant les principaux chefs militaires français, il a confirmé la perspective d’une guerre avec l’Irak en demandant aux militaires de « se tenir prêts à toutes éventualités » ; évoquant les théâtres d’opération sur lesquels les forces françaises sont déployées, il a ajouté que « d’autres, hélas, pourraient s’ouvrir ». L’après-midi, en revanche, devant les représentants du corps diplomatique, il a réaffirmé que « l’éventuelle décision d’utiliser la force doit être explicite et être prise par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies sur la base d’un rapport motivé des inspecteurs ».
Au-delà du maintien apparent de la posture française – rejet de toute action unilatérale, légitimité exclusive de l’ONU -, le président de la République a apporté trois inflexions significatives.
Primo, même s’il la déplore d’un « hélas » volontiers gaullien, Jacques Chirac s’inscrit désormais explicitement, et pour la première fois, dans la perspective d’une « guerre » – le mot est prononcé – à laquelle il reconnaît, à demi-mot, que la France s’associerait. C’est admettre que, en définitive, la France ne pourrait pas ne pas s’aligner sur les Etats-Unis.
Secundo, il invite les responsables irakiens, s’ils veulent éviter la guerre, à coopérer « activement, par tous les moyens » avec les inspecteurs de l’ONU, alors que tout indique, jusqu’à présent, que ceux-ci n’ont rien trouvé qui justifie les accusations portées par le président américain contre Saddam Hussein. Il serait prématuré de voir dans cette injonction à l’Irak le prétexte dont manque aujourd’hui la communauté internationale pour justifier une intervention militaire. Mais cela pourrait, à terme, y ressembler, au risque de donner le sentiment que les efforts de la France, s’ils retardent la guerre, permettent aussi de lui donner la justification juridique qui fait toujours défaut.
Enfin, en invitant le gouvernement à organiser sur le sujet un débat au Parlement – que l’opposition réclame depuis des semaines et qu’il avait jusqu’à présent écarté -, le chef de l’Etat entend manifestement préparer une opinion, pour l’instant rétive, à l’éventualité d’un conflit. Ce ne sera sans doute pas la bataille la moins délicate pour le chef de l’Etat.
M. Chirac prépare l’opinion à une éventuelle guerre contre l’Irak
« Se tenir prêt à toutes éventualités »
Le Monde du 09.01.03
EN RÉPONSE aux voeux des armées et du corps diplomatique au président de la République, mardi 7 janvier, Jacques Chirac a notamment déclaré :
Un coup d’arrêt a été porté à la dégradation de notre outil militaire et je veillerai à ce que ce signal fort qui vient d’être donné soit respecté pendant toute l’exécution de la loi [de programmation militaire].
Dans l’année qui vient, de nombreux défis, bien sûr, nous attendent. Sur le plan opérationnel, il y a tout lieu de croire que les théâtres d’opérations sur lesquels nos forces sont déployées continueront de nous solliciter.
D’autres, hélas, pourraient s’ouvrir. Se tenir prêt à toutes éventualités est au coeur du métier de soldat que vous avez choisi. En particulier, nous devons être attentifs à la manière dont est appliquée par l’Irak la résolution 1441 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.
Au corps diplomatique
Le désarmement de l’Irak est une obligation pour le Moyen-Orient et pour le monde. C’est un problème de paix et de sécurité collective. Nous devons donc le résoudre collectivement. Le cadre prévu à cet effet est celui des Nations unies. C’est le seul qui soit légitime. L’action internationale ne peut, sous peine d’être discréditée, s’affranchir des principes sur lesquels elle se fonde : le respect du droit, la responsabilité, l’équité, la démocratie. La communauté internationale ne saurait recourir à la guerre qu’en dernière extrémité, une fois que toutes les autres options ont été épuisées. L’éventuelle décision d’utiliser la force doit être explicite, et être prise par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies sur la base d’un rapport motivé des inspecteurs. La France, qui a toujours assumé ses responsabilités, entend garder sa pleine liberté d’appréciation. (…) Le message adressé aux responsables irakiens est clair : une dernière chance leur est proposée de désarmer dans la paix. (…) Ils s’exposeraient sinon à une guerre aux conséquences incalculables pour eux, pour la région et pour le monde. Sur l’ensemble des questions posées par la crise irakienne, j’invite le gouvernement à organiser un nouveau débat au Parlement, qui sera associé naturellement à toutes les étapes de l’évolution de cette crise. J’attache (…) le plus grand prix à ce que, face à de tels enjeux pour notre pays, la nation soit tout entière rassemblée.
Voir par ailleurs:
The documents discuss Osama bin Laden, weapons of mass destruction, al Qaeda and more.
The full documents can be found on the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office Web site: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products-docex.htm.
Note: Document titles were added by ABC News.
« U.S. War Plan Leaked to Iraqis by Russian Ambassador »
Two Iraqi documents from March 2003 — on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion — and addressed to the secretary of Saddam Hussein, describe details of a U.S. plan for war. According to the documents, the plan was disclosed to the Iraqis by the Russian ambassador.
Document written sometime before March 5, 2003
The first document (CMPC-2003-001950) is a handwritten account of a meeting with the Russian ambassador that details his description of the composition, size, location and type of U.S. military forces arrayed in the Gulf and Jordan. The document includes the exact numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, different types of aircraft, missiles, helicopters, aircraft carriers, and other forces, and also includes their exact locations. The ambassador also described the positions of two Special Forces units.
Document dated March 25, 2003
The second document (CMPC-2004-001117) is a typed account, signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Hammam Abdel Khaleq, that states that the Russian ambassador has told the Iraqis that the United States was planning to deploy its force into Iraq from Basra in the South and up the Euphrates, and would avoid entering major cities on the way to Baghdad, which is, in fact what happened. The documents also state « Americans are also planning on taking control of the oil fields in Kirkuk. » The information was obtained by the Russians from « sources at U.S. Central Command in Doha, Qatar, » according to the document.
This document also includes an account of an amusing incident in which several Iraqi Army officers (presumably seeking further elaboration of the U.S. war plans) contacted the Russian Embassy in Baghdad and stated that the ambassador was their source. Needless to say, this caused great embarrassment to the ambassador, and the officers were instructed « not to mention the ambassador again in that context. »
(Editor’s Note: The Russian ambassador in March 2003 was Vladimir Teterenko. Teterenko appears in documents released by the Volker Commission, which investigated the Oil for Food scandal, as receiving allocations of 3 million barrels of oil — worth roughly $1.5 million. )
« Osama bin Laden Contact With Iraq »
A newly released prewar Iraqi document indicates that an official representative of Saddam Hussein’s government met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan on February 19, 1995, after receiving approval from Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden asked that Iraq broadcast the lectures of Suleiman al Ouda, a radical Saudi preacher, and suggested « carrying out joint operations against foreign forces » in Saudi Arabia. According to the document, Saddam’s presidency was informed of the details of the meeting on March 4, 1995, and Saddam agreed to dedicate a program for them on the radio. The document states that further « development of the relationship and cooperation between the two parties to be left according to what’s open [in the future] based on dialogue and agreement on other ways of cooperation. » The Sudanese were informed about the agreement to dedicate the program on the radio.
The report then states that « Saudi opposition figure » bin Laden had to leave Sudan in July 1996 after it was accused of harboring terrorists. It says information indicated he was in Afghanistan. « The relationship with him is still through the Sudanese. We’re currently working on activating this relationship through a new channel in light of his current location, » it states.
(Editor’s Note: This document is handwritten and has no official seal. Although contacts between bin Laden and the Iraqis have been reported in the 9/11 Commission report and elsewhere (e.g., the 9/11 report states « Bin Ladn himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995) this document indicates the contacts were approved personally by Saddam Hussein.
It also indicates the discussions were substantive, in particular that bin Laden was proposing an operational relationship, and that the Iraqis were, at a minimum, interested in exploring a potential relationship and prepared to show good faith by broadcasting the speeches of al Ouda, the radical cleric who was also a bin Laden mentor.
The document does not establish that the two parties did in fact enter into an operational relationship. Given that the document claims bin Laden was proposing to the Iraqis that they conduct « joint operations against foreign forces » in Saudi Arabia, it is worth noting that eight months after the meeting — on November 13, 1995 — terrorists attacked Saudi National Guard Headquarters in Riyadh, killing 5 U.S. military advisers. The militants later confessed on Saudi TV to having been trained by Osama bin Laden.)
« Osama bin Laden and the Taliban »
Document dated Sept. 15, 2001
An Iraqi intelligence service document saying that their Afghan informant, who’s only identified by a number, told them that the Afghan consul Ahmed Dahastani claimed the following in front of him:
That OBL and the Taliban are in contact with Iraq and that a group of Taliban and bin Laden group members visited Iraq
That the U.S. has proof the Iraqi government and « bin Laden’s group » agreed to cooperate to attack targets inside America.
That in case the Taliban and bin Laden’s group turn out to be involved in « these destructive operations, » the U.S. may strike Iraq and Afghanistan.
That the Afghan consul heard about the issue of Iraq’s relationship with « bin Laden’s group » while he was in Iran.
At the end, the writer recommends informing « the committee of intentions » about the above-mentioned items. The signature on the document is unclear.
(Editor’s Note: The controversial claim that Osama bin Laden was cooperating with Saddam Hussein is an ongoing matter of intense debate. While the assertions contained in this document clearly support the claim, the sourcing is questionable — i.e., an unnamed Afghan « informant » reporting on a conversation with another Afghan « consul. » The date of the document — four days after 9/11 — is worth noting but without further corroboration, this document is of limited evidentiary value.)
« Election Campaign Laws in France »
Documents dated July-August 1999
Correspondence regarding election campaigns in France. This includes a document from the Iraqi intelligence service classified as « secret, » ordering the translation of important parts of a 1997 report about campaign financing laws in France. It also includes a document from the foreign minister’s office indicating the report was attached. The attached translated report included very detailed information about all the regulations regarding financing of election campaigns in France. Translation was done by someone called Salam Abdul Karim Mohammed.
(Editor’s Note: This is an intriguing document that suggests Saddam Hussein’s regime had a strong interest in the mechanics and legalities of financial contributions to French politicians. Several former French politicians are implicated in receiving oil vouchers from Iraq under the U.N. Oil for Food program.)
« Hiding Docs from the U.N. Team »
Document dated March 23, 1997
A letter from the Iraqi intelligence service to directors and managers advising them to follow certain procedures in case of a search by the U.N. team, including:
Removing correspondence with the atomic energy and military industry departments concerning the prohibited weapons (proposals, research, studies, catalogs, etc.)
Removing prohibited materials and equipment, including documents and catalogs and making sure to clear labs and storages of any traces of chemical or biological materials that were previously used or stored
Doing so through a committee which will decide whether to destroy the documents
Removing files from computers.
The letter also advises them on how they should answer questions by U.N. team members. It says the intelligence service should be informed within one week about the progress made in discarding the documents.
(Editor’s Note: This document is consistent with the Report of the Special Adviser to the Director of Central Intelligence, which described a pattern of deception and concealment on the part of Saddam Hussein’s government toward the U.N. inspectors in the mid to late 1990s. Hussein halted all cooperation with those inspectors and expelled them in October 1998.)
« Al Qaeda Presence in Iraq »
Document dated August 2002
A number of correspondences to check rumors that some members of al Qaeda organization have entered Iraq. Three letters say this information cannot be confirmed. The letter on page seven, however, says that information coming from « a trustworthy source » indicates that subjects who are interested in dealing with al Qaeda are in Iraq and have several passports.
The letter seems to be coming from or going to Trebil, a town on the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Follow up on the presence of those subjects is ordered, as well as a comparison of their pictures with those of Jordanian subjects living in Iraq. (This may be referring to pictures of Abu Musaab al Zarqawi and another man on pages 4-6.) The letter also says tourist areas, including hotels and rented apartments, should be searched.
(Editor’s Note: This document indicates that the Iraqis were aware of and interested in reports that members of al Qaeda were present in Iraq in 2002. The document does not support allegations that Iraq was colluding with al Qaeda.)